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Foreword
The microfinance industry has seen impressivegrowth for longer than a decade yet stillreaches only a small percentage of its poten-
tial market worldwide. How do we reach those still
un-banked? What steps can we take to make micro-
finance available to more people and do so on a last-
ing basis and, as well, provide them with the finan-
cial services they need other than just credit?
Many paths have emerged in response to these
questions, including the downscaling of commercial
banks and the creation of start-up, for-profit micro-
finance institutions. However, one way, which has
proven successful in many cases around the world,
is through the transformation of nongovernmental
microfinance providers into regulated deposit-
taking financial institutions. These transformations
have successfully taken place in Bolivia, Kenya,
Uganda, Mongolia, Peru, and several other coun-
tries. Much has been published on these institu-
tional success stories; however, to date there has not
been a comprehensive guide to help lead nonprofit
microfinance institutions (MFIs) through the trans-
formation process.
What are the key questions an MFI must ask
itself before even considering transformation?
Where does one begin? How much will it be
expected to cost? How will the organization
change? What new challenges emerge when engag-
ing in deposit-taking? What are the legal and regu-
latory requirements? Joanna Ledgerwood and
Victoria White address these key questions, drawing
from the experience of transformation in Uganda,
bringing together the expertise of leaders from
the field, the vast experience with transformation
of the MicroFinance Network, and the valuable
knowledge and resources of the World Bank. We
are pleased to present this guide to help MFIs
navigate through the challenging process of
transformation. 
With the publication of the Microfinance Hand-
book: An Institutional and Financial Perspective by
Joanna Ledgerwood in 1998, the World Bank took
a leading step in providing a comprehensive look at
the world of microfinance, from providing an en-
abling regulatory framework, institutional capacity
building, performance measuring and monitoring,
and product design to effective management of
microfinance institutions. The Handbook has been a
key source of knowledge and a dominant training
resource in microfinance worldwide for the last
xvi | Foreword
eight years. Today, the World Bank continues to
strongly support the development of financial sys-
tems that better serve the poor, within which trans-
formed, regulated MFIs have a central place.
Since its inception in 1993, the MicroFinance
Network1 has provided a forum where the most
advanced microfinance institutions can convene
to engage in high-level discussions that allow them
to learn from each other’s experiences. The Micro-
Finance Network has been at the forefront of
advancing the idea of transformation in microfi-
nance as a way to reach greater scale and ensure
permanence in the industry. From the beginning,
network members shared the idea that financial
principles applied by sound financial institutions
would be the strongest foundation for growth in
microfinance. Permanence in the industry became
possible through the application of these principles–
what we came to call the financial systems approach.
With these guiding principles, many of the leading
providers around the world today are members
of the MicroFinance Network. Transformation has
been one key way to create financial viability and
scale, and to establish permanent sources of funding
for microfinance institutions. The MicroFinance
Network is committed to expanding the possi-
bilities of microfinance, inspired by its pioneer
members.
We believe that nonprofit institutions that trans-
form themselves into regulated microfinance insti-
tutions will be central players in the efforts to scale
up microfinance and address poverty at a global
level. As more nonprofit MFIs around the world
seek to establish greater permanence in their mar-
kets, wish to offer deposits and other important
financial services to their clients, and seek to achieve
greater penetration in their markets, we hope this
guide will serve as a starting point and companion
tool for helping all those involved—practitioners,
policy makers, donors, regulators, investors, and
technical assistance providers—through the process
of transformation. 
Marilou Uy
Director, Financial Sector Operations 
and Policy Department
The World Bank
Maria Otero
Chair, MicroFinance Network (1995–2005)
1 The MicroFinance Network is a global association of institutions committed to improving the quality of life of the
poor through the provision of credit, savings, and other financial services. The members of the network believe in
the establishment of sustainable and profitable institutions that operate on commercial principles and serve large
numbers of clients who are not currently served by traditional financial institutions. The network’s aim is to promote
microfinance institutions that embrace a commercial strategy as a means to achieve social goals in a sustainable way
and to influence the microfinance community and financial system to incorporate these double bottom line values.
(See http://www.mfnetwork.org)
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The difference between transformation by acci-
dent and transformation by a system is like the
difference between lightning and a lamp. Both
give illumination, but one is dangerous and
unreliable, while the other is relatively safe,
directed, available. 
—Ferguson and Naisbitt 1987, p. 85 
Well over a decade ago, Promotion and Develop-
ment of Microenterprises (PRODEM) created the
first regulated financial institution dedicated to
microfinance, BancoSol. This single event changed
the way in which microfinance was viewed, revealing
new possibilities for other microfinance nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) and sparking great
debate within the microfinance community. “Trans-
formation” and “commercialization” are today part
of the microfinance lexicon, reflecting a shift in
the industry’s focus from microfinance as a social
movement to the integration of microfinance into
the formal financial sector. In fact, the financial
systems approach,1 while not embraced by all stake-
holders, is widely viewed as the best way to achieve
the outreach needed to substantially increase access
to financial services for the world’s hundreds of
millions of low-income households. Stemming from
the experience of BancoSol, the financial systems
approach has been demonstrated to facilitate the
creation of sustainable and growing financial
institutions.
Much has been learned since PRODEM first
created BancoSol (box I.1), and numerous NGO
transformations have occurred around the world.
This book draws from these lessons and looks
specifically at the issue of transforming from a
credit-focused microfinance institution (MFI) to a
regulated deposit-taking financial intermediary.
Because of the authors’ familiarity with Uganda and
the passage of the Uganda Micro Finance Deposit-
Taking Institutions (MDI) Act in 2003, the book
frequently draws on transformation experiences in
this East African country. 
Commercialization and
Transformation
The terms commercialization and transformation
are frequently used interchangeably; however,
transformation is only one of the ways an MFI can
commercialize. 
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Box I.1 PRODEM: A Transformation Pioneer
The NGO PRODEM was created in 1986 as a joint
venture between Bolivian business leaders and
ACCION International, a U.S.-based NGO. Its lending
operations grew rapidly and by 1989 the size of
PRODEM’s portfolio began to exceed the available
donor funds. Donor funds that took a year to
acquire were disbursed in three weeks, leaving the
institution with a continual need for new funding.
By year-end 1991, PRODEM was serving over 22,000
active clients with an outstanding loan book of
U.S.$4.5 million. Unable to offer its clients savings
services and restricted from accessing commercial
funds to fund its expansion, PRODEM’s leadership
decided to pursue a commercial bank license. 
PRODEM was well positioned to act as the trans-
formation pilot, not only because of its financial
viability but also because it had board members
with influential commercial contacts who were
willing to put their reputations on the line. At the
time, it was considered potentially politically risky to
promote the concept of commercial microfinance.
On February 2, 1992, BancoSol opened its doors,
becoming the first commercial bank in the world
dedicated exclusively to serving the microenterprise
market.
Today, BancoSol is one of the most successful
banks in Bolivia. Since 1992, BancoSol has served
over 650,000 clients and has strived to balance being
a successful private commercial bank with maintain-
ing a strong social focus. With 14 different products,
the bank provides the most complete range of ser-
vices compared to national competitors. Despite an
increase in nonperforming loans in 2003–04 caused
by a general economic crisis, BancoSol was ranked
the best bank in Bolivia in 2004 by Semanario Nueva
Economia, a leading Bolivian publication specializ-
ing in economic subjects. It has listed BancoSol as
one of the top three financial institutions for the
past eight years as measured by liquidity, solvency,
and capital adequacy. 
In 2000, PRODEM, the original NGO that created
BancoSol, launched a second transformation,
becoming a regulated Private Financial Fund, a legal
form not available when BancoSol was created.
PRODEM FFP has steadily grown and now operates
82 branches across Bolivia, offering both individual
and solidarity group loans for working capital and
investments. In addition, PRODEM FFP offers a wide
range of deposit services, national and international
money transfer services, life insurance products,
foreign exchange services, service payments, payroll
services, and cash advances. 
Widely known for its cutting-edge innovations,
PRODEM FFP has succeeded in consolidating its rural
network with the use of 58 intelligent automated
teller machines (ATMs) that use color-coded touch
screen menus and a walk-through voice system in
Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara, the three main lan-
guages spoken in Bolivia. Clients use intelligent
debit cards with an electronic chip containing the
client’s savings account record, which is updated as
the client deposits or withdraws cash. To safeguard
transactions, the ATM verifies the client’s identity by
means of biometrics. PRODEM FFP has demonstrated
that it is possible to succeed as a regulated entity
with competitive market prices for financial prod-
ucts and services, in urban as well as rural areas.
Sources: Bazoberry 2003; Rhyne 2001; interviews with Eduardo
Bazoberry, CEO, PRODEM FFP; and Kurt Koenigsfest, General
Manager, BancoSol, October 2005.
Commercialization
Commercialization of microfinance generally refers
to the application of market-based principles and to
the “movement out of the heavily donor-dependent
arena of subsidized operations into one in which
microfinance institutions ‘manage on a business
basis’ as part of the regulated financial system”
(Christen and Drake 2002, p. 4). “In [commercial-
ization] lies the potential for truly exponential
growth and ultimately, vastly improved financial
services to the poor. Competition for microenter-
prise clients will improve product design, delivery
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systems, and perhaps even outreach” (Christen
and Drake 2002, p. 19). Commercialization also
includes linking MFIs with commercial sources of
funds, both debt and equity. This “linking” is driv-
en by the belief that massive outreach will only be
achieved when the sector can access truly commer-
cial financial markets. See figure I.1.
An MFI can commercialize in a number of ways.
One is to transform a nonprofit entity into a for-
malized, regulated financial institution that can, if
so licensed, intermediate deposits from the public.
This model is one of the prevailing methods for
commercializing MFIs throughout the world and
is the focus of this book. A second is to create a
commercial MFI from scratch. Many of the MFIs
in Eastern Europe, particularly the microbanks
started by the German firm Internationale Projekt
Consult (IPC) GmbH, were created this way,
bypassing the more common approach of starting
as a nonprofit and then converting into a share
company. A third path to commercialization in
microfinance is for traditional banks to become
involved in microfinance. For example, Sogebank
in Haiti created a subsidiary, Sogesol, to enter the
microfinance market. Operating as a service com-
pany to the bank, Sogesol uses the existing branch
network of the larger bank to conduct its microfi-
nance operations. This model has shown to be
cost-effective, particularly with regard to start-up
costs. The “downscaling” approach also includes
large banks that develop a specialized unit or divi-
sion within the bank to focus on microfinance, as in
the case of the BRI-Unit Desa created within the
larger Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). Finally, MFIs
can merge—for example, XacBank in Mongolia
was created in October 2001 from the merger
of two existing nonbank financial institutions
(box I.2).
Progress toward
commercialization
Increased
cost
recovery
Achievement
of operational
self-sufficiency
Achievement
of financial
self-sufficiency
Utilization of
market-based
sources of funds
Operation as a for-
profit institution
within the formal
financial system
Applying commercial principles Full commercialization
Figure I.1 Path toward Commercialization
Source: Charitonenko 2003.
Box I.2 XacBank: Merger and Transformation
The Golden Fund for Development (X.A.C. Co Ltd.)
was formed in 1998 as a microfinance provider by six
local NGOs, with funding from the United Nations
Development Programme. It was the first licensed
nonbank financial institution (NBFI) in Mongolia.
Goviin Ekhel LLC (GE) was founded by Mercy Corps
with United States Agency for International Devel-
opment and United States Department of Agricul-
ture funding in November 1999 to provide small and
medium enterprise loans in the Gobi region. It trans-
formed into an NBFI in March 2000. 
Operating in different parts of the country and
with different lending technologies (cash flow for
GE and asset based for X.A.C.), the two programs
were the leading NBFIs in their respective markets. In
October 2001, the two institutions merged to create
XacBank. The rationale for merger was compelling—
in addition to gaining access to each other’s branch
networks and products, the combined entity was
able to meet the minimum capital requirement for a
full commercial banking license, which was received
on December 27, 2001.
Source: MIX Market data XacBank 2005; personal communication
with Munhmandah.O, XacBank, January 2006.
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Transformation
Transformation in the microfinance industry gener-
ally refers to the institutional process whereby an
NGO microfinance provider or a microfinance proj-
ect creates or converts into a share-capital company
and becomes licensed as a regulated financial insti-
tution. Transforming from an NGO or project to a
regulated financial institution may involve becoming
licensed to be a deposit-taking institution or only as
a credit institution. Other forms of transformation
include a donor or government project transforming
into a locally managed and registered institution
(but not regulated), either independently or with
international partners as did Microenterprise Devel-
opment Fund-Kamurj in Armenia (box I.3).
For the purposes of this book, transformation is
defined as the process of a credit-focused MFI (either
an NGO or a project) creating or becoming a regu-
lated deposit-taking financial intermediary. An
intermediary is an institution that mobilizes
deposits and then on-lends these deposits to its
borrowing clients. It is important to highlight that
this book focuses on deposit-taking institutions and
thus addresses the two crucial aspects of financial
intermediation:
1. The need for a sound and reasonable regulatory
environment and capable supervision by the
central bank or relevant regulatory authority 
2. The institutional capacity and culture required
to be a true financial intermediary taking
deposits from the public, on-lending these
deposits, and in doing so, complying with regu-
lations and being supervised by a regulatory
body
Regulation and Supervision
The existence of an appropriate and enabling
regulatory and supervisory environment is critical to
the success of MFI transformations. The Consulta-
tive Group to Assist the Poor’s (CGAP’s) 2003
“Microfinance Consensus Guidelines: Guiding
Principles on Regulation and Supervision of Micro-
finance” defines regulation as the “binding rules
governing the conduct of legal entities and indi-
viduals, whether they are adopted by a legislative
body (laws) or an executive body (regulations)” and
supervision as the “external oversight aimed at
determining and enforcing compliance with regula-
tion” (CGAP 2003, p. 6). Simply put, regulations
are a set of rules to govern financial operations
while supervision ensures compliance with those
rules.
As microfinance has continued to grow, financial
regulators have come to realize that most current
policy frameworks need to be adapted to regulate
Box I.3 Transformation in Armenia
The nonprofit organization Microenterprise
Development Fund-Kamurj (“bridge” in
Armenian) provides small loans in support of
microentrepreneurship. The goal of MDF-Kamurj
is to build a bridge to greater financial security
for Armenian families. MDF-Kamurj emerged by
joining the efforts and resources of two microfi-
nance projects created in 1998 by Catholic Relief
Services (with an investment fund of U.S.$190,000)
and Save the Children Federation U.S. (with an
investment fund of U.S.$280,000). These pro-
grams merged operations in September 2000 to
create one professional local institution that
clients could rely on in the long term. The trans-
formation resulted in synergies and economies of
scale, and expanded the geographic outreach
necessary to achieve financial sustainability. By
joining the technical and monetary resources of
the two organizations, consolidating overhead
expenses, and improving economies of scale for
training and capacity development, MDF-Kamurj
is constantly increasing its efficiency and scale
and paving the way for long-term sustainability.
Source: MDF-Kamurj 2005. Web site http://www.mdf-kamurj.am/
aboutus.htm.
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and supervise microfinance activities. They often see
the need to “develop a framework of policy and
eventually to integrate some portion of the microfi-
nance spectrum into the framework of regulated
financial services institutions” (Meagher 2002,
p. 1). De Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz found lack
of appropriate regulation to be a significant barrier
to offering savings services2:
In 2000, the MIX [Microfinance Information
eXchange] Market listed only 25 MFIs offer-
ing savings services. By 2003, the number had
grown to 90. Still, some MFIs do not take
deposits because they cannot meet the regula-
tory requirements to do so, or because appro-
priate regulatory regimes do not exist. A
recent CGAP survey of MFI funding issues
showed almost all financial institutions,
regardless of type and region, believed regula-
tory barriers were, after funding, the greatest
challenge to growth. Much of this concern
focused on lack of suitable deposit regulatory
regimes. (de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz
2004, p. 37)
The larger question is which institutions should
be regulated. It is generally accepted in the microfi-
nance industry that MFIs focused on credit-only
services do not need to be regulated. It is also gen-
erally agreed that regulation should be applied
when institutions begin taking deposits. This
prudential regulation governs the financial sound-
ness of licensed intermediaries to prevent financial-
system instability and losses to small, unsophisti-
cated depositors. Nonprudential regulation focuses
on anything other than protecting depositors’ safety
and the soundness of the financial sector as a whole
(CGAP 2003). These other activities can include,
for example, the formation and operation of micro-
lending institutions; consumer protection; fraud
and financial crimes prevention; credit information
services; limitations on foreign ownership, manage-
ment, and sources of capital; tax and accounting
issues; and interest rate policies (Microfinance
Gateway 2005).
Although there are many different approaches to
regulating microfinance3 the “tiered approach” is
commonly employed by superintendents and cen-
tral banks around the world. The basic premise is
that tiers or “windows” are defined based on the
products and services an institution offers. As an
MFI reaches each threshold, it can offer more
services and may have fewer or more restrictive reg-
ulations. See chapter 2, Regulation and Supervi-
sion: The Policy Framework, for more detailed
discussion. 
Many countries are just now tackling the ques-
tion of when and how to regulate microfinance. For
example, in Kenya, the current challenge faced by
the government is how to manage MFI supervision
and regulation when MFIs in Kenya are registered
under eight different Acts of Parliament. To address
this, Kenya is devising a tiered approach, recogniz-
ing the inappropriateness of the existing banking
legislation for the regulation of specialized activities
of microfinance and the diversity of the institutions
engaged in the sector. Many other countries, par-
ticularly in Latin America, have had laws in place for
many years. No matter how a country chooses to
regulate the microfinance sector, the most impor-
tant consideration after protecting depositors is that
the regulatory framework foster innovation, com-
petition, stability, and growth for MFIs.
Why Transform?
From an institutional perspective, the primary rea-
sons MFIs choose to transform are to offer addi-
tional products and services (particularly savings)
to their clients and to gain access to capital (both
debt and equity), and in so doing, expand their out-
reach. Furthermore, transformation to a regulated
deposit-taking financial intermediary generally
results in an improved governance and ownership
structure.
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Provision of Savings Services 
and Other Products
The ability to offer savings services to clients is a
primary reason MFIs choose to transform. Savings
mobilization can increase the number of clients
served, improve customer satisfaction and reten-
tion, improve loan repayment, stabilize sources of
funds, and improve governance of the MFI. In
most countries, regulatory policies prohibit unreg-
ulated financial institutions from taking deposits
and thus it is necessary to become licensed as a
deposit-taking institution (transform) before
accepting deposits from the public and intermediat-
ing these deposits.4
In addition, savings services represent a critical
component of any household’s financial manage-
ment strategy. In fact, it is often argued that pro-
viding access to savings services is a much more
valuable service to poor people (including those not
able to access credit either because of lack of debt
capacity or poor product offerings by the MFI)
than credit (box I.4). The path out of poverty
lies in building assets, not accumulating debt. In
addition, other services—specialized housing loans,
money transfers, and microinsurance—are greatly
valued by clients and may only be possible through
licensed financial intermediaries.
Access to Capital
The ability to source capital is a fundamental com-
ponent for an institution to grow. An MFI must be
able to meet continual demand for loans by new
and existing clients. Relying on donor funding to
meet capital needs is not sustainable given recent
trends in donor funding and the recent unwilling-
ness of donors in general to permanently fund the
growing needs for loan capital. As donor funding
becomes less available and clients continue
demanding well-designed and delivered products
with improved customer service, it is imperative
that MFIs plan for long-term sustainability and
client retention. This is not to suggest that all NGO
MFIs need to transform, but it does indicate that
over the long term, MFIs need to ensure a path
toward sustainability as donors’ priorities evolve
and funding becomes less available. If NGO MFIs
choose not to become licensed deposit-takers they
will need to continually seek funding sources to
grow their portfolios and inevitably will face limita-
tions in the amount of donor funding and debt they
can access.5 Exceptions may exist for those MFIs
serving special niche markets that donors may be
willing to continue to subsidize, but overall donor
funding is becoming more and more scarce, partic-
ularly for loan capital needs.
According to the Consultative Group to
Assist the Poor (CGAP), the current
combined portfolio of MFIs worldwide is
Box I.4 XacBank: Provision of Savings
Services
The leading driver behind the merger and trans-
formation of X.A.C. Co. Ltd. and GE in Mongolia
was the desire to offer savings products, which
required a banking license. As of May 2005,
XacBank offered seven deposit products for indi-
viduals and legal entities including demand
deposits, time deposits, children’s savings, long-
term savings, and housing deposits. Credit prod-
ucts have been expanded to 15, including micro-
enterprise loans (start-up and growth loans) and
small and medium enterprise loans, leasing prod-
ucts, wholesale loans, mobile lending in villages,
consumer loans, overdrafts, home improvement
loans, employee loans, and mortgages. The bank
also offers domestic and international money
remittances and foreign currency exchange ser-
vices, and has plans to issue the XacBank Master-
Card to existing customers.
XacBank is now one of the largest banks in
Mongolia, with 42,000 borrowing clients and
53,000 savings clients as of June 30, 2005. Its loan
portfolio exceeded U.S.$24 million and its savings
totaled U.S.$20 million.
Source: MIX Market data XacBank 2005; personal communica-
tion with Munhmandah. O, XacBank, January, 2006.
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approximately $U.S.15 billion. Microfinance
is believed to be growing annually between
15 and 30 percent, translating into a demand
of between $2.5 to $5.0 billion for port-
folio capital and requiring $300 million to
$400 million in additional equity each year.
Non-commercial investors, including donors,
bilateral and multilateral financial institutions,
disburse approximately $400 million annually
to the sector. They simply cannot provide the
level of funding necessary to support the
microfinance industry’s demand for capital
funds particularly since much of their support
goes toward regulatory change, information
services, sector associations and other sector
development initiatives. Hence, it comes as
no surprise that a CGAP survey of over 144
MFIs found funding to be the number one
constraint to growth . . . (de Sousa Shields
and Frankiewicz 2004, p. xiv)
Part of an MFI’s desire to transform is to offer
savings services not only as an additional service to
clients, but also to fund a larger volume of loans and
access a stable and potentially cheaper local source
of funds. Access to capital, therefore, includes
accessing client deposits, commercial or concession-
al debt, as well as equity sources. MFIs that have
transformed have been able to access a significantly
broader range of financing sources, thus greatly
improving their ability to rapidly scale up operations
by growing, deepening, and leveraging their equity
bases. See box I.5.
Increased Outreach
The addition of new products and services as well as
increased access to capital leads directly to increased
outreach for transformed MFIs. In honoring their
social mission, many MFIs decide to transform to
extend their services to larger numbers of low-
income clients who do not have access to financial
services. With the ability to offer additional prod-
ucts, as well as being forced to operate efficiently
to satisfy the new stakeholders, including regulators
and shareholders, regulated deposit-taking institu-
tions are generally able to compete better than
unregulated MFIs and are thus able to increase
market share and outreach.
In addition to the numerous other benefits
of transformation that may not be explicitly iden-
tified as reasons to transform, becoming regu-
lated generally results in increased professionalism
and improved governance structures, leading to
more permanent institutions. This benefits all
stakeholders—most important, the clients who
deserve continued access to a range of financial
services that meet their needs.
As mentioned, transformation is not appropriate
for all MFIs. Microfinance NGOs must consider
their own long-term objectives and whether the
economic environment and regulatory framework
in a given country are conducive to transformation.
Transformation requires a tremendous investment
of time and financial resources and the commit-
ment of management and staff (box I.6). This
investment should be carefully measured against the
Box I.5 Strategic Investors—AfriCap
Microfinance Fund
The AfriCap Microfinance Fund’s mission is to
support the commercialization of the microfi-
nance industry by bridging the transition from a
sector traditionally funded by donors to a sce-
nario where the leading MFIs are raising most of
their funds from commercial sources, whether
voluntary savings, wholesale deposits, interbank
liquidity, or private investment capital. AfriCap
invests in only a handful of institutions across
Africa that it thinks have the potential to
develop into demonstration models of successful
commercial microfinance. The fund is designed
to provide more than just capital to its investees,
and expects to play an active, patient gover-
nance role over a reasonable time frame, given
its 10-year life. 
Source: AfriCap 2003.
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benefits. Depending on an MFI’s particular internal
or external constraints, transformation may not be
suitable. In addition to initial transformation costs,
in the short term, operating costs will also increase
as the result of taxation, regulatory requirements,
improved customer service, and so on. Finally, it is
important to consider the regulatory environment
in the country where the MFI is operating before
transforming to a licensed, deposit-taking financial
intermediary.
Global Perspective: Results to Date
Experience with transforming MFIs since the mid-
1990s has been largely positive based on the per-
formance and changes that have taken place in the
majority of transformed institutions. As discussed in
this section, transformed MFIs have indeed
widened their product range to include savings
services, enjoyed increased access to capital, and
increased their outreach. These changes have had a
positive effect on the institutions, which has in turn
significantly benefited their clients. 
Provision of Savings Services 
MFIs that have transformed into deposit-taking
financial intermediaries have fulfilled one of the
main goals of transformation—to offer savings ser-
vices to the public. The majority of transformed
institutions in table I.1 offer numerous savings
products, specialized loans, and other important
financial services. Together the regulated, deposit-
taking MFIs in the MicroFinance Network included
in table I.1 are providing deposit services to over
Box I.6 Transformation from Aga Khan Rural Support Programme to First MicroFinance
Bank of Pakistan 
Transformation of an NGO into a bank is not an easy
task, and requires careful planning. Organizations
looking for transformation must have a clear man-
date in mind before taking the next step. First
MicroFinance Bank of Pakistan (FMFB)’s experience
suggests that transformation becomes easier if the
organization is well prepared. The preparation
phase can take months, if not years, but the out-
come is promising.
The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP)
has been operating an integrated development pro-
gram in the remote northern areas of Pakistan since
1982. FMFB was established as a nonlisted public
limited company under the provisions of AKRSP’s
ordinance (1984) in November 2001 and was
licensed as an MFI in January 2002. The last phase of
the transformation was completed in December
2003 with the settlement of AKRSP’s final portfolio
tranche.
Transformation brings more opportunities for
an MFI for outreach, sustainability, efficiency, and
customer satisfaction. Despite the challenges and
difficulties, positive results of the transformation
experienced by FMFB are 
• Access to low-cost funds
• Enormous growth opportunities
• Wide branch network 
• Increased outreach
• Introduction of a range of new products and
services 
• Widening of income stream
• Better trained staff
• Effective use of information communication
technology 
• Increased transparency
• Better customer service
• Effective portfolio management
• Social mobilization and public awareness
• Opening of new markets
• Increased innovation
• Better organization 
Source: Personal communication with Tejany Hussain, CEO, First
MicroFinance Bank of Pakistan, December 2005.
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Table I.1 Profile of Members of the MicroFinance Network
(Deposit-Taking MFIs), December 2004
Number 
Gross loan of active Number of 
portfolio Savingsa borrowers savers
MFI Country (U.S.$ millions) (U.S.$ millions) (thousands) (thousands)
ASA Bangladesh 201.1 33.6 2,772.7 2,986.6
Banco ADEMI Dominican Republic 72.2 39.2 25.6 48.6
Banco Los Andes Bolivia 113.8 71.2 64.7 53.8
ProCredit
BancoSol Bolivia 108.7 81.2 71.6 61.9
BRAC Bangladesh 243.1 0.5 3,993.5 27.2
BRI Indonesia 1,953.4 3,347.4 3,210.7 31,271.6
CERUDEB Uganda 44.6 77.7 52.7 402.7
EBS Kenya 40.1 57.9 59.3 413.1
Finamerica Colombia 27.8 18.3 24.4 2.3
FMFB–Pakistan Pakistan 3.6 6.0 9.5 18.4
K-Rep Bank Kenya 27.3 6.0 55.4 25.4
Mibanco Peru 128.7 86.1 113.5 53.3
PRODEM FFP Bolivia 86.6 61.0 55.9 119.5
XacBank Mongolia 16.1 12.9 32.0 39.2
TOTAL 3,067.1 3,899.0 10,541.5 35,523.6
Source: MIX Market (http://www.mixmarket.org) and MFI self-reported data; exchange rates from http://www.oanda.com.
a. Represents voluntary deposits.
35 million clients. Aside from the few countries that
allow unregulated MFIs to intermediate deposits,
these services are generally not available to the
clients of unregulated MFIs.
Access to Capital
There is no question that MFIs that have trans-
formed from an NGO or project to a regulated
deposit-taking institution have benefited from
increased access to capital; however, the results have
been somewhat mixed in terms of defining success.
Although 8 of the 14 institutions in table I.1 report
more depositors than borrowers, underscoring the
importance of savings services for clients, the mobi-
lization of savings has not always met the funding
needs of a transformed institution. 
A sample of 67 MIX Market–listed deposit-
taking MFIs with a savings collection history
of more than three years showed that a rela-
tively small average deposit does not necessar-
ily correlate with a low volume of savings.
This observation is true for any size, age or
location of MFI. Several West African
mutuels/caisses and the Equity Building Soci-
ety in Kenya are good examples of how small
savings can be an effective and significant
source of portfolio funding. MFIs in the same
and other markets, however, have experienced
difficulty mobilizing deposits in volumes suf-
ficient to meet portfolio needs. XacBank in
Mongolia, for example, wants to decrease
dependence on large institutional deposits and
collect more small, less expensive passbook
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and current account savers. . . . [However] an
assessment of 15 Latin American credit
unions (Richardson 2003) . . . concludes that
deposits can be an attractive source of funds
if a small number of large deposits cross-
subsidize the administrative costs of many
small savers. (de Sousa-Shields and
Frankiewicz 2004, p. 38)
In addition to funding assets with deposits,
transformation has resulted in increased access to
debt and equity by regulated MFIs. “Estimates
vary, but the bulk of the worldwide microfinance
portfolio is currently funded by deposits (25 to
30 percent), debt (35 to 40 percent) and equity
(30 to 40 percent)” (de Sousa-Shields and
Frankiewicz 2004, p. xiv). On the basis of table I.2,
it would appear, with a couple of exceptions, that
regulated MFIs have somewhat higher levels of
debt and deposits, with equity funding only 10
to 20 percent of assets rather than the estimated
average of 35 to 40 percent. This indicates a fairly
significant ability to increase leverage in trans-
formed MFIs. 
Although some transformed institutions, prima-
rily in Latin America, have successfully tapped pri-
vate capital markets for both debt and equity, to
date most investors in transformed regulated finan-
cial institutions have been social or noncommercial
investors. Regulated MFIs have a distinct advantage
over nonregulated MFIs in accessing capital from
noncommercial funders: 
[N]on-commercial sources of investment
funds now tend to focus on larger and regu-
lated institutions. Investments from publicly
owned international funds, such as the IADB’s
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) or
funding from the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD), for
example, are 88% concentrated in regulated
MFIs, which are the institutions most able
to attract private debt or equity capital. (de
Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz 2004, p. ix)
Table I.2 Funding Structures of Regulated Deposit-Taking Institutions, December 2004
(percent)
Transformation Public Loans from Total Total Debt/
MFI date deposits FIs/bonds Other liabilities equity equity 
BancoSol 1992 60 23 4 87 13 6.41
Banco Los Andes 1995/2005a 52 32 5 89 11 8.30
ProCredit
FIE 1997 38 42 7 88 12 7.11
Mibanco 1998 55 17 4 77 23 3.26
K-Rep Bank 2000 51 5 16 72 28 2.54
PRODEM FFP 2000 57 29 5 92 8 11.60
ACLEDA Bank 2001/2004a 38 29 13 80 20 3.89
Compartamos 2000 n/a 58 2 61 39 1.55
XacBank 2002 50 33 2 85 15 5.50
Source: http://www.themix.org (represents data listed on MIX at December 2005 and includes ranges from 2001 to 2005 data); Superintendency of
Banks and Financial Entities of Bolivia http://www.sbef.gov.bo; ACCION Quarterly Reports; http://www.xacbank.com; ACLEDA Bank Audited Financial
Statements 2004; Compartamos Annual Report 2004
Note: FI  Financial institution. For a more complete breakdown of assets and liabilities of these institutions, please refer to table 6.8 in this book.
Numbers may not be exact because of errors introduced by rounding.
a. First year is transformation to a regulated deposit-taking financial institution; second year is transformation to a commercial bank.
Introduction | xxxv
As of December 2005, a total of 71 investment
funds were listed with the MIX, including 42 that
make equity investments in MFIs. Representing
close to U.S.$500 million in funding allocated to
MFI investments, these funds were engaged in
1,800 active investments in MFIs. However, the
vast majority of these funds come from internation-
al financial institutions, bilateral donors, and indi-
vidual and institutional donors (MIX December
2005).
Part of the reason for the small percentage of
private investments has been the lack of quality in-
formation, on both financial and social perform-
ance, available on MFIs. There also seems to be a
continued lack of understanding regarding impor-
tant issues particular to microfinance. Some
investors are dissuaded by the high interest rates
charged by MFIs, likely because they may not fully
appreciate the rates charged by alternative sources
of finance for the poor—moneylenders—or the
need for MFIs to charge higher interest rates to
cover high operating costs relative to loan sizes.
Other barriers to investment in microfinance
include a lack of knowledge about particular coun-
tries and their financial markets, a lack of sufficient
foreign exchange hedging instruments (for foreign
currency–denominated debt), and inadequate
risk/return profiles. In addition, subsidized donor
funding to profitable MFIs and adverse local regu-
lations can also negatively affect investor decisions.
A key challenge moving forward is to increase
the availability of diversified funding, especially pri-
vate capital (in addition to deposits), to regulated
MFIs. In countries with newly formed regulatory
and supervisory frameworks, local investors are now
able to make investments in different kinds of insti-
tutions and are beginning to appreciate the benefits
of investing locally. Also, with the hope of attract-
ing more investment capital to microfinance, vari-
ous stakeholders, including donors, regulators, and
practitioners, are addressing the need for trans-
parency and quality reporting. In September 2003,
CGAP published “Definitions of Selected Financial
Terms, Ratios, and Adjustments for Microfinance”
(CGAP 2003). The guide, aimed at producing a
standard method for calculating basic financial
ratios, was a result of the efforts of a cross-section
of industry representatives. In addition, the Small
Enterprise and Promotion Network published
Measuring Performance of Microfinance Institu-
tions: A Framework for Reporting, Analysis, and
Monitoring in September 2005 (Bruett 2005). This
guide, developed and agreed to by rating agencies
and donors, looks to standardize financial report-
ing, performance monitoring, and financial adjust-
ments, and includes detailed definitions of financial
terms and explanations of how to construct finan-
cial statements and monitoring reports according to
emerging global standards. Designed to accompany
the guide, an Excel-based tool was also developed
to be used by managers and advisers to track finan-
cial performance in a standardized format for up to
three years. 
In Uganda, all donors supporting microfinance
agreed on a standard performance monitoring tool
to be used by all MFIs for donor and management
reporting (box I.7). In addition, this tool allows the
Association of Microfinance Institutions of Uganda
(AMFIU) to aggregate industry data and provide
peer group comparisons within the industry with-
out divulging any confidential information about
individual MFIs. 
Increased Outreach
Based on the results outlined in table I.3 the num-
ber of loan clients served has clearly increased, and
savings clients have been added by transformed
MFIs. 
These numbers demonstrate a significant
increase in clients served by the transformed MFIs.
Aside from Corposol, which experienced a signifi-
cant financial crisis in 1994, all MFIs in table I.3
have dramatically increased both the number of
borrowers and their portfolios of outstanding loans,
and have also added a significant number of deposit
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Box I.7 Performance Monitoring—Local Initiatives
One example of a local initiative to standardize
information is the Performance Monitoring Tool
(PMT), developed jointly by donors, practitioners,
and other stakeholders in the microfinance industry
in Uganda. All MFIs and all donors active in microfi-
nance in Uganda have agreed to use the PMT and
thus have agreed on standard report formats, defi-
nitions for financial and outreach data, indicators
for analysis, and ratio calculation methods. In addi-
tion, the national microfinance network in Uganda
has developed a performance monitoring database
for aggregating and monitoring all data from the
submitted PMTs to provide investors, donors, gov-
ernment, and other stakeholders an overview of the
outreach in the industry, allowing all stakeholders
to better understand the microfinance landscape in
Uganda and thus better direct their interventions
and investments.
Source: Duval 2003.
Table I.3 Transformation Results: Outreach
Banco Los
Andes Banco K-Rep 
BancoSol Finamerica ProCredit ADEMI Mibanco Bank
ACCION Com-
ADEMI munitaria
Founding NGO PRODEM Corposol Procredito (Dominican del Peru K-Rep
(Country) (Bolivia) (Colombia) (Bolivia) Republic) (Peru) (Kenya)
Date of 2/92 10/93 7/95; 1/05b 1/98 5/98 9/99
transformationa
No. of active 22,743 32,022b 12,662 18,000 32,000 13,201
borrowers of NGO (12/91) (12/93) (7/95) (1/98) (5/98) (12/98)
at transformation
No. of active borrowers 76,904 26,726 72,048 51,045 124,526 55,441
of transformed (5/05) (12/05) (6/05) (3/05) (6/05) (12/04)
institution as of 2005
% increase 238 17 469 184 289 320
Value of outstanding loans 4,500,000 11,000,000c 4,200,000 30,300,000 14,000,000 3,300,000
at transformation ($U.S.) (12/91) (12/93) (7/95) (1/98) (5/98) (12/98)
Value of outstanding 113,321,650 37,400,000 128,470,572 80,848,212 161,192,317 26,743,172
loans as of 2005 ($U.S.) (5/05) (12/05) (6/05) (3/05) (6/05) (12/04)
% increase 2,418 240 2,959 167 1,051 710
No. of depositors 68,051 1,827 64,240 26,502 48,248 16,355
as of 2005 (5/05) (12/05) (6/05) (3/05) (6/05) (12/04)
Value of deposit balances 96,000,000 26,800,000 89,318,034 51,045,000 55,712,479 11,558,293
as of 2005 ($U.S.) (5/05) (12/05) (6/05) (3/05) (6/05) (12/04)
Sources: PRODEM: Drake and Otero 1992; Campion and White 1999; MIX Market 2005; MFI self-reported data.
a. First year is transformation to a regulated deposit-taking financial institution; second year is transformation to a commercial bank.
b. Refers to date of official opening and operation as a regulated financial institution.
c. Reflects aggregate for Corposol.
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accounts. This increase in outreach is undoubtedly
to some extent the result of an increase in products
and services, which, in many cases, can only be
offered by regulated institutions. For example, in
1995 Procredito was offering a micro and small
enterprise loan and a gold pawn loan. Today, Banco
Los Andes ProCredit offers micro and small enter-
prise loans, consumer loans, housing loans, agricul-
ture livestock loans, savings accounts, time deposit
accounts, guarantee slips, national and international
money transfers, and national tax and public ser-
vices collection. Before transformation XacBank
offered two loan products and was unable to offer
savings products. As of June 2005, XacBank was
offering 17 different loan products and seven sav-
ings products to serve a range of client needs. 
Is Transformation a Good Idea?
In addition to facilitating the mobilization of sav-
ings, expanding the funding base, and increasing
the numbers of clients reached, these institutions,
through transformation, have also diversified their
ownership and governance structures, increased the
professionalism of their staff, improved manage-
ment information systems, and improved overall
internal controls. All of these changes, combined
with a strategic shift to focus on customer service
and provide demand-driven services, as well as the
requisite need to satisfy investors and regulators and
increase transparency, have resulted in overall
improved performance and efficiencies that have
benefited their clients. Proponents of the transfor-
mation model would argue that for the most part,
transformed MFIs have met their objectives in
becoming regulated institutions. 
However, despite the increase in the number of
transformed institutions and evidence that regu-
lated institutions are better able to meet client
demand and thus increase outreach, many skeptics
believe that the commercialization of microfinance
will inevitably result in the profit motive replacing
the social mission. This is often referred to as
mission drift. They cite as well the high costs asso-
ciated with transformation and argue that these
funds (often provided by donors) could be better
spent elsewhere.
Mission Drift
Many critics of MFI transformation believe that as
institutions transform into regulated entities and
consequently experience demands for higher
returns from shareholders, they will gravitate
toward offering larger loans to higher income
clients, thus shifting services away from the poor. 
Almost all transformed MFIs have gradually
begun to offer bigger loans to some of their clients
(often new), but generally not at the expense of the
clients at the lowest income level. Instead, many
transformed MFIs have sought to offer a range of
products to a range of clients, often to help offset
the costs of smaller loans extended to the poorest
clients. 
Figure I.2 shows only modest growth rates in
average loan size between 1998 and 2005 for five
transformed MFIs. 
An increase in loan size and in products offered
does not necessarily imply mission drift. As Christen
(2002) points out, this increase could indicate the
natural progression of a loan portfolio, particu-
larly as an MFI seeks to retain its clients and is com-
pelled to offer larger loans to meet demand. This
was precisely why BRAC Bank in Bangladesh has
been offering Micro Enterprise Lending and Assis-
tance loans since 1996 to small enterprise clients
seeking larger loans. Loans range from U.S.$345 to
U.S.$3,448 and support over 20 different business
sectors today.6
Other than using average loan size and average
deposit amount as a proxy for depth of outreach, it
has generally been difficult to rigorously assess
the level of outreach and impact of microfinance
services because of the high cost of developing and
utilizing tools to effectively measure these areas. In
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addition, disagreement remains over what to mea-
sure and how to do it. With more tools available
today and broader acceptance of different
approaches, the industry is making great progress
toward adding social indicators to benchmarking
standards that can measure an institution’s social
performance alongside its financial performance
(See Imp-Act Secretariat 2005 and CGAP n.d.).
Cost of Transformation 
A frequent criticism of transformation is of the costs
involved. While it is true that successful transforma-
tion of an MFI NGO entails a considerable amount
of financial and human resources (as well as signifi-
cant commitment from the board and senior man-
agement), many transformation-related activities
must be viewed as activities that any maturing MFI
looking to professionalize its operations, expand
outreach, and increase transparency must go
through. A detailed look at the costs of transforma-
tion is provided in chapter 3, Planning for Trans-
formation, and chapter 5, Strategic and Business
Planning. In many cases, investments in transfor-
mation costs have for the most part been recovered
as the result of a steady flow of lower-cost funding
and the increased efficiencies achieved from
economies of scale. 
Despite disagreement over the implications of
transforming to regulated institutions and the
positive or negative effect on the reduction of
poverty, there is general agreement within the
microfinance community that offering microfinance
services through regulated institutions is an efficient
and realistic means to make microfinance services
permanently available. This book is intended to
provide the tools needed to help build strong regu-
lated MFIs able to reach more clients with products
and services they demand, most particularly savings
services.
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Figure I.2 Average Loan Size, 1998 to June 2005
Source: MIX Market, self-reported data: XacBank, First MicroFinance Bank Ltd., Banco Los Andes ProCredit, Mibanco,
K-Rep Bank.
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Book Contents
This book draws on the many lessons learned dur-
ing the last decade or so as institutions around the
world have completed the transformation process
and are now operating as regulated deposit-taking
financial institutions. Its objective is to outline key
issues that regulators and practitioners need to un-
derstand and address to develop a well-functioning
core of formalized MFIs intermediating deposits
from the public. 
The book is divided into four parts, followed
by an appendix. Part I—Savings and Regulation:
Principles and Policies contains two chapters. 
• Mobilizing Savings from the Public: 10 Basic
Principles—introduces the key focus of transfor-
mation as defined here, and outlines the basic
principles from the institutional, regulatory, and
macroenvironment perspectives, which are
important for an MFI to begin to mobilize and
intermediate public deposits. 
• Regulation and Supervision: The Policy
Framework—examines the regulatory frame-
work for microfinance, focusing on issues that
need to be addressed to adequately and appro-
priately regulate and supervise deposit-taking
MFIs. This chapter also provides a guideline for
central banks to assist them in developing a
separate tier or law for regulating microfinance
and to establish the capabilities to supervise
microfinance. This chapter will be useful for reg-
ulators and other government bodies involved in
microfinance as well as donors interested in
assisting in the development of an appropriate
regulatory environment. 
Part II—Transforming the Institution: Strategic
Decisions focuses on the institution, specifically the
strategic issues an MFI needs to address during
transformation to a regulated deposit-taking insti-
tution. It begins with the development of a trans-
formation plan for the transforming MFI to meet
the requirements of the regulatory body responsi-
ble for its licensing and supervision and to ensure
institutional capacity. This is followed by chapters
on each of the following strategic issues that must
be considered and decisions that must be made
before and during transformation:
• Marketing and Competitive Positioning—
includes gathering market intelligence, deter-
mining the ideal product mix, and developing
and communicating the brand for the new
institution.
• Strategic and Business Planning—using findings
and decisions that evolve from the development
of the institution’s overall marketing strategy,
provides a guide to developing a strategic busi-
ness plan for internal use and as part of the
license application, and provides a prospectus for
potential investors.
• The Funding Structure—outlines how to deter-
mine and develop an appropriate capital struc-
ture and how to access funding to finance
growth as a regulated institution.
• Ownership and Governance—addresses issues
related to ownership and the need for a sound
governance structure appropriate for a regulated
shareholder institution.
• Legal Transformation—outlines options to
legally transform the NGO or project into a
shareholding company (or other form) and the
various legal issues that need to be addressed
during transformation.
Part III—Transforming the Institution: Opera-
tional Implications continues the focus on the
institution and considers the operational issues a
transforming MFI must address to ensure it has the
institutional capacity to operate as a deposit-taking
institution. Its five chapters cover the following
topics:
• Human Resources Management—outlines how
transformation fundamentally changes the
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human resources requirements of an MFI and
how to meet these new requirements.
• Financial Management—provides an overview of
financial management issues that arise due to
transformation, particularly asset and liability
management and treasury management, and
how to organize the new institution to carry out
these activities.
• Management Information Systems—examines
the numerous issues regarding management
information systems that need to be considered
with transformation and adding savings services
to the institution.
• Internal Control and Audits—reviews the need
to ensure adequate internal controls and audit
processes as a regulated institution.
• Customer Service and Operations—highlights
the increased need for a focus on customer
service and the various changes to operations,
including significant upgrades to the branch
network, required with transformation.
Part IV includes two case studies that provide
practical examples of regulating microfinance
and transforming an NGO to a deposit-taking
institution.
• Creating a Separate Tier: the Micro Finance
Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2003—
summarizes the experience in Uganda of devel-
oping a new law to license and regulate microfi-
nance deposit-taking institutions (MDIs). 
• The Creation of Uganda Microfinance Limited—
provides an overview of the process the Uganda
Microfinance Union went through to transform
from an MFI NGO to a shareholding company,
licensed and regulated to intermediate deposits
from the public.
Finally, appendix 1, Sequencing the Introduc-
tion of Public Savings in Regulated MFIs, provides
15 steps to appropriately sequence the introduction
of voluntary savings mobilization. This appendix
provides a summary of the institutional issues
addressed in the book, and examines how a regu-
lated deposit-taking financial institution introduces
voluntary savings to the public.
Each chapter is written as a stand-alone chap-
ter, that is, it is not necessary to read the book in
order, nor to read every chapter. To make the
book as practical and useful as possible, included at
the end of each chapter in the institutional sections
(Parts II and III) are sample Terms of Reference for
hiring technical assistance. In addition, checklists
providing a summary of the various issues a trans-
forming institution needs to consider as addressed
in each chapter are included. 
Notes
This introduction was written by Kelly Hattel, director of
the MicroFinance Network. She would like to thank
Joanna Ledgerwood, Victoria White, Deborah Burand,
and Isabelle Barrés for providing useful input for this
introduction and Christian Rodriquez of ACCION Inter-
national and Meral Guzel of the MicroFinance Network
for their help in collecting data. She is grateful to Zeus
Yiamouyiannis for his editorial and moral support
throughout the development of the book. Finally, she
would like to thank the MicroFinance Network Steering
Committee for backing the project and the members of
the Network and all microfinance institutions who shared
their experience with great transparency and candor.
1. The financial systems approach as defined in Otero
and Rhyne (1994) applies market-driven principles
used by formal financial institutions to the provision of
financial services to the poor.
2. The Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX)
Market provides detailed information on both sup-
ply (donors and investors) and demand (MFIs) for
institutional funding. The MIX Market strives “to
facilitate exchanges and investment flows, promote
transparency and improve reporting standards in the
microfinance industry” (MIX Market http://www.
mixmarket.org/en/what.is.mix.asp).
3. One of the most comprehensive sources of information
on regulation and supervision of microfinance is pro-
vided in the Microfinance Regulation and Supervision
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Resource Center in the Microfinance Gateway (2005).
The Comparative Database on Microfinance Regula-
tion profiles 50 countries, providing detailed informa-
tion about how different countries approach regulation
and supervision of microfinance.
4. When an MFI is “regulated” it does not always mean
it is “licensed to take deposits.” In India, for example,
a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC) is
regulated, but needs a separate license to mobilize
deposits. The same situation exists in the Russian Fed-
eration with Non-Deposit Credit Organizations.
5. While in many countries becoming a licensed financial
institution is necessary to access commercial sources of
funds (even if the license does not necessarily allow for
intermediation of public deposits), this is not always
the case. Experience in Uganda has shown that com-
mercial banks provide wholesale lending to MFIs
frequently even if the MFI does not have a license,
provided that the MFI is self-sustainable and can
assure the bank of its ability to repay the loan, and
more often than not, qualify under some type of guar-
antee facility. 
6. An increase in average loan size can also indicate that
the original target of the institution was small enter-
prises to begin with and not necessarily the lowest
income sectors of the market. This would differ from
NGOs that enter the microfinance market with the
express intent of reaching the poorest populations. 
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Savings and Regulation
Principles and Policies
Part I

3Mobilizing Savings from the Public
10 Basic Principles
For microcredit organizations that have theleadership, vision, and skills to change theirinstitutions fundamentally, transformation to a
regulated deposit-taking institution can be a route
to viable long-term commercial microfinance—and
to large-scale outreach to the poor. But transform-
ing to a regulated financial intermediary is not
for the vast majority of financial nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) or other microfinance
institutions (MFIs). Even for a strong MFI, the
process of building a large-scale financial intermedi-
ary is considerably more difficult than is generally
realized.
The single most important point that transform-
ing MFIs must understand is that successful mobi-
lization of savings from the public, including from
large numbers of low-income people, changes the
institution (but not its mission) profoundly and
irreversibly. Only financial institutions that are pre-
pared for such change should open public savings
facilities.
Mobilizing and Intermediating
Savings in Developing Countries
This chapter focuses on some basic principles of
collecting and intermediating voluntary savings
from the public in developing countries.1 It has
two main aims. One is to help transforming MFI
owners, boards, donors, managers, and staff mem-
bers understand what to expect when opening
savings facilities for the public. The other is to
inform their decisions about whether collection and
Chapter 1
This chapter was written by Marguerite S. Robinson and is based on a paper, “Mobilizing Savings from the Public:
Basic Principles and Practices” (Robinson 2004). The writing of that paper—aimed at MFIs transforming to regulated
deposit-taking institutions—was supported by the USAID-funded Support for Private Enterprise Expansion and
Development (SPEED) Project in Uganda; Chemonics, the implementing agency for the SPEED Project; and by
Women’s World Banking. The author is grateful to these organizations for their support. She is indebted as well to the
MicroFinance Network for the invitation to contribute to this book, and to Kelly Hattel, Joanna Ledgerwood, and
Victoria White for their varied and valuable contributions to this work. Special thanks to Joanna Ledgerwood for her
careful and very helpful reading and comments on multiple drafts of the chapter.
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intermediation of public savings is the right choice
for their institution.2
The principles discussed below are also relevant
in a wider context. It is crucial that they are under-
stood and used appropriately by regulatory and
supervisory authorities that license MFIs applying
to become regulated financial intermediaries—and
that must also develop the capacity to supervise
such institutions. These basic principles are also
important for financial institutions that are already
intermediaries, but that want to improve their sav-
ings performance, to increase their scale, or to enter
the microfinance market.3
Experienced MFIs can operate profitably on a
large scale, serving many clients, and financing all or
most of their loan portfolios with deposits.4 But this
requires clear and responsible ownership, high levels
of skilled and knowledgeable governance and man-
agement, an organizational structure appropriate for
commercial microfinance, and a corporate culture
of transparency and accountability. It also requires
extensive knowledge of the microfinance market,
expertise in financial intermediation among branches
that may be located far apart, and experience in suit-
able investment strategies for excess liquidity.
However, most NGOs (and other MFIs) were
not founded, and have not operated, as large-scale
commercial financial intermediaries. Even those
that have a strong record in providing credit and
other services to the poor may have board members
and managers who do not have the skills necessary
for overseeing and managing large-scale growth in
financial intermediaries. And MFIs that are consid-
ering or planning a transition to a regulated finan-
cial intermediary may not understand sufficiently
the ways in which public savings mobilization will
affect their newly regulated institutions.
Transforming MFIs typically have much to do to
meet the licensing requirements of their regulatory
authorities, and often the tendency is to put learn-
ing about voluntary savings on the back burner.
Still, such institutions often expect to open savings
services to the public shortly after being licensed as
a financial intermediary. But learning to provide
savings facilities to the public—including managing
crucial organizational changes; recruiting experi-
enced and financially skilled managers and staff, and
training both old and new staff; upgrading infor-
mation technology, reporting, accounting, treasury
management, internal controls, security, and others;
and designing, costing, pricing, and pilot testing
new products and services—takes considerably
more time and skill than is usually anticipated.
Thus, the most important first step for an MFI
considering transformation to a regulated deposit-
taking MFI is to acquire a full understanding of the
basic principles that underlie successful voluntary
savings mobilization from the public—including
large numbers of low-income savers. In this con-
text, analysis of the institution’s capability and
resources for mobilizing savings from the public
must be undertaken and an informed decision made
as to whether the institution should take this route.
MFIs that then decide to undertake the challenges
involved in large-scale commercial microfinance
should keep the basic principles firmly in mind as
they move forward.
Ten Basic Principles for MFIs that
Collect Savings from the Public 
Underlying the performance of successful micro-
finance intermediaries are some basic tenets. Ten of
the most essential are discussed here. These princi-
ples are especially important for microcredit institu-
tions transforming to regulated financial intermedi-
aries, because such institutions tend to have little
prior experience with either public savings or finan-
cial intermediation.
Principle 1. Poor people in developing
countries save. The job of the MFI is not to
teach them to save, but to learn their needs
and design and deliver products and services
that meet their demand.
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Developing countries show considerable similarity
in the ways poor people save in the informal sector,
in the reasons they save, and in the ways they match
the types of savings with the particular purposes for
which they save. Evidence from a wide range of
countries, cultures, and economies shows that
economically active poor savers want from their
financial institutions basically the same things as
most readers of this chapter (and its author)
demand from theirs. Low-income savers—whether
in India or Mexico, Uganda or Vietnam, Bolivia or
Indonesia—generally want security, convenience,
liquidity, confidentiality, a choice of products
appropriate for their needs, helpful and friendly
service, returns, and potential access to loans.5 And
they want their financial savings to be a legally rec-
ognized asset—often the only one they have. These
demands form a package—they are not a menu
from which the MFI can choose. But MFIs that can
deliver this package effectively can mobilize massive
amounts of savings, and if they price their products
right and operate efficiently, they can do so
profitably.
How does an MFI learn to do this? Those that
want to mobilize savings from low-income people
must first understand in what ways and for what
reasons poor people save—and what savers like
and dislike about each savings method used. The
institution can then design and deliver financial
products that will maintain those aspects of their
present savings methods that the savers like (for
example, liquidity), and improve on those that
they dislike (such as lack of security). Then the
MFI can develop products and services that meet
the needs of poor people better than they can
do by themselves. If the institution is successful in
this effort, it is likely to draw large numbers of
savers.
Transforming MFIs often ask, “How can we train
our clients to save?” The answer is, don’t train the
clients to save. Instead train your managers and
staff—first to learn what the clients’ demands are,
and then to provide for them.
Principle 2. For credit, the MFI must trust the
client. But for savings, it is the client who must
trust the MFI.
Regulated MFIs that mobilize voluntary savings
from the public must be—and must be perceived
as—trustworthy, secure, stable, and receptive to the
needs of their clients. Informal methods of savings
do not provide the complete savings package
discussed above. Savings held informally may be
secure, but without returns; or returns may be pro-
vided, but not liquidity; or savings may be conve-
niently accessed, but risky. Yet regulated MFIs that
provide clients with the complete package can, and
have, attained wide outreach profitably. 
However, being regulated and considered secure
are necessary, but not sufficient, to attract most
savers. Clients who are borrowers will often travel
long distances and wait in long lines for matters
connected with their loans (unless the MFI operates
in a competitive environment where better service is
available). But savers will generally not accept sub-
stantial transaction costs, including the opportunity
cost of their time, to make use of savings facilities.
Convenience of location and opening hours; a
choice of several appropriate savings products and
services that can be customized for each saver’s
needs; and well-trained and helpful staff are essen-
tial to attract and keep savers. And when introduc-
ing savings products, public relations becomes
important—because potential savers need to know
about the institution and why they should put their
trust in it.
Savers who come to MFIs may be poor and illit-
erate, but they are typically perceptive and rational.
If they are not treated with respect and served effi-
ciently, they will return to saving in animals or in
gold or they will put their cash back under the bed
or beneath the floor. Or if the opportunity exists,
they will move their savings to another institution.
They will tell their family, friends, and neighbors
about their experiences with the MFI they left. And
the word will spread.
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MFIs accustomed to the idea that the institu-
tion selects its customers (borrowers) often find it
difficult to make the adjustments in management,
attitude, training, products, and services that are
required when an MFI becomes a financial inter-
mediary providing savings services to the public.
Transforming MFIs, and their newly created
financial intermediaries, must ensure that this
message—for savings, it is the client who selects the
institution—is understood and internalized through-
out the MFI, from the board members to the security
guards.
Principle 3. Certain basic preconditions
are needed for mobilizing voluntary savings
from the public. 
MFIs with owners, board members, and managers
who are interested in having their institutions
become regulated, and who understand and agree
with these first two principles, must consider next
the preconditions for successful operation of a
financial intermediary with large numbers of low-
income clients among its customers. Five main con-
ditions need to be met before a financial institution
begins—and before it should be allowed by the reg-
ulatory authorities to begin—the mobilization of
public savings. The first three, however, are usually
beyond the control of the institution. But in some
cases, MFIs with knowledgeable and powerful own-
ers and boards have been able to work with their
central banks to develop appropriate regulations
and supervision for the transformed MFIs (points b
and c below).
a. The political economy: Mobilizing voluntary
public savings, especially at the early stages,
requires at least a moderately enabling macro-
economy and some degree of political stability.
Especially in difficult environments, careful judg-
ment based on knowledge of the local political
economy is important for institutions applying
for a license to collect and intermediate public
savings—and also for the regulatory authorities
who will decide on the application. In this con-
text it is also important to recognize that large-
scale and competitive mobilization of voluntary
public savings, including accounts held by many
low-income savers, is unlikely to succeed in areas
where donors or governments provide continu-
ing subsidized credit and grant funds for micro-
credit. MFIs that receive such low-cost funds on
a long-term basis are simultaneously provided
with a negative incentive to undertake the work
and costs required to meet demand for savings
services.
b. The policy and regulatory environment: A reason-
ably adequate policy and regulatory environment
is needed—or if not immediately possible, at
least consistent nonenforcement of inappropriate
policies and regulations. MFIs that are licensed
to take savings from the public and to interme-
diate these funds need to operate in an environ-
ment characterized by liberalized interest rates
and regulations appropriate for commercial
microfinance. As discussed in other chapters, the
latter include specifications for minimum capital
requirements, capital adequacy ratios, liquidity
ratios, accounting and audit standards, criteria
for opening branches, reporting requirements,
and the like.
c. Public supervision: For the protection of their
customers, especially savers, MFIs that mobilize
savings from the public must be publicly super-
vised. This generally means that their govern-
ments must be willing to modify their standard
banking supervision practices so that the rules
for microfinance institutions are suitable for their
activities. As in the case of regulations, appropri-
ate supervision does not mean relaxing stan-
dards. It means applying high standards in ways
that are relevant for MFIs. It also means ensur-
ing that the supervisory body has, or develops in
a timely manner, the capacity to monitor effec-
tively the performance of such licensed microfi-
nance providers.
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d. A strong institutional performance record: An
MFI planning to transform to a regulated finan-
cial intermediary must have a strong perform-
ance record and an excellent reputation. It must
have (or be prepared to add) high quality owner-
ship, governance, and management capacity
that is appropriate for a financial intermediary.
The institution should have a demonstrated
track record of high level performance and
transparency. It should have effective and effi-
cient operations, maintain a high rate of loan
recovery, and regularly earn good returns. It
should be financially self-sufficient, with consid-
erable outreach. And it must have a corporate
culture that is open to new ideas, new products,
and new methods. MFIs that do not meet these
criteria should not be licensed to take public
savings.
e. Preparation for far-reaching changes: As dis-
cussed above, before the MFI becomes regulated
and undertakes voluntary savings mobilization,
the institution’s owners, governing board, man-
agers, and staff, as well as the licensing authori-
ties, need to understand that basic changes in the
institution’s organization, leadership, infrastruc-
ture, information, and operations will be
required—many of them in a relatively short
period.
Efforts to mobilize public savings should begin
only when all five preconditions have been met,
although judgment calls may be needed concerning
the state of the economy and the political context.
Some leeway may be required for certain issues of reg-
ulation and supervision. In many countries commer-
cial MFIs and the regulation and supervision of
microfinance are evolving simultaneously. But an
institution that is not prepared for fundamental
changes should not proceed further in planning for
collecting public savings.
Principle 4. Owners, board members, and
managers of regulated MFIs must meet legal
and regulatory requirements for accountability
and qualifications.
A country’s legal framework is important for com-
mercial MFIs and their clients in a variety of ways,
including contract enforcement, legal recognition
of clients’ savings as assets, and the legal responsi-
bility of MFI owners and board members for their
actions and their institutions.
One of the most important principles of the
commercial microfinance industry is that owners,
board members, and managers must be certified
using international standards as “fit and proper,”
and they must be accountable for their decisions
and their conduct. Owners of regulated financial
institutions that serve microfinance clients are
legally responsible for their institutions. Board
members must be competent to oversee a rapidly
growing financial intermediary. Managers must be
well qualified—that is, experienced, financially
skilled, and knowledgeable about the microfinance
market. However, when MFIs become regulated,
they often face special problems in these areas.
For example, unregulated NGOs providing
microcredit frequently do not have clear, account-
able ownership. Yet regulated financial intermedi-
aries are (or should be) required to have qualified
and accountable owners. This transition is often
problematic, and changes in ownership can be
prolonged and difficult.6
A related problem concerns the governance of
the newly regulated institutions. MFIs created
by NGOs sometimes appoint members of the
NGOs’ boards to sit on the boards of the regulated
deposit-taking institutions. Some may be eminently
suitable, but others may not be appropriate. Thus,
some appointees to the new board may be people
with considerable dedication and long-standing
commitment to helping the poor and advancing
microcredit, but their backgrounds are often in the
social services or other nonfinancial professions.
They are frequently not competent to oversee com-
plex financial intermediaries serving a wide range of
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clients. Establishing appropriate governance can be
challenging, and the problems may be exacerbated
by conflicts of interest among owners and board
members.
Other problems that can arise during the trans-
formation process concern management. Managers
and staff of the parent NGO may be appointed to
the new institution in positions for which they are
unqualified. Managers of excellent NGOs, even
those who initiated their institution’s transforma-
tion process, are often not the right choices to
manage the financial intermediaries that emerge
from the transition. The skill sets required are dif-
ferent in many respects. Relatively few MFI
managers have the financial skills and managerial
experience needed to take responsibility for a fast-
growing, regulated financial intermediary.7
When an MFI transforms to a regulated MFI and
begins to mobilize voluntary savings from the pub-
lic, the institution is adding to its operations not
only savings, but also financial intermediation.
Often little attention is given to the latter during the
transformation process, but these two activities typ-
ically require a significant increase in the financial
expertise of the newly regulated institution. How-
ever, finding experienced management with strong
financial skills, coupled with knowledge of the
opportunities and risks of the microfinance market,
can be difficult. Well-qualified managers for microfi-
nance intermediaries are scarce and generally expen-
sive. They need to be actively sought, and their
services suitably budgeted. And careful oversight by
a competent, well-structured board is essential.
The basic management problem in the global
microfinance industry at present is a rapidly increas-
ing demand by regulated (or about-to-be-regulated)
MFIs for financially skilled managers with appropri-
ate administrative experience—and a small pool of
well-qualified MFI managers. Some much needed
efforts are being made by a variety of institutions to
train managers for microfinance, and to attract expe-
rienced financial managers into microfinance, but
there is a long way to go. 
Meanwhile, what happens too often is that well-
meaning but unqualified managers are transferred
to the regulated MFI from the NGO. Such man-
agers often fear the changes that come with regula-
tion. They may fear losing their mission. They may
also fear losing control of the institution (and their
jobs) to outsiders. 
Thorny problems, and sometimes acrimonious
disputes, can arise when difficult questions emerge
during the transition from a credit-based institu-
tion to a financial intermediary. Can appropriate
owners for the new institution be found who are
commercially oriented, but are also “patient
investors”? Who should be appointed to the new
board? How can politicization and corruption be
avoided? Who is to manage the new MFI? Which
NGO staff are to be appointed to the regulated
institution, and which are to remain at the parent
NGO (if it continues)? Are there managers and
staff who should be phased out or retired? If so,
what criteria should be used? What positions in
the new MFI should be filled from outside? Such
issues can result in instability and conflicts that
increase existing tensions and factional disputes.
These, in turn, can lead to operational crises—just
as the MFI begins to introduce savings services to
the public.
In some cases, an independent outside review of
the MFI can be helpful. Usually some of the MFI’s
methods can be adapted to the new circumstances,
and some managers and staff can be retrained. Oth-
ers cannot. What is needed is “the wisdom to know
the difference”—and the leadership to make the
necessary changes.
Nothing is gained by postponing crucial decisions
about ownership, governance, and management.
Regulated MFIs created by NGOs or other microcre-
dit organizations must have qualified owners. Their
board members and managers must be competent,
respectively, to oversee and to operate financial inter-
mediaries. It is especially important that the author-
ities responsible for licensing deposit-taking MFIs
perform careful due diligence in this regard.
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The next two principles (5 and 6) focus on
fundamental institutional changes that must take
place when microcredit organizations transform to
regulated deposit-taking intermediaries. The transi-
tions and reorganizations discussed below need to
be planned and started long before the institution
begins collecting voluntary savings. For a trans-
forming MFI, change is not an option, it is a
prerequisite.
Principle 5. Regulated commercial MFIs must
mobilize savings from the public, and not
from the poor alone.
This principle sounds obvious, but few microcredit
organizations understand how it will affect them if
they become financial intermediaries.8 Can finan-
cial institutions that want to be financially self-
sufficient, and that plan to fund their microcredit
portfolio substantially or entirely from savings,
mobilize voluntary savings from the poor on a large
scale and remain profitable? Not if they confine
their savings services to poor savers.
The transaction costs are too high for a financial
institution to collect savings only in very large num-
bers of small accounts. With the increasing devel-
opment of technology, the costs of servicing small
accounts may decrease in the future. Currently,
however, transaction costs for a $5 savings account
are typically little different from those of a $1,000
account. For this and other reasons discussed
below, commercial MFIs should not collect savings
only from poor people. Providing large numbers of
small savers with the kinds of savings accounts that
they demand (especially the much-in-demand
accounts that permit an unlimited number of
withdrawals) can be labor intensive and therefore
costly—even if no interest is paid below a minimum
balance.
Thus, when MFIs mobilize voluntary savings
from large numbers of poor people, they need to
raise the average account size with larger accounts.
Such MFIs can then mobilize savings profitably and
on a large scale, and they can afford to meet
demand from low-income savers with small
accounts.
However, MFIs that have transformed from
microcredit organizations typically carry with them
considerable baggage that can hinder or prevent
needed changes. This may be in the form of the
MFI’s objectives, products, practices, training, atti-
tudes, and so forth. All may have been crucial for
the success of the earlier credit-based organization,
and some remain essential for the new MFI as well.
But others must be changed, as some assumptions
and practices of the transforming organization
can be counterproductive for a regulated financial
intermediary. For example, when MFIs transform,
they often continue defining their target market
as poor people, mainly women. They may resist—
sometimes through policy, and sometimes in
practice—serving other kinds of clients. For reasons
discussed below, this approach does not work for
regulated financial intermediaries. 
Successful commercial institutions that provide
financial services to many poor clients also collect
savings from middle- and even high-income indi-
viduals, as well as from organizations, businesses,
and institutions that are located near the MFI’s
branch or sub-branch. This permits the MFI to
meet local demand for savings services, to collect
small savings from the poor, to use savings from all
sources to finance an expanding microloan portfo-
lio, and to maintain the institution’s financial self-
sufficiency.
Mobilizing savings from the general public has
another important advantage: staggering with-
drawals. If MFIs target only low-income clients,
withdrawals can be clustered around certain
times—when school fees are due, at religious holi-
days, in preharvest months, and the like. If large
numbers of clients withdraw savings at the same
time, the institution can face a liquidity crisis. But
when savings are collected from a range of clients,
including organizations and institutions, this
problem is unlikely to occur except in special
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circumstances such as hyperinflation, regional
shock, or loss of trust in the MFI. 
Collecting savings from the public, however, car-
ries high transition risks for newly transformed
MFIs. Does the MFI know how to design and deliv-
er products, including loans, for a wider variety of
clients than it has previously served? For example,
• Do staff members know how to approach and
talk with new kinds of clients?
• Can the staff of institutions that have previously
served only poor groups of women explain
clearly the MFIs’ products and services to poten-
tial male clients? To middle-income people? To
organizations, institutions, and businesses oper-
ating in the MFIs’ service areas?
• Savers who are not poor tend to demand indi-
vidual loans (as do many low-income savers as
well). A potential client who wants to save
$1,000 and also to borrow is not likely to agree
to join a solidarity group to obtain the maximum
$100 loan available to new borrowers. Under
such circumstances, the potential client is quite
likely to take his savings elsewhere (even back
home). Before opening its facilities for public
savings, the newly regulated institution needs to
design individual loan products, and must also
make sure that its staff has been well trained and
carefully tested in assessing the creditworthiness
of individual borrowers and their enterprises.
Such an institution should ask itself: Do our loan
officers really know how to evaluate the credit-
worthiness of individual loan applicants? Do they
know how to collect individual loans? Do our
managers understand that some of the institu-
tion’s traditional group loan customers may, for
good reasons, prefer individual loans once these
are offered? Is there a plan for allowing such
shifts, and has the potential cost been analyzed? 
• Have staff members at regional and branch
offices understood and internalized the institu-
tional changes required to mobilize public sav-
ings effectively, and are they implementing these
in practice? This often takes considerable time.
MFIs that succeed as intermediaries are those
that understand they can provide appropriate finan-
cial services to far larger numbers of poor people
than they did previously—if they also serve other
kinds of clients. Their managers understand the
questions asked above, and they work hard to
ensure that their institutions can answer them
positively. Regulatory authorities must also fully
understand these issues and risks, because they affect
both regulation and supervision. For example,
deposit insurance regulations sometimes make a
distinction between MFIs and other financial inter-
mediaries, setting a ceiling for deposit insurance
for MFIs that is too low for them to attract larger
savers. That can create a problem with far-reaching
consequences because MFIs serving poor voluntary
savers need the accounts of larger savers.
In their role as credit providers, some institutions
specialize in microcredit while others serve a wide
range of borrowers, including low- and lower-
middle-income clients. But the options for savings
mobilization are different. Regulated commercial
microfinance institutions that want to meet local
savings demand and plan to fund their microcredit
portfolios with voluntary savings must serve a wide
cross-section of savers. Commercial microfinance thus
refers to profitable financial intermediation between
borrowers with loans up to a cutoff point set by the
institution (which can vary widely) and all locally
available savers.
Principle 6. The numbers of borrowers can be
controlled by the numbers of loans approved,
but voluntary savers cannot be turned away
without widespread and long-term negative
effects. This fundamental difference can result
in rapid, and largely uncontrollable, growth in
the client base when a newly regulated MFI
opens appropriately designed and effectively
delivered deposit facilities to the public—and
is quickly swamped with savers.
In aggregate, financial institutions that offer
voluntary savings services suitable for low- and
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lower-middle-income people have significantly
more savings accounts than outstanding loans.
Many such institutions also have higher volumes of
savings than of loans.
A recent study by the Consultative Group to
Assist the Poor (CGAP) on loans and savings
accounts in more than 3,000 “alternative financial
institutions” (AFIs)—institutions that focus on
clients who are at an income level generally below
that of commercial bank clients—found that “on an
aggregate basis, savings accounts in AFIs outnum-
ber loans by about four to one. This is a world-
wide pattern that does not vary much by region”
(Christen, Rosenberg, and Jayadeva 2004, p. 7).
The study found more than 152 million active loans
(disbursed but not repaid or written off) and more
than 573 million savings accounts in the AFIs cov-
ered. These totals include loans and savings
accounts in MFIs; in cooperatives and credit
unions; and in rural, state, agricultural, develop-
ment, and postal banks.9 While the income levels of
the clients holding these savings accounts and loans
in AFIs are not available, “it is clear that AFIs,
including those not usually thought of as microfi-
nance providers, serve a very large number of poor
or very poor clients” (Christen, Rosenberg, and
Jayadeva 2004, pp. 5–6). There is no doubt that
savings accounts in financial institutions are in high
demand by low- and lower-middle-income people
in developing countries around the world.10
Thus, when an MFI that has been transformed
from a microcredit organization first offers well-
designed and effectively delivered voluntary savings
products and services to the public—especially in
areas with substantial unmet demand for savings
facilities—the institution may quickly find itself with
large numbers of new savers. 
This is the second crucial reason that basic insti-
tutional change occurs in transformed institutions.
Microcredit organizations can control the number
of their clients because they are borrowers, and it is
the MFI that determines how many loans it makes.
But regulated intermediaries cannot limit the
number of savers, except by driving them away—
which would create severe long-term problems for
the MFI, and also defeat its mission. Thus, rapid
client growth is likely to occur in an MFI offering
attractive savings products and services soon
after these are made available to the public. How-
ever, such large and essentially uncontrollable
growth carries substantial financial, operational, and
strategic risks.
Yet considerable evidence demonstrates that
rapid growth in savings has been achieved by lead-
ing MFIs of various types. To give an idea of possi-
ble growth curves, box 1.1 provides examples of
rapid growth in different kinds of institutions. Not
coincidentally, all have excellent management and
all are financially self-sufficient. Their rapid growth
in savings (along with simultaneous growth in lend-
ing and fundamental changes in the organizations)
made enormous demands on the high-quality
management of these institutions. Extraordinary
management skills and commitment were essential
for the achievements of each of these institutions.
Even then it was difficult. Although each still faces
challenges (of different kinds), all these institutions
are now industry leaders.
In preparing to collect and intermediate public
savings, critical questions need to be asked—by
both the transforming institution and its country’s
supervisory authorities—well before the MFI is
licensed to collect and intermediate public savings: 
• Can the institution manage and finance such
rapid—and largely uncontrollable—growth in
savings?
• Can the MFI coordinate and manage the differ-
ent types of organizational, operational, and atti-
tudinal changes that are required for a financial
intermediary?
• Can it manage the many changes in operating
procedures that must be instituted and main-
tained? 
• Can it maintain a high-quality loan portfolio
while investing the substantial human and finan-
cial resources needed to introduce and interme-
diate voluntary savings from the public?
Box 1.1 Examples of Rapid Growth in Voluntary Savings in Different Types 
of Microfinance Providers
Bank Rakyat Indonesia
In 1983 the microbanking system of the then-failing,
state-owned Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) had
U.S.$18 million in savings after a decade of offering vol-
untary savings services in more than 3,600 bank units
located in all the country’s subdistricts (the number of
accounts is not known). With interest on loans set by
the government at 12 percent and interest on savings
at 15 percent per year (and other major mistakes), this
was a savings program that could only fail. In addition,
loan defaults were high and losses large. Then in 1984,
BRI’s loss-making, heavily subsidized microfinance pro-
gram was converted to a commercial microbanking
system. As part of the reforms, BRI totally revamped its
approach to voluntary savings and began pilot projects
in a major new microbanking savings initiative. Ten
years later, by the end of 1993, the microbanking sys-
tem had U.S.$2 billion in 11 million accounts, and by
1996 the microbanking system had U.S.$3 billion in 16
million accounts. The number of savings accounts and
the rupiah value of savings continued to increase sub-
stantially throughout the severe Asian financial and
economic crisis of the late 1990s (see Robinson 2002b).
As of 2005, BRI’s microbanking system had U.S.$3.7 bil-
lion in 32 million savings accounts. The average savings
account balance in 2005 was U.S.$115 (10 percent of
the country’s 2004 per capita gross national income
(GNI) of U.S.$1,140). BRI’s microbanking system, which
has been profitable for more than 20 years, now oper-
ates the largest financially self-sufficient MFI in the
world. It is also the first microfinance intermediary to
offer shares broadly in the world’s main financial mar-
kets. These two points are, of course, directly related.
Equity Bank (Kenya)
In 1994 Equity Building Society (EBS) in Kenya began its
conversion from a failed mortgage lender to a com-
mercial microfinance institution. EBS had mobilized vol-
untary savings between 1984 and 1993, but the institu-
tion had a narrow product focus and its managers and
staff knew little about client demand. Savings stagnat-
ed. Then a new management team took over and
began to revise EBS’s products and services, with the
result that savings grew from U.S.$3 million in 12,000
accounts in 1994 to U.S.$7 million in 41,000 accounts in
1998. By 1999 EBS was ready to begin full-scale, client-
focused savings mobilization methods—learning about
customer needs and designing and delivering products
tailored to client demand.a At the end of 2004 EBS was
licensed as Equity Bank, and by mid-2005, the special
annual edition of Market Intelligence: The Business and
Finance Journal that surveys and rates banks in Kenya,
rated Equity Bank third out of 44 banks. By 2005, Equity
Bank’s savings had jumped to U.S.$121 million in
556,000 accounts—a growth in seven years of nearly
fourteen times the number of accounts and more than
seventeen times the value of savings. The average
account balance was U.S.$217 (47 percent of Kenya’s
2004 per capita GNI of $US460). 
Three Bolivian Regulated Financial Institutions
Three Bolivian NGOs that transformed to regulated
financial institutions (partly to be permitted to mobilize
voluntary deposits from the public) show similar trends,
operating in what is perhaps the world’s most compet-
itive microfinance market. 
Banco Los Andes Procredit, begun in 1992 as the
NGO Caja Los Andes, was licensed in 1995 as Bolivia’s
first regulated nonbank financial institution (Fondo
Financiero Privado, or FFP). In 1996 Caja Los Andes FFP
had U.S.$3 million in savings in about 400 accounts,
with an average balance of U.S.$7,497. However, by
2004, Caja Los Andes FFP had more than U.S.$71 million
in nearly 54,000 savings accounts. The average savings
account balance was U.S.$1,325 (138 percent of
Bolivia’s U.S.$960 GNI per capita in 2004). At the start of
2005, Caja Los Andes FFP was licensed as Banco Los
Andes Procredit.
Fondo Financiero Privado para el Fomento a Inciati-
vas Económicas (FIE), established as an NGO in 1985,
became a regulated nonbank financial institution in
1998. That year FIE had U.S.$7.8 million in 121 savings
accounts, with an average savings balance of
U.S.$64,425. By 2005, it had U.S.$32.7 million in nearly
61,000 savings accounts, with an average savings bal-
ance of U.S.$539 (56 percent of 2004 GNI per capita). 
Fondo Financiero Privado PRODEM, begun in 1986
as an NGO, was licensed as a nonbank financial institu-
tion in 1999. In 2000, PRODEM FFP had U.S.$20 million
in 854 savings accounts, with an average balance of
U.S.$23,937. But by 2004, it had nearly 120,000 savings
accounts, with an average balance of U.S.$511 (53 per-
cent of GNI per capita).
Sources: BRI unit bank monthly reports and other BRI data; Equity
Bank data; The MIX Market 2005; Market Intelligence 2005.
a. MicroSave, a large program funded by the United Kingdom’s
Department for International Development (DFID), CGAP, and others,
was instrumental in helping EBS learn how to understand their clients’
needs and to design appropriate products and services for the micro-
finance market.
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Institutions that do not prepare adequately to
meet these challenges and risks can find themselves
in considerable difficulty. The financial risks include
liquidity and portfolio risks. As noted, serving only
poor savers can raise liquidity risk because with-
drawals tend to cluster at certain times of the year.
An increase in portfolio risk while introducing pub-
lic savings is more common than is often realized.
The process of introducing savings to the public by
newly regulated MFIs is sometimes rushed by the
MFIs’ managers or boards who want to finance
an expanding loan portfolio quickly, and who do
not adequately understand the risks of improperly
sequencing the introduction of savings (see appen-
dix 1, Sequencing the Introduction of Public Sav-
ings in Regulated MFIs). Multiple problems may
occur, requiring correction over a prolonged
period. The result may be an overload on managers
and staff, and as has happened in some institutions,
a rapid decline in loan portfolio quality—which may
then take substantial amounts of time and resources
to overcome. The lesson here cannot be overem-
phasized: do not rush the sequencing in introduc-
ing savings facilities to the public.
Operational risks include human resources risk
(managers and staff who are poorly trained and
insufficiently motivated to undertake their new
responsibilities), management information systems
and other technology risks, and fraud risk. Strategic
risks, generally the most serious for newly trans-
formed institutions, cluster around risks of gover-
nance, management, and reputation.
Voluntary savings mobilization from the public is
not a matter of adding a few products to a micro-
credit organization. If successful, it inevitably and
irreversibly changes the institution, though not its
mission. Those that are not prepared for such changes
should not undertake to collect savings from the pub-
lic. However, MFIs that are willing and able to make
the changes needed to overcome the risks can profitably
attain wide outreach as financial intermediaries
and can serve as models of the industry for other
institutions.
Principle 7. Savings is not only a service and a
source of funds, but also a liability.
MFIs that mobilize savings from the public need
to pay careful attention to protecting savers’ funds
from risks that include internal corruption, theft,
loan defaults, investment losses, and others. MFIs
tend to concentrate on preventing some of these
risks, but may not focus sufficiently on all. Yet they
are vulnerable to all these potential dangers, and
continual vigilance is required for all types of risk.
• Internal fraud: A corporate culture of trans-
parency and accountability is required of MFIs
for many reasons, but it is especially important
for deposit-taking institutions and financial inter-
mediaries. Internal corruption is, of course, a
potential problem for MFIs and also a risk
for savers. Strong effective management, a clear
policy of delegating responsibility and holding
managers and staff accountable for their deci-
sions and actions, appropriate management
information system (MIS), careful internal
supervision and controls, and a promotion
and incentive system designed to encourage
employee loyalty to the MFI can all help to
prevent internal fraud.
• Security measures: Additional and improved secu-
rity measures are needed when an MFI begins
collecting and intermediating public savings
(safes, guards, methods for transporting cash,
and the like).
• Loan defaults: Nonperforming loans can also put
savers’ money at risk. As discussed, it is crucial
for an MFI introducing voluntary savings prod-
ucts and services to maintain high loan portfolio
quality. Before introducing public savings, trans-
formed MFIs must have effective procedures in
place for borrower selection and loan recovery
(including collection of individual loans); accu-
rate, transparent accounting and reporting sys-
tems; and qualified, well-managed internal
supervision and audit.
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• Losses from investments: Recently transformed
MFIs are generally not experienced in investing
excess liquidity generated by public savings. Yet
such investment requires considerable attention
and expertise. This is not yet a widespread risk
among transformed MFIs because most are rela-
tively new and do not have substantial excess
liquidity. It is a significant risk, however, for
some older MFIs—and it soon will be a risk for
an increasing number of transformed MFIs.
• Budgeting for new operating costs: Common
problems in transforming microcredit organiza-
tions include a propensity to plan separately for
savings and loans, and sometimes a refusal to
change traditional loan terms, procedures, and
interest rates. Financial intermediaries must set
(and adjust as necessary) the spread between
interest rates on loans and savings so that it is
sufficient for profitability. This includes having a
spread that is adequate to cover the expenses
incurred in keeping savers’ money safe. New cost
issues may require changes in the institutions’
traditional loan products, as well as improve-
ments in its overall efficiency.
A successful intermediary focuses on all the risks
pertaining to its liabilities—and it allocates suffi-
cient funds and human resources to do so effectively.
It designs, prices, and manages its savings and lend-
ing products together.
Principle 8. New kinds of products and
services, a wider range of clients, and larger-
scale operations require a major effort to
develop new training and incentive programs
for management and staff.
The market served by commercial microfinance
intermediaries—low- and lower-middle-income
borrowers (men and women), and savers from all
income levels—is quite different from that served
by most microcredit organizations, though there is
overlap. The management and staff of transformed
institutions need to learn how to serve a wide range
of clients profitably. The depth and extent of per-
sonnel retraining needed for this change to be made
effectively is rarely appreciated at the start.
Serving a wider market. Most transformed MFIs
beginning public savings mobilization have consid-
erable experience with the microcredit market
but, as noted, they usually have little knowledge of
collecting or intermediating voluntary savings.
Thus, managers and staff need to be trained in
developing savings products and services appropri-
ate for all types of savers. They need training in
how to identify, talk with, and mobilize savings
from larger savers. They usually also need to be
trained in evaluating loan applicants for individual
loans, and in how to collect the loans. Not all
regional and branch managers and staff can carry
out these new activities effectively, even after train-
ing. Some managers may have to be retired, trans-
ferred to a different type of job, or phased out of
the institution.
Product design, pricing, and delivery. Training in
multiple new concepts and activities is needed to
ensure that the managers and staff of a transform-
ing MFI are capable of designing and delivering
appropriate products, and of reporting and remedy-
ing any important design flaws that may be discov-
ered in the course of product delivery. Both class-
room and on-the-job training are needed in market
research, product costing and pricing, and in devel-
oping and implementing new operational proce-
dures and manuals. The training must also focus on
changes in internal communications, backroom
operations, and management information systems;
on accounting, reporting, and audit systems; and
on internal controls, as well as on instituting
and operating new security measures. And training
must include rigorous procedures, including client
feedback, for monitoring and evaluating perform-
ance results.
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Trainers of trainers. Because so much that has to
be learned is unfamiliar to newly transformed
MFIs, those planning to collect savings from the
public must make a special effort to find trainers of
trainers with the right kinds of backgrounds and
skills, and they must then develop their own in-
house trainers. Their previous trainers are often
not competent (and are sometimes unwilling) to
train staff in savings mobilization, financial inter-
mediation, and individual credit products. Some can
learn, but finding suitable trainers can be difficult.
Performance-based incentives. Attractive incentives
for management and staff are essential. For regional
and branch offices, these should be provided to
employees based on the performance of each
branch, sub-branch, or other lowest-level unit that
delivers financial services. Incentives for the staff of
each lowest-level unit that meets its goals should
include both monetary bonuses and institutional
recognition. Many kinds of incentive schemes are
used by MFIs (see Holtman 2003). Some may work
better in some regions and cultures than others. One
that has worked extremely well for 20 years in a very
large institution is the incentive system developed by
Indonesia’s BRI (Robinson 2002b). There the
incentive payment, a percentage of the unit’s profits,
is divided among all managers and staff who work at
a particular unit, in proportion to their salaries. In
addition, everyone who receives an incentive bonus
is formally recognized at a ceremony presided over
by BRI’s highest-level managers. The incentives are
based on the overall performance of each unit, with
various weightings given to increases in the numbers
of loans and savings accounts, growth in amounts of
savings and outstanding loan portfolio, the quality
of the portfolio, and the administrative performance
of the managers and staff. Unit supervisors at branch
level are also given incentives when the units for
which they are responsible meet their goals. Further
incentives are provided to units (and their branch
supervisors) that are judged best in their region and
best in the country.
Newly regulated institutions that want to mobilize
public savings need to learn how to serve a wide range
of clients profitably, and how to make (and collect)
individual loans. New kinds of training are essential,
as are desirable and effective performance-based
incentives. These should not be based on savings
performance alone, however, because portfolio quality
(and other performance indicators) may then
deteriorate.
Principle 9. MFIs starting to collect savings
from the public should offer a few well-
designed savings products and, if they do
not already have one, a general purpose
individual loan product. The increasingly
common view—that a wide choice of products
is important—should be avoided. 
When beginning the mobilization of public savings,
MFIs should offer a few carefully designed savings
products so that savers of all types can customize
their use of these products to meet their own needs.
If the institution does not already provide individ-
ual loans, these should be added. As discussed, the
products should be designed and priced together to
enable both appropriate coverage and institutional
profitability.
A savings account permitting unlimited transac-
tions, a fixed deposit account (which includes
options for relatively short maturities), one or two
other savings products, and facilities for remittances
and transferring funds are sufficient in the early
stages. These basic products must be carefully
designed for use in different combinations for dif-
ferent purposes by all types of savers—poor and
nonpoor, individuals and institutions.
Introducing too many savings products makes
sub-branch and branch management too complex
and expensive, and many products are not necessary
for most savers. What is needed are a few comple-
mentary products, each of which is in high demand.
Savers can then customize their use of these
products to meet their own needs, and they can
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reconfigure the ways in which these accounts are
used as their needs change over time.
For many years, product design was neglected in
microfinance. Now the pendulum has swung, and
product design is too often overemphasized by MFI
managers who sometimes appear to think that the
race is won by the MFI with the largest number of
products. Well-designed savings products are essen-
tial, but they are only one element in a much larger
set of requirements for successful mobilization of
savings from the public—many of which tend to be
overlooked as increasing emphasis has been placed
on designing multiple products. Product delivery is
far more difficult than product design. Convenience
of sub-branch location and opening hours; attitudes
of managers and staff toward clients; MIS, space
use, asset-liability management liquidity, and cash
management; efficiency of operations (for example,
short waiting periods for savers who want to deposit
or withdraw, and an effective service for remit-
tances); quality of administration; quality of the
loan portfolio; trustworthiness of the institution;
and many other factors are crucial to capturing and
maintaining public savings. Getting the structure
and operations of these interlinkages right—which
requires experienced, skilled management at all
levels—is far more important than a wide range of
products. The race is generally won by the MFI that
demonstrates the best delivery of a relatively few
well-chosen products.
As discussed, the newly regulated institution also
needs to offer individual loans, which will be in
demand by some savers—and the MFI must antici-
pate that some of its group borrowers may want to
move to individual loans.
Once the savings program is well established and
the transformed institution has learned to make
and collect individual loans, other products can be
added. If not already offered, remittances and
money transfers should be added, as these are par-
ticularly important for the microfinance market.
Special fixed deposit accounts for education, retire-
ment, housing, and ceremonies and pilgrimages are
popular, as are housing and education loans. Insur-
ance products are also often in high demand, but
these are generally best offered through MFI link-
ages with appropriate insurance companies rather
than by the MFIs directly.
Thus, the key to large-scale savings mobilization
from the public is a few well-designed and effectively
delivered products that clients can use to customize
their savings portfolios in ways that meet their partic-
ular needs. The MFI should not undertake to offer
many products simultaneously, especially in the begin-
ning. Too many products can lead to strains on man-
agement and staff capacity that negatively affect both
the MFI’s performance and its client service. Consis-
tent, high-quality delivery of a few complementary
products in high demand is essential. Others can be
gradually added later, as demand and costs become
better understood.
Principle 10. Mobilizing savings from the
public takes considerable time and proper
sequencing. It should not be rushed to finance
expanding portfolio requirements or for other
reasons.
Most transforming microcredit organizations have
little understanding of how to sequence the intro-
duction of mobilizing savings from the public. Yet
this is a critical process that takes considerable time,
effort, human and financial resources, and patience.
Assuming that the basic preconditions have been
met (Principle 3), the sequence starts with training,
demand research, product design and preliminary
costing, further training, and pilot projects. Next
are revisions to products, delivery systems, organi-
zation, management, and others, as needed; then
come more training, a gradual rollout, trou-
bleshooting, more revisions, more planning, and
finally implementation of market penetration
methods. All are required and in the appropriate
sequence (see box 1.2).
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These steps are discussed in detail in appendix 1
to this book, Sequencing the Introduction of Public
Savings in Regulated MFIs. 
Who Benefits?
No one has ever said that transforming from a
microcredit organization to a regulated financial
institution is simple—or that mobilizing and inter-
mediating savings from the public is easy. These are
not activities for the faint of heart. But is it worth all
Box 1.2 Sequencing the Introduction of Public Savings in Regulated MFIs: 15 Steps
Appropriate sequencing is crucial for MFIs that want
to add savings services for the public to their micro-
credit portfolios. Sequencing errors can cause mul-
tiple, severe, and extended setbacks. Not every
transforming MFI needs to follow every step listed
below (some MFIs may have already carried out
some of the early steps), but careful attention to the
different stages of introducing savings facilities is
essential. 
1. Assess internal capabilities, identify gaps,
recruit new staff members as required, and
retain outside experts as necessary. 
2. Conduct research on demand among potential
savers of different kinds, and on the supply of
savings facilities among competitors. 
3. Plan the pilot project, and design and price
products and services for the pilot. 
4. Determine whether the necessary institutional
capacity is in place to open savings facilities for
the public. Create a checklist and make sure
that the tasks are completed before introducing
savings to the public.
5. Develop criteria for a pilot project site and
select the pilot branch. 
6. Prepare for the first pilot project—a complex
and multifaceted task.
7. Conduct the first pilot project, ensuring that
adequate resources are available (and are used),
both for the pilot and for its close supervision
and regular monitoring. 
8. Assess pilot results and revise products, pricing,
operations, MIS, and so forth, as necessary. If a
second pilot is needed, which is highly likely,
begin the planning and preparations for step 9. 
9. Plan the second pilot, selecting branches locat-
ed in different environments, and train man-
agers and staff of the pilot branches. 
10. Implement and evaluate the second pilot. 
11. Train the trainers of the trainers in preparation
for the rollout phase. 
12. Expand gradually to all branches, training man-
agers and staff in each location. Do not rush this
step! 
13. To penetrate the market, develop a detailed,
systematic approach to identifying potential
savers and mobilizing their savings.
14. Select a pilot area, train managers and staff,
and conduct a pilot in market penetration. Eval-
uate results, revise methods, and gradually roll
out to all the MFI’s branches. 
15. Develop appropriate strategies for investing
excess liquidity. 
Source: Author.
the trouble? What difference does it make if large-
scale financial intermediaries fund loans with savings
collected from the public, and serve low-and lower-
middle-income households? The short answer is
that commercial microfinance makes a difference—
and that it benefits virtually everyone involved.
MFI clients benefit in multiple ways The emerg-
ing microfinance industry increases the options and
the self-confidence of large numbers of clients from
low-income households by making available to
them a set of financial instruments—savings, credit,
money transfers, and other products. These are
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designed and implemented so that clients can select
which products they want and can then customize
product use in ways that meet their own particular
needs. This approach helps such people to expand
and diversify their enterprises and decrease risks, to
store their excess liquidity safely and obtain returns
on their savings, and to hold savings accounts that
are legally recognized assets.
Institutions providing commercial microfinance
services have been able to grow to scale profitably
and to become viable for the long term. Efficiency
increases with growing competition, benefiting
both the financial institutions and their clients.
Governments benefit because they no longer
need to provide credit subsidies or cover the losses
of subsidized credit programs—and because the
resulting savings can be used as needed for direct
poverty alleviation programs for the extremely poor.
Economies benefit from increased production,
from the new resources made available for invest-
ment, and from improvements in equity.
Societies benefit because building inclusive finan-
cial sectors helps to create an enabling environment
for the growth of social and political participation,
and of equity.
Notes
1. In the banking industry a savings account refers to
“money that is deposited in a bank, usually in small
amounts periodically over a long period, and not sub-
ject to withdrawal by check,” while the term deposit
refers to “an amount of funds consisting of cash
and/or checks, draft, coupons, and other cash items
that may be converted into cash upon collection”
(Rosenberg 1993, pp. 107, 308). Because these
distinctions are not always relevant in the microfi-
nance market and because others may be more
important, the terms deposit and savings (when used
to refer to accounts and services) are used synony-
mously here.
2. The term public savings is sometimes used to refer to
publicly owned savings. Here it refers to voluntary
savings mobilized from the public; these savings may
be privately or publicly owned. Many MFIs have both
kinds of deposits. In contrast to voluntary savings,
mandatory savings, required by many microcredit
organizations as a condition of receiving a loan, are,
from the clients’ perspective, largely a cost of the
loan; they are not discussed here. 
3. Such institutions include banks of various kinds, non-
bank financial institutions, credit unions, financial
cooperatives, and others—including some in devel-
oped countries. Microfinance providers of these kinds
can select the aspects of savings mobilization dis-
cussed here that may be most relevant for their par-
ticular needs (which will vary from one institution to
another).
4. The term large-scale microfinance institution, as used
here, is broadly construed to mean an institution that
provides microfinance services on a substantial scale,
and that includes both specialized and nonspecialized
institutions. Large scale means coverage of millions of
clients in large countries. For smaller countries and
for middle- and high-income countries with limited
demand, large scale means outreach to a significant
portion of the microfinance market. Profitability
means covering all costs and risks without subsidy
and returning a profit to the institution.
5. There are sometimes exceptions to this list of savers’
common requirements. One example is interest
payments. Under Islamic (Sharia) law, money is not
considered an earning asset, and gaining income
through fixed interest payments is prohibited. But
risk sharing and profit sharing between the owner of
the capital and its user are encouraged. Thus, when
strictly observed, Islamic banking principles require
adjustments to standard lending and savings prod-
ucts, as well as to other banking instruments. Loans
may be provided, but on a profit-sharing basis. While
a fixed interest rate may not be paid on savings
accounts, financial institutions can invest clients’ sav-
ings in industries that comply with Sharia law—and
can then share the profits from these investments
with the savers.
6. The ownership issue can also be exacerbated by dis-
agreements between donors or international NGOs
that have established microcredit organizations that
plan to transform to regulated MFIs, and the coun-
try’s regulatory authorities. The former may insist on
maintaining 100 percent, or at least majority, owner-
ship while the latter may require more diversified
ownership.
7. This problem is, of course, not unique to microfi-
nance. That people who are successful in envisioning
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and building institutions are often not qualified to
manage these institutions once they have become
large and complex is a fact well known to the business
world.
8. The discussion in principles 5 and 6 is based in part
on Robinson 2002a.
9. The terminology used in the CGAP study differs
somewhat from that used here. In this chapter MFI is
used, for convenience, to refer to all types of microfi-
nance providers, both those that specialize in micro-
finance and those that serve a wider range of clients.
In contrast, the CGAP paper uses MFI in a restricted
sense to mean institutions that specialize in microfi-
nance, while AFI is used there to refer to the broad
category of institutions (including MFIs) that focus
on clients generally below the level served by com-
mercial banks. Both the term MFI as used here and
the term AFI as used in the CGAP study include
institutions such as NGOs, financial cooperatives and
credit unions, rural and agricultural banks, postal
savings banks, and others. 
10. See also Robinson 2001, 2002b; MicroSave 2001d;
Mutesasira 2000; Rutherford 2000, 2001; and
Wright 1999c.
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Regulation and Supervision
The Policy Framework
Financial services to poor people include notonly small working capital loans but also sav-ings services, payment transfers, loans for con-
sumption purposes, housing loans, insurance facili-
ties, and more. Furthermore, microfinance services
can be offered by a wide range of financial institu-
tions ranging from commercial and public banks,
savings and loan cooperatives, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and others. Given the diver-
sity of financial services to the poor and the institu-
tions that offer these services, microfinance should
be seen as an integral part of a country’s financial
system.1
The financial system includes financial institu-
tions, financial markets, and financial instruments,
as well as the legal environment, financial policies,
and institutional frameworks. The integration of
microfinance into a country’s financial system
requires a strategy that takes into account the over-
all policy and legal framework, markets and instru-
ments, as well as the state of development of the
microfinance industry. 
Views regarding the role of financial systems in
poverty alleviation underwent profound changes
during the past decades. Until the 1990s, in many
developing countries, vast amounts of mostly subsi-
dized government funds were channeled to farmers
and small enterprises, often for specific targeted
activities. During the 1990s and more recently, a
new approach has emerged that focuses on the per-
formance of financial institutions in delivering serv-
ices to segments of the population that have little or
no access to finance. This change is substantial, with
some observers referring to it as a “paradigm shift”
in development finance. 
Achieving a conducive policy and legal frame-
work is generally believed to be a better way to pro-
mote microfinance and increase the depth and
breadth of access to financial services (sometimes
referred to as “financial deepening”) than for gov-
ernments and central banks to directly participate in
market transactions. It is further believed that a
favorable policy environment is the prerequisite
for the development of viable and sound financial
Chapter 2
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institutions operating in an efficient financial system
that serves the significant demand of various un-
banked markets. Finally, there is agreement, for the
most part, that the need for regulation and supervi-
sion arises when microfinance institutions (MFIs)
take deposits from the public.
Although there is general consensus on the need
for a favorable policy environment for microfinance,
there is no current consensus on how to create this
environment. In particular, there are competing
views on whether microfinance should be subjected
to specialized legislation and regulations or whether
MFIs should be regulated under the existing frame-
work in a country. “Microfinance services can be
provided under a wide range of institutional
models, which are regulated under laws as different
as a banking law, a cooperative law, a specific micro-
finance law, or any other law defining a lower ‘tier’
of financial institutions” (Staschen 2003, p. 2).
The decision about whether to introduce a new
law needs to consider the context of each country.2
In Uganda, as in many other countries, the decision
was made to develop separate legislation to regulate
microfinance—this, however, is only one possible
approach. It may be easier, in fact, to adapt existing
legislation than to promulgate a new law. Adapting
existing legislation could involve amending the
law or issuing microfinance specific regulations or
both.3 However, both options may suffer from
politicalization and consume a fair amount of time,
or in some cases, may not be possible.
Although this book does not advocate that
microfinance be regulated only under a specialized
law (rather than the existing framework), it does
emphasize the need to understand how microfi-
nance differs from traditional financial services and
how effective regulation and supervision should be
implemented. The underlying assumption is that
institutions conducting “microfinance business,”
whether solely or as part of a larger portfolio, may
be subject to regulatory provisions that differ from
traditional banking regulation. At the very least,
the supervisory body needs to understand and
appreciate the different risk profile of microfinance
institutions.
Thus, this chapter presents an outline to design
a regulatory framework that separates microfinance
services from the provision of other financial servic-
es and as such discusses how to develop or revise
separate legislation for microfinance. Even if stake-
holders determine that separate legislation is not
required, much of this chapter will still be of inter-
est because there is still the need to understand the
unique aspects of MFIs if they are to be licensed
and supervised under existing legislation or under
legislation adapted to microfinance. 
In part due to political pressure caused by often
high but unclear expectations regarding the pur-
pose of microfinance relative to poverty alleviation,
governments often make hasty attempts to pro-
duce a specialized framework in a short time, or to
license MFIs under the existing framework. This
can result in microfinance regulation and supervi-
sion that is ill-suited both to the developmental
stage of the industry as well as to the capacities of
the supervisory authorities charged with oversee-
ing microfinance.
It is imperative, therefore, that the introduction
of microfinance legislation follows a systematic
approach. In this chapter, three areas are presented
that must be addressed to successfully introduce
and implement an adequate regulatory framework
for microfinance: policy; legislation, from both
strategic and practical viewpoints; and supervision.
Key Policy Issues
To begin, a number of key policy issues need to
clarified and agreed upon among major stakehold-
ers, including government, investors, the central
bank and other supervisory bodies, practitioners,
and international donors contributing to the sector.
Whether the process of creating a legal framework
for microfinance should even be initiated depends
on factors including existing government policies,
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the stage of development of the microfinance
sector, and the capacity of regulators and supervi-
sors in the country. Given the differing agendas and
needs of various stakeholders, all must be consid-
ered for the development of a vibrant and sustain-
able microfinance industry, fully integrated into the
country’s financial sector.
The design of a comprehensive microfinance
policy framework requires a consultative process
among all stakeholders. Although this process is
time-consuming and costly, it is indispensable to
developing a consistent and sustainable long-term
approach for the creation of an effective microfi-
nance industry. See boxes 2.1 and 2.2.
The consultative process must recognize and take
into account the motives of the various stakeholders
to regulate the microfinance industry. The most
common motives include the protection of deposi-
tors through the safety and soundness of financial
Box 2.1 Consultative Process in Uganda
In Uganda, discussions on microfinance regulation
started in 1996, long before the specialized microfi-
nance law was finally passed. Initially, there was a
lack of clarity and some confusion regarding key
development issues of the industry. In particular, the
purpose of regulating MFIs was not well understood.
In 1997, the government set up the Microfinance
Forum (MFF) chaired by the Ministry of Finance,
Planning and Economic Development where gov-
ernment, donor, and MFI representatives met to dis-
cuss how to develop an adequate legal framework
to include MFIs as full-fledged sustainable financial
intermediaries. The central bank, as the responsible
supervisory body, took the lead in drafting a policy
paper, which was, after lengthy consultations with
all representatives in the MFF, accepted by all stake-
holders and approved by the cabinet in 1999. This
document provided the overall policy framework for
microfinance in Uganda including the guiding prin-
ciples for the eventual microfinance law (Micro-
Finance Deposit-Taking Institutions Act of 2003),
which was passed by Parliament in November 2002
and came into effect in July 2003.
During this time, the culture of consultation
became deeply rooted among microfinance stake-
holders in Uganda. All important industry issues
(for example, outreach, credit reference systems,
capacity building for MFIs, consumer protection)
were discussed in the MFF or subcommittees on a
monthly or quarterly basis. The culture of consulta-
tion not only contributed to a relatively smooth
passage through the legal process but also signifi-
cantly improved donor coordination and effective-
ness. The culture of consultation was also reflected
in the dialogue between the Bank of Uganda and
MFIs submitting applications for licenses as deposit-
taking institutions. This contrasts with other coun-
tries where only after new legislation has been
introduced do the supervisory body and the practi-
tioners start discussions to better understand each
other’s positions.
Source: Authors.
institutions; the protection of borrowers from high
interest rates; controlling MFIs, that are sometimes
seen as too far outside the formal financial sector;
and facilitating access to additional funding sources.
Depositor Protection: Safety and Soundness
of Financial Institutions
Savings mobilization is attractive to MFIs for two
primary reasons: it can help an institution achieve
long-term viability by providing a stable source of
relatively low-cost funds, and it can drive large-scale
outreach by broadening both the product array and
the client base. At the same time, the mobilization
of savings introduces new risks for the institution,
most of which have implications for the larger
financial system.
Prudential regulation is defined as a set of clear
and fair rules governing the intermediation of
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financial resources between savers and investors.
The purpose is to protect customer deposits from
unsound lending practices. Depositors are general-
ly not in a position to monitor the risks taken by a
financial institution and to take appropriate correc-
tive action (Diamond 1984; Staschen 1999). In
contrast, borrowers put the institution’s money at
risk and consequently do not need protection
from a public agency. Accordingly, prudential regu-
lation is largely aimed at protecting depositors, not
borrowers.
The failure of a financial institution affects not
only the fortunes of its shareholders and depositors
but can affect the stability of the whole financial sec-
tor. Therefore, the regulator’s emphasis is on insti-
tutional sustainability and soundness of financial
operations to ensure the stability of the financial
system. However, the extent to which a failed MFI
can pose a threat to the overall stability of the finan-
cial system depends highly on context. The scale of
microfinance in the economy, the size of the partic-
ular MFI, and the scope of its integration into the
payment system are some of the factors that will
define the degree of systemic risk.
Borrower Protection: High Interest Rates
Another frequent argument for the introduction of
a regulatory framework for MFIs is the need for
consumer protection of borrowers from MFIs. Not
surprisingly, many politicians and other stakehold-
ers feel that poor borrowers should be protected
from inappropriate or unethical lending practices.
Sometimes these concerns focus attention on the
interest rates charged by MFIs. Although it is
certainly true that many MFIs charge high interest
rates, this is often, at least in part, attributable to the
high costs of microfinance operations relative to the
size of the loans that generate revenue to cover
these costs. However, there are also cases where the
high rates of interest charged on loan products by
MFIs are due to operational inefficiencies and in
some cases even to exploitive practices. A question
for policy makers, therefore, is whether to impose
interest rate limits or alternatively to advance an
environment that encourages MFIs (and other
providers of finance to poor borrowers) to be trans-
parent about the pricing, terms, and conditions
of their loan products so borrowers can make
Box 2.2 Steps for Launching a
Consultative Strategy
When launching a consultative process the fol-
lowing steps may be considered:
• Map existing legal and regulatory framework
currently applied to financial service providers.
• Map existing means of delivering and
providers of microfinance services in the
country.
• Articulate broad goals of the legal and regu-
latory environment for microfinance.
• Assess adequacy of existing legal and regula-
tory framework for needs of microfinance
industry and identify legal or regulatory
bottlenecks or limitations, if any, that have
slowed development of the microfinance
industry.
• Determine which government authorities and
bodies are likely to have an interest in this
area.
• Determine which nongovernment authorities
are also likely to have an interest, such as
donors, MFI practitioners, national microfi-
nance associations (if any), downscaling com-
mercial banks, government-related funders of
microfinance, and others.
• Determine which political players and interest
groups will likely seek to participate in the
consultative process.
• Identify champions within and outside the
government who are likely to steer and lead
the consultative process once launched. 
Source: Authors.
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informed choices. Governments can also contribute
to the lowering of interest rates by providing the
physical infrastructure necessary in rural areas
(which would lower costs for the MFIs) and ensur-
ing that legal policies are in place for effective financial
services and that efficient capital markets are devel-
oped. In fact, it is generally accepted that usury laws
do not reduce borrowing costs to clients because
institutions need to earn enough revenue to be sus-
tainable and will make up revenue through charges
other than interest. 
Another question is how best to ensure that bor-
rowers have the opportunity and channels for mak-
ing complaints about abusive and fraudulent prac-
tices.4 Prudential regulation and supervision by the
banking supervisory authority is not the appropriate
way to deal with this problem unless inappropriate
lending practices put the profitability of a deposit-
taking MFIs, and hence the safety of depositors’
money, at risk.5 Channels of communication for
borrowers need to be established separate from the
regulatory framework.
Control of MFIs
In some countries, the introduction of microfinance
regulation is driven by policy makers’ desires to
control NGOs and other semiformal microfinance
providers. An example is provided by Ethiopia,
where the central bank is mandated to license all
MFIs that extend small credit to rural farmers and
urban entrepreneurs (Meagher 2002). Putting aside
the question of whether central banks have the
capacity to supervise all MFIs, a regulatory frame-
work that aims at controlling all semiformal or
informal financial activities may prevent small and
innovative forms of microfinance from emerging
and developing by overburdening MFIs with
exhaustive regulatory requirements such as report-
ing mechanisms, operational standards, and busi-
ness limitations. This may impede the development
of an effective microfinance industry.
Facilitating Access to New Funding Sources
From the practitioners’ perspective, transforming
into a regulated financial institution can increase
access to a broader array of funding sources; how-
ever, the types of funding sources available, such as
deposits or certain debt facilities, may be restricted
by the type of license. Although the focus of this
book is on NGOs that transform into deposit-
taking regulated financial institutions, it is important
to note that not all MFIs are choosing to subject
themselves to bank regulation with the intent to take
deposits from the public. Some, instead, subject
themselves to securities regulation (Lopez 2005) to
facilitate raising funds from the local or internation-
al capital markets, and once this is in place, then
decide to transform into a bank. Such is the case of
Compartamos in Mexico, which initially changed
legal form (from an NGO to a Sociedad Financiera
de Objeto Limitado [SOFOL], which translates to
“a regulated financial institution with limited objec-
tive”) to issue debt securities in the Mexican capital
market, and is now converting to a commercial
bank to mobilize public deposits. In some countries,
MFIs seek to be licensed by a government authority
because this is the only way to access funding
provided by a wholesale refinancing institution (see
the example of Peru’s EDPYME’s in box 2.3), or
because being regulated enhances MFIs’ reputations
as sustainable financial institutions.
Whatever the nature of the legal transformation,
such transformed MFIs typically are able to tap a
broader range of funding sources—savings, bonds,
and equity provided by institutional and private
investors—than their charitable or not-for-profit
counterparts.
To summarize, prudential regulation in all its
forms is often seen as an instrument to achieve
diverse objectives, such as protection of depositors,
reduction of systemic risk, and promotion of safety
and soundness of the financial sector as a whole.
Stakeholders should understand that prudential
regulation can contribute to the development of the
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microfinance industry by enabling strong MFIs to
access commercial funding or to mobilize deposits
(or both), but it cannot address all issues in the
development of the microfinance industry. The best
way to promote the industry is to design a holistic
strategic framework that clearly identifies the indus-
try’s development issues and that assigns responsi-
bilities to the relevant actors in resolving these
issues. This strategy should include key issues such
as capacity-building standards and the relevance of
apex organizations, as well as the effects of interest
rate restrictions and direct political interventions.
The Strategic Approach 
to Regulation
Just as microfinance should be considered within the
overall financial system of a country, microfinance
regulation should be understood as an integral part
of a strategic microfinance policy framework. This
strategic framework will help stakeholders develop a
clear understanding of the different steps to promote
microfinance and will lead to the formulation of a
joint vision for the future of the industry and the
financial sector as a whole.
If the introduction of prudential regulation is
found to be an appropriate measure for the devel-
opment of the microfinance industry, the various
stakeholders should begin by addressing “who” and
“what” should be regulated and then address the
roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders
including the government, regulatory and supervi-
sory bodies, practitioners, and donors.
Who Should Be Regulated? 
Only MFIs that intermediate deposits from the
public are likely to pose risks—either to depositors
or to the systemic health of the financial sector at
Box 2.3 EDPYMEs in Peru
Through an amendment to its banking legislation in
1995, Peru established a framework for NGO MFIs to
convert into regulated financial institutions called
Entidades de Desarrollo para la Pequeña y Microem-
presa (EDPYME) (Development Entities for Small
and Microenterprises). Concurrently, the Peruvian
wholesale refinancing institution Corporación
Financiera de Desarrollo (COFIDE) (Financial Devel-
opment Corporation) received considerable funding
from donor agencies and the Peruvian government,
which created pressure to on-lend to MFIs. However,
since COFIDE was only allowed to lend to regulated
financial institutions, disbursement pressure consti-
tuted a major factor in introducing the legal frame-
work. 
Entry requirements for EDPYMEs are relatively
easy to meet. Minimum capital, for instance, is set
at U.S.$245,000, which is quite low in the Latin
American context. However, EDPYMEs are only
allowed to mobilize deposits if they have minimum
capital of at least U.S.$1.35 million and receive an
acceptable rating (B or higher) from a rating
agency recognized by the supervisory authority. As
of 2004, no EDPYME had been cleared for deposit
taking. Thus, this model is unlikely to provide a
good example for promoting financial sector deep-
ening, particularly for providing an incentive to
offer diversified financial services other than cred-
it. EDPYMEs have access to sufficient funding from
COFIDE, so there is little incentive to seek investors
or to go into the cumbersome business of deposit
mobilization. Moreover, a wholesale financial insti-
tution should be in a position to evaluate the
creditworthiness of the financial institution to
which it lends money instead of shifting this task
to the banking supervisory authority.
Source: Staschen 1999, p. 36; Meagher 2002, p. 21; and Jansson,
Rosales, and Westley 2003.
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large—and thus require prudential regulation and
supervision. Most credit-only MFIs do not need to
be subjected to prudential regulation for reasons
explained above.
Any decision on introducing prudential regula-
tion and supervision should be preceded by a thor-
ough analysis of the actual state of the industry and
the performance of the leading MFIs. If the leading
MFIs are not ready to transform into deposit-taking
institutions, the high costs of introducing a new
framework and developing the adequate supervisory
capacity cannot be justified. In this case, supportive
measures should be put in place for MFIs to build
their capacity to provide sustainable microfinance
services before pursuing a regulation strategy. If
only one or two MFIs are candidates to become
regulated deposit-taking institutions, it may be
appropriate to try to accommodate them under
existing laws, possibly through amending the exist-
ing banking and financial institutions law.6
The regulatory framework should be flexible
enough to permit unregulated MFIs to evolve.
These institutions, although typically prohibited
from taking deposits from the public, may have the
potential to test innovative technologies, and to
grow and to maintain outreach to the poor. The
coexistence of regulated and unregulated financial
institutions can be supported by adopting a tiered
approach, which, in theory, should facilitate appro-
priate regulation and supervision and prevent
regulatory arbitrage.
Defining a regulatory window distinct from
other legal frameworks is a multidimensional
undertaking. . . . Microfinance regulation
differs in a number of ways from traditional
banking regulation, just as microfinance dif-
fers from other financial services. At least in
theory, these differences in regulatory
requirements for microfinance should make it
unattractive for other kinds of institutions to
use the regulatory window, which is solely
reserved for MFIs. The clear definition of
microfinance-specific provisions, which ren-
ders the regulatory framework unattractive
for other types of financial institutions, leads
MFIs to filter themselves into the most
appropriate regulatory window. (Staschen
2003, p. 15)
The fundamental issue in seeking the most
appropriate tiered approach is whether there are
MFIs strong enough to obtain a license as a spe-
cialized financial intermediary but find it difficult
to be licensed under the existing regulatory frame-
work due to high minimum capital or other
requirements imposed on banks and other regu-
lated nonbank financial institutions. In many coun-
tries, minimum capital requirements for non-bank
financial institutions and even for commercial
banks can be met by strong and sustainable MFIs
that have the necessary track record to attract one
of the dozens of institutional investors that have as
their main objective the provision of equity to
transformed MFIs (ProFund, ACCION Invest-
ments in Microfinance, AfriCap Microfinance
Fund, Triodos Bank, and many others). Separate
legal windows are only justified if transformation
under the existing laws is not feasible for strong
and sustainable NGO MFIs. As mentioned above,
a critical mass of MFIs that are likely to want to
offer deposit-taking services to the public, that
have or will soon have the operational and manage-
ment capacity to do so, and that are likely to meet
rigorous licensing and regulatory requirements,
should exist before introducing a separate microfi-
nance window.
Among the countries that have introduced tiered
approaches are Bolivia, Ghana, Indonesia (where
the Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR) constitutes a
second tier of institutions recognized under the
banking law, see box 2.4), the Kyrgyz Republic,
Peru, the Philippines, and Uganda.
In jurisdictions with no specific microfinance
enabling law (and with little chance of enacting
one, either due to the small number of institutions
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to which the law would apply or for legislative
reasons), NGOs seeking to transform must do so
under existing structures. See box 2.5 for examples.
With respect to member-based institutions, the
large number and small size of most such MFIs
make effective supervision almost impossible
because costs would be prohibitively high. Further-
more, and perhaps more important, such institu-
tions are unlikely to pose a risk to the stability of the
financial sector (CGAP 2000), although this may
not always be the case (Kenya, for example, has a
large cooperative sector). Prohibiting deposit mobi-
lization by small, community-based institutions
would force savers back to riskier forms of saving,
such as keeping cash or livestock if no formal sav-
ings facilities are in place (Christen, Lyman, and
Rosenberg 2003).
In general, the reach of prudential regulation
should have some lower boundary to exclude cer-
tain very small institutions, even if they are interme-
diating deposits. Nonprudential regulation for
these types of institutions, usually member-based,
could ensure that banking authorities and other
government agencies are aware of the amount
and kinds of institutions that are engaging in such
activities. However, many countries do not have a
Box 2.4 Bank Perkreditan Rakyat
Indonesia’s highly diversified and predominantly
formal microfinance industry is both the result of
the country’s past colonial administration and the
evolution of its financial sector. The key enabling
factor for the rise of BPRs was financial sector dereg-
ulation in the early 1980s. Liberalized interest rates,
allowing MFIs to charge cost-recovery interest rates,
supported the transformation into commercially ori-
ented MFIs and increased outreach of financial serv-
ices. According to the 1988 banking reform, which
constituted a tiered legal and regulatory framework
and removed most banking industry entry barriers,
BPR unit banks were newly established with private
capital and some existing community-owned finan-
cial institutions converted into BPRs. The banking
act of 1992 finally recognized BPRs as secondary
banks—limited to providing savings, deposits, and
credit products only—with minimum capital
requirements of only 50 million rupiah (equivalent
to U.S.$24,190 at year-end 1992). During the follow-
ing five years, more than 1,000 new BPRs were set
up, mostly by private owners, and some 600 other
MFIs converted to BPRs. With the amendment of the
banking act in 1998 and more recent regulations
concerning the BPR industry, licensing restrictions
for BPR branches were lifted, enabling BPRs to open
branches in the national, provincial, and district
capitals as well in the subdistricts. The central bank,
as the licensing authority of BPRs, has promulgated
prudential regulations, including increased paid-up
capital requirements, more rigid supervision, and
enforcement of performance standards in response
to the financial crises in 1997, with the effect that
the number of BPRs will not continue to grow as fast
as during the last two decades. It can be expected
that the consolidation period, which started in 2000,
might force small BPR unit banks to merge with
other BPRs to create larger, more efficient and
professional BPRs or alternatively, to merge with
commercial banks.
The following statistics, as of June 2005, indicate
the success of the BPR initiative:
• Number of BPRs: 2,062
• Number of outlets: 3,086 (including branches and
payment posts)
• Number of savings accounts: 6.0 million
• Number of deposit accounts: 331,814
• Number of borrowers: 2.74 million
• Loans outstanding: Rp 11.4 trillion (U.S.$1.2 bil-
lion)
• Average loan size: Rp 5.1 million (U.S.$5,300)
• Total assets: Rp 18.7 trillion (U.S.$1.97 billion)
• Nonperforming loan ratio: 8.19 percent
Source: Bank Indonesia 2005; Authors.
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special law for financial cooperatives nor are they
generally under the purview of the financial regula-
tor. Depending on the size of the sector, this could
pose systemic risk if the larger ones failed. It is
imperative that large financial cooperatives come
under some type of effective supervision at some
point, to be determined on a country-by-country
basis. This may be a significant area for stakeholders
to consider when developing a strategic microfi-
nance policy framework. (See annex 2A, Note on
Supervising Savings and Credit Cooperatives, for
further discussion.)
The Mongolian microfinance market is too small to
warrant the creation of a specific law for deposit-
taking MFIs. In 2001, when X.A.C. Co. Ltd. decided
it wanted to mobilize deposits from the public, it
needed to pursue licensing as a full-scale commer-
cial bank. Given the high minimum capital for bank
licensing (U.S.$3 million, compared to X.A.C.’s capi-
tal of U.S.$1.2 million at the time), the company
opted to pursue a merger with Goviin Ekhel LLC
(GE), a leading provider of loans to small and medi-
um enterprises. After the October 2001 merger
(and following an additional U.S.$150,000 capital
injection from Mercy Corps, the owner of GE), the
two companies’ combined capital met the mini-
mum requirement, and XacBank (the successor
organization) was licensed in December 2001. As
of June 2005, XacBank had mobilized almost
U.S.$20 million in deposits, equal to 83 percent of
its loan portfolio.
In Russia, the government created a special type
of entity, the nondeposit credit organization
(NDCO). However, this was not intended as a form
for MFIs, but rather was established to reduce the
excessive number of banks in the country. The inten-
tion was that some of the weaker banks could trade
in their licenses for NDCO licenses, and continue to
operate as credit institutions but no longer mobilize
deposits from small savers, hence lessening the risk
to the financial system. The Russian Women’s Micro-
finance Network (RWMN), a Moscow-based affiliate
of Women’s World Banking, determined that this
regulatory form would work for them because
NDCOs are permitted to take institutional savings
deposits. Given the widespread availability of low-
cost savings vehicles for private individuals in Russia,
RWMN believed that institutional deposits would be
its best route for raising local funds, rather than tak-
ing on the burden of becoming a full-scale bank and
competing against the entrenched institutions
(particularly the state-owned savings bank). Accord-
ingly, RWMN restructured itself and became an
NDCO, receiving its license in September 2005.
Microfinance activity in India has been primarily
carried out by NGOs, organized in the form of trusts,
societies, cooperatives, or Section 25 companies (a
form of not-for-profit company in India). For MFIs
seeking to become regulated, deposit-taking insti-
tutions, the options are not clear. Options being
considered by some of the larger players include
nonbanking finance companies (NBFC), coopera-
tives, and local area banks. Each of these, however,
has certain advantages and disadvantages that need
to be considered. An NBFC has the ability to attract
equity investment from domestic and foreign
investors in large volumes, but specific approval
must be obtained from the Reserve Bank of India to
mobilize deposits. In addition, NGOs face obstacles
from a tax standpoint when considering invest-
ments in for-profit companies (potentially losing
their tax-exempt status) creating challenges for any
asset transfer from an NGO to an NBFC. Coopera-
tives, however, are able to mobilize savings from
their members, yet are limited in terms of geograph-
ic outreach. Local area banks also have limited geo-
graphic presence, as well as steep entry require-
ments. In short, careful thought needs to be given as
to which path to take when integrating MFIs into
the formal financial sector in India.
Source: Contributed by Lloyd Stevens, DFID Financial Sector Deepen-
ing Project Uganda, and Victoria White, ACCION International.
Box 2.5 Examples of Countries with No Specific Microfinance Enabling Law
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What Should Be Regulated?
Even within the broad parameters of microfinance,
a good deal of complexity can surround the deter-
mination of what kinds of activity should be
regulated. Some of this may seem a matter of
semantics—but definitions do matter. As a result,
much attention is often paid to defining what is or
is not “microfinance” when establishing a legal and
regulatory framework for microfinance. The balanc-
ing act for policy makers and legislators is to define
activities in terms broad enough to allow the indus-
try to grow and change to respond to the needs of
its target customer base, but not to be so general as
to become meaningless and perhaps invite regula-
tory arbitrage by financial players seeking to “pass”
as microfinance providers. Some policy makers have
responded to this challenge by focusing on defini-
tions of the target client base of microfinance.
Others have responded by focusing attention on the
kinds of financial services and products being
offered. Still others have tried to address both by
applying definitions or limitations to the target
clients reached and products and services offered by
microfinance.
How should microfinance be defined? Microfinance
typically refers to the provision of financial services,
primarily but not exclusively savings and credit, to
poor households that do not have access to formal
financial institutions (box 2.6). Many countries use
quantitative approaches to define the segments of
the population that can be targeted for microfi-
nance products and services (that is, who qualifies
as “poor”) or to set limits on the maximum loan
size of a microloan. However, limits on maximum
loan sizes or the size of the borrowers’ businesses
restrict the ability of MFIs to offer adequate loan
products to clients with potential to grow, as well
as their ability to service some of the larger loan
requests coming from new savings clients. Fur-
thermore, quantitative limits can quickly fall out of
date, particularly in economies that are growing
increasingly more prosperous. One way to avoid
this is to peg loan size limits to a percentage of core
capital. As core capital grows, so do the limits on
loan sizes.
Supervisors must be able to verify and enforce
whatever criteria have been established. So, for
example, it is likely to be difficult for supervisors to
verify and enforce criteria linked largely to the type
or size of business of the MFI’s clients. For the pur-
pose of prudential regulation, it may make more
sense to define microfinance according to distinc-
tive features that can be established and verified
based on “patterns” of operations, rather than indi-
vidual transactions—such as loan size limitations.
Some of these patterns can be geared toward gen-
eral client and product characteristics and the lend-
ing methodologies employed. That said, however,
loan size limits are an effective instrument for pre-
venting regulatory arbitrage; rather than absolute
loan size limits, regulations may consider a more
flexible interpretation, for example, 80 percent of
the loan portfolio complying with the limit, or aver-
age loan amounts rather than individual loan
amounts. Table 2.1 provides examples of countries
with loan size limits. 
How should the regulator treat compulsory savings?
Many MFIs require compulsory savings from
customers as a condition for receiving loans.
Compulsory savings cannot be considered deposits
from the public but rather a device for the MFI to
enforce repayment (that is, as an element of the
loan product). As long as customers are in a net
borrower position (meaning that they owe the
MFI more than they have deposited as compulsory
savings), there is little risk to them if the MFI
should act recklessly with such forced or compul-
sory savings. However, a more difficult situation
exists when the amount of compulsory savings
exceeds the amount of the outstanding loan of the
customer. This can occur, for example, when com-
pulsory savings are retained in their entirety by the
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Box 2.6 Examples of Categories of Microloans
and non-profit organisation whose basic activity
is the provision of microcredits to the socially
jeopardised with a view to the development of
entrepreneurship.” 
• The Pakistan Prudential Regulations for Microfi-
nance state that the MFI shall not extend loans
exceeding 100,000 Pakistan rupees (approxi-
mately U.S.$1,700) to a single borrower.
• In Honduras, the Law for FPDOs includes, “Finan-
cial Private Development Organisations are
private companies, which are founded with the
purpose to offer financial services in support of
the economic activities carried out by micro and
small enterprises.”
• In Nepal, the Preamble to the Development
Banks Act includes the following: “Development
banks [are] connected with the development of
specific sectors in order to make available finan-
cial resources and technology needed for the
establishment, development, expansion and
increase in the capacity and productivity of agri-
cultural, industrial, services, trade and other com-
mercially viable and productive enterprises, and
thus impart dynamism to the development of the
nation’s industrial, trade and agricultural sectors
and mobilize available skills, labour and capital
for the development of rural and urban areas.” 
Source: Adapted from Staschen 2003.
Regulators in different countries define microcredit
differently—some by asset volumes or number of
employees (or both) and some by less quantitative
measures.
• In Peru, banking regulation defines microcredit
as loans granted to microenterprises with a
volume of assets, excluding fixed assets, below
U.S.$20,000 and accumulated debts below
U.S.$20,000. 
• In Colombia, according to the definition of the
banking supervisory authority, microcredits are
defined as loans granted to microenterprises with
fewer than 10 employees and total assets below
501 times monthly minimum wages, which at the
time of the study were U.S.$115.60 per month
(U.S.$58,000). The loan size granted to such an
enterprise by a financial institution may not
exceed 25 times monthly minimum wages
(U.S.$2,890) (Jansson, Rosales, and Westley 2003). 
• In the Philippines, microfinance loans are defined
as small loans granted to poor and low-income
households for their microenterprises and small
businesses. The maximum amount of a microloan
is approximately 150,000 Philippine pesos
(U.S.$2,700).
• In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Law on Micro-
credit Organisations states, “Microcredit organi-
sation in the sense of this law is a non-deposit
MFI or somehow stay under its control, even
though the principal balance on the outstanding
loan is diminishing over time. 
Even when the customer is a net saver (albeit a
“forced” net saver) the role of prudential regulation
may be limited. Rather, policy makers may want to
consider what are appropriate consumer protection
(or nonprudential) practices to encourage MFIs
to engage in if requiring compulsory savings from
their customers. Furthermore, when MFIs start to
mobilize deposits from the public, not only does the
need for prudential regulation arise, but to ensure
clear and simple business principles, it is also strong-
ly suggested that MFIs abandon the practice of
demanding compulsory savings, and instead intro-
duce other risk mitigating techniques, such as inter-
est rate rebates for clients who consistently pay on
time. See appendix 1 to this book, Sequencing the
Introduction of Public Savings in Regulated MFIs,
for more discussion on the elimination of compul-
sory savings when taking voluntary deposits from the
public.
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Roles and Principles
The following definition is useful when discussing
the various roles and principles related to regulation
and supervision:
Regulatory policy is formulated by the gov-
ernment; legislative principles incorporating
the policy are passed by Parliament; to flesh
out the principles, powers are conferred on a
Minister to promulgate rules, generally by
means of a statutory instrument; those rules
are subject to enforcement by a specialized
agency; the courts are responsible for the
adjudication of disputes and the imposition of
sanctions. (Ogus 1994, p. 104, as quoted in
Staschen 2003, p. 5) 
In addition to the various government bodies
and courts, practitioners, including MFIs and
networks of MFIs and international donors, also
play important roles in the development of the laws
and regulations. The following section highlights
the role each of these stakeholders can play, provid-
ing recommendations for each in the process. 
Political and government support for microfinance.
Governments should focus on providing and
developing appropriate policy frameworks, which
define the market environment, the regulatory
approach, institutional standards, capacity-building
standards, and the requirements in building the
financial infrastructure, including rating agencies,
information service providers, apex organizations,
associations, and other infrastructure.
• Clarify key issues regarding microfinance
regulation: In most countries, microfinance is
an important element in poverty alleviation
strategies. Governments and policy makers,
therefore, have a genuine interest in driving the
creation of a microfinance regulatory framework.
However, political support can become counter-
productive if microfinance regulation is perceived
as a tool to directly increase outreach by licensing
a great number of MFIs and as a channeling
device for government funding for development
purposes. Therefore, it is important to clarify key
issues regarding the need for and the direction of
microfinance regulation to avoid the emergence
of different and often conflicting paradigms.
• Avoid “the rush to regulate”: Since the late
1990s, politicians and donors in many countries
tend to perceive regulation of microfinance as a
way to promote the sustainable delivery of finan-
cial services to the poor. However, overregula-
tion or improper regulation may hamper the
development of the microfinance industry and
do not always lead to the desired effects. In addi-
tion, the introduction of a special microfinance
law is too expensive in many countries (CGAP
2000).
• Clearly distinguish between prudential and
nonprudential regulation: The objective of
Table 2.1 Limits for Loan Amounts
Maximum loan amount 
Country as a percentage of capital
Bolivia 
Ethiopia
Ghana
Honduras
Indonesia
Nepal
Pakistan
Uganda
1 percent for CACs (Cooperatives de
Ahorro y Crédito—Savings and Credit
Cooperatives) category 1 to 4 (unsecured
loans)
Fixed amount
10 percent for rural banks (for unsecured
loans)
10 percent for deposit-taking NBFIs
(unsecured loans)
2–5 percent depending on kind of security
BPRs: 10 percent (proposed)
Cooperatives with limited banking license:
5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent
for first, second, and following loans,
respectively
Fixed amount
1 percent and 5 percent for individual
loans and group loans, respectively
Source: Adapted from Staschen 2003.
Note: NBFI  nonbank financial institution.
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prudential regulation is to ensure the soundness
of the financial system and to protect depositors’
money. Nonprudential regulation addresses
methods regarding the conduct of business, such
as standardization of reporting systems, con-
sumer protection, and prevention of fraud and
financial crimes.7 In the political process of pass-
ing a new law on microfinance regulation, politi-
cians may take the opportunity to impose usury
ceilings with the objective of promoting devel-
opment though affordable credits to the poor.8
Governments have to understand that even if
done in the most efficient way, microfinance
involves higher operational costs as a percentage
of assets than traditional banking. If MFIs serve
clients in remote and sparsely populated areas,
costs are necessarily even higher. Introducing
interest rate ceilings may hamper the develop-
ment of a flourishing and sustainable microfi-
nance industry and make outreach impossible if
ceilings are set too low.
• Follow a market-oriented approach to devel-
opment: Many governments today pursue
market-oriented development policies including
various measures to liberalize the financial sector.
However, when it comes to the objective of
poverty alleviation, governments still tend to
directly intervene in financial markets. Policy
makers should understand that the best way to
promote sustainable microfinance is the creation
of an enabling environment for the establish-
ment and operation of private providers of finan-
cial services for the poor. They should abstain
from interventions that distort financial markets,
such as the provision of subsidized credit, lend-
ing quotas, or, as mentioned above, interest rate
ceilings. 
• Recognize microfinance as an integral part of
the financial sector: In many countries, policy
makers tend to perceive microfinance as an effec-
tive tool for poverty alleviation, micro and small
enterprise promotion, or rural development, but
not as an integral part of the financial sector. This
occurs especially when the responsibility for
microfinance is assigned to specific line ministries
(for example, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry
of Gender). Because these actors may be more
interested in short-term impact on outreach than
in long-term sustainability of institutions, the
development of a strategic framework for sus-
tainable microfinance can become a cumbersome
process. It is, therefore, preferable for micro-
finance to be assigned to the same ministry as
other financial institutions (like banks), fre-
quently the Ministry of Finance.
• Leave room for flexibility: In many countries,
microfinance is regulated by laws and acts that
are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. If microfi-
nance regulation becomes a political issue, legis-
lators may feel tempted to set standards for
details of microfinance regulation without dele-
gating rule-making power to the specialized
supervisory agency.9 Legislators should under-
stand that a law can only provide a general
framework for prudential regulation and should
focus on general issues. Normally, regulatory
policy should be structured such that regulatory
and supervisory practices can be adapted to a
changing environment or easily changed when
more experience has been gained. The fine-
tuning of rules and guidelines should be done by
a specialized regulatory body. Requiring the
approval of parliament for every adjustment
would lead to enormous inflexibility and ulti-
mately impede the growth of a sound micro-
finance industry. 
Leadership by the supervisor. Leadership by the
supervising authority can be instrumental in the
successful design and implementation of a microfi-
nance regulatory framework. Because the supervi-
sor’s main interest is to ensure safety and soundness
of the financial sector, she or he will argue against
overburdening the regulatory framework with
other or conflicting objectives such as monetary
stability, credit channeling, or even redistribution of
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income. However, this greatly depends on the
supervisory body’s knowledge and understanding
of microfinance. Also, supervisory authorities may
not have the necessary political accountability to
implement legal frameworks. The supervisor must
also be careful to balance the goal of financial sector
stability with outreach, lest regulation be so strict
that all growth is curtailed in the name of safety.
• Do not regulate what cannot be supervised: Even
carefully designed regulations will be useless if
they cannot be enforced by effective supervision.
Effective supervision requires sufficient capacity
and resources, which are often not available to
the extent required to supervise large numbers of
small MFIs. Entry requirements should balance
the objectives of enabling strong MFIs to offer a
broader range of services to their clients against
not allowing large numbers of weak institutions
to mobilize deposits from the public without
being adequately supervised.
• Take a strategic perspective when designing the
regulatory framework: The regulatory frame-
work sets the parameters for the future as a basis
to ensure safety and soundness of the MFIs’
operations as well as as the foundation for sus-
tainable growth. Regulators should anticipate
and do their best to prevent the worst-case sce-
nario rather than simply legalize current practices
(Hannig and Omar 2000).
• Accept that microfinance supervision requires
cultural change: Most supervisors do not know
how microfinance works and how it is different
from traditional banking. Hence, they may be
reluctant to accept any modification to normal
procedures (Theodore and Trigo Loubiere
2001). It may take some time to accept and
understand microfinance management tech-
niques for handling small loans without tradi-
tional forms of collateral. 
• Consider creating a separate section or division
for supervision of MFIs within the banking super-
visory authority: It is advisable to create a
separate division for microfinance with special-
ized staff to supervise MFIs and microfinance
portfolios of other financial institutions
(Theodore and Trigo Loubiere 2001). As noted,
microfinance is a special segment of the financial
system, requiring specialized knowledge for
effective supervision. Supervisors accustomed to
traditional banks may stifle the growth of micro-
finance simply due to a lack of understanding of
its approaches and nontraditional forms of risk
mitigation (such as solidarity group guarantees).
• Prevent “brain drain” of skilled microfinance
supervisors: Staff who have been well-trained,
usually at significant expense, might be tempted
to look for employment opportunities outside
the supervisory agency. Especially in countries
where there is a general lack of well-trained
microfinance specialists, MFIs and even donors
sometimes offer high salaries to supervisors expe-
rienced in microfinance. The supervisory agency
should offer competitive remuneration schemes
and other incentives such as career prospects to
well-trained staff.
Support from practitioners. Open communication
between MFIs and the supervisory authority has
proven to be invaluable in building mutual under-
standing between the parties to develop acceptable
supervisory mechanisms (Theodore and Trigo
Loubiere 2001). Engaging practitioners in the
consultative process helps to ensure that an ade-
quate framework is developed that takes into
account their capacity to fulfill rules and regula-
tions. However, it is important to keep in mind
that this process could result in the regulations
being shaped in the interest of the industry rather
than the broader public interest represented by the
regulator, so a balance must be reached. Microfi-
nance networks can significantly support the policy
dialogue regarding an appropriate regulatory
environment for microfinance. They can drive
consensus building among member organizations,
disseminate information on good practices, lobby,
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and play an advocacy role to ensure appropriate
policies. To effectively play this role, a microfinance
network must have a broad membership and a clear
mandate to perform its role as a voice for the
industry. Furthermore, the professionalism of
the board and the management and the network’s
ability to create alliances with national and inter-
national stakeholders are important factors for
success.
• Educate policy makers and the public about good
microfinance practices and lobby for adequate
frameworks: MFIs and strong microfinance net-
works can play an important role as providers of
information about good practices (box 2.7) and
as the voice of the industry lobby policy makers
to refrain from introducing inadequate regulato-
ry frameworks. 
• Appreciate that self-regulation and supervision
are not effective for deposit-taking institutions: In
some cases, self-regulation and self-supervision
models are introduced due to limited resources
of the supervisor. However, self-regulation and
supervision produce a conflict of interest when
the “watchdog” is controlled by the institutions
that should be watched. Self-supervision can eas-
ily become ineffective when there is no enforce-
ment. However, MFI umbrella bodies or associ-
ations or networks can introduce performance
monitoring systems for their nondeposit-taking
members to set incentives for a reporting process
that may enhance transparency and discipline.
• Be realistic about the costs and benefits of being
regulated: In most countries, the majority of
MFIs are not yet ready to take on the complex
task of financial intermediation. Boards of direc-
tors and management should carefully evaluate
the costs and benefits of transformation into reg-
ulated institutions. Many MFIs mistakenly
believe that the capacity to manage savings auto-
matically goes along with the capacity to manage
credit. Unrealistic expectations about the poten-
tial to become a financial intermediary may result
in unnecessary expenses, burdens on manage-
ment and staff, and may even lead to the failure
of the institution. 
Enabling role of donors. Donors play a crucial role
in knowledge transfer of international best prac-
tices, and can be instrumental in facilitating know-
how for governments, supervisors, and the industry.
They can also facilitate information exchange
between stakeholders in different countries and set
the basis for an effective South–South dialogue. See
box 2.8 for an example of how donors can support
the industry.
Box 2.7 The Interest Rate Debate
in Uganda
When the MDI bill was discussed in the Ugandan
Parliament, members of parliament repeatedly
raised their concerns about high interest rates
charged by MFIs. The strong and well-recognized
Ugandan microfinance network, Association of
Microfinance Institutions of Uganda (AMFIU),
representing the practitioners and others in the
industry and with the support of major donor
agencies, carried out intense lobbying activities
and actively educated members of parliament
and the general public about microfinance good
practices. The Ministry of Finance, through its
Micro and Small Enterprises Department under
the supervision of the Director of Economic
Affairs, also provided much needed support to
the industry in this debate. At the end of the day,
the members of parliament agreed not to
include the issue of interest rates in the regulato-
ry framework. However, they passed a motion
that the cabinet should develop a proposal to
address high interest rates and short loan matu-
rities. This reduced political pressure during the
discussion on the regulatory framework and
gave the industry more time to design an appro-
priate strategy for consumer protection.
Source: Authors.
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• Coordinate support to the industry: To build up a
strong microfinance industry, donors should
coordinate their support and agree on common
principles based on best practices. Donor agen-
cies should seek to agree on a division of tasks
based on their comparative advantages.
• Help MFIs upgrade their skills by setting perform-
ance standards: Umbrella organizations can
encourage greater efficiency in the microfinance
sector by setting standards and introducing per-
formance monitoring. Standards and peer group-
ing provide an incentive for individual MFIs to
upgrade their managerial, technical, and financial
capabilities, which is a condition for successful
transformation into financial intermediaries.
• Support mature MFIs to be ready for licensing:
Evidence suggests that the costs of meeting the
requirements of the supervisory agency can be
very high. Donors can help MFIs with good
track records and high potential to become fully
sustainable to prepare for regulation by provid-
ing technical assistance, subsidizing investments
in infrastructure and management information
systems (MIS), and so forth.
• Provide technical assistance to develop the capacity
of supervisors to supervise microfinance operations
effectively: Supervision of microfinance opera-
tions puts high demands on the human and tech-
nical capacity of supervisors. Donors can support
capacity building through training and interna-
tional exposure.
• Support information exchange between stakehold-
ers from different countries: Donors can add
great value in promoting an effective South-
South exchange between stakeholders from dif-
ferent countries to enable them to learn from
their successes and failures. 
• Accept that banking supervisory authorities might
not be in a position to take on additional responsi-
bilities (at least temporarily): If supervisors’
capacity is already overstretched by handling
problem banks (which might be protected by
powerful political parties), they may be reluctant
to accept additional responsibilities for oversee-
ing relatively small MFIs that do not constitute
a danger to the financial sector. Donors and
Box 2.8 Uganda’s Transformation
Steering Committee
To help achieve the goals of donors supporting
transformation in Uganda—coordination, sup-
port to mature MFIs, technical assistance, and
information exchange—the major donors formed
a Transformation Steering Committee. These
donors include the World Bank, which is supervis-
ing the Uganda Rural Financial Services Project on
behalf of IFAD; USAID’s Support for Private Enter-
prise Expansion and Development Project; DFID’s
Financial Sector Deepening Project; GTZ/SIDA’s
Financial Systems Development Project; and the
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic
Development’s Microfinance Outreach Plan. The
committee meets quarterly to discuss issues per-
taining to transformation, and coordinates all
support to institutions by issuing joint requests
for proposals and vetting all assistance provided.
To date (December 2005), the committee’s mem-
bers have provided U.S.$4.7 million in support to
five institutions, four of which have received their
MDI licenses (this figure includes U.S.$2.2 million
provided prior to the formation of the commit-
tee). The funds are not pooled—the committee’s
role is to advise its members by reaching consen-
sus. Individual members are, however, free to
override the views of the committee in granting
funds. The committee also engaged a part-time
consultant to serve as its administrator and secre-
tary, and to provide technical assistance where
necessary to the transforming institutions.
Source: Contributed by Lloyd Stevens, DFID Financial Sector
Deepening Project Uganda.
Note: DFID  the UK Department for International Development;
GTZ/SIDA  the German Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit/Swedish International Development Coopera-
tion Agency; IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural
Development; USAID  United States Agency for International
Development.
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MFIs should accept these reasons instead of
believing central banks are narrow minded and
not concerned with the poor (CGAP 2000). 
The Regulatory Framework
Once all major stakeholders have agreed on the
strategic approach to regulation, the detailed legal
framework can be developed. When developing the
regulatory framework, regulators should under-
stand and take into account the risks MFIs face to
fully ensure the adequacy of regulation. Although
MFIs face many risks similar to those faced by
other financial institutions, features unique to
microfinance influence the risk to MFIs, which the
regulator should be aware of when developing
microfinance regulation and when supervising MFI
operations.10
Risks in Microfinance
MFIs are particularly exposed to the following
risks:11
• Ownership and governance risk
• Credit risk
• Liquidity risk
• Operational or management risk
• Interest rate risk
• Reputation risk 
An MFI’s performance critically depends on its
ownership and governance structure. In particular,
NGO MFIs are exposed to considerable ownership
and governance risk. NGO MFIs do not have real
owners with their own capital at risk, particularly
institutions capitalized with donor funds where
funding agencies may be primarily interested in
achieving social objectives. Generally, little incentive
is provided to closely observe the MFI’s financial
performance and to install adequate internal con-
trol mechanisms. Thus, regulators often insist that
MFIs convert into companies with shareholders
under private company law before they are allowed
to take deposits. This may lead to the risk of regu-
lators (and new owners) encouraging the MFI to
move up market (mission drift), as happened when
K-Rep in Kenya transformed to a bank (box 2.9).
Credit risk is the probability of loans not being
repaid on time or at all.12 Although MFIs generally
maintain low delinquency rates, their portfolios
tend to be more volatile than portfolios of financial
institutions that use traditional lending technolo-
gies. The use of collateral substitutes and reputa-
tion-based repayment incentives combined with
low contract enforcement capabilities creates con-
siderable risk. Because the borrowers’ main incen-
tive to pay back a loan is the expectation of receiv-
ing subsequent loans, delinquency may have
contagious effects. Moreover, the clientele of most
MFIs show a relatively high degree of homogeneity
in geographical proximity or market segment,
resulting in covariance risk. Because the loan port-
folio usually constitutes a proportionately large
share of the overall assets, a slight deterioration in
repayment rates can have a substantial effect on
overall performance.
Box 2.9 K-Rep Bank, Kenya
To demonstrate its commitment to serving the
poor, K-Rep Bank located its headquarters in
one of the largest slums in Nairobi, called
Kawangware. Nonetheless, K-Rep Bank encoun-
tered potential mission drift, as regulators and
some board members urged the bank to move
into more profitable lending activities (especially
after the central bank’s first inspection). Some of
the new staff from the banking sector tried hard
to instill conventional lending practices that
would exclude poor clients. It would have been
difficult to overcome these challenges if the
board composition and top management did not
include key proponents of microfinance.
Source: Nyerere et al. 2004.
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Liquidity risk refers to the potential inability of a
financial institution to accommodate depositors’
demands to withdraw their funds or to fund
increases in loan demand because of a lack of avail-
able cash. Liquidity shortages severely limit the
MFI’s ability to react adequately to the demand of
borrowers and might force it to restrict its lending
operations. Because most MFIs employ reputation-
based enforcement schemes that ensure access to
subsequent loans when borrowers promptly meet
their obligations, liquidity shortages weaken a main
repayment incentive, which may further stretch the
liquidity position. 
Like any other financial intermediary, MFIs are
also exposed to the risk of portfolio deterioration
due to system failures or management and staff
weaknesses or fraudulent behavior (operational or
management risk). Decentralized decision making
requires a sophisticated internal control system and
a good MIS. In many MFIs these systems are weak
and internal and external control functions are
often not properly defined.
Any financial institution is exposed to interest
rate risk from a potential mismatch in the term
structure of assets and liabilities. For instance, if an
MFI is tied to a long-term loan with a fixed interest
rate and is therefore not able to refinance the loan
with cheaper funding when market rates go down,
it is forced to keep the lending rate for short-term
loans high, although competitors with a more
favorable term structure of their assets and lia-
bilities are able to reduce it. In addition, interest
rate caps (if applicable) seriously limit an MFI’s
ability to increase its lending rate if costs of capital
increase. 
Reputation risk is the risk to earnings or capital
arising from negative public opinion (Campion
2000). For transforming MFIs, this risk can expand
exponentially as the institution shifts from being a
credit-only institution to one that takes on respon-
sibility for mobilizing and intermediating public
deposits. Successful savings mobilization requires
that the institution be perceived as stable and trust-
worthy. Any damage to the institution’s reputation
can have significant implications for the institution’s
bottom line. 
This overview of the major risks in microfinance
shows that the risk factors are similar to those of tra-
ditional financial institutions.13 However, in micro-
finance the relevance of individual risks—the risk
profile—may differ considerably from traditional
financial institutions.14
Levels of Regulation
Regulatory frameworks can be stipulated on differ-
ent levels of regulation (Staschen 2003). Primary
legislation, in the form of laws or acts of parliament,
define general standards and principles that financial
institutions must meet and that remain relatively
stable over time. Secondary legislation, or “statutory
regulations,” that are promulgated under such laws
and acts typically prescribe specific benchmarks and
procedures that need to be adapted more often
and are unlikely to require legislative input. Laws and
acts generally have to be passed by Parliament and
thus undergo a time-consuming political decision-
making process whereas regulations can be altered
more flexibly through an executive body such as
a ministry or a central bank. Regulations are usually
more detailed and can be adapted to changes in the
industry, economy, or regulators’ and supervisors’
enhanced understanding of the risk being addressed
by the regulatory regime. In addition, the supervi-
sory authority may introduce guidelines that further
specify selected sections of the laws or statutory reg-
ulations. Such guidelines are often defined in circu-
lars; however, they only show the expectations of
the supervisory body, and are not included in the
requirements for compliance. Specific guidelines or
circulars allow for the highest degree of flexibility by
providing considerable discretionary power to the
supervising authority; however, they also have a
lower degree of legal enforceability.
Usually the primary legislation distinguishes
between different types of financial institutions and
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defines the kinds of business these institutions can
undertake. It further lays down restrictions on
transactions and defines minimum and ongoing
capital requirements as well as maximum sharehold-
ings by individuals or groups of individuals (see
box 2.10). The law stipulates basic principles of cor-
porate governance including internal and external
control, sets rules on concentration and insider
lending, provides general guidance on supervision,
and spells out the rules for sanctions and corrective
actions such as receivership, liquidation, and exit.
The statutory regulations define standards for
those issues that may be subject to more frequent
changes in the environment (asset quality, loan loss
provision, and reporting requirements). To give an
example, the ongoing capital requirements for dif-
ferent kinds of financial institutions should be
defined in the law, whereas the components of the
capital adequacy ratio should be defined in specific
regulations (see box 2.11).
Table 2.2 shows the differences between the
levels of the regulatory framework in terms of
democratic accountability, legal foundation, and
flexibility to adapt to changes in the environment.
A prudential regulatory framework (which
includes the law and the regulations or statutory
instruments) ensures that only sound institutions
enter the market, that they are managed in a prof-
itable and sound manner, and that financial institu-
tions and their clients are relatively insulated
from the collapse or weaknesses of other financial
institutions. Prudential regulation typically includes
the following, among others:
• Minimum capital requirements
• Maximum shareholder requirements
• Capital adequacy requirements
• Licensing requirements
• Benchmarks for asset quality
Box 2.10 Law #1488 of Banks and
Financial Institutions (1993) 
Law #1488 in Bolivia classifies financial services
by financial banking institutions, ancillary finan-
cial services companies, and nonbanking financial
intermediaries. A bank is defined as an “author-
ized financial entity devoted to intermediation
and the provision of financial services to the
public.” Private financial funds (FFPs) are non-
banking financial entities whose principal
objective is channeling resources to micro and
small-scale borrowers in urban and rural areas.
Cooperatives and credit unions are defined as
“[a]ll societies constituted under the General Law
of Cooperative Societies that have as their objec-
tive to promote savings and grant loans to their
members.” According to the law, all three classes
must be registered with the Superintendent of
Banks and Financial Entities. The minimum capi-
tal requirements and the minimum capital ade-
quacy ratios differ for each category. 
Source: Microfinance Gateway, Microfinance Regulation and
Supervision Resource Center—Bolivia. http://microfinancegateway.
org/resource_centers/reg_sup/.
Box 2.11 The Uganda Micro Finance
Deposit-Taking Institutions
(MDI) Act of 2003
The Ugandan MDI Act of 2003 includes the defi-
nition of microfinance (clarification of basic ter-
minology, microfinance as a line of business),
general principles for licensing, restrictions on
certain transactions and dealings by MFIs, owner-
ship and corporate governance (including capital
requirements, maximum shareholding, and inter-
nal and external control), supervision and correc-
tive action, receivership, liquidation, and exit.
The regulations that accompany the law define
capital adequacy and outline reporting require-
ments, asset quality, and liquidity requirements,
and detail the licensing requirements and
procedures.
Source: Uganda MDI Act 2003.
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• Limitations on risk exposure and insider lending
• Reserve and liquidity requirements
• Reporting requirements
• Sanctions and corrective actions 
• Deposit insurance schemes15
Good and bad practices of microfinance regula-
tion have been exhaustively discussed elsewhere.16
The relevant issues are summarized in the following
discussion.
Minimum Capital Requirements
To cover the risks of financial intermediation,
deposit-taking MFIs must be sufficiently capital-
ized. Capital provides a cushion against a financial
institution’s potential losses. It further serves as a
screening device so scarce supervisory resources can
be used most effectively to supervise financial insti-
tutions that create systemic risk. It is often argued
that minimum capital should be set at levels low
enough to promote the entry of MFIs into the
financial sector. Nonetheless, it would be irrespon-
sible to set minimum capital requirements at a level
that would allow large numbers of smaller and less
mature MFIs to mobilize deposits from the public.
It is virtually impossible to supervise them ade-
quately. Also, higher capital requirements can com-
plement monitoring by the regulator, because
investors with their own funds at risk will demand
increased internal controls.
The legal framework should define minimum
capital requirements in a way that two objectives—
the opening of the financial sector to nontradition-
al providers of financial services and allowing only
sound MFIs with the capacity to intermediate
deposits to enter the financial sector—can be pur-
sued simultaneously. 
Maximum Shareholder Requirements
Because of ownership and governance risks associ-
ated with the predominance of a few owners, legis-
lation should limit maximum shareholding by any
one investor. Evidence suggests that it can be more
difficult to establish a balanced shareholder struc-
ture in an MFI than to raise sufficient capital to
meet minimum capital requirements. A balanced
shareholder structure is a critical factor when regu-
lating MFIs that have transformed from NGOs,
where typically the founder NGO becomes one of
the shareholders in the licensed financial institution.
Individuals and institutions that dominate the
NGO are often reluctant to forgo majority share-
holding in the transformed institution because
they fear mission drift and loss of control.17 How-
ever, concentration of ownership may result in
insufficient internal controls and seriously hamper
Table 2.2 The Regulatory Framework
Regulations (or
Primary “statutory legislation,” 
legislation “secondary 
(or laws and legislation,” or 
acts) “normative acts”) Guidelines
Democratic accountability
and delegation of authority
Degree of legal foundation
Flexibility to be altered
Passed by legislative body
High 
Low
Promulgated by executive
body charged with respon-
sibility to execute the law
Medium
Medium 
Published by supervisory
authority charged with
enforcing legal and
regulatory framework
Low
High
Source: Authors’ adaptation from Staschen 2003.
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external supervision.18 Stakeholders should be
aware of the need to ensure a sound ownership and
governance structure that allows for efficient man-
agement and effective internal controls. Nonethe-
less, some time may be required for the original
NGO or project founders to dilute the ownership to
fully comply with regulatory requirements.
In addition to defining quantitative ratios and
standards, the regulatory framework must define
qualitative standards for adequate ownership and
good governance (systems of checks and balances,
internal controls), and outline the necessary qualifi-
cations of owners, board members, and senior man-
agement (“fit and proper” criteria).
Capital Adequacy Requirements 
The capital adequacy ratio correlates capital with
different degrees of risks with the asset side of a
financial institution. It is generally accepted that a
capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent, as stipulated in
the Basle Capital Accord of 1988, is a minimum
standard for financial institutions.19 It is also gener-
ally accepted that given the high credit and opera-
tional risks of MFIs, capital adequacy requirements
should be higher than for traditional financial insti-
tutions (Christen, Lyman, and Rosenberg 2003).
For example, in Uganda, MDIs require core capital
of not less than 15 percent and total capital of
not less than 20 percent of risk-weighted assets as
compared to 8 percent and 12 percent, respective-
ly, for commercial banks and nonbank financial
institutions.
Licensing Requirements
The following minimum criteria should be assessed
before permitting an MFI to mobilize deposits
from the public:
• Applicant’s ability to meet minimum and on-
going capital requirements including the ability
to inject more capital if required in the future
• Shareholder structure
• Background, reputation, and professional record
of the owners, directors, and senior management
(fit and proper criteria) 
• Business plan of the applicant including the mis-
sion statement; market research results; owner-
ship and corporate governance structure; a
description of the scope of operations and serv-
ices to be offered including the past record, if
applicable, of management in providing these
services; business strategy; and projected balance
sheet and income statements and other support-
ing documentation 
• Description of the applicant’s risk management
systems showing the ability to detect, measure,
monitor, and control the level and types of risks
that can be assumed with microfinance services 
• Management information systems, the adminis-
trative and operational processes, and the inter-
nal control system; the supervisor will want to
review the manuals that address risk manage-
ment and various processes including:20
– Credit manual
– Human resources manual
– Operations manual
– Liquidity and funds management policies and
procedures
– Accounting manual
– Audit manual
• Quality, security, and appropriateness of the
premises (branch network, head office)
Once the supervisor accepts the information
submitted, the applicant is notified that the applica-
tion has been accepted and the period for either
granting or refusing a license as stipulated in the
regulatory framework commences.21 During the
evaluation process the supervisor will have meetings
and interviews with the applying MFI’s representa-
tives whenever clarification is needed. The impor-
tance of this dialogue cannot be overemphasized.
Complete openness with the supervisor is critical to
the MFI’s credibility and any issues that arise must
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be brought to the supervisor’s attention immediate-
ly. This helps build an atmosphere of confidence
and trust between the parties, and can lead to a
much smoother licensing process.
To confirm the adequacy of the systems and pro-
cedures, the MIS, the security systems, and the
premises, the supervisor will conduct on-site inspec-
tions. Licensed financial institutions have to system-
atically and timely disclose accurate information to
the supervisor. The MIS, therefore, must be able to
accommodate any reporting requirement set by the
supervisor. Given the importance of the MIS and
the internal control system, it is recommended that
minimum standards be formulated in the statutory
instruments. 
Before beginning the licensing process, supervi-
sors need to gain knowledge of the microfinance
sector in the country as well as become familiar with
the MFIs that have a realistic chance to transform
into regulated financial institutions. In some
countries, although it may not be stipulated in the
regulatory framework, the supervisor will conduct
preapplication examinations with those MFIs that
have indicated their plans to submit a license appli-
cation to become a regulated institution. This
enables the supervisor to have a close look at the
institution and its systems and procedures before a
formal application is submitted.22 Based on the
findings, the supervisor can advise the MFI on
which areas need improvement to meet licensing
requirements.
The execution of preapplication examinations
saves time in the formal licensing process because
the supervisors gain a relatively deep understanding
of the key elements of the MFI’s business at an early
stage. Likewise, it helps prevent MFIs that are not
ready for licensing from spending substantial
resources applying for the license, thus saving the
MFI and the supervisor significant time. However,
because prelicensing examinations consume consid-
erable supervisory resources, only candidates that
are known to have some potential for transforma-
tion should be considered.23
Once the supervisor thoroughly understands the
microfinance sector and is familiar with the leading
MFIs in the country that wish to transform, the
licensing process generally takes the following steps:
• Supervisor may conduct preapplication examina-
tions and advise “licensable” MFIs on those
areas that still need to be changed or improved
to meet licensing requirements. 
• MFIs submit applications including the docu-
mentation needed to assess the capacity of the
MFI to get a license (as stipulated in the regula-
tions on licensing).
• Supervisor reviews application with special
emphasis on a sound governance structure that
allows for appropriate checks and balances
regarding the shareholder structure and the
background of the shareholders; for example,
the supervisor will want to obtain the following
from individuals proposed as board members:
– clean references from individuals and bankers
– certificate of good conduct
– statement of assets and liabilities
– statement of earnings or sources of income
– professional and educational background
• proper administration and management,
which includes the soundness of the MFI’s
risk management systems and thus comprises
elements such as the level of engagement of
the board and senior management oversight;
board committees; adequate policies, proce-
dures, and limits; adequate risk monitoring
and MIS; and a comprehensive internal con-
trol system24
• the applicant’s ability to adequately manage
liquidity
• trends in projected financial statements
• The supervisor meets and interviews senior man-
agement during the review process to clarify
issues to make the evaluation process as transpar-
ent as possible.
• Once the supervisor feels that the documen-
tation is complete and is satisfied with the
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information submitted, she or he notifies the
MFI that the application has been accepted.
Once the application has been accepted the
period for either granting or rejecting a license
commences. 
• The supervisor can request the applicant MFI to
publish a notice in a daily newspaper to enable
persons with objections to licensing of the MFI
to come to the attention of the supervisor and
the applicant. If there are any objections from
the public the applicant will be given a limited
period to address the objections.
• To confirm the adequacy of systems, procedures,
and premises, the supervisor will conduct on-site
inspections.
• During the period for either granting or reject-
ing the license, the supervisor may disqual-
ify shareholders or members of the senior man-
agement that do not meet the “fit and proper”
criteria and request that these persons be
replaced.
Once the supervisor is satisfied that all condi-
tions have been fulfilled, a license to allow com-
mencement of operations will be granted. The
supervisor may attach temporary or permanent
conditions to the license (nonpermissible opera-
tions, for example).
Asset Quality 
Given the unconventional collateral used in micro-
finance operations and the prevalence of short-term
loans with frequent repayment periods, require-
ments for provisioning and write-offs may need to
be stricter for MFIs than for traditional lenders.
Provisions and write-offs should be based on the
amount of loans overdue (portfolio at risk) and the
number of days any payments (principal or interest)
are overdue. In some countries (Bolivia and
Uganda, for example), provisioning requirements
are stricter for rescheduled loans than for regular
loans taking into consideration that the risk of non-
repayment is higher for loans that have not been
paid regularly and on time.
Central bank regulators must also work with
other regulatory bodies, such as the tax authority,
because provisioning requirements imposed by
bank regulators may not always be accepted by tax
authorities as allowable expenses, which leads to
inconsistent treatment of provisioning and loan
losses under the two regulatory regimes.
Risk Concentration and Insider Lending
Although MFIs do not tend to concentrate their
lending activities in a small number of large bor-
rowers, regulations typically impose limits on the
size of the loans that may be granted to individual
borrowers or groups of borrowers. Maximum loan
sizes can be prescribed for an individual or a group
of borrowers as a percentage of capital, as discussed
above. More relevant for MFIs is the risk of concen-
tration of large numbers of small loans in geo-
graphic areas or economic sectors. However,
whether the regulatory framework should establish
benchmarks to avoid covariance risk is not clear.
It may be better for the supervisor to assess the
quality of the MFI’s risk management techniques
instead of setting rigid benchmarks for portfolio
diversification.
The problem of insider lending in MFIs is typ-
ically addressed either through prohibition or
through restricting the size of loans to employees
or board members (or their family members) by
imposing maximum loan sizes often determined
as a percentage of the institution’s capital. Pro-
hibiting lending to employees is not always advis-
able given that many employees, particularly those
who are in remote locations, do not always have
access to credit elsewhere. It may be reasonable to
allow this “benefit” to employees if managed
appropriately and staff turnover is taken into
account. Furthermore, the regulator may want to
require that these loans be fully secured, perhaps
by salary.
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Reserve and Liquidity Requirements
As mentioned above, even nondeposit-taking
MFIs are exposed to liquidity risks. However, liq-
uidity management becomes more complicated
when the institution begins mobilizing deposits
from the public. Typically, regulations prescribe a
percentage of deposits that must be held in reserve
as liquid assets as an ongoing requirement. High
reserve requirements come at a cost because MFIs
are required to hold available resources as idle funds
instead of investing them in earning assets
(box 2.12). This can, in turn, lead to a disincentive
for MFIs to mobilize deposits in favor of accessing
commercial loans (Staschen 2003).
However, liquidity risks are complex and cannot
be fully measured and analyzed by a single ratio.
Therefore, the supervisory authority should moni-
tor the institution’s capability to manage its liquid-
ity effectively (for example, through cash flow
analysis, measurement and control of funding
requirements, management of access to funds, and
contingency plans in case of a liquidity crisis) by
means of an internal policy. The policy needs to be
supported by an effective MIS and fully imple-
mented with reporting to management and the
board of directors. Given most MFIs’ lack of expe-
rience in liquidity management, supervisors should
carefully assess the quality of the liquidity manage-
ment system before deposits are accepted.
Reporting Requirements
The MFI’s ability to produce accurate and timely
statistical information, both on the institution’s
financial position and the quality of the loan portfo-
lio, is a key assumption underlying each of the
above prudential requirements. In the licensing
process, the MFI will need to demonstrate a reliable
and robust MIS that is capable of consolidating, on
a routine basis, information from all the branch
operations and generating accurate reports for
both management and external stakeholders,
including the central bank. From licensing onward,
the MFI will then need to generate and submit
key financial and portfolio reports to the central
bank (demonstrating compliance with the above
prudential regulations), or face fines or other penal-
ties. General recommendations about frequency
of reporting are not possible to make, given the
diversity of approaches in various countries. For
example, in Bolivia and Peru, the most frequent
reporting is daily, whereas in Honduras and Mexico
it is monthly (Theodore and Trigo Loubiere 2001).
Sanctions and Corrective Actions
Sanctions and corrective actions deter financial insti-
tutions from contravening regulations and correct
problems caused by the violation of regulations.
Staschen (2003) provides an overview of the most
common sanctions and corrective actions found
when analyzing microfinance legislation in several
countries. These include fines, imprisonment, sus-
pension or removal of directors or the entire board,
Box 2.12 Reserve and Liquidity
Requirements in Ghana
Ghana has comparatively high reserve require-
ments. Rural banks must hold 5 percent of total
deposit liabilities with the ARB Apex Bank, 8 per-
cent as primary (cash and balance with other
banks), and 20 to 30 percent as secondary reserve
requirements (government and Bank of Ghana
bills, bonds, and stocks). The percentage rate for
the secondary reserve requirements depends on
the loan recovery rate. This means that only
between 57 and 67 cents of every dollar mobi-
lized from savers can be used for on-lending.
Deposit-taking nonbank financial institutions
are subject to a 10 percent and 15 percent
liquidity ratio for primary and secondary
reserves, respectively.
Source: Staschen 2003, p. 30.
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management takeover, receivership, revocation of
operating licenses, and, finally, liquidation of the
financial institution. In general, the sanctions and
corrective actions that may be imposed on MFIs do
not differ significantly from those of other financial
institutions. However, the effectiveness of sanctions
and corrective actions may be clearly defined on
paper, but depend critically on the strength and
readiness of the supervisory authority to enforce
these rules, that is, to take prompt corrective
actions for clearly measurable violations of regula-
tions. Corrective tools used with banks may not
work well with MFIs, given their unique portfolios
and credit methodologies. Supervisors may find
that stop-lending orders, for example, are not
appropriate25 or that management takeovers are not
easy given the difficulty of finding qualified man-
agers in the microfinance industry. Because this is a
new area for many regulators, some learning still
needs to take place on what will work best.
Deposit Insurance Schemes
In general, the very existence of a deposit insurance
scheme is an effective instrument to avert a “run on
deposits” (the massive withdrawal of deposits when
a financial institution faces problems). However, as
any insurance might, deposit protection may create
“moral hazard” in the sense that depositors feel safe
and, therefore, do not take into account or seek
all available information when choosing to deposit
their funds with a particular financial institution.
This absence of effective oversight by depositors
may induce excessive risk taking by the financial
institution. To avoid moral hazard, deposit insur-
ance schemes normally cover a maximum value per
client or per account, representing only a percent-
age of the total deposit volume. If a financial insti-
tution collapses, large depositors whose deposits are
not fully covered by the insurance would suffer
major losses, giving these depositors an incentive to
take effective measures to control the risk-taking
behavior of the financial institution. In contrast,
small depositors who are not in a position to mon-
itor the financial institution’s behavior require
external protection. Unlike in traditional financial
institutions, the savers that put their money in an
MFI, in general, remain below the traditional limit
for covering depositors’ losses and because MFIs
normally do not attract many large savers, a large
portion of deposits is covered by the insurance.
Therefore, there may be no outside interests to
control the institution effectively, which exposes an
MFI to moral hazard.
Another issue related to deposit insurance is the
fact that commercial banks may be reluctant to
share their commonly funded deposit insurance
schemes with newly licensed MFIs because they
perceive these MFIs as high risks. Although it does
not make much sense to establish a separate insur-
ance protection fund for the few and relatively small
regulated MFIs, it may happen, as in Uganda, that
two depositors’ protection funds are needed (one
for commercial banks and one for MFIs) with one
governing board overseeing both funds. The prob-
lem that arises from such a scheme is that the con-
tributions to the fund provided by the few regulat-
ed MFIs will not be sufficient to cover all the risks
the fund should cover. It is also unclear how the
operating expenses that normally should be covered
out of the returns from investing the fund’s unused
capital in interest-bearing assets, can be funded.
Either the government or a donor agency may need
to provide the necessary seed capital for the estab-
lishment of an MFI deposit insurance fund large
enough to operate on a cost-covering basis. How-
ever, it must be kept in mind that regulated MFIs
are likely to mobilize relatively large amounts of
deposits. Depending on the amount of coverage,
the fund could easily be depleted if a single institu-
tion closes. In sum, the discussion on microfinance
deposit protection schemes is fairly new and does
not yet provide general experience to support ways
to design such schemes.26
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Supervision
The last decade saw broad discussion of regulatory
frameworks for MFIs. However, far less attention
was given to the supervisory challenges in microfi-
nance, perhaps because experience in microfinance
supervision is still limited. Regulators’ resources
are scarce and dedicated to protecting depositors
(thus, they are seldom interested in MFIs, because
their efforts tend to be directed to larger institu-
tions where most of the depositors’ assets are
concentrated). Effective supervision of financial
institutions comprises licensing new financial insti-
tutions; establishing a framework for prudential
reporting and off-site surveillance, and the execu-
tion of these activities; followed by on-site supervi-
sion. Supervision also includes the execution of
sanctions and corrective actions if regulations have
been violated.
This section first describes the risk-based
approach to supervision compared to the tradition-
al approach and shows why the former is more suit-
able for microfinance. Then, based primarily on the
experience in Uganda, the supervisory process is
described.
Risk-Based Approach to Supervision
Although experience in microfinance supervision is
still limited, indications are that a risk-based
approach to supervision might be better than the
traditional approach. The focus of risk-based super-
vision lies in understanding and assessing the ability
of a financial institution to identify, measure, moni-
tor, and control risks in an appropriate and timely
manner.27 The traditional approach to supervision
applies standardized procedures and focuses on in-
dividual transactions and the adequacy of collateral.
Risk-based supervision is suited to addressing
causes of problems rather than just highlighting
current problems.
To understand how the risk-based approach to
banking supervision can be distinguished from the
traditional approach it is necessary to understand
how to minimize the adverse consequences of risks
(Fitzgerald and Vogel 2000):
• Risks can be avoided by not taking any particular
risk. Many banks in developing countries follow
this strategy, especially when competition is
limited and banks are not forced to develop a
broader range of financial services and products
to groups that are perceived as high risk. 
• Risks can be offset by shifting the burden to the
borrower. Charging a risk premium (interest
rates and fees) when lending to high-risk bor-
rowers or demands for excessive collateralization
of loans are typical ways to offset risks. 
• Finally, risks can be mitigated by implementing
appropriate risk management systems.
The traditional approach to banking supervision
focuses primarily on the accuracy of financial state-
ments, compliance with certain financial ratios, and
internal controls to prevent internal fraud. The
advantage of the traditional approach is that it pro-
vides a clear picture of the present condition of a
financial institution, which can be measured and
quantified. However, insight into potential future
problems is limited.
Focusing on the current situation of a financial
institution and on financial indicators merely allows
supervisors to advise financial institutions to reduce
or simply avoid risks when problems are found. In
microfinance, risks cannot be avoided or offset
through sizable and high-value collateral. The
capacity to diversify risks across economic sectors
and geographic areas is limited. However, many
MFIs have successfully developed methods for man-
aging risks associated with microlending using thor-
ough analyses of the borrowers’ repayment capacity
and behavior, and offering strong repayment incen-
tives. Yet, traditional on-site and off-site surveillance
tools, with their focus on documentation and collat-
eralization of individual transactions, may overesti-
mate the risk associated with microfinance and,
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moreover, are not very practical when assessing the
risks of large numbers of transactions. 
In contrast to the traditional approach, risk-
based supervision focuses on risk management pro-
cedures. Supervisors recognize an individual MFI’s
ability to deal with risks associated with specific
borrowers, products, and investments and thus
leave room for offering nontraditional services such
as uncollateralized loans. Risk-based supervision,
with its focus on different risk profiles, is therefore
particularly suited to nontraditional financial
operations.
However, the risk-based approach makes the
supervisors’ job more challenging. Supervisors
must understand the risk profiles of different finan-
cial institutions dealing with different products and
services (and their clients) and they must be able to
assess the adequacy of the measures taken to miti-
gate these risks. In microfinance, therefore, supervi-
sors must have an understanding of how MFIs work
and be able to assess whether an individual MFI’s
management and methodologies are appropriate
and focused on minimizing risk. This requires a
deep understanding of the specific features of
microfinance, which is a binding constraint for the
application of this approach, because supervisors
normally have supervised only traditional financial
institutions and products. Supervisors need to gain
in-depth knowledge of the specific risks and the way
these risks can be effectively managed.
The introduction of risk-based supervision
brings along a cultural change. Traditional supervi-
sion deals with risks by placing prudential limits on
the risks that financial institutions may take. As a
result, supervisors are reluctant to treat financial
institutions differently based on the ability of those
institutions to manage risks. Supervisors that have
decided to adopt a risk-based approach can be
expected to be more open to nontraditional prod-
ucts and services and hence may be more willing
to accept microfinance as a specific risk manage-
ment technique for handling small and unsecured
loans.
The Supervisory Process
An effective supervisory system comprises off-site
surveillance and on-site examination. Off-site sur-
veillance is based on analysis of financial data sup-
plied by the financial institutions. The central
objective is to monitor the condition of individual
financial institutions, peer groups, and the financial
sector as a whole. Off-site surveillance provides an
early indication of an individual financial institu-
tion’s problems and helps define priorities for the
use of supervisory resources. Off-site surveillance
relies on financial reporting in a prescribed format
that is supplied by financial institutions according to
certain time schedules. Normally, data on liquidity,
capital adequacy, asset quality, portfolio concentra-
tion, earnings and profitability, and the balance
sheet structure is collected. This will also be the case
for regulated MFIs. Nonetheless, because the risk
profile of MFIs is different, the focus of financial
reporting may be different and reporting formats
and time schedules should be adapted to the spe-
cific features of microfinance.
On-site examination enables the supervisory
authority to validate the information provided by a
financial institution during the reporting process, to
establish the cause of a financial institution’s prob-
lems, and to assess the future viability or possible
problem areas that should be further observed. It
also enables the supervisor to assess management’s
risk-management capabilities, an attribute difficult
to capture through off-site surveillance. On-site
examination is demanding of supervisory resources
and therefore should only address the areas of
greatest risks determined in previous inspections
and through the off-site surveillance process.
External auditors play an important role when
risk-based supervision is applied. External auditors
are in the position to provide complementary infor-
mation within the supervisory process, although
they cannot replace prudential supervision executed
by a public supervisory authority. However, in some
countries, supervisory authorities use only external
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auditors for on-site supervision. Whereas the super-
visory authority’s focus is on maintaining the stabil-
ity of the financial system and the protection of
depositors’ money, the auditor’s major task is to
present the annual financial statements to share-
holders and, possibly, to the general public. Because
supervisory resources are scarce, a reasonable
degree of job-sharing between supervisors and
auditors permits supervision to be more efficient.
Drawing from the Bank of Uganda’s policy, risk-
based supervision comprises three major steps
(Bank of Uganda 2002):
• Institutional overview and off-site surveillance
• Assessment of the financial institution’s risks
• Development and execution of the supervisory
plan
Institutional overview and off-site surveillance.
The institutional overview is a summary report of
the institution’s present condition, its present and
prospective risk profiles, past supervisory findings,
and other key issues. It is based on all suitable infor-
mation such as past examination reports, the find-
ings of the off-site surveillance process, reports sub-
mitted by the regulated institution, and internal and
external audit reports.
The off-site surveillance process comprises the
following activities (Bank of Uganda 2004):
• Monitoring the liquidity position to periodically
verify compliance with minimum liquidity
requirements and observe the development of
relevant assets and liabilities. Failure to meet
the requirements or unusual movements in the
liquidity position indicate a serious risk. Because
maintenance of adequate liquidity is essential for
the soundness of any financial institution, the
institutions must submit their liquidity state-
ments on a relatively frequent basis.
• Monitoring the overall financial position to peri-
odically verify compliance with the capital ade-
quacy ratio, provisioning, and lending limits. To
verify compliance with the legal ongoing capital
requirements, the supervisor will analyze the
progression of all balance sheet and income and
expense accounts and verify whether loan loss
provisions and other necessary adjustments have
been booked. If adjustments are not properly
booked, the financial statements should be
rejected and penalties should be considered. 
• Because credit risk is a substantial threat in MFIs,
it is important to analyze the portfolio-at-risk
(the balance of loans overdue more than a
certain number of days) report regularly. In
Uganda, for example, this occurs on a quarterly
basis through a review of the MFI’s loan files and
corresponding reports.
• The analysis of the financial situation focuses on
key weaknesses detected in the last on-site exami-
nation to determine whether these issues have
been addressed.
Off-site surveillance should define thresholds for
key indicators to be monitored and benchmarks
that when reached will trigger an alert. Such indica-
tors can include an unusual growth of operations
that is substantially higher than average market
growth, capital adequacy ratios that approach the
legal limit, and portfolio at risk ratios (the ratio of
the balance of loans overdue, for example, more
than 30 days, to outstanding portfolio) approach-
ing 5 percent.
Supervisors should follow a “dialogue-oriented
approach.” Whenever unusual movements in key
areas are detected during the off-site surveillance,
the supervisor should first try to determine the
underlying causes through discussions with
the MFI’s finance manager. If the problem cannot
be resolved through dialogue with the MFI, the
supervisor can conduct targeted on-site examina-
tions that address the specific problem.
In addition to the off-site analysis of the financial
institution, report on the financial institution, an
institutional overview is produced and includes
descriptions of the internal and external audit,
Regulation and Supervision | 49
including the nature of any specific work performed
by external auditors during the period under
review; a summary of supervisory activities per-
formed since the last review, including special exam-
inations, supervisory actions, and the MFI’s degree
of compliance including applications (for example,
for opening new branches) that have been submit-
ted to the supervisory authority; and considerations
for future examinations.
The institutional overview should be maintained
by a supervision officer who has been assigned
responsibility for the off-site analysis of a particular
institution. Ideally, this person would also perform
the on-site examinations, or at least closely collabo-
rate with the examiner in charge for the particular
MFI, because the whole process of risk-based
supervision is based on an in-depth knowledge of
the financial institution.
The risk assessment process. In preparation for the
on-site examination, a preliminary assessment of
major risks and the financial institution’s ability to
manage these risks is recommended (table 2.3).
Risk assessment in Uganda, for example, is
accomplished using a risk framework that sum-
marizes all available information on current and
potential risks typical in institutions that engage in
microfinance as their primary business and the
external and internal sources of these risks.28 The
risk assessment takes the type of risk and the risk
level into account. If, for instance, a position is large
in relation to the institution’s overall resources and
could potentially result in a significant or harmful
loss for the institution, the level of risk is considered
high. In MFIs a typical example for an inherently
high risk is credit risk, because the quality of the
loan portfolio can be highly volatile and the loan
portfolio typically constitutes a major portion of the
balance sheet. 
The risk framework also includes an assessment
of the adequacy of the risk management systems
within the MFI for the identified areas of risk.
Composite risk is based on the level of inherent
risk of the activity and the overall strength of the
risk management system for that activity. If the risk
management system does not adequately mitigate a
high inherent risk of an activity, the composite risk
is high. Alternatively, it can be low if risk manage-
ment systems are strong and can mitigate much of
the risk effectively. For example, if the credit tech-
nology (all procedures and policies for extending,
monitoring, and collecting loans) is adequate to
manage the specific credit risks arising from differ-
ent loan products (such as group or individual
loans), the composite risk can be moderate or even
low. Conversely, if the lending technology is not
adequate due to deficient procedures, the compos-
ite credit risk will be high. The direction simply
indicates whether the risk is increasing, decreasing,
or remaining stable. 
Table 2.3 Example of an MFI Risk Framework (Summary)
Inherent level Risk Composite 
Risk area of risk management risk Direction
Strategic High Weak High Increasing
Credit High Acceptable Moderate Increasing
Liquidity Low Weak Moderate Stable
Interest rate High Acceptable Moderate Increasing
Operational High Weak High Increasing
Overall risk High Weak Moderate Increasing
Source: Bank of Uganda 2005.
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A preliminary risk profile is prepared for the
institution based on information compiled during
off-site surveillance, auditors’ reports, former exam-
inations, and so on. It is then finalized during the
on-site examination and constitutes a confidential
document for internal use of the supervisory
authority only. The risk profile is a living document
that should be updated on a regular basis and after
every examination.
A sample risk framework that provides indicative
benchmarks for MDIs in Uganda is included as
annex 2B, Risk Framework.
Organization and execution of on-site examinations.
To be effective, on-site examinations need careful
preparation. Before visiting the MFI, the examiners
should review the current documentation describ-
ing the policies and procedures of the financial insti-
tution (that is, lending policies and procedures,
deposit policies and procedures, accounting policies,
information systems and procedures, and quality of
internal controls).
Supervisory officers, in coordination with the
MFI’s IT manager, should extract data on all out-
standing loans and deposits to generate a data file
that can be reviewed with the supervisory
authority’s data analysis tool. The idea is to verify
the integrity of the information and to validate
the accuracy and reliability of the MFI’s MIS (for
example, have all loans reported to be rolled over
been reported properly? are interest and other
charges recognized as income according to the
payment schedule?). Any discrepancies between
reported information and the results of the analysis
should be reviewed with the MFI’s management.
The review of the extracted data also helps verify
compliance with key regulations (loan limits as per-
centage of core capital, capital adequacy ratios, loan
loss provisioning, and others). The review of the
internal audit activities should be based on the data
extracted by the examiners.
The review of documentation and analysis of
data, the results of the preliminary risk assessment,
and a list of weaknesses identified in former exami-
nations constitute the basis for the supervisory plan.
This plan addresses all supervisory activities to be
conducted and the scope of these activities (for
example, full or targeted). The examination should
be tailored to the size, complexity, current rating,
and risk profile of the institution. Once again,
supervisory resources must concentrate on areas of
greatest risk.
The examination visit should focus on ade-
quately assessing management’s ability to identify,
measure, monitor, and control risks. The examina-
tion includes evaluation of the risk management
systems and internal controls, liquid assets, asset
and liability structure as well as liquidity manage-
ment, oversight, and planning procedures. Check-
lists for the different areas of potential risks and
typical weaknesses that may cause problems can
serve as a guide, especially for junior supervisory
staff with little operational experience.
The well-known CAMEL system (Capital, Asset
quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity) is
often cited as a method for assessing the adequacy
of a financial institution’s financial and management
health.29 The CAMEL system is not associated
with any particular supervisory approach nor does it
focus on specific risks or measures to minimize
these risks (Fitzgerald and Vogel 2000). However,
the risk profile of financial institutions is implicitly
given in any CAMEL rating. The CAMEL system
can be adapted to risk-based supervision. For
instance, for supervision of the Ugandan MDIs, a
“CAELS” (CAMEL  M  S [see box 2.13]) sys-
tem has been developed that includes the adequacy
of the institution’s risk management system, which
can be determined only after the on-site examina-
tion takes place.
The final examination report should clearly and
concisely communicate any supervisory issues and
comment on deficiencies noted in the institution’s
risk management systems in each risk area (credit
risk, management or operational risk, liquidity risk,
governance risk, such as). On-site examinations
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auditors (Van Greuning and Brajovic-Bratonovic
2000). To avoid ineffective and costly proce-
dures, the supervisor must be willing to enter
into a dialogue with the supervised institution,
that is, to listen and take into account the views
of senior staff and the board of the regulated
institutions. Owners and managers are crucial in
ensuring effective corporate governance, and
maintaining professional standards, respectively.
Internal auditors are in charge of continuously
reviewing and ensuring that properly defined
processes and procedures are followed. External
auditors approved by the supervisory body play a
key role in examining the accuracy of the finan-
cial statements.31
Box 2.13 The CAELS Rating System
An overall measurement of the MFI’s performance
can be obtained using a ratio that is composed of
two elements:
• A quantitative CAELS (Capital, Asset quality,
Earnings, Liquidity, Sensitivity to market risk) 
ratio 
• A qualitative indication of the adequacy of the
risk management systems—the Management
(“M”) component.
To make sure the adequacy of the MFI’s risk man-
agement system gets a higher weight than any
other component, the overall CAMELS ratio is com-
puted using the formula:
CAMELS  CAELS  M
The CAELS ratio is computed by using weights for its
different components. To capture the specific risk
profile of microfinance, those components that
constitute major risks in microfinance get higher
weights. For example, the proposed weighting in
Uganda is Capital, 30 percent; Asset quality, 20 per-
cent; Earnings, 20 percent; Liquidity, 20 percent,
Sensitivity to market risk, 10 percent. To assign rat-
ings (1 to 5) to the components of the CAELS ratio,
indicators and benchmarks for the different ratings
should be defined. For instance, Earnings could be
measured through the Return on Adjusted Equity
(RoA). A RoA above a certain limit (2 percent, for
example) could be given an excellent rating
(1) whereas a negative RoA could be rated as
poor (5). (Note: It is important not to copy bench-
marks from elsewhere but to develop them in
the supervisory process because only experience
can lead to benchmarks that are adequate for
certain types of financial institutions in specific
environments.)
The overall CAELS ratio ranges from 1 to 5, where
1 is the highest rating. 
The Management component of the CAMELS
ratio is determined through proxies that give an
indication of the quality of the MFI’s risk manage-
ment systems. Shortcomings in the risk management
systems will reduce the rating given by the CAELS
ratio. For example, if the loan tracking software has
significant shortcomings, the CAELS ratio could be
reduced by one point. An additional point can be
subtracted if deficiencies in the internal audit are
detected.
Source: Adapted from Bank of Uganda 2005.
should be conducted periodically.30 If the on-site
examination is well prepared and focused on
areas that have been identified as potential risks,
the costs of supervision can be kept to reasonable
levels. 
Summary of principles of risk-based supervision.
To summarize, risk-based supervision of MFIs con-
centrates on the following principles (Hannig and
Omar 2000):
• Share responsibilities among key players: Under
the risk-based approach, the responsibility for
risk management is shared among supervisors,
owners, managers, and internal and external
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• Focus on licensing: The licensing process is not a
guarantee that a financial institution will be
run professionally once licensed. It is, however,
an effective means of reducing the number of
potentially weak financial institutions engaging
in deposit mobilization from the public. Focus-
ing on licensing enables the supervisor to
enforce quality standards and minimizes the
probability of failures in the future, thus limiting
loss to depositors and maintaining public confi-
dence in financial institutions. With this focus,
the resources required for the supervisory
process are relatively high in the first stages of
the life cycle of an MFI. However, the more
efficiently the licensing process has been carried
out, the less costly is the subsequent supervisory
process, because it is not necessary to do detailed
routine transaction-focused examinations as long
as there are no indications of a deterioration of
the risk position of the MFI.
• Focus on internal controls: During the licensing
process, risk-based supervision focuses on the
quality of the MIS and the adequacy of internal
controls rather than relying too much on exter-
nal auditors.32
• Focus on procedures and practices: Assessing
the quality of the loan portfolio must be based
on understanding the risks associated with the
key products and procedures. Rather than
reviewing documentation of individual transac-
tions, supervisors review the history and trends
of portfolio quality and compare it with bench-
marks. They appraise qualitative aspects of the
lending technology, such as adequacy of the loan
appraisal and collection procedures for different
products, and the quality of the loan officers’
work and management oversight. Supervisors
focus their attention on areas of greatest risk and
examine whether internal audits are appropriate
to deal with these risks. Liquidity risk is assessed
by examining the adequacy of liquidity manage-
ment and the availability of flexible access to
liquidity pools.
• Use assessment tools: Risk-based supervision uses
financial ratios and other quantitative
instruments and methodologies. However, these
instruments need to be adapted to assess the
specific risk profiles of MFIs and their portfolios.
Specific benchmarks can be defined in accor-
dance with best practices, taking into account
the specific situation in a given country.
• Focus on information disclosure: Licensed finan-
cial institutions have to systematically and in a
timely manner disclose accurate information to
the supervisor. Their MIS, therefore, must be
able to accommodate reporting requirements
set by the supervisor. Reporting requirements
should, however, take into account specific fea-
tures of microfinance and should focus on the
information that is needed to assess the specific
risks encountered by MFIs. The frequency of
reporting depends on the volatility of these risks
and should take into consideration potential
communication difficulties associated with oper-
ating in remote areas and with lack of proper
infrastructure.
Remaining Challenges
Despite the growing body of experience in regula-
tion and supervision of MFIs, some outstanding
challenges remain.33
Costs of Supervision Cannot 
Be Covered by MFIs
Prudential regulation and supervision include the
authorization of financial institutions to accept and
intermediate funds from the public, on-site and
off-site surveillance, corrective actions, and, at the
extreme, the power to take over, liquidate, or close
down financial institutions. The cost of supervision
is significant and the inclusion of large numbers of
small MFIs may overstretch usually tight budgets.
In some countries, financial institutions are obliged
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to fully or partly contribute to the costs of their
own supervision. Yet, MFIs often cannot afford to
fully assume these costs. For instance, Peruvian reg-
ulated MFIs were not in a position to cover more
than 6.5 percent of their supervisory costs in
2000.34 The deficit was covered through contribu-
tions from the larger financial institutions. It
appears, therefore, to be indispensable for govern-
ments to finance—at least partly—efficient supervi-
sion of microfinance operations.
Owners of Regulated MFIs Do Not Necessarily
Have Pockets Deep Enough to Respond to
the Need for Capital Injections in Times
of Financial Distress 
To address the ownership and governance risk of
NGO MFIs, regulators often insist that they con-
vert into companies with real shareholders with
“deep pockets” to bail out the financial institution
in case of financial distress. During the late 1990s
a number of specialized institutional investors
for MFIs emerged. However, it is still not clear
how “deep” their pockets are.35 In addition,
these organizations usually follow conservative
investment strategies and therefore tend to focus on
the best performing MFIs, which are often already
in the position to access market funds to expand
their operations. Moreover, “public” investors espe-
cially (for example, international financial institu-
tions) typically expect to perform their role as a
shareholder for a limited time, and given the fact
that the issue of transformation is quite young, it
is still not clear whether enough commercial
investors are willing to buy the shares when institu-
tional investors exit. Finally, with “real” commercial
investors, mission drift becomes a risk, because they
may decide to move away from microfinance to
segments of the market that they perceive as more
profitable.
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Annex 2A Note on Supervising
Savings and Credit Cooperatives
In most countries, savings and credit cooperatives
(SACCOs) are too small to justify the cost of regu-
lation; however, very large SACCOs operating in
some countries do pose systemic risk to the coun-
try’s financial system. Where large SACCOs are not
present, it appears to be commonly understood
that small institutions with limited geographical
coverage and common-bond members know each
other well enough to exert sufficient self-control on
the institutions’ performance. Nonetheless, the
effectiveness of these mechanisms should not be
overestimated. Due to the specific institutional
setup of SACCOs and other member-based institu-
tions, especially in comparison to nonmutualist
institutions such as NGOs, members theoretically
have a strong incentive to monitor the operations
of the SACCO of which they are a member. How-
ever, these incentives are seldom strong enough to
manage without any external oversight. First,
because there is no secondary market for coopera-
tive shares they are repurchased at their nominal
value and not as fractions of the organization’s net
worth. Members thus may not have strong incen-
tives to enforce profitability of operations, other
than to receive dividend payments. Second, the
“democratic” system of “one person, one vote”
leads to a situation in which members, even if they
owned a considerable portion of the cooperative’s
shares, would not have adequate voting powers.
Thus, even if not donor-funded, SACCOs have a
specific incentive structure that prevents members
from seeing their participation as a profitable
investment. They typically perceive their ownership
as the only way to access financial services (Krahnen
and Schmidt 1994).
As has been mentioned, the capacity of supervi-
sors to oversee large numbers of small institutions
effectively is limited. And self-supervision of finan-
cial intermediaries has not proved to be effective
due to the inherent conflict of interest.
An alternative may be delegated supervision,
under which the banking supervisory authority
maintains regulatory power, but the tasks of regu-
lar performance monitoring and on-site inspec-
tions are delegated to a specialized third party (for
instance, an independent or an umbrella body). In
many developing countries, SACCOs are regulated
under a special law designed for any cooperative
society independent of its activity. Typically, a
ministry or another public agency created for the
cooperative sector is in charge of supervising
them. These entities have neither the expertise
nor the financial and technical capacity to pruden-
tially supervise financial activities.36 Power of
enforcement, however, cannot be delegated to a
third party because it requires legal backing by a
public agency with a clear mandate to take correc-
tive action to be effective. Delegated supervision
can be effective but, so far, there are not many
examples where it has been put into practice
successfully.37
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Annex 2B Risk Framework (Example from Uganda)
Quantitative Assessment
Legal Source of
Risk Category Indicator Rationale Definition reference verification Benchmark or rating
Ownership and
governance
risk
Management
risk
Maximum
shareholding 
Minimum capital
1. Minimum
paid-up capital
2. Minimum
capital
unimpaired
by losses
Ongoing capital
adequacy
Operating cost
ratio
Operational self-
sufficiency
Avoid concentra-
tion in ownership
Ensure adequate
funds to run the
business
Ensure adequate
funds to run the
business
To assess effi-
ciency of
management
To assess ability
of MDI to cover
all costs
Share of one
person over total
equity
1. Minimum
paid-up capital
has to be
provided in
liquid assets
(S. 15 1)
Capital adequacy
ratio, core capital
in form of issued
and fully paid-up
shares plus all
retained reserves
and other
reserves
approved by
Bank of Uganda
Operating costs
(administrative,
salary expenses,b
depreciation,
board fees)/avg.
portfolio
outstanding
Financial income/
(financial costs 
operating costs
loan loss
provision)
MDI Act, 
Section 21 
1. MDI Act,
Section 15 (1)
2. MDI Act,
Section 15 (2)
MDI Act, 
Section 16; 
Definition of
weights in
regulations 
Internal
benchmark
n.a.
Articles of associ-
ation, announce-
ment of change
Audited
accounts,
certificates of
investment,
reports, license
application
Licensing,
monthly compu-
tation as pre-
scribed in regula-
tions on capital
adequacy
Balance sheet
and profit and
loss statement
(monthly)
Profit and loss
statement
(monthly)
30% with 5 years transition
period; no limitation for sub-
sidiaries of banks, reputable
financial institutions or, in
exceptional cases, reputable
public companies with
special approval from Bank
of Uganda
25,000 currency points;a (a
currency point at the time of
licensing the first four MDIs
was valued at 20,000
Ugandan shillings)
20% total capital, 15% core
capital to risk-weighted
assets as follows: cash, cash
equivalents, balance with
Bank of Uganda, invest-
ments in government securi-
ties: 0%, Balance with other
licensed financial institutions:
20% All others: 100%
25%
No benchmark
(Continues on the following page)
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Credit risk
Financial self-
sufficiency
Provisioning
Write-offs
Loan loss reserve
ratio
Portfolio at risk 
Restrictions on
insider lending
To assess ability
of MDI to cover
all costs and pre-
serve its value 
Not to overstate
income and for
early identifica-
tion of problem
loans
Not to overstate
assets
To check ade-
quate and pru-
dent provisioning
To assess quality
of the loan
portfolio
To reduce insider
abuse
Financial income/
(financial costs 
operating costs
loan loss provi-
sion  imputed
cost of capital)
Provisioning for
the outstanding
balance (reduced
by compulsory
savings balance)
according to
days overdue
with stricter pro-
visioning sched-
ule for resched-
uled loans
Remove unrecov-
erable loans from
books
Loan loss reserve/
value of loans
outstanding
Balance of loans
past due (30
days)  balance
of restructured
loans/outstand-
ing loan portfolio
Maximum per-
centage of core
capital; definition
of insider in act
Internal
benchmark
Regulations on
asset quality
Regulations on
asset quality
n.a.
Internal
benchmark
MDI Act, 
Section 18 (1c)
Balance sheet
and profit and
loss statement
(monthly)
Statement for
provisions on
bad debts
(monthly)
Balance sheet
(monthly)
Balance sheet
(quarterly)
Portfolio quality
report (monthly)
Statement on
loans to insiders
(monthly)
100%
General 1% (8–30 days
5%), 31–60 days 25%
(50%), 61–90 days 50%
(75%), > 90 days 100%
(figures in parentheses for
rescheduled loans)
Latest after 180 days of
loans becoming delinquent
or case by case decision (for
example, on death of
borrower)
Ratio to be compared with
Portfolio at Risk, no inde-
pendent ratio, therefore no
benchmark
5%
Unsecured and in the
aggregate and outstanding
<1% of core capital
Quantitative Assessment (Continued)
Legal Source of
Risk Category Indicator Rationale Definition reference verification Benchmark or rating
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Liquidity risk
Interest rate
risk
Restrictions
on credit
concentration
Liquidity ratio
Gap analysis
To promote risk
diversification
To ensure that
institution can
meet its short-
term obligations
at reasonable
cost
To measure
sensitivity of
interest-bearing
assets and liabili-
ties to changes
in interest rate
Maximum
percentage of
core capital
Liquid assets to
deposit liabilities
Matching interest
rate–bearing
assets with inter-
est rate–bearing
liabilities for 3, 6,
and 12 months
MDI Act, 
Section 18 (1a)
MDI Act, 
Section 17 and
regulations on
liquidity
MDI Act, 
Section 27 (3) 
Portfolio quality
report (monthly) 
Liquidity state-
ment (weekly)
Term structure of
assets and
liabilities
In the aggregate and out-
standing <1% of core capi-
tal for individual borrower,
<5% of core capital for a
group of borrowers
15% 
Look at different time
buckets (3, 6, 12 months), in
each bucket assets similar to
liabilities; no benchmark
a. Currency points are used rather than a specific currency amount so changes can be made to the value of minimum capital required without requiring a change to the body of the law.
b. Salary expenses only include staff in-kind donations if they are of a permanent nature (3 years).
n.a.  not applicable
Ownership and
governance risk
“Fit and proper”
check for owners of
MDIs
“Fit and proper”
check for directors
To ensure responsible
ownership and
accountability
To ensure integrity
and competence to
manage the business
Reasonable assurance that
owners bail out MDI in
distress by assessing
shareholders’ net worth,
signing a declaration of
the willingness of share-
holders to that effect, and
assessing the capacity of
the latter to raise addi-
tional capital; professional
background (financial vs.
social objectives)
Look at competence and
professional background
of directors
MDI Act, 
Section 21 (4), in
connection with 
Second Schedule for
shareholders >10% 
and transfers >10%;
MDI Act, Section 7 (4) c;
regulations on licensing
MDI Act, 
Section 22 (2),
regulations
Reliable information on
new shareholders such
as curriculum vitae,
references, and so on;
announcement in case
of transfer of shares
Reliable information on
new directors such as
curriculum vitae, refer-
ences, interviews, and
so on
Qualitative Assessment
Definition, Legal Source of
Risk Category Indicator Rationale criteria reference verification
(Continues on the following page)
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Management
risk
Role of the board
1. System of checks
and balances
2. Incentive schemes
3. Vision and mis-
sion statement
Reporting of internal
auditor to board
audit committee
Dependence on
donations and grants
“Fit and proper”
check for
management
Human resources
policy
Adequacy of internal
control systems
Promote good
governance
To ensure compliance
of management with
corporate policy and
procedures as laid
down by the board
To be aware of the
influence of donors
Ensure professional-
ism of management 
To ensure profession-
alism in MDI
operations
Ensure orderly con-
duct of business
1. 4-eyes-principle (two
people accountable)
responsibilities and
powers
2. Bonus-system, fringe
benefits, and such
3. Prominence of finan-
cial objectives
Actual practice and
requirement in
constitution
Extent of donations and
grant funding, respective
terms (duration,
conditions)
Banking and microfi-
nance skills
1. Recruitment policy for
staff, particularly loan
officers
2. Policy on staff
development
3. Staff turnover
4. Job descriptions
5. Remuneration and
benefits
1. Quality of accounting
(timeliness, accuracy,
compliance with inter-
national accounting
standards)
2. MIS (manuals, appro-
priateness and quality
of IS)
3. Existence of process
flow documents
MDI Act, Section 24 and
guidelines
MDI Act, Section 28 
and guidelines;
requirement in MDI
constitution
n.a.
MDI Act, Section 7 (4) a,
Section 81 (4) b, second
schedule
Guidelines
MDI Act, Section 28 (2i),
regulations on licensing 
Constitution and
policies of MDI; 
on-site inspections
Board policies; on-site
inspections
Balance sheet,
donations and grant
contracts
Licensing and on-site
inspections; changes in
management to be
announced; references,
curriculum vitae, and
others
Policy documents,
interviews
Accounting records,
systems manuals,
licensing, on-site
inspections
Qualitative Assessment (Continued)
Definition, Legal Source of
Risk Category Indicator Rationale criteria reference verification
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Credit risk
Liquidity risk
Interest rate risk
Product development
Lending methodology
Approval limits
Responsiveness of
policies to business
environment
Quality of documen-
tation of loan
portfolio
Write-off policy
Sectoral distribution
of loan portfolio
Procedures for
liquidity and funds
management
Institution monitors
developments in
financial markets
To assess whether
proper guidelines for
product development
are in place
To ensure that proper
lending policies are in
place
To ensure risk
limitation at different
levels
To ensure that policy
and management is
flexible enough to
cope with changes in
business environment
To ensure that proper
records are kept for
disbursement and
collection
To have an adequate
write-off policy in
place
To assess risk diversi-
fication and to take
specific risks in
specific sectors into
account
To ensure that insti-
tution can meet its
short-term obliga-
tions at reasonable
cost
To be aware of devel-
opments in financial
markets and their
implications for
institution
Policy on product
development
Repayment incentives,
clarity of description;
borrower selection,
disbursement and
collection procedures
Specification of approval
limits at various levels
Frequency of policy review
Procedures for loan dis-
bursement and collection
Written policy for
write-offs
Sectoral distribution and
changes thereto due to
new product develop-
ment, high growth in spe-
cific sector, and so forth
Arrangements for and
costs of liquidity access
Monitoring procedures for
developments in financial
markets
MDI Act, Section 19,
guidelines, on-site
inspection manual
Guidelines, regulations,
on-site inspection
manual
Guidelines, regulations,
on-site inspection
manual
Guidelines, regulations,
on-site inspection
manual
Guidelines, regulations,
on-site inspection
manual
Guidelines, regulations,
on-site inspection
manual
MDI Act, Section 57,
guidelines, regulations,
on-site inspection
manual
MDI Act, Section 27 (3)
MDI Act, Section 27 (3)
and Section 57, guide-
lines, on-site inspection
manual
Credit manual; licens-
ing and on-site inspec-
tions, compulsory
information on new
products
Credit manual,
licensing and on-site
inspections
Credit manual,
licensing and on-site
inspections
Credit manual,
management minutes,
board minutes, on-site
inspections
Loan dossiers, licensing
and on-site inspections
Credit manual, board
minutes, licensing and
on-site inspections
Credit manual, loan
policy
Liquidity and fund
management policy,
licensing and on-site
inspections
Performance reports
(monthly), investment
policy, sensitivity analy-
sis (if available), budget
performance report
Source: Adapted from unpublished “Risk Framework Final,” Bank of Uganda, 2001.
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Notes
1. In the context of microfinance, various agencies and
in particular the German bilateral co-operation, since
the early 1990s, have supported an approach to
“financial system development” with the goal of
strengthening financial intermediation, thereby rec-
ognizing that in addition to credit, other financial
services, particularly savings, are equally important to
the poor (BMZ 1994, 2004). 
2. For example, a new law may be required based on the
lack of inclusiveness of current banking law(s) or the
fact that the main providers of microfinance services
are NGOs (as opposed to member-based savings
cooperatives or banks that fall under supervision).
3. The term “legislation” generally includes the pri-
mary legislation, which is the law that governs the
financial institution; secondary legislation includes the
regulations that outline requirements that the finan-
cial institution (or that portion of business governed
by specific regulations) must meet on an ongoing
basis; and guidelines provide benchmarks for the
supervisory body to monitor financial institution
performance.
4. Some countries have introduced nonprudential regu-
lation that is enforced by an independent overseer
empowered to enforce codes of conduct, such as the
Microfinance Regulatory Council in South Africa
(Staschen 2003).
5. A recent publication by the Small Enterprise Educa-
tion and Promotion Network underlines the appro-
priateness of self-regulation for the protection of
consumer rights (McAllister 2003). 
6. In Uganda, three years after the passage of the Micro-
finance Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDI) Act, there
are four licensed MDIs and one more in the pipeline.
Some segments of government are questioning
whether the Act was worth the effort, putting the
MDIs in the position of actively defending their exis-
tence. However, the MDIs are by far the largest MFIs
in the country and serve over half the Ugandan mar-
ket. As capacity of MFIs to sustainably deliver finan-
cial services increases, and as the capacity at the cen-
tral bank to supervise more than five or six MDIs
increases, so will the outreach and likely, the number
of MDIs in Uganda. It would be imprudent at this
point to rush to license additional institutions.
7. Christen, Lyman, and Rosenberg (2003) provides
a comprehensive description of the issues that non-
prudential regulation can comprise. 
8. This was recently done in the Philippines. With the
enactment of the new Banking Law in 2000, micro-
finance, on the one hand, was recognized as part of
mainstream banking but, on the other hand, a section
was included where the Monetary Board is inclined
to regulate the interest rates imposed on microfi-
nance borrowers (Llanto 2001). 
9. During the process of passing the MDI Act, the
Ugandan Parliament, for instance, temporarily consid-
ered including a section that would have subjected the
approval of the statutory instruments to parliamentary
scrutiny instead of leaving this to the central bank. 
10. The regulator is the rule-making body and the super-
visor monitors compliance with the regulations. (The
regulator and supervisor can be the same institution,
for example, the central bank.)
11. This list, of course, is not exhaustive. Some authors,
for instance, mention new industry risk as a specific
risk to microfinance. New industry risk refers to the
fact that because microfinance is still young there are
not many well-trained managers who are able to deal
with rapid introduction of new products and tech-
nologies (Staschen 1999). New industry risk includes
the risk of supervisors lacking experience with micro-
finance operations. In addition, according to coun-
try-specific legislation, risks such as foreign exchange
risks can be associated with microfinance operations.
12. In addition, supervisory authorities are also concerned
with other credit risks such as “balance due from other
banks or financial institutions,” and, in some cases,
even Treasury Bills. (Comment from David Kalyango,
Assistant Chief Accountant, Bank of Uganda, e-mail
communication with Joanna Ledgerwood, 9/05.)
13. “Core Principles for Banking Supervision” (Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision 1997) highlights
the following risks in banking: credit risk, country and
transfer risk (in international lending), market risk
(risk of losses in operations that arise from movements
in market prices including foreign exchange markets),
interest rate risk (exposure to adverse movements in
interest rates), liquidity risk, operational risk, legal risk
(risk that might arise from incorrect legal advice or
the failure of resolving legal issues under the current
legislation), and reputational risks (arising from oper-
ational failures and other sources).
14. For further analysis on microfinance risk, refer to
Vogel, Gomez, and Fitzgerald 2000. 
15. In some countries, credit information services are
included in the prudential regulatory framework.
However, because their primary purpose is the
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protection of the financial institution by facilitating a
better selection of borrowers, credit information
services only indirectly protect depositors through
the limitation of a financial institution’s risk exposure.
As such, they are not always considered part of pru-
dential regulation.
16. During the past few years, numerous comparative
studies on regulatory frameworks for MFIs and oper-
ations were published. See Gallardo et al. 2005;
Jansson, Rosales, and Westley 2003; Meagher 2002;
and Staschen 2003. 
17. There are often exceptions to this, for example, if a
licensed financial institution operates an MFI as a
subsidiary, or if a shareholder is a public company
with diverse ownership.
18. A well-documented example is provided by the
licensed MFI FINANSOL in Colombia where in
1995 the predominance of the founder NGO was
one of the major reasons for a serious financial crisis
that resulted in the near-collapse of the institution
(Staschen 1999; CGAP 2000). 
19. In 1999, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion issued a consultative paper for improving the
capital framework. One of the three pillars of the
framework is the improved calculation of capital ade-
quacy by refining the existing system of risk weight-
ings and shifting the regulatory emphasis to assessing
the banks’ own risk management processes. For
details see Chami, Khan, and Sharma 2003.
20. From MDI Licensing regulations, p. 330. 
21. Note that it can take a long time for the supervisor to
accept the application as complete. In Uganda, the
application of one institution took a full year from the
initial submission to be deemed complete.
22. Although not directly addressed in this book, some
organizations may decide to create an MFI as a regu-
lated institution without going through the NGO or
project stage. In this case, prelicensing on-site inspec-
tions are not possible without the supervisor at least
declaring his or her intention (without guarantee)
that a license will be granted. Premises are prepared
and policy manuals drafted after this “letter of intent”
(the term used in Kenya) has been sent out.
23. In Uganda, a prelicensing inspection team comprises
four to five inspectors, who, depending on the size of
the branch network, will spend three to four weeks in
the field.
24. Regulators normally require that the board approves
the manual and policies on risk management as well
as on money laundering.
25. A common tool that supervisors use to prevent
financial institutions in trouble from further risk-
taking is stop-lending orders. In microfinance, how-
ever, stop-lending orders can be dangerous. If the
MFI stops granting subsequent loans, borrowers lose
their main incentive to repay. This may lead to a
rapid deterioration of the portfolio quality and, given
the high weight of the portfolio in overall assets,
aggravate the problem. Supervisors therefore should
be careful when using stop-lending orders (CGAP
2003).
26. A facility has been created in Latin America by the
donors to help mitigate liquidity constraints in the
wake of external shocks (natural or other emergen-
cies, or both); see www.emergencyliquidityfacility.
com.
27. The concept of risk-based supervision should not be
confused with the Basle Capital Accord of 1988.
Whereas the Basle Capital Accord and subsequent
amendments determine what should constitute a
financial institution’s capital and assigns risk weights
to assets, it does not prescribe a specific approach to
banking supervision. 
28. The typical risks as described previously in this chap-
ter include governance risk, credit risk, management
or operational risk, liquidity risk, and interest rate
risk. The supervisory authority may add other types
of risks such as reputational risk, market risk (for
example, arising from politization of microfinance or
movements in market prices), and legal risks (lack of
legal security, for example).
29. The CAMEL system has been adapted by ACCION
International to the features of the microfinance
industry. The ACCION CAMEL serves as a decision-
making tool for MFIs, as an internal assessment tool
for ACCION affiliates to provide more focused tech-
nical assistance, and as a rating instrument that is
meant to contribute to the “due diligence” process of
potential investors (Saltzman, Rock, and Salinger
1998). 
30. For example, in Uganda onsite examinations are con-
ducted at least once a year.
31. Empirical evidence suggests that external auditors still
lack experience to assess the financial soundness of
MFIs. It is therefore recommended that the supervi-
sor regularly test the auditors’ work (Christen et al.
2003).
32. The importance of internal audit and control systems
is also highlighted by Van Greuning, Gallardo, and
Randhawa (1999).
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33. Although not a specific topic in this book, a signifi-
cant challenge in many countries is to determine how
to most effectively and efficiently supervise coopera-
tives and other member-based MFIs. This is
addressed briefly in annex 2A, Note on Supervising
Savings and Credit Cooperatives.
34. Jansson, Rosales, and Westley (2003) provide an
overview of the sources of funds of supervisory
authorities in Latin America.
35. When in 1996 the Colombian regulated MFI
Finansol was declared insolvent, its institutional
investors failed to recapitalize the institution accord-
ing to their initial bail-out plan (CGAP 2000),
though a new debt restructuring and recapitalization
plan was ultimately agreed upon, leading to the
launch of the new FINAMERICA in 1997.
36. For details on the Ugandan example, see Staschen
(2003).
37. The best documented examples include the Cajas
Municipales de Ahorro y Crédito in Peru, the BRI
(Bank Rakyat Indonesia)/Unit Desa Network in
Indonesia and the hierarchical supervisory model
under the PARMEC (Projet de Appiu a la Reglemen-
tation sur les Mutuelles d’Epargne et de Credit) Law
in West Africa (Meagher 2002).
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Planning for Transformation
Transformation from a nongovernmentalorganization (NGO) to a deposit-takingfinancial intermediary does not simply repre-
sent a change of legal status. When a microcredit
organization becomes licensed and begins to offer
voluntary savings services, a wholesale cultural and
operational transformation is required, compel-
ling a full understanding and appreciation of the
changes that will occur within the organization as
it transforms. Transformation is ultimately about
significant changes in governance as well as man-
agement and staff roles and responsibilities—all
of which imply changes in how employees relate to
one another and how the institution relates to
its many new stakeholders. Transformation plan-
ning is, therefore, at its core, a change management
process. 
This chapter begins by outlining the significant
institutional changes that occur with transforma-
tion. Ensuring the leaders of the microfinance insti-
tution (MFI) fully understand the implications and
results of institutional transformation is thus the
starting point for any transformation. What are the
important issues that need to be considered? What
are the fundamental changes that occur within an
institution due to transformation? These changes
must be carefully considered by the MFI to deter-
mine its readiness and willingness to transform. If
the decision is made to go forward, the MFI must
examine and potentially redefine its vision and
mission in line with a regulated deposit-taking insti-
tution rather than a credit-focused project or NGO.
The focus then moves to managing the process of
change that comes with transformation. The insti-
tution’s ability to successfully lead and manage the
changes inherent with transformation is critical.
The chapter then details how to develop a plan for
transformation and how to manage transformation
through its many stages, concluding with a discus-
sion of the financial costs of transformation.
Fundamental Changes Resulting 
from Transformation
Although numerous and significant changes take
place with transformation (box 3.1), four funda-
mental changes affect all aspects of the MFI. Each
of these changes may affect the original vision and
mission of the MFI and will ultimately require full
commitment of the board and senior management,
if not the entire staff. Each change must be fully
Chapter 3
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considered and appreciated before embarking on
transforming to become a regulated deposit-taking
institution: 
Change #1—Transformation implies ceding
control to a broader group of
stakeholders.
Change #2—Transformation facilitates an
expanded product offering, thus
broadening the institution’s client
base. 
Change #3—Transformation leads to significant
changes in human resources
requirements.
Change #4—Transformation requires compli-
ance with regulatory requirements,
adding significant costs to
operations.
Change #1: Transformation implies ceding
control to a broader group of stakeholders.
Experience worldwide has shown that many NGO
MFIs undergoing transformation to regulated
institutions resist giving up operational and
management control. With transformation, the
ownership structure changes from an NGO or proj-
ect capitalized by donors and generally governed by
a board of directors of socially minded founders,
to a shareholding structure with investors who
demand financial returns and as part owners, share
in the fiduciary responsibilities of the regulated
institution. Consequently, it is appropriate that
investors play an active governance role. For NGOs
that have been largely controlled by a strong
founder with little active board involvement, this
shift can be significant. For example, one of the
more important roles of the board is to appoint
the new institution’s managing director, or Chief
Executive Officer. This is in contrast to a founder-
dominated NGO, where board members are often
selected by the founder—a distinction with signifi-
cant implications for decision making and approval
processes. The managing director of the transform-
ing NGO is not always appointed by the new board
as the head of the new institution. This reality only
heightens the fear of losing control. Likewise, NGO
board members also need to recognize that not all
current members will necessarily become members
of the new institution’s board (box 3.2). 
In addition to new investors, regulators form
another new stakeholder group to whom the insti-
tution must now be accountable. The financial posi-
tion and portfolio quality of the MFI, for example,
is no longer for internal eyes only. Instead, all activ-
ities undertaken by the organization need to be
clearly documented, explained, and justified to a
new set of external eyes. Although donors may have
played this role to a certain extent before, the regu-
lators’ reach can be more intrusive (with frequent
and significant reporting requirements), costly
(with fines for delinquent report submission), and
far reaching (with the threat of regulatory interven-
tion or closure). The presence of this new stake-
holder thus implies a significant change in control. 
Furthermore, many regulators set limits on
majority ownership. For example, in Uganda, the
Box 3.1 Compartamos Savings
Mobilization Project
“Savings will be the ‘detonator’ of Comparta-
mos,” predicts Gonzalo Ramirez, Manager, Com-
partamos Savings Mobilization Project, who has
spent six months working on Compartamos’ sav-
ings mobilization feasibility study. “‘The intro-
duction of deposits will mean radical changes at
all levels of the organization. Savings can’t be
seen as just another product—they entail a
change in our legal status, which will in turn
trigger serious changes to our structure and
organization.’”
Source: CGAP n.d.a.
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Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDI)
Act limits the maximum ownership to 30 percent
by any one owner, unless the owner is a licensed
financial institution or a public institution. This
generally means that founding NGOs (or their
founders) cannot maintain majority ownership once
they transform.1
Finally, as an MFI becomes regulated and thus
more transparent given public reporting require-
ments, other interested parties may hold it to a
higher level of accountability, including environ-
mental accountability. To the extent that the trans-
formed MFI has agricultural clients or small manu-
facturers, transformation may highlight the need to
incorporate environmental policies, or other poli-
cies not required previously in the NGO.
Change #2: Transformation facilitates an
expanded product offering, thus broadening
the institution’s client base.
By definition, transformation to a deposit-taking
institution will result in an expanded target market.
Clients who may have been uninterested in bor-
rowing from the MFI may find the institution’s
deposit services suitable to their needs. In addition,
as outlined in chapter 1, Mobilizing Savings from
the Public: 10 Basic Principles, the regulated MFI
will need to mobilize savings not only from its exist-
ing credit clients or those with a similar economic
profile, but also from wealthier individuals and
institutions. These higher-income savers may in
turn demand a wider array of products than
currently provided by the MFI. Therefore, the
transformed MFI will need to consider its product
mix—including credit, savings, money transfers,
insurance, and others—and determine if it offers
appropriate and marketable products for this
broader market. 
Institutions that have offered only group loans
often need to develop an individual loan product.
To safely and profitably offer individual loans, credit
staff need to know how to accurately assess the
creditworthiness of clients through expanded debt-
capacity analysis that takes into consideration the
client’s household and business cash flow needs.
Furthermore, without a group guarantee in place,
alternative forms of collateral need to be identified,
which may require overall changes in processes for
securing and recovering collateral. New policies and
procedures must be established and staff be pro-
vided with additional training.
Also, with a license to operate as a financial inter-
mediary, the MFI may have the option to offer
additional financial products such as money trans-
fers, insurance, and, in some cases, foreign
exchange services. As the transformed MFI
becomes more established, various new products
should be explored because they can significantly
Box 3.2 Ceding Control
In the late 1990s, a large Asian NGO spent a fair
amount of time, energy, and money planning its
transformation to a regulated financial institu-
tion. Ultimately, however, the transformation
failed due primarily to resistance from the board
to relinquish control. Although transforma-
tion was discussed at length and it was clear
who would be on the board of the bank and who
would remain on the NGO board, there was a
strong fear of letting go, particularly by those
who would remain with the NGO because they
would be left with a smaller, less important
organization. A relatively acrimonious split
ensued resulting in a number of senior staff and
board members leaving the organization when it
became clear that the commitment to transform
was simply not there.
Ten years later, however, the NGO was thriv-
ing and considering transformation once again
as the board members felt more confident about
their roles and the position of the NGO in the
marketplace.
Source: Authors. 
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improve revenues through fee income, often with
minimal added costs. However, it is important to
remember, any additional products or services
offered will require compliance with regulatory
requirements as well as increased staff and manage-
ment skills and possibly enhanced systems.
Change #3: Transformation leads to
significant changes in human resources
requirements. 
When an MFI becomes a licensed deposit-taking
institution, significantly greater demands on staff
and management lead to the need for different and
enhanced skills among the institution’s human
resources. In general, the organization chart of a
transforming NGO changes substantially with the
new institution. New positions are added while
some are reduced as staff are redeployed or made
redundant in light of changes in overall operations.
Ultimately, an increase in staff is usually the final
outcome, particularly in the middle ranks (treasury
staff, internal auditors, branch supervisors, informa-
tion technology [IT] managers).
Transformation requires a close evaluation of
senior management capacity and skills. In most trans-
formations to date, the senior management team has
been augmented with the addition of formal sector
bankers either in an advisory capacity or, in many
cases, as senior and middle managers. In some coun-
tries, regulators will insist on senior managers having
previous formal sector banking experience. Replac-
ing a large portion of the senior management can
be disruptive to the MFI. Not bringing in the new
skills needed to manage the new institution, how-
ever, can be equally disruptive. Moreover, finding the
right balance between external hires and in-house
training is important for maintaining or establishing
the right organizational culture.
When offering voluntary savings, one of the
most obvious changes in staff requirements is the
need for tellers to accept and process deposits and
withdrawals, as well as the need for customer repre-
sentatives to market various services and help clients
open new accounts. With both functions come a
host of tasks that may not have been required in a
credit-only MFI. For example, a supervisor may be
needed at the branch level to oversee teller opera-
tions, and additional internal auditors (or at the
very least additional internal controls and proce-
dures) may be required because cash is handled at
the branches, possibly for the first time.
At the head office, a treasury department may
need to be established and a competent treasury
manager put in place to oversee asset and liability
management—a task that may not have been
required when the NGO MFI had few liabilities to
manage. At the management and board level, an
Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO) needs to be
established to monitor and make decisions on fund-
ing and placements of funds. 
In addition, transforming MFIs normally need
to strengthen their management information sys-
tems (MIS) and procurement policies, as well as
their legal resources and fiscal management. They
also often need to create public relations and
investor relations functions.
These changes have the potential to alter the cul-
ture of the institution significantly. Thus, leadership
needs to be proactive about defining the new cul-
ture up front, and ensuring sufficient buy-in among
all staff members to the institution’s new future.
Change #4: Transformation requires
compliance with regulatory requirements,
adding significant costs to operations.
With the license to operate as a deposit-taking
financial intermediary comes the requirement to
comply with a regulatory body, adding significant
and often unexpected cost to the operations of the
MFI. In fact, in some cases, transformed MFIs have
underestimated this change to such an extent that
once operating as a licensed institution they have
admitted that had they known the extent and cost
of compliance, they would never have transformed. 
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The first step in complying with regulatory
requirements involves assembling the license
application. The requirements for applying for a
license are many and it often takes months to
compile the complete application, requiring signifi-
cant effort and use of resources, both human and
financial. 
Once the application is submitted, the MFI has
to undergo a number of inspections—both of the
institution with regard to its operations, and of
the management and board with regard to being
“fit and proper” to manage or govern a financial
intermediary. The central bank will examine the
entire operations of the MFI including the internal
control systems, security, branch infrastructure
(strong rooms, safes, positioning of tellers and
supervisors), operating manuals, financial manage-
ment practices including provisioning, asset-liability
management, and so on. It will also examine the
competence and experience of the board and senior
management.
Once licensed, substantial periodic reporting to
the central bank is required (daily, weekly, monthly,
quarterly and annually). These reporting require-
ments often entail significant enhancements to the
MFI’s management information systems, treasury
and financial departments, and overall management
resources.
In addition to reporting, licensed deposit-taking
institutions must maintain a certain level of
reserves. In Uganda, MDIs must maintain cash
reserves equal to 15 percent of their deposit base.
Mibanco, a transformed NGO operating in Peru,
must keep 7 percent of its domestic-denominated
deposits on reserve at the central bank and 20 per-
cent of its international-denominated deposits (of
which 13 percent is to be kept on reserve at the cen-
tral bank) (Campion, Dunn, and Arbuckle 2001).
These reserves are not available to fund the loan
portfolio and thus earn less revenue than they
would if unencumbered.
Being a licensed financial intermediary also
results in a different risk profile, which, in turn,
requires a focus on risk management. Complying
with regulations is meant to help the MFI mitigate
various risks. For example, specific levels of capital
are necessary to comply with both minimum capital
as well as capital adequacy requirements. Specific
levels of loan loss provisioning of the loan portfolio
are required, which may be more conservative than
what the NGO had in place. The central bank also
requires a certain level of security at the branches
including strong rooms, safes, additional guards,
and protective doors and walls, all of which add to
the expense of operations. Finally, annual external
audits as well as internal audit procedures and
policies must be formally approved by the central
bank. 
These requirements and more arise when operat-
ing as a licensed intermediary and add significantly
to the cost structure of the institution and the need
for skilled human resources.
Assuming each of these four changes has been
considered and the consequences understood and
appreciated by the board and management (see
box 3.3 for a sampling of the issues a transforming
MFI must be ready to confront), the next step in
the transformation process is for the MFI to revisit
its vision and mission statement and determine who
within the organization will lead the transformation
process.
Leading the Transformation
The effect transformation has on an MFI’s culture
is often overlooked and undervalued. An institu-
tion’s corporate culture is typically defined by the
values and beliefs held by its staff. As stated by
the chairperson of the Drucker Foundation, “Peel
away the shell of an organization and there lives a
culture—a set of values, practices and traditions that
define who we are as a group” (Hesselbein 1999).
With the addition of new staff and the changes to
processes and procedures that accompany trans-
formation, an institution’s culture is likely to be
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significantly affected by the transformation process.
The transforming MFI needs to consider how it will
ensure it retains the essential elements of its cor-
porate culture and if it can develop a strategy to
address areas in which the current corporate culture
may be incompatible with its incarnation as a regu-
lated institution. The degree to which an MFI uses
an introspective and inclusive process to formulate
its values has a significant impact on the extent to
which staff buy into these organizational values. In
general, the more connected staff feel to the organ-
ization, the more they feel like a valued client them-
selves, a key ingredient in providing better service
to external clients. A proactive process of articulat-
ing institutional values and beliefs is critical to the
transformation process (box 3.4).
The first step in planning for transformation is
for the MFI to review its vision, mission, and values
to ensure that transformation is congruent with its
strategy for the future. Once the vision has been
established, key strategic decisions must be made
about who will lead the process.2
Box 3.3 Are We Ready for Change? Questions for NGO Stakeholders
• Are we prepared (emotionally and financially) to
embark on substantial capacity development to
become a true financial intermediary?
• How willing are we to allow outsiders to see our
operations and how willing are we to seek tech-
nical assistance in areas in which we feel we do
not yet have adequate capacity?
• Are current board and management adequate to
oversee the transformation process, and do we
have the right skills on the board to oversee a
financial intermediary?
• How will we source new equity from investors?
Will the new investors be “like-minded”? How
much control are we willing to give up?
• What will the ideal capital structure be for the
new organization?
• How should the board of the licensed company
be structured? How many board committees are
required?
• Should the NGO continue to exist? If so, should it
hold shares in the new organization? What role
should the NGO play after transformation—shell
to hold shares in the new organization? Engage
in other social activities with proceeds from the
investment in the new organization?
• What role should the NGO founders play in gov-
ernance of the new institution, and if they own
shares, what compensation, if any, should they
receive for their “sweat equity”?
• Should we create a new institution or convert
our current one? What are the tax implications?
• If we create a new institution, should everything
be transferred to the new organization or should
some assets remain with the NGO?
• When and how should the loan portfolio and
other investments as well as physical assets (vehi-
cles, computers, office equipment, and the like)
be transferred—before licensing? Upon licens-
ing? When loans renew? 
• Will our product mix be adequate? If not, do we
have the capacity and willingness to develop and
offer new products?
• What should the name of the new company be?
To what extent do we want to maintain the
“brand” we have established as an NGO?
• Are our management information systems
robust and our business processes efficient? To
what degree will we need to change the way we
operate?
• How able are we to comply with regulatory
requirements, both for licensing and for ongoing
operations? Do we have the staff and manage-
ment skills and capacity to be a financial inter-
mediary? How willing are we to hire externally if
required?
Source: Author.
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Defining the Vision and Mission
As stated by celebrated satirist Jonathan Swift,
vision is “the art of seeing the invisible.” It involves
a process of building consensus around how an
institution wants to define itself in the future.
Establishing a vision can be particularly challenging
for a transforming MFI, because entry into a new
operating environment and the need to meet new
but often undefined expectations from investors
and regulatory authorities can create significant
uncertainty about the future. In addition, the sub-
stantial institutional changes that are taking place
further add to the difficulty of building consensus.
Creating a vision statement to capture the trans-
forming institution’s new vision, as distinct from
its old vision, is an important tool for consensus
building, because key players in the institution must
be in agreement about the ultimate goals of the
transformation. 
The vision outlines the goals and ideals for the
institution after transformation. Defining a vision is
essential to establish a common understanding of
goals. It is a constant reference point for strategic
decisions along the way. The vision also reinforces
why change—both internal change and change to
the institution’s public image and position in the
local competitive market—is important for the
institution.
A new vision not only delineates an idea of how
things will be done in the future, but also indicates
Box 3.4 Compartamos: Finding the Right Fit 
“Compartamos management knows that changing
from an MFI into a bank will require personnel with
different professional backgrounds than those
currently in the institution. But they are equally
determined that this new influx of people and
skills should not change the institutional culture—
’la mística’—that they think is key to Compartamos’
success. The challenge of upgrading skills while pre-
serving the institution’s personality falls in large part
to new HR director Ivan Mancillas.
“‘I’m not so worried about finding people with
the right skills, but rather finding people with the
right attitude,’ says Ivan. ‘Making sure our people
have the right skills is a question of improving our
training programs and our selection process. Right
now, I am working on developing a training model
that can be de-linked from the number of people
being trained. To do this, we’re going to invest in a
training team, decentralize our training (which cur-
rently takes place at the Mexico City headquarters),
and start using distance-learning techniques so that
thousands of people can be trained at a time.’
“Enhancing the scalability and flexibility of train-
ing will be crucial given Compartamos’ planned
expansion from 1600 to 5000 employees by 2008.
But the current practice of bringing new staff to
headquarters for at least two weeks serves another
important purpose besides training: namely, helping
them understand and absorb la mística. 
“To compensate for the loss of this opportunity,
Ivan plans to introduce new ways to align individual
staff with the institution’s vision. These include cre-
ating a dedicated Employee Services team to sup-
port projects like a new leadership program, which
will help employees internalize the organization’s
values. The Employee Services team will also be
charged with developing a set of indicators that can
be used to judge individuals’ ‘fit’ with the institu-
tion. ‘It’s difficult because we’re trying to develop
indicators for subjective things,’ Ivan explains. ‘For
example, we’ll be trying to track the number of pro-
motions and rotations that occur, to understand
how managers are managing their people. We’re
hoping that we’ll be able to combine the use of
such indicators with tools like 360-degree evalua-
tions, to make sure that each staff member is work-
ing well with their team and the institution as a
whole.’”
Source: CGAP n.d.a.
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an end to the way things were done in the past
(box 3.5). The implications of a new vision take
time to comprehend and synthesize. The successful
adoption of the new vision is contingent not only
on leadership skills, but also on the way that vision
is presented and communicated.
The mission statement reflects the purpose of the
organization and therefore may also change in the
process of transformation (box 3.6). At its simplest,
a mission statement should include the following
aspects: Who are we? What do we do? For whom do
we do it? Where do we do it? And how do we do it?
The answers to each of these questions will
undoubtedly change with transformation, and thus
need to be carefully considered in the strategy for-
mulation phase. Any change of mission must
involve the majority of the MFI staff—changing the
mission without broad buy-in increases the risk of
losing the original commitment of some of the staff,
a risk that needs to be managed carefully. 
Formulating a clear vision and mission for the
licensed deposit-taking financial intermediary
• Allows for a shared mindset among staff and
board members and helps communicate the
need for change to others
• Clarifies the difference between where the insti-
tution is now and where the institution wants
to be
• Helps maintain the focus (especially in difficult
times), and provides a measure for progress in
meeting anticipated changes
• Helps identify who will need to be involved to
move the institution to where it wants to be
(Dellien and others 2005)
Leadership
Leadership is always crucial, but especially so at
times of change. Energetic leadership that is highly
focused and resourceful, yet open to questioning,
will enhance the response to new ideas and a well
thought out approach to communications will
increase the acceptance of changes by those
affected. By recognizing that changes can be threat-
ening and destabilizing, leaders who are able to
present a vision in a way that is compelling and
inclusive will build the consensus and buy-in of
staff, board members, and others required to
Box 3.5 Uganda Women’s Finance Trust:
Evolution of Institutional Vision
Pretransformation Vision
An improved quality of life for all people of
Uganda through the economic empowerment of
women.
Posttransformation Vision
Low-income people should have access to finan-
cial services.
Source: Personal communication from Harriet Mulyanti, Uganda
Finance Trust, November 2005. 
Note: In addition to revising its vision, Uganda Women’s Finance
Trust changed its name to Uganda Finance Trust to recognize its
change in focus from primarily women to all low-income people.
Box 3.6 Uganda Women’s Finance Trust:
Evolution of Institutional
Mission Statement
Pretransformation Mission
To economically empower low-income women
by providing a consolidated package of savings
facilities, credit services, and awareness creation
in a manner that safeguards its financial sustain-
ability and self reliance.
Posttransformation Mission
To provide unique financial services to low-
income people in Uganda in a manner that
delights customers and adds value to all stake-
holders.
Source: Personal communication from Harriet Mulyanti, Uganda
Finance Trust, November 2005.
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ensure the successful transition to individual lend-
ing (see box 3.7).
Leadership during change is as much about
motivating and inspiring people as it is about mak-
ing strategic decisions. Getting board members’
buy-in early in the planning process is essential
before transformation. If board and senior manage-
ment are not in complete agreement to transform,
plans for transformation should be abandoned or
put on hold until such time as the key people
achieve consensus. Achieving true consensus
requires more than just voting at a board meeting.
Often, dissenters (who may be in the minority) will
remain silent or even vote in the affirmative, and
then stall the process at every stage. The key trans-
formation leaders need to carefully monitor the
opinion of every stakeholder, and ensure that every-
one is truly on board.
A successful strategy of many transforming MFIs
is to identify a champion—ideally someone in a very
senior position within the organization—who can
lead the transformation process and ensure consen-
sus building among key stakeholders. In partic-
ular, dealing with strategic issues will be key for the
champion to address and build consensus. This
champion does not manage the transformation
process—management is ideally carried out by a
full-time person hired specifically for that purpose.
The champion is someone who has authority
and respect within the MFI who can lead and
encourage buy-in from the board, management,
and staff throughout the transformation process
(see box 3.8).
In addition to the champion, the transforming
MFI should identify key staff members who will
play leading roles in the change process. Their com-
mitment is particularly valuable because they will
work with the champion throughout the transfor-
mation. As such, it is critical that this team brings
the skills, capacity, and commitment necessary, and
that it represents the various stakeholders directly
affected by transformation to ensure their interests
are taken into consideration.
Box 3.8 Trust in the “Champion”
The Asian NGO described in box 3.2 that ulti-
mately abandoned its plans for transformation
due to unwillingness of the board to cede control
also suffered from a lack of trust among some of
the NGO board members in their “champion of
change”. Although most of the board members
and senior management trusted completely in
the champion and the promised results of creat-
ing a bank, not all did and it ultimately proved
impossible to allay everyone’s fears of the
changes transformation would bring, particularly
at a time of economic uncertainty (the Asian
financial crisis). What if it was the wrong deci-
sion? Or what if it was the right decision but at
the wrong time? What if our champion has hid-
den motives? What if we lose our social mission?
At its core, transformation is about managing
major change, and for this, the MFI needed
someone leading this change whom everyone
trusted implicitly. 
Source: Author.
Box 3.7 Eight Common Errors that
Leaders of Change Make
• Not establishing a great enough sense of
urgency
• Not establishing a powerful enough guiding
coalition
• Lacking a vision
• Under-communicating the vision by a factor
of 10
• Not removing obstacles to the new vision
• Not systematically planning for a creating
short-term wins
• Declaring victory too soon
• Not anchoring changes in the corporation’s
culture
Source: Kotter 1998.
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Change Management and Consensus Building
MFIs can conduct thorough diagnoses of the exter-
nal environment and internal capabilities and define
in clear terms the vision and mission for the institu-
tion going forward, but these alone do not ensure
smooth implementation. For an institution to
implement the new vision effectively, the change
process needs to be well-orchestrated. Integral to
the change management process is building con-
sensus at all levels of the institution. 
Building strong consensus early in the process
is essential, however, it is not imperative that the
MFI have complete buy-in to transformation at the
very beginning; rather, managing staff’s reaction to
change as well as the impact of the change on staff
is key to success. By having the key stakeholders on
board and then managing the process so that the
“early adopters” help in closing the gap with the
“laggards” will ultimately improve the chance of
success of the transformation. Where consensus is
not possible, leadership must be able to manage dis-
sent constructively.
A useful change management tool that helps the
organization identify change management issues is
the Change Overview tool in table 3.1. This frame-
work helps provide structure to the transformation
process and helps communicate the new vision and
mission (Dellien et al. 2005).
All staff must understand the reason for and
importance of transformation relative to the mis-
sion and future of the MFI. This requires that
everyone in the institution be aware of what trans-
formation entails and the advantages it will bring to
the organization. The more thoroughly staff mem-
bers comprehend the transformation process and
understand its effect, the more likely they will be
able to actively support the change process. In addi-
tion, it is important to integrate staff in the discus-
sions of the impact transformation will have on the
institution. Forming small working groups to ana-
lyze and discuss operational changes will help to
consider the staff perspective and ensure their feed-
back is received to develop better processes and
products and build ownership. In addition, fre-
quent meetings and written communications will
keep management and staff informed of progress
and the activities required. See box 3.9.
An often neglected yet critical issue is the need
to manage staff expectations and concerns. As with
any change, transformation brings with it fears
of redundancy and mission shift. Staff wonder if
their positions will still exist after transformation.
Table 3.1 Change Overview
Dimension What remains the same What will change Potential issues
Ownership and governance
Target market
Competitors 
Credit products
Savings products
Delivery channels
Staffing
MIS
Financial management
Reporting
Risk management
Source: Adapted from Dellien and others 2005.
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Without the commitment and belief of staff in
the transformation process and the understood
value of the ultimate goal (a license to operate as a
financial intermediary), transformation has little
chance of succeeding. Box 3.10 sets forth a number
of steps managers can take to bolster the probability
of success.
Planning the Transformation
Once an MFI understands the considerable changes
required with offering voluntary savings services
and complying with regulations and determines
that it will proceed with transforming into a regu-
lated deposit-taking financial intermediary, it needs
to develop a transformation plan. The transforma-
tion plan is different from a business plan in that the
transformation plan takes into account everything
Box 3.9 Change Management Project at Equity Bank
In February 2004, Equity Building Society (EBS) in
Kenya conducted a needs analysis of change
required during the transformation to a bank. In
March they reviewed the organization’s mission and
vision, and developed eight Critical Success Factors
(CSFs) for successful change management. In July
intensive training was provided to managers and
officers to develop an in-depth understanding of
the eight CSFs. In September, training on the CSFs
was provided to all staff and in October 2004 the
transformation process began:
• A cross-functional team was formed to champion
the conversion of Equity Building Society into a
commercial microfinance bank; the objective of
this team was the establishment of the rationale,
process, and benefits of transformation. 
• The team developed a mission, a vision, objec-
tives, and strategies for the bank and communi-
cated this throughout the organization. 
• A staff competition was launched to create a
name, logo, and colors for the new bank.
• An image survey was carried out to determine
customers’ perceptions of the proposed change.
• A customer perception survey was carried
out to listen to the customers to determine what
they needed and expected from the converted
entity.
In November 2004, EBS incorporated the eight
CSFs into all staff job descriptions, provided train-
ing in leadership skills development, and created
problem-solving teams. In December 2004, Equity
Bank received its banking license and in March 2005,
a thorough review was conducted on the achieve-
ment of the eight CSFs.
Source: Personal communication from L’parnoi Lengewa, Equity Bank
Ltd., December 2005.
Fears of competency arise as the need for new skills
is anticipated—will the workload increase and if so,
will everyone be able to handle the increase? Will
existing staff have the right skill set or will a num-
ber of “outsiders” be hired? In addition, manage-
ment needs to be aware of the potential for the
increased risk of fraud occurring during the trans-
formation. Staff may feel that management is dis-
tracted and less likely to detect fraud, or may believe
that because they are likely to lose their job in any
case, they might as well take what they can get.
Staff members also question the possibility of a
loss of mission—will the organization shift from
“helping the poor” to “profit making”? Will the
MFI become too bureaucratic? Will staff members
lose their right to speak up? These concerns require
excellent communication with staff and a plan to
maintain open lines of communication throughout
the transformation process.
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the MFI needs to consider to become a financial
intermediary. In essence, developing a transforma-
tion plan requires a gap analysis of the institution—
an assessment of where the MFI is now, and where
it needs to be to become a true financial intermedi-
ary. In general, the transformation plan outlines the
specific activities that need to take place to develop
the capacity of the MFI to be a licensed deposit-
taker. The business plan, conversely, addresses ongo-
ing operations and plans for the future, and includes
projected results (both financial and outreach). 
That said, a business plan for a transforming MFI
would include a discussion of the changes taking
place and the plans for licensing and ownership and
other pertinent issues, but would not specifically
address the type of technical assistance that will be
required for transformation and the process to
become licensed. In fact, what is included in the
business plan is often the result of some of the
efforts undertaken as described in the transforma-
tion plan. For example, the transformation plan
may indicate that market research will be under-
taken to determine the needs of existing clients as
well as potential new clients. From this research, it
may be concluded that new products are needed.
The transformation plan would outline plans to
examine the current product mix and determine
what is required to enhance, revise, or add products
and the institutional capacity development neces-
sary to deliver these products and how to develop
that capacity. These new or revised products would
be included in the business plan as a “plan” for the
future and, ultimately, the financial projections in
the business plan would include the estimated
growth and volumes of these new products. 
The business plan usually outlines the MFI’s
plans over the next three to five years; the transfor-
mation plan addresses the immediate future and the
Box 3.10 Change Management during Transformation
A number of factors can be addressed when man-
aging change; a few are articulated here for internal
project managers to use:
• As members of senior management, lead the
change and clearly articulate and communicate
the rationale for change.
• Plan for change, assess its impact on the broad
set of stakeholders, and provide opportunities
for letting go of the past and contributing to the
creation of the future vision and the new way of
operating.
• Emphasize ongoing communication about the
changes and perceived usefulness; eliminate
surprise, and clearly define new roles and respon-
sibilities. 
• Involve users in the change process to create buy-
in early in the transformation and build support
throughout it.
• Show links between an individual’s current and
future jobs and the new vision for the organiza-
tion, thus contributing value and aligning expec-
tations for employees.
• Create a positive learning environment for
employees to safely learn new skills and respon-
sibilities without fear of failure or loss of oppor-
tunities in the new organization.
• Raise red flags early—deadlines, resources, budg-
ets, capabilities.
• Model the change for others and provide a safe
learning environment for employees to be
taught new skills and tasks.
• Expect resistance to change, and look for ways to
help employees move beyond their initial fears,
break from the old ways, and help create the
new way of operating (for example, goal setting,
praise, enjoyment, roles, rewards, conditions,
procedures).
Source: O’Keeffe and Frederick 2004.
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period it will take to transform, usually somewhere
between 12 and 24 months or longer. Finally, finan-
cial projections, normally a significant part of a
business plan, are not included in the transforma-
tion plan although the costs associated with trans-
formation are usually estimated and a funding plan
developed. See chapter 5, Strategic and Business
Planning, for a full discussion of the business plan-
ning process during transformation.
The transformation plan should ideally begin
with an institutional assessment that honestly and
clearly assesses and documents the current capacity
and operations of the MFI (box 3.11). The next
step is to consider where the institution needs to be
to be an effective, efficient, and profitable regulated
financial intermediary, and then what needs to
happen to reach that state.
The most common issues and activities that need
to be addressed with NGOs or projects transform-
ing to financial intermediaries relate to institutional
capacity development including human resources
training, product development or refinement, treas-
ury management and compliance reporting, among
others, and capital improvements including im-
proved branch infrastructure such as teller windows
and strong rooms, and more robust management
information systems.
A transformation plan would likely address the
following (see annex 3A for a detailed outline of a
sample transformation plan):
• Review of operations
• Legal due diligence 
• Conversion to a company limited by shares
(if applicable)
• Compliance with relevant regulations
• Licensing
• Strategic planning
• Funding strategy
• Ownership 
• Governance
• Human resources management
• Management information systems
• Risk management
• Financial management
• Internal audit
• Operations
• Credit products 
• Savings products
• Transformation budget
• Transformation funding
Often, it is beneficial to hire an external consult-
ant to develop the transformation plan. An outsider
can take an honest look at the MFI and see things
that someone working directly in the institution
(with a vested interest in its success) cannot see.
Moreover, frequently employees and board mem-
bers of the NGO MFI do not have formal financial
sector experience and cannot always be expected to
Box 3.11 Independent Institutional
Assessments in Pakistan
All MFIs in Pakistan that are interested in trans-
forming into a microfinance bank must arrange
for an independent institutional assessment of
their “capacity and advisability to transform in
the given economic, political, cultural, legal and
regulatory environment” (State Bank of Pakistan
n.d.). This assessment needs to include an analy-
sis of the MFI’s financial position, governance
structure, human resources, control systems, and
accounting and information systems. The assess-
ment must be carried out by a team of profes-
sionals comprising an approved chartered
accountancy firm and microfinance specialists,
domestic or foreign, with adequate understand-
ing and knowledge of the Pakistan microfinance
sector and policy and regulatory environment.
This assessment is then submitted along with a
feasibility report, including the business plan
and financial projections, to the State Bank of
Pakistan as part of the licensing process. 
Source: Authors.
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know what is required to act as a true financial
intermediary. It is important, therefore, that the
consultant or firm selected to develop the transfor-
mation plan have formal financial sector experience,
preferably in operations, and ideally with experience
in managing deposits. See annex 3B for a sample
terms of reference to hire a consultant or firm to
develop a transformation plan.
In addition to determining the necessary
activities and drafting a transformation plan, it is
necessary to consider the overall management
requirements during transformation and the cost of
upgrading and developing the capacity of the insti-
tution to become a financial intermediary.
Managing the Transformation
Given the immense task an MFI undertakes with
transformation to a regulated deposit-taking insti-
tution, it needs to carefully consider what will be
required to manage the transformation, keeping in
mind the need to continue to maintain operations
of the MFI during the process. 
The Transformation Manager
It is strongly recommended that a transforming MFI
hire a full-time transformation manager to coordi-
nate and manage its transformation activities. The
amount of work involved in transformation is often
underestimated and many MFIs may think this posi-
tion is unnecessary. However, experience in Uganda
and elsewhere has shown that it is imperative to have
someone dedicated to the oversight and coordina-
tion of transformation activities—allowing senior
management to continue operating and managing
the MFI on a day-to-day basis. See annex 3C for
sample terms of reference and an outline of the tasks
and activities of a transformation manager to oversee
and coordinate the transformation.
Ideally, this person will have formal financial
sector experience and be familiar with the demands
of operating a regulated financial intermediary. In
addition, familiarity with microfinance is useful as is
an understanding of the country, its culture and
customs, and the regulatory environment and mar-
ketplace in which the MFI is operating. 
Generally, the position is required for 12 to
24 months or longer depending on the capacity of
the MFI as it begins the transformation process
and the state of the regulatory environment. In
Uganda, transformation managers were hired
(funded by donors) for each transforming institu-
tion for an initial period of 12 months. This timing
was established in anticipation of the passage of
the MDI Act and the subsequent expectations for
licensing. As it turned out, the time required of the
transformation manager was significantly longer
and technical assistance continued to be provided
until submission of the license application and
beyond. Furthermore, it is highly likely that techni-
cal assistance will be required once licenses are
issued and the transformed MFIs begin actively
offering and intermediating public deposits.
The Transformation Committee
In addition to a full-time transformation manager, a
transformation committee, comprising representa-
tives from senior management and the board,
should be formed (box 3.12). This committee
receives monthly or quarterly updates from the
transformation manager and is responsible for mak-
ing strategic and operational decisions as required.
Funding the Transformation
Practitioners and donors involved in transformation
often say transformation costs “about a million U.S.
dollars.” The cost, of course, differs greatly depend-
ing on the MFI’s existing capacity and infrastruc-
ture when it begins the process and to a great extent
on the allocation of costs directly to transformation
as opposed to costs associated with the normal
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maturation process of an MFI. The total cost is also
dependent on the size of the MFI and the number
of branches it has or plans to have at the time of
licensing. A significant cost, and thus one with large
variances, is the extent to which the MFI needs to
upgrade its management information systems (MIS)
and branch infrastructure. Furthermore, costs differ
depending on the country in which the MFI is oper-
ating. In general, however, transformation from a
credit-focused MFI to a regulated deposit-taking
intermediary tends to cost somewhere between
U.S.$700,000 and U.S.$1.5 million. 
Transforming MFIs frequently turn to donors
for assistance in funding their transformation
efforts. In Uganda, the five transforming MFIs
(four of which are licensed, with the fifth in process
at the time of publication) received on average
approximately U.S.$1 million each from donors.
However, all donor funds are not alike. Many come
with restrictions on use, particularly limitations on
using donor funds for capital costs. Capital expen-
ditures (those costs that are capitalized on the
balance sheet and thus add to the value of the trans-
formed MFI) include items such as MIS upgrades
and branch infrastructure development. Depending
on the systems in place and the state of the MFI’s
branches, these costs can vary from U.S.$300,000
to U.S.$1 million. In Uganda, donors estimated
that each branch upgrade would cost U.S.$25,000
to U.S.$50,000, so an institution with 10 branches
in need of improved strong rooms, safes, refurbished
banking halls, and teller windows, would need
approximately U.S.$250,000 to U.S.$500,000 for
branch infrastructure. New software systems that
can accommodate voluntary savings services and
comply with central bank requirements on average
tend to cost about U.S.$300,000, again depending
on the number of branches and thus the number of
software licenses required. Hardware costs could
also run as high U.S.$200,000 to U.S.$300,000
depending on the quality of hardware existing in
the MFI before transformation, the requirements of
the regulators, and the selected software. Donors
are sensitive to funding capital expenditures because
they increase the value of the institution, and there-
fore increase the value of its shares. Unless this
increase is fully reflected in the purchase price of the
Box 3.12 Compartamos Bank Transfor-
mation Team
“In late 2004, Compartamos’ Board of Directors
decided to transform from a SOFL (finance
company) into a commercial bank—and their
staff found themselves in a quandary.
“‘We had the One Million Client project, the
new IT system, savings, insurance, transforma-
tion, training . . . too many projects,’ explains
Gonzalo Ramirez, a manager at Compartamos.
‘Different departments were being told to do
too many different things.’ . . .
“In response, Compartamos launched two
parallel processes designed to achieve better
alignment between all of these different initia-
tives. First, several independent projects, includ-
ing savings, were brought together and a new
Bank Transformation (BT) team was formed to
manage them. ‘All the departments have to
change something,’ says Carolina Velazco, BT
coordinator. ‘This involves thinking about two
things: (1) what you do right now, and (2) what
you will have to do as a bank. So we’re doing a
gap analysis, laying out what steps are necessary
to do the new things, and how much time this
will take,’ she explains. ‘Now, we will start meet-
ing with all the departments to see what they
think of the gaps we’ve identified and the time-
lines, since they are the experts.’ . . .
“‘In March, we had a meeting with all the HQ
staff to explain why we’re changing into a
bank—because it’s the best way to achieve our
goals for our customers,’ she recalls. ‘We
explained that they need to be flexible: have a
good attitude and work as a team with different
departments and the coordinating team.’”
Source: CGAP n.d.b.
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shares, donor funds (often taxpayers’ money) in
effect end up being passed on to the shareholders.
In such cases, it may be more appropriate to fund
the bulk of the capital expenditures, by either bor-
rowing (the liability thus offsetting the asset, and
not increasing the net worth of the company) or
using equity provided by the new investors.
The other large part of the estimated costs of
transformation is for consultants or advisory
services to the MFI—particularly to develop the
capacity of its human resources. These costs are
normally not capitalized. Depending on how the
costs for advisory services are funded, the trans-
forming MFI may or may not need to record these
costs (and the funding received to pay them) on its
income statement. If donors are funding advisory
services for the transformation of the MFI, some
donors will pay consultants directly, thus not requir-
ing the MFI to record the revenue and expenses on
their books. Other donors will give a grant to the
transforming MFI and simply request an account
statement for the funds.3
Transformation in less developed countries can
be more expensive than in more developed, higher
cost countries. Less developed countries may not
have a local pool of consultants on which to draw,
meaning that expensive international consultants
must be brought in. Additionally, MFIs in less
developed countries with poor infrastructure will
need to incur many more costs (generators, satellite
connectivity, security) than those operating in
countries with a well-developed infrastructure.
See annex 3D for a sample transformation
budget with estimated costs based on consultant
days or fixed contracts, and fixed purchases (soft-
ware, branch upgrades, and so on) for a medium-
size MFI with 10 branches. In this example, the esti-
mated cost for transformation is U.S.$1.5 million.
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Annex 3A Sample Outline 
for a Transformation Plan
Many of these tasks are carried out concurrently—
this list is not meant to be completed in chronolog-
ical order.
1. Review of operations
a. Analyze overall operations with regard to
efficiency and adequacy of products and
processes (portfolio management, operating
costs, head office and field activities).
b. Analyze overall quality and skill set of
human resources (inventory of available
skills, required skills, training requirements,
incentive schemes).
c. Evaluate branch infrastructure and geo-
graphic outreach for adequacy for a deposit-
taking institution.
2. Credit products
a. Critically evaluate credit products including
delivery mechanisms, portfolio quality,
growth, staffing levels, costing, size, flexi-
bility in structuring, legal documentation,
internal controls, client demand, and so
forth, and improve as necessary.
b. Examine compulsory savings requirements
and consider reducing or eliminating.
c. Ensure consistent compliance with regula-
tory requirements for loan products (collat-
eral registration, loan documentation, and
provisioning, for example) at all branches;
improve as necessary.
d. Introduce additional loan products (for
example, salary loans for employees of small
and medium enterprises, housing loans)
starting with product concepts, structure,
marketing plans, and so forth and then pilot-
ing and refining before rolling out. 
e. Consider introducing other financial prod-
ucts (money transfer services, insurance,
foreign exchange services, and so on).
3. Savings products
a. Critically examine and determine institu-
tional readiness to mobilize and intermedi-
ate public deposits.
b. If applicable, develop modalities for making
noncompulsory savings accounts fully open
and accessible.
c. Research, design, and price products for
pilot.
d. Pilot savings services in one branch for up to
six months; assess pilot and refine products
and processes.
e. Train staff, design, implement, and evaluate
second pilot; eventually expand to all
branches.
f. Develop strategy to expand market and seek
institutional deposits and deposits from
wealthier individuals.
g. Develop strategies for investing excess
liquidity.
4. Competitive positioning
a. Conduct market research and competitive
analysis to determine organization’s com-
parative and competitive advantages.
b. Consider the current product mix and deter-
mine if new product offerings are required
in addition to voluntary savings.
c. Consider existing and new delivery channels
and plan for expansion.
d. Decide upon name and logo for the regulated
institution and other branding strategies.
e. Develop marketing strategy.
5. Business planning
a. Finalize various strategic decisions such as
product mix and pricing and asset transfer
method, and make indicative decisions for
planning purposes.
b. Update or develop three- to five-year busi-
ness plan including financial projections,
incorporating plans for transformation and
the addition of voluntary savings and
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possibly other products as well as additional
operational functions, and prepare for inclu-
sion with license application (if required).
c. Develop and implement strategy to address
tax considerations.
d. Determine the role of the NGO after trans-
formation (if applicable).
6. Legal due diligence
a. Confirm legal status of the MFI and the
applicable law. 
b. Confirm ongoing compliance with govern-
ing laws. 
c. Review tax status and compliance with appli-
cable law (corporation tax, value added tax,
and employee entitlements under the laws of
the country). 
d. Review employment contracts and the ability
to transfer employees to the new company.
e. Review legal requirements under the law for
regulated institutions. 
7. Set up and transfer to a company limited by
shares (if applicable)
a. Outline steps required to set up a company
limited by shares.
b. Address the implications for transfer of
NGO business (that is, taxation on transfer
of net assets and other tax implications, cur-
rent and future).
c. Determine best timing of transfer to mini-
mize negative consequences.
d. Determine mechanism for transferring assets
and liabilities (all at once? as loans renew?);
renegotiate loans from the NGO to the reg-
ulated financial entity.
e. Engage a legal advisor to register the new
company, develop articles of association,
shareholders agreement, and company arti-
cles and statutes. 
8. Licensing
a. Hold ongoing consultations with the regu-
lator on licensing requirements.
b. Analyze infrastructural and organizational
changes required to obtain license.
c. Compile and submit license application.
d. Follow up license application with the regu-
lator; respond to enquiries.
9. Compliance with relevant regulations
a. Develop a strategy for compliance with min-
imum capital and capital adequacy require-
ments (minimum capital required as cash at
time of licensing). 
b. Consider all requirements under the relevant
regulations and determine what steps to take
to comply; establish framework to enable
compliance.
c. Review reporting capabilities and improve to
meet regulatory reporting requirements
including ensuring required data are col-
lected in a timely manner.
10. Funding strategy
a. Determine the ideal capital structure based
on capital requirements under the law, the
required level of equity to operate prof-
itably and to finance growth into the
future, and the size of investment required
externally.
b. Determine the expected profitability hurdle
(both rate of return and time to profitabi-
lity) for the core investors and determine the
appropriate leverage to meet that hurdle.
c. Document information regarding sources,
terms, and availability of funding.
d. Given available sources of funds, determine
the ideal liability strategy to achieve desired
leverage.
e. Determine the appropriate debt/equity split
of the NGO’s contribution (if applicable).
11. Ownership
a. Determine ownership requirements under
the relevant laws or regulations and clarify
restrictions, if any, on ownership (foreigners,
public sector entities, NGOs).
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b. Outline the profile of desired investors and
investor mix. 
c. Develop an ownership plan with a carefully
reasoned and researched divestiture strategy
(employee stock ownership plan, listing,
private placement, other).
d. Outline conditions precedent to divestiture/
transfer; obtain clearances from donors,
financiers (loan covenants), government,
and other stakeholders.
e. Prepare prospectus including financial pro-
jections for marketing to potential investors;
conduct a valuation of the company.
f. Identify potential investors and determine
how they fit the profile and what their inter-
ests and restrictions are.
g. Secure equity investors: solicit investors,
negotiate with investors, finalize share struc-
ture and pricing. 
h. Finalize shareholding agreements includ-
ing definition of shareholders; exit options,
valuation of shares, timing; requirements for
additional capital injections and dilution of
shares; any special features regarding distri-
bution or assignment of profits.
12. Governance
a. Develop an inventory of skills for the current
board of directors, review the adequacy of
board skills both to govern a financial inter-
mediary and to satisfy license requirements,
and propose additional skills if necessary.
b. Determine appropriate conduct of board
business for regulated entity (adequacy of
notices, attendance of meetings, depth of
analysis of issues, board subcommittees).
c. Propose changes, if any, in conduct or struc-
ture of board business to enhance control
and satisfy licensing and other regulatory
requirements.
d. Create new board for licensed institution
and define number of board members, con-
stitution of board, board procedures, the
percentage of shareholding that results in a
board seat, if there will be non-owner board
members, voting rights, standard issues
(quorum, meetings, minutes, general assem-
bly, appointment and renewal of board
members), areas of board responsibility.
e. Develop board policies and procedures.
13. Human resources management
a. Evaluate adequacy of organizational struc-
ture and identify changes and additions
required to operate as a deposit-taking
financial intermediary.
b. Develop a process for qualifying existing
staff for positions in the new organization.
c. Examine and determine if the current salary
and incentive structure is appropriate and
competitive given licensing and addition
of new products and functions; revise if
necessary.
d. Ensure an adequate human resources policy
manual is in place.
e. Critically review management skills and
assess adequacy of skills to steer organization
through transformation.
f. Critically review management skills and rec-
ommend changes if required to manage a
financial intermediary; identify key positions
in senior management team and the skills,
qualifications, and personal characteristics
they will need to fulfill their roles; ensure
that senior management will be acceptable
to the regulator.
g. Develop and implement plan for filling
personnel-related gaps through retraining,
redeployment, and recruitment for required
staff and management positions.
h. Establish or expand training department
to include training in new products, new
functions, and overall staff capacity; con-
sider what training needs can be outsourced
and what can be developed and offered
internally.
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14. Management information systems
a. Critically review MIS including hardware,
software, and human resources.
b. Assess adequacy to support existing prod-
ucts, new products, management reporting,
compliance reporting, flexibility to accom-
modate changes in procedures, decentraliza-
tion of operations, and so on.
c. Upgrade or purchase software adequate for
operating as a financial intermediary and
acceptable to the regulator; upgrade or pur-
chase hardware required.
d. Ensure ability to report accurately and in a
timely manner to the regulator (liquidity
reports, capital adequacy reports, financial
statements) as well as to management and
front-line staff (loan repayment reports, on-
line savings balances, for example).
e. Determine requirements for networking and
implement.
15. Risk management
a. Review policies for risk management (opera-
tional risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, market
or systemic risk, foreign exchange risk, capi-
tal adequacy, exposure limits, and so on) and
recommend and implement activities for
improvement.
b. Ensure compliance with regard to risk man-
agement.
c. Ensure adequate internal controls are
in place for a regulated deposit-taking
institution.
d. Ensure policy of zero tolerance for delin-
quency and appropriate risk classification for
microfinance loans.
16. Financial management
a. Determine adequacy of structure of finance
department.
b. Determine adequacy of relevant accounting
policies as a licensed institution.
c. Analyze chart of accounts for management,
financial, and compliance reporting.
d. Change financial year-end if required to
comply with regulations.
e. Ensure compliance with provisioning poli-
cies and reserve requirements as required by
the regulator; establish a write-off policy
congruent with regulatory requirements.
f. Review budgets and budgetary perform-
ance analysis framework and adequacy for
compliance.
g. Establish a treasury function; review liquidity
management function taking into account
regulatory requirements; develop strategies
to optimize returns.
h. Create an Asset and Liability Committee
(ALCO); develop financial management
guidelines to manage capital, liquidity, and
asset quality.
i. Ensure financial policies and procedures
are documented (including an accounting
policy manual) and consistently followed in
head office and branch network.
17. Internal audit
a. Critically review internal audit function
(staffing, seniority, skills, audit plans, cover-
age, reporting structure, duplication, and so
on).
b. Review audit subcommittee of the board
(composition, independence from the
finance or procurement subcommittee, cor-
rective actions on audit reports, and so on). 
c. Document internal and external audit proce-
dures and policies as approved by the board
and ensure manual is followed consistently.
d. Review gaps in compliance and propose
strategies for compliance with regulation.
18. Branch operations and customer service
a. Evaluate and improve branch security proce-
dures including vault management and cash
handling.
b. Evaluate and improve number of teller
windows, size of banking hall, hours of
operations.
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c. Evaluate and improve internal controls and
risk management at the branches. 
d. Establish policies for tellers including cash
limits and account maintenance (opening
and closing).
e. Establish new product protocols at the
branches including training, piloting, target-
ing, incentives, and so on.
f. Develop branches as profit centers includ-
ing implementing a transfer pricing system
with the head office (excess funds are
“sold” to head office by net savings branch-
es, and funds are “purchased” from head
office by net lending branches at a “transfer
price”).
g. Ensure excellent customer service is in place
in all branches; if not, develop and imple-
ment strategy to achieve continual excel-
lence in customer care.
h. Develop and implement a strategy to
maintain client loyalty during and after
transformation.
19. Transformation costs and strategies for
funding the transformation
a. Estimate costs of transformation process
broken down by activity.
b. Develop a timeline for completion of trans-
formation.
c. Identify potential consultants and advisors.
d. Identify the sources of funding for the
transformation-related expenses.
e. Prepare funding proposals and solicit
funding.
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Annex 3B Sample Terms of
Reference for Development of a
Transformation Plan
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
other facts, and so on.
Objective
The first objective is to determine the level of insti-
tutional readiness of MFI A to obtain a license from
the central bank or other supervisory body, where
it will be regulated and supervised under the rele-
vant law to mobilize and on-lend deposits from the
public. 
The second objective is the development of a
detailed transformation plan. This plan may also
provide the basis for a donor agreement to support
the institution in transforming into a privately
owned, regulated MFI.
Transformation is defined as the conversion of
an unregulated MFI into a licensed deposit-taking
intermediary. It includes the change of legal form
(where necessary), ownership, and governance as
well as internal operational changes needed to
meet regulatory requirements and to attract
investors.
Tasks
1. Before visiting MFI A’s country, the consultant
will prepare a generic transformation plan to
serve as a starting point for discussions. This
generic plan should include the key questions
that must be addressed in MFI A’s transforma-
tion plan. It should be submitted at least two
weeks before arriving in country.
2. Review the relevant law and regulations as well as
any other pertinent documents.
3. Meet with the relevant authorities in the central
bank to discuss key institutional requirements.
4. Conduct an institutional assessment to determine
the level of institutional readiness to be a deposit-
taking financial intermediary. The assessment
should focus on identifying actions required
and should cover the following areas at a mini-
mum (see annex 3A, Sample Outline for a
Transformation Plan, for an outline of all areas to
consider):
a. Assess management and staff skills and com-
petencies including conducting a manage-
ment skills audit and training needs analysis of
staff (including both field staff and manage-
ment staff) and the board
b. Assess adequacy of corporate governance
including
i. Skill levels of the board in relation to pro-
viding governance for a deposit-taking
institution
ii. Frequency of meeting, levels of documen-
tation, governance processes
c. Review the product mix and delivery method-
ologies including
i. Loan products
ii. Savings products
iii. Other financial products
d. Review the Management Information Sys-
tems (MIS) and procedures and assess
i. Extent to which the current systems meet
the proposed reporting requirements
ii. Adequacy of the proposed future system
(if applicable)
iii. General level of computerization
iv. Ability to network between branches
e. Assess financial management capacity
including
i. Existence of systems and procedures
ii. Financial performance
iii. Calculation of key ratios
iv. Treasury management capacity
f. Review internal audit procedures and capacity
g. Review overall operations and systems with a
view to how the addition of deposit services
will require changes
Planning for Transformation | 89
5. Conduct a one-day plan development workshop
with relevant stakeholders 
6. Develop a transformation plan outlining the
activities to be undertaken to prepare the organ-
ization for licensing and determine the cost of
implementing such a plan
a. Detailed list of activities to be completed for
successful transformation
b. Time frame
c. Costs
Deliverables
The main deliverable will be a detailed transforma-
tion plan. This plan will be submitted in draft form
within two weeks of the consultant’s departure.
Comments will be provided within two weeks after
receipt and the consultant will have up to two weeks
to respond to comments. The final version will be
presented by a specified date.
Qualifications
The consultant should have formal financial sector
experience as well as detailed knowledge of the
transformation process. The consultant should also
have microfinance experience and expertise in regu-
latory and supervisory issues affecting transform-
ing MFIs, structuring and raising equity invest-
ments, internal financial management and control,
microfinance service delivery, and institutional
development. 
Level of Effort
It is estimated this assignment will require 25 to
30 days to complete.
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Annex 3C Sample Terms of
Reference for a Transformation
Manager
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and other facts.
Strategic Objective
To better serve its customers and increase its reach
and profitability, the MFI seeks to provide a wider
range of financial services, including savings prod-
ucts, and to gain access to and intermediate savings
to finance and scale up its lending operations. It
has, therefore, decided to transform into a regu-
lated financial intermediary. A Transformation
Committee (TC), comprising board members and
senior management, has been established to oversee
the process. 
Rationale for Transformation Management
Following the completion of an institutional assess-
ment in [insert month or year] to determine the
organization’s level of preparedness for transforma-
tion, a detailed Transformation Plan was prepared
as a guideline for the activities that need to be
undertaken to prepare MFI A for transforma-
tion. Most of the activities are to be undertaken
during (year), with the target timing for submit-
ting a license application to the central bank by end
of (year).
It has been established that the scope of work
involved in the transformation process is of such
magnitude and nature that it can not be carried out
by the existing management structure without sig-
nificantly diverting its attention from the day-to-
day activities of the core business. Additionally,
several aspects of transformation require special-
ized expertise. Therefore, MFI A needs a full-time
on-site Transformation Manager (TM) to manage
the transformation process and to coordinate the
outsourcing of technical and other assistance. 
The TM will coordinate all activities of the trans-
formation, and will be responsible to and report to
the Board through the CEO and the TC. 
Responsibilities of the Transformation
Manager
• Coordinate implementation of all activities
detailed in the transformation plan.
• Provide technical support to the TC and man-
agement for implementation of transformation
activities.
• Set key performance indicators to measure and
regularly report on transformation status to
Board and management through the TC.
Specifically, the TM will be responsible for the
following:
1. Review the transformation plan and budget.
2. Coordinate the TC meetings to ensure they are
held regularly and as scheduled, and ensure that
all stakeholders are kept informed and involved
in the process.
3. Provide technical assistance to the TC and man-
agement in areas of own expertise.
4. Coordinate the implementation of all the
activities outlined in the transformation plan,
including
a. Activities for preparing the institution to com-
ply with regulations
b. Preparing the application and following up
with the central bank
c. Actual conversion into a regulated financial
intermediary.
5. Coordinate the outsourcing and use of techni-
cal assistance for the transformation process,
including
a. Formulating scopes of work and terms of ref-
erence and designing contracts
b. Writing proposals to donors and providers of
technical assistance
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c. Assisting the TC in selecting and engaging
consultants or firms to carry out the activities
d. Scheduling underlying activities
e. Assembling and providing background
information
f. Providing initial briefing to consultants or
other interested parties 
g. Ensuring quality control and compliance with
contracts as well as transfer and integration of
knowledge and skills to management
h. Receiving and reviewing technical assistance
implementation reports for submission to and
discussion with the TC.
6. Manage investor relations.
Ideal Candidate 
The ideal candidate will possess the following:
• A master’s degree in business administration or
Economics 
• At least five years experience in a large and
successful regulated microfinance institution
or commercial bank, or other financial insti-
tution, particularly in operations or senior
management
• Experience in financial planning, management,
analysis, and modeling in a financial institution
• Previous involvement in the transformation of an
NGO MFI into a regulated intermediary
• International work experience with low-income
entrepreneurs 
• Experience with investor relations and funding
negotiations
• Ability to provide direct technical assistance in a
number of operational areas envisaged in the
transformation process, for example, MIS, strate-
gic and business planning, financial manage-
ment, treasury management, institutional devel-
opment, internal audit, operations, policies and
procedures
• Advanced computing skills
Personal Traits
• Highly organized and able to accomplish com-
plex tasks
• Diplomatic and a good negotiator
• Ability to work independently
• Results oriented
• Good leadership skills
Duration and Terms
The TM will be based in country for a period of
12 months, with a possible extension to 18 months.
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Annex 3D Sample Transformation Budget
Estimated 
Consultant 
Estimated Days 
Cost (U.S.$) (if relevant)
Transformation Management and Strategic and Business Planning
Hire a full-time Transformation Manager (budget assumes salary plus housing, 12 to 
transport, and education costs). 120,000 18 months
Finalize business plan (financial projections) for the next 3 years. 20,000 20
Subtotal 140,000
Market Analysis and Competitive Positioning
Engage consultant to coordinate and interpret market research. 20,000 20
Engage a local firm to conduct market research. 15,000
Develop corporate image, brand, signage, promotion materials. 20,000 20
Subtotal 55,000
Savings Products
Market research and product design. 15,000 15
Test market strategy for savings; pilot and evaluate new and revised products 
and subsequent rollout. 30,000 30
Document savings policies and procedures. 20,000 20
Train staff on new products and services. 10,000
Support development and refinement of back office operations. 15,000 15
Subtotal 90,000
Credit and Other Products
Assess and refine lending methodologies and new product development. 20,000 20
Pilot and evaluate new products and subsequent rollout. 30,000 30
Document current and revised credit policies and procedures. 10,000 10
Train staff on new and refined products and services. 10,000
Subtotal 70,000
Ownership and Governance
Establish valuation or institutional rating. 20,000
Develop marketing prospectus and strategy for attracting new investors. 15,000 15
Design and implement profit-sharing plan. 20,000 20
Retain legal advice on share structuring. 20,000
Subtotal 75,000
Legal, Licensing
Analyze options of legal structures and process registration, articles, and so on. 20,000 20
Transfer assets and liabilities to new entity; legal costs and tax advice; legal work 
on license application. 30,000
Subtotal 50,000
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Annex 3D (continued)
Estimated 
Consultant 
Estimated Days 
Cost (U.S.$) (if relevant)
Regulation and Compliance
Conduct regulatory and policy analysis of systems and upgrading for compliance. 30,000 30
Provide training (ongoing) on regulatory, policy, and compliance requirements. 20,000
Subtotal 50,000
MIS and IT Consultancy 
Conduct systems audit for compliance with central bank reporting. 25,000 25
Design branded forms and passbooks for computerized teller services. 10,000
Migrate data from existing to new system (data cleansing and input). 15,000
Train users on new system. 15,000
Subtotal 65,000
Human Resources Development and Staff Training
Review performance reward systems. 5,000 5
Review organizational structure, job descriptions, policies, and procedures. 25,000 25
Develop human resources development strategy and plan. 20,000 20
Subtotal 50,000
Financial Management
Engage a consultant or advisory service on capital structure. 15,000 10
Design and implement a budget model. 10,000 10
Develop treasury risk management policies and procedures. 15,000 15
Train new staff members on financial risk management. 10,000
Subtotal 50,000
Internal Controls and Audit
Train additional internal audit staff members. 10,000
Review internal controls, audit, and supervisory functions. 20,000 20
Review, finalize, and document policies and procedures. 15,000 15
Subtotal 45,000
TOTAL CONSULTANCY EXPENSES 740,000
MIS and IT Capital Costs
Network setup for branches and head office. 10,000
Upgrade and integrate or interface loan tracking, savings, accounting. 250,000
Purchase new or upgrade hardware. 250,000
Subtotal 510,000
Infrastructure
Upgrade branch infrastructure: banking halls, teller counters, 
strong rooms, 10 branches. 250,000
TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS 760,000
GRAND TOTAL 1,500,000
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Notes
1. This is not always the case, as evidenced by FINCA
Uganda. The Bank of Uganda found FINCA Interna-
tional to be a financial institution (under the MDI
Act [2003] financial institutions are allowed to own
100 percent of an MDI) and thus FINCA Uganda was
exempted from the ownership restriction. Also,
Mibanco in Peru was 60 percent owned by the found-
ing NGO at the time of transformation.
2. Parts of this section, “Leading the Transformation,”
are adapted from Dellien et al. 2005.
3. This sometimes triggers a tax liability for the MFI,
which should be considered when negotiating with
donors.
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Marketing and Competitive
Positioning
Once a transforming microfinance institution(MFI) has defined its vision, mission, andvalues, it needs to develop its marketing
and competitive strategy. This process begins by
clarifying who the expanded target market will be
for the regulated institution and gathering market-
ing intelligence to understand the target market
preferences, needs, and habits, as well as the prod-
ucts and services offered by competitors. This mar-
keting intelligence becomes a key input into the
transformation process—from strategic planning, to
business and marketing plan development—helping
the institution decide which products will best suit
the revised target market, and how to develop,
price, and deliver them. Marketing intelligence, in
combination with a thorough analysis of the MFI’s
strengths and core competencies, is also necessary
for the MFI to determine how to position itself in
the market relative to its competitors. This compet-
itive position is solidified through branding—
actively communicating a key concept, core benefit,
or value proposition that becomes associated with
the regulated institution and helps shape its image.
As shown in figure 4.1, matching institutional
strengths with well-analyzed market opportunities
must drive decision making so the MFI can develop
a clear strategy going forward as a regulated institu-
tion. Through understanding its target market,
determining the ideal product mix, and positioning
itself in the market, the MFI can then develop its
business plan, including financial projections, and
test the viability of its decisions.1
The purpose of this chapter is to outline key
areas related to marketing and competitive strategy
that transforming MFIs need to master to success-
fully make the transition to and take full advantage
of being a regulated financial institution. This
chapter begins with a description of marketing and
how it fits within the MFI as it transforms into a
regulated institution. It then outlines the process
for gathering marketing intelligence—the core of
any marketing and competitive strategy. Once
gathered, such marketing intelligence provides
the information the transformed MFI needs to
Chapter 4
This chapter was written by Monica Brand, Vice President, Marketing and Product Development, ACCION Interna-
tional. She would like to thank Jacqueline Urquizo, Director of Marketing Intelligence, and Nino Mesarina, Director
of Product Development, both of ACCION International, for their contributions to this chapter.
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determine its portfolio of products and services,
how to price them appropriately, and the channels
through which to deliver them. Finally, the chapter
defines branding and the process for developing a
corporate identity, including communications
strategies. It concludes with an overview of how to
implement the marketing plan in the transformed
institution.
Marketing
“Marketing is the management discipline and orga-
nizational function responsible for understanding
and conditioning the target market so clients desire
and prefer the institution’s offer over that of the
competition” (Brand 2003, p. 18). The goal of
marketing, therefore, is to create the conditions
necessary so the target market is more receptive to
purchasing products or services and becoming loyal
customers. As is clear from the definition, knowing
one’s customer intimately and the factors that influ-
ence his or her decision making is a critical first step
to the creation of any successful marketing strategy. 
As MFIs transform into regulated entities they
need more formal and sophisticated marketing
and positioning strategies. For credit-focused
MFIs, marketing usually refers to the provision of
promotional materials (free calendars, pens, posters,
flyers); for those with more of a client focus, mar-
keting may include conducting some basic market
research. MFIs operating on a noncommercial basis
can generally operate with impromptu promotional
campaigns and “reactive” product development
efforts. However, once operating in the formal
financial sector, an MFI requires a more concerted,
coherent marketing strategy. Transformation takes
place not only by the imposition of regulation but
also in the eyes of the MFI’s clients and competi-
tors, which in turn determines an MFI’s position in
the marketplace. As such, transformation creates
both challenges and opportunities for the MFI. 
Vision, mission, goals
    What do we want to do?
Marketing intelligence
    What is happening in the market?
Opportunity evaluation
    Where can we create value?
Strategic marketing and positioning
    How can we position ourselves competitively?
Action plan
    How do we put these ideas in motion?
Strategy
Client
analysis
Market
analysis
Competitive
analysis
Institutional
strengths
Market
opportunities
Marketing strategy
(product, price, promotion,
channel, positioning)
Value
proposition
Action plan and
implementation
f
i
t
Figure 4.1 Framework for Strategic Marketing Plan Development
Source: ACCION International, Marketing and Product Development Unit.
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To develop a coherent marketing strategy, the
transforming MFI needs to focus on the following:
• A deep understanding of its customer profiles,
preferences, and key insights (via qualitative
and quantitative research, data analysis, and
segmentation) 
• Competitive analysis (using both macro trend
analysis and mystery shopping2 as inputs) 
• An integrated product portfolio (via systematic
development, pricing, pilot testing, and rollout
with monitoring of targets) 
• Channel expansion (using automated teller
machines [ATMs] or strategic partnerships, for
example, to expand points of sale) 
• Branding and image building (defining the value
proposition and making good on the promise,
developing a corporate identity, and standardiz-
ing the look and feel of the organization) 
• Communications strategy and promotion
(including tactical “go-to-market” initiatives)
Unlike strategic planning, which is carried out
periodically (perhaps every three to five years),
marketing becomes an integral day-to-day function
of an MFI, much like human resources or financ-
ing strategies. Thus, some of the most successful
transformed MFIs in Latin America— including
Mibanco, BancoSol, and Compartamos—have set
up marketing departments and significantly expand-
ed their marketing efforts.
Marketing Intelligence 
Market-driven institutions develop their strategies
and operations based on client needs and competi-
tive realities. Clients’ needs evolve (such as demand
for individual credit rather than group loans) and
competitors become more aggressive. In many
countries (including Bolivia, Haiti, and Mexico), a
new entrant will literally stand outside the branches
of leading MFIs and offer more attractive financing
to entice the clients away. The only way to maintain
one’s position is by developing the capacity to not
only collect, but then analyze and apply, market
information to the MFIs’ operations.
An MFI can influence its positioning by devel-
oping sustainable competitive advantages and then
communicating that point of differentiation aggres-
sively. This process involves assessing the MFI’s
strengths and weaknesses against those of its com-
petitors and differentiating the institution in ways
that prospective clients find meaningful. This
process must be based on marketing intelligence
about client needs and preferences, competitors’
strategies, the MFI’s strengths, and the context
within which it works.
Marketing intelligence3 refers to an institution’s
ability to do the following:
• Collect market data in a systematic and objective
fashion (market research),
• Analyze and interpret this information (market
analysis), and
• Apply it to develop strategic recommendations
and action plans (marketing strategy) (Brand
2003).
As illustrated in figure 4.2, marketing intelli-
gence becomes the building block for key areas an
MFI can use to differentiate itself from the compe-
tition and create value for the customer:
• Product mix and pricing: the value proposition
comprising the core product (customer needs
and wants); the actual (features and design) and
enhanced product (benefits); and the pricing
strategy.
• Channels and the customer experience: how the
products and services reach the client, including
distribution strategy and client management.
Both of these areas have strong links to opera-
tions and thus are discussed in more detail in
chapter 13, Customer Service and Operations.
• Branding and image: key selling concept; attrib-
utes (tangible and emotional), visual identity
(logo and tagline), and image (the face the MFI
wants to display to the market).
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• Communications and promotion: the communi-
cations strategy (positioning statement, public-
ity) as well as the promotional efforts (tactical
initiatives to induce purchase).
The ultimate success of the competitive strategy
hinges on the quality and depth of an institution’s
marketing intelligence.
The importance of marketing intelligence is even
greater for a transforming MFI. The very nature of
becoming a regulated institution means that the
universe of potential clients expands. In addition to
microenterprise borrowers, the transformed MFI
also needs to attract deposit holders—from both its
traditional socioeconomic segments and higher
ones—including salaried workers and other savers
able to put away the coveted larger term deposits.
Moreover, the transformed MFI enters a new com-
petitive landscape in which it must track the moves
and strategies not only of other microfinance
providers, but banks and other formalized institu-
tions that compete in these same market segments.
To succeed in this more formal, complicated busi-
ness environment, the transformed MFI must shift
from being a product-driven institution (defining
itself by its lending methodology) to being a
market-driven institution.
The Four “C’s” of Marketing Intelligence
Transforming MFIs must begin to master the four
key components of marketing intelligence: client,
competition, company, and context.4
Client. Gathering marketing intelligence on the
client requires knowing the target market intimately,
particularly the following aspects:
• Client profiles: What are the demographics and
income levels of clients? MFIs typically have a
good understanding of the demographic profile
of the clients they serve, including their age, gen-
der, education level, marital status, household
size, and location. This information is often avail-
able from secondary sources such as country
census information, or by mining (reviewing and
analyzing) the MFI’s database. For transforming
Channel and the
customer experience
Marketing intelligence
• Customer needs
• Competitors
• Core competencies
• Context
Branding and
image
Communications
and promotion
Product mix and
pricing
Figure 4.2 Elements of Marketing and Competitive
Positioning
Source: Author.
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MFIs, this information is a starting point for clari-
fying and segmenting the target market.
• Needs and preferences: Which products and deliv-
ery channels do clients prefer? MFIs typically have
some intelligence on client needs, derived from
the credit officers’ relationships with clients.
Qualitative market research can build on this
intelligence by allowing the MFI to explore
more directly the wants and preferences of its
clients. Quantitative market research can be used
as a follow-up to qualitative research to deter-
mine the degree and frequency of the observed
desires in the greater population.
• Beliefs and attitudes: What are client perceptions
of banks? Of MFIs? MFIs typically have a weak
understanding of the beliefs and attitudes of their
clients unless they have actively conducted direct
market research. These subjective characteristics
generally need to be teased out of clients, and are
critical for commercializing new products. Also,
beliefs and attitudes beyond those related to
financial institutions need to be considered. For
example, in some Kenyan tribes, one cannot fore-
close on a property if the potential buyer is from
outside the community. In Uganda, some clients
take witchcraft very seriously—when one trans-
forming MFI wanted to occupy offices in a cer-
tain location someone put a dead animal outside
the premises, which meant the MFI had to find
an alternate location because clients said they
would not enter the building.
• Buying habits: How do clients make decisions?
Many factors and people influence a purchasing
decision, whether for consumer goods or finan-
cial services. Understanding how the client
makes decisions on how to fulfill his or her needs
for different financial services can illuminate
opportunities for the transforming MFI to
improve or expand its services. For example, a
client might choose a remittance provider based
on its convenience to the client’s workplace, so
delivery channel development would be an
important element of the MFI’s marketing strat-
egy if it wanted to begin offering this service. 
Competition. Marketing intelligence about com-
petition includes understanding the different
institutional categories (bank, MFI, finance com-
pany, rotating savings and credit associations
[ROSCAs]) from the client perspective, and the
relative advantages and disadvantages of each. Only
by thoroughly understanding its competition can
the transformed MFI differentiate itself from
others. This deep understanding involves gathering
the following intelligence on all of its competitors
(both regulated and unregulated):
• Mission and objectives: What are competitors’
primary business drivers—social effect? profit? a
mix of the two?
• Business strategy: What are competitor’s business
strategies and the mechanics of their business
models? 
• Growth and profitability: Which institutions are
growing and why? Why are some more profitable
than others? For example, if all the growth of a
competitor is coming from consumer lending, it
might be an opportune time for the transformed
MFI to begin a savings mobilization campaign
targeted at salaried employees, before the com-
petition begins directly cross-selling.
• Cost structure: What cost advantages do competi-
tors have? For example, banks may have lower cost
structures because of access to cheaper sources of
capital and the ability to leverage fixed costs using a
more diversified portfolio of products. NGOs may
be able to access cheap donor funds, generally no
longer available to transformed MFIs.
• Organizational culture: Institutional norms,
values, and other relatively intangible character-
istics of competing organizations, which can
sometimes be obtained through mystery shop-
ping, can be a source of competitive advantage.
For example, UniBank, an MFI in Haiti, treats
the personnel orientation as an inspirational, fes-
tive event that has since become legendary in the
market. The CEO is always present and infuses a
sense of excitement and purpose in the staff,
which carries over in how staff treat clients.
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• Image: What is the image and position of com-
petitors in the marketplace? For a transformed
MFI, understanding its own image as well as
those of its competitors is critical to determine
where its relative strengths and weaknesses lie. In
some countries (Tanzania, for example), banks
connote security and strength, but in others
(Ecuador, for example), they connote risk and
instability. 
• Barriers to entry or exit: Well-entrenched com-
petitors can benefit from a barrier to entry based
on their specialized know-how and the relation-
ship staff develop with clients, making them
reluctant to switch providers (“high switching
costs”). 
Understanding these aspects will allow the trans-
formed MFI to define its advantages clearly and
possibly preempt competitive action.
Company. An MFI must also understand itself,
both what it has been historically, and what its
potential is for the future, particularly as a deposit-
taking intermediary:
• Capabilities: What can the MFI do or develop,
such as the ability to make and collect loans,
attract clients, and motivate staff, or improve
its MIS and technological capabilities, the
learning capacity and flexibility of its staff,
and the location and capacity of its branch
network? 
• Competencies: What does the MFI do well?
What has helped the institution grow? What can
be exploited for future competitive advantage?
For example, the ability to disburse loans is a
capability, but it becomes an institutional com-
petency to do it quickly and error free. The
transforming MFI should determine its key
areas of expertise, such as credit methodology,
client relationships, and trained personnel, and
define those it might need to strengthen, such
as operations, treasury functions, and risk
management.
• Organizational culture: What is the personality
of the MFI? What differentiates it from tradi-
tional financial institutions? From other MFIs? A
big challenge for transforming MFIs is to pre-
serve this “mystique” as they grow and formalize
in the process and aftermath of transformation.
What management pays attention to and rewards
is often a stronger indicator of the organization’s
culture than the values it verbalizes or the ideals
it espouses (Hagberg Consulting Group n.d.)—
an organizational culture is defined by what an
institution does rather than what it says in its
mission statement or in company gatherings.
Typically, the transformed MFI is trying to bal-
ance its social goals with the new demands of
more profit-oriented investors. The MFI needs
to understand its existing culture and then define
the one it wants to have as a regulated, formal
financial institution. 
Context. The final intelligence the transforming
MFI needs to gather concerns the context within
which it operates. As an MFI formalizes its opera-
tions, its risk management processes must include a
more sophisticated understanding and analysis of
the macroeconomic and political environment,
financial sector policies, regulation, and supervision.
Among the factors that an MFI should track are the
following:
• Monetary policy and price stability to determine
trends in interest rates and inflation
• Exchange rate regimes, foreign exchange
reserves, and trade balances
• Tax policies and regimes
• Requirements regarding accounting, disclosure,
and other prudential supervision (for example,
capital controls and restrictions on foreign-
denominated debt)
• National rates of employment and income
• Social trends such as immigration and popula-
tion growth
• Political stability and governing regimes
• Technological trends, such as the use of mobile
phones and internet access
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Market Research: Accumulating 
Marketing Intelligence
Knowing what type of intelligence to collect is half
the battle—gathering it in a way that is useful to the
MFI is just as important. Marketing intelligence
refers to an MFI’s ability to systematically and
objectively collect, analyze, and apply data; market
research is the process of gathering this information.
The microfinance industry has benefited from a
wealth of good market research tools and tech-
niques used to gather marketing intelligence.5 The
focus of this section is how to employ these tools,
including a brief review of some of the ones most
commonly employed. A summary of the systematic
process to collect and apply marketing intelligence
is depicted in figure 4.3.
Phase I: Definition and preparation. The first step is
to clearly define the objective of the market
research. This clarification of focus involves listing
and refining the questions to be answered by the
market research and developing hypotheses based
on a review of existing sources of intelligence, com-
monly referred to as secondary sources of informa-
tion. These secondary sources include previous
research results, the MFI’s database, industry stud-
ies, and other intelligence that has been gathered.
For example, a transforming MFI interested in
researching the potential for savings mobilization
might want to determine how prone existing bor-
rowers will be to depositing their savings in the
newly regulated institution. Secondary market
research might involve analyzing central bank statis-
tics regarding the savings rate of this target market,
surveying loan officers, or mining the MFI’s data-
base to uncover information on disposable income
or rate of forced savings. 
Phase II: Design and planning. Once the objectives
of the market research are defined, the MFI must
determine how it will go about gathering marketing
intelligence directly from clients. The first major
decision is whether to use qualitative or quantitative
tools and techniques,6 though they usually should
Phase I:
Definition and
preparation
Phase II:
Design and
planning
Phase III:
Implementation
Activities in italics are usually necessary for quantitative research studies.  
Analyze the situation:
• Establish the market
   research focus.  
• Gather information
   from secondary
   sources and internal
   primary research.  
• Analyze information
   and refine market
   research focus. 
• Prepare proposal
   and define team. 
Define the investigation: 
• Determine the method
   (quantitative or
   qualitative).
• Choose the technique.  
• Define the sample.
• Prepare the terms
  of reference.
• Evaluate proposals, and
   select firm, if outsourcing.
• Develop the time line
   and budget.
Phase IV:
Analysis and
integration
Analyze and integrate
the results: 
• Define strategic and
   operational implications.
• Establish action plan
   with personnel (roles,
   responsibilities,
   time line, and so on) .
• Present plan to
   management. 
• Define goals, follow-up,
   and monitoring plan.
Implement the
investigation:  
• Develop and test tools.
• Select and train facilitator
   and interviewers.
• Coordinate logistics and
   recruit participants.  
• Implement focus groups
   and surveys.
• Supervise and monitor.  
• Define conclusions. 
• Clean, codify, transcribe,
   and tabulate results.
Figure 4.3 Marketing Intelligence Gathering Process
Source: Author.
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be viewed as complementary. Qualitative market
research—including focus groups, mystery shop-
pers, or in-depth interviews—is typically the starting
point for exploring a given topic. In the previously
mentioned example of research on deposit mobi-
lization, the transforming MFI could use qualitative
market research—such as attribute ranking7—to
determine what characteristics are most important
to a microsaver in deciding where to deposit money.
Quantitative research can be used to determine the
extent to which the attitudes identified in the qual-
itative investigation are representative of the market
as a whole. The MFI could use a quantitative survey
to test different savings packages and to determine
the ideal combination of savings product character-
istics (number of free withdrawals, interest rate,
minimum deposit balance).
Testing product bundles (grouping different
attributes to create distinct offerings) using quanti-
tative techniques allows the MFI to have reliable
data on product design before pilot testing. Quanti-
tative research can also be used to track client satis-
faction levels—another key piece of marketing
intelligence that allows the transforming MFI to
monitor how well it is doing as it goes through
transformation. For example, a focus group can un-
cover the interest among an MFI’s clients for a new
product, such as insurance, but quantitative research
can help determine how great the demand for a par-
ticular type of insurance might be. Conversely, if the
goal of the MFI is to diagnose why there is a deser-
tion problem, for example, qualitative research is
more appropriate, given its exploratory nature.
Table 4.1 summarizes the purposes and applicability
of qualitative and quantitative techniques. 
The reality is that most research involves the
application of both qualitative and quantitative
techniques (box 4.1).
Table 4.1 Comparison of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Tools
Method matrix Qualitative research Quantitative research
Objective
Confidence level
Techniques
Tools
Participants
Results
Training and preparation
Strengths
Weaknesses
To gain in-depth understanding of
consumers’ attitudes and behavior
Explorative, anecdotal
Unstructured or semistructured
Focus groups, in-depth interviews,
mystery shoppers
Small and homogeneous groups
Words and descriptions
Understanding objectives of the study
In-depth exploration of questions
Better understanding of underlying
behaviors
Usually can implement with staff
Subjective; bias can be introduced in
the execution and analysis of results
Not conclusive; results cannot be
inferred to the population
Source: Brand 2003, p. 8.
To measure the degree and extent of the
attitudes
Conclusive, with a specified degree of
certainty 
Structured
Simple and complex surveys, database
analysis (cross tabulation)
Samples with a statistical representation
of the population
Codified results, compiled as statistics
Consistency and precision of questions used
Computer analysis
Conclusive; its results can be inferred to the
rest of the population
Better for costly investment because it meas-
ures degree and frequency of behaviors
Bias on the form and the questionnaire
Can be costly and time consuming
Usually implemented by outside marketing
research firms
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Phase III: Implementation. Once the intelligence
gathering techniques are chosen, the MFI must
determine how best to carry out the market
research. Qualitative market research can be con-
ducted in-house if staff members have been espe-
cially trained in facilitation techniques, such as the
difference between probing and prompting.
Another option is to outsource the market research
to specialized companies, which has the benefit of
maintaining objectivity but the downside of being
more costly and sometimes these firms may be
unfamiliar with low-income market segments or
financial services. Table 4.2 provides a summary of
the options. 
Often an outside firm is used for the logistical
aspects of the market research—defining the sam-
ple, recruiting participants, providing a place to
meet, supplying refreshments or gifts to thank
clients for their participation—and possibly also the
implementation (focus group moderation or survey
interviews) if the MFI does not have the expertise
or the staff time to spare. In fact, it is more valu-
able for MFI staff to be listening and taking notes
during focus group sessions than moderating,
which can be “complex and surprisingly difficult”
(Wright and Ahmed 2005, p. 2). Either way, it is
important that MFI staff be intimately involved in
the implementation process through reviewing
discussion guides and questionnaires, attending
focus group sessions, or shadowing interviewers.
Although outside support can help the MFI focus
its resources on quality control and the more valu-
able final phase of analysis, there is no substitute for
hearing client feedback directly. 
Phase IV: Analysis and integration. The final and
most important phase is transforming research into
intelligence through analysis of the results and inte-
gration into an action plan. The MFI must be
heavily involved in the analysis of market research
results. Outside experts, if engaged, can provide
objective conclusions and recommendations, but
they should complement an internal vetting and
analysis of the results. The MFI’s role is to define
the strategic and operational implications of the
intelligence gathering, and define a plan of action
involving different areas of the institution. This final
step is where most intelligence gathering efforts go
off track, because research reports are not widely
circulated or the day-to-day “urgency” overwhelms
the more important planning and strategizing
activities.8
As mentioned, most transformed MFIs formalize
this intelligence function within a marketing
Box 4.1 Market Research: Uganda
Microfinance Union
One of the first activities conducted by the Ugan-
da Microfinance Union (UMU) in its preparations
for transformation was targeted market research
to better understand the market for its current
and planned products. The organization first
used various qualitative research techniques,
including focus group discussions and participa-
tory rapid appraisal tools, such as product attrib-
ute ranking, relative preference ranking, and
life-cycle profile analysis, among others. This pre-
liminary research helped provide insight into
clients’ preferences, which contributed to the ini-
tial prototype design for various products. The
organization then contracted the Ugandan sur-
vey firm Wilsken Associates to conduct a quanti-
tative survey. The objectives of the survey were
threefold: to estimate demand for both current
and planned products in the different geo-
graphic regions in which UMU was operating
or planning to operate, to guide efforts to
refine the existing product portfolio, and to
clarify UMU’s competitive position. A total of
577 people from various regions of Uganda were
interviewed for the survey, using random sam-
pling with certain qualifications. Findings from
this survey provided critical input into the orga-
nization’s product development efforts. 
Source: Contributed by Victoria White. 
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department. The marketing intelligence officer
should be responsible for managing the market
research process (including defining the parameters,
supervising the implementation to ensure quality
control, and analyzing the results). The marketing
intelligence officer should also be responsible for
the up-front secondary market research—including
data mining, competitive analysis, and industry
trends. This position typically reports to the mar-
keting director or the commercial manager,
depending on how the MFI is structured, though
the two areas must collaborate closely to opera-
tionalize the marketing intelligence. For example,
the marketing intelligence director periodically par-
ticipates in the regular meetings the commercial
manager9 holds with the loan officers to both dis-
seminate results of the market research and “truth
check” it with the field personnel. These kinds of
communication and feedback loops10 are critical to
ensure the successful application and leveraging of
marketing intelligence.
The Total Product
For transformed MFIs, increasing competition and
evolving needs of the customer requires a more
market-driven approach to product design and
development. This market-driven approach is par-
ticularly important when dealing with lower-
income communities because their priorities and
ways to meet their needs vary. Even though these
underserved markets might need the same generic
services (savings, liquidity, credit, investment), the
way they should be approached and their percep-
tion of traditional financial service providers signifi-
cantly affect product design and delivery.
Broadly defined, a “product” is anything that
satisfies a customer’s needs or wants (Kotler 2002).
From the transformed institution’s point of view, a
new or refined product represents an opportunity
to create value, and in so doing, offers a strategic
competitive advantage (Thomas 1993). Unfortu-
nately, most MFIs miss this opportunity by focusing
Table 4.2 Comparison of Implementation Options
In-house Contracted out
A
d
va
n
ta
g
es
• Allows MFI staff members who understand and
care about the sector to run the process
• Builds skill set of and provides experience for
MFI staff
• Allows MFI to internalize issues raised and
lessons learned
• Generates more appropriate and relevant
conclusions because MFI staff members are
often more familiar with the market
• Requires special skills to
– moderate focus group discussions
– develop and administer questionnaires
– analyze data effectively
• Diverts staff time from other duties
• Results in bias, because staff members often
have preconceptions
Source: Brand 2003, p. 10.
• Offers specialized expertise and a professional,
structured process
• Provides objectivity, especially in cases of high
customer dissatisfaction
• Brings significant resources (infrastructure, skilled
staff) and experience to the process
• Saves the MFI time
• Should result in analyzed data and a report ready
for presentation
• Most market research companies lack under-
standing of the MFI sector 
• MFIs are often “low-value” clients and thus
neglected or given poor service by market
research companies 
• Good market research firms are expensive
D
is
ad
va
n
ta
g
es
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on the features of the product rather than its
benefits. Features are the tangible aspects that char-
acterize what the customer is buying, including
how it is designed (minimum deposit amount,
interest rate offered, withdrawal policies) and pack-
aged (passbook, debit card). Features describe what
the customer is buying, but not necessarily why they
are purchasing the product. 
Benefits are the true motivation for client pur-
chase, satisfying needs and meeting customer
expectations. The transformed MFI can offer bene-
fits that can help create competitive advantages—
for example, one-stop shopping (deposit, credit,
and other financial services all from one institution)
or products more tailored to the needs of poorer
segments (forms and staff available in local lan-
guages, or flexibility in terms of minimum deposits
so that clients can save small amounts each month). 
Thus, a transforming MFI needs to consider the
total product and break it down into its component
parts that help explain why a customer buys (see
figure 4.4).
Most institutions focus excessively on the actual
product, although it is the other components that
often drive the purchasing decision. For example,
institutional image (part of the enhanced product)
and brand are much more important than interest
rates (feature of the actual product) in driving the
Actual product: 
The specific features that
characterize what the
customer is buying—
including how it is designed
(terms, interest rates,
eligibility requirements) and
packaged (length and clarity
of the application, color of
the passbook, and so on)
Core product: 
Why the customer
pays money to acquire
the product or service—a
benefit (for example,
financial return, security)
or the need it fulfills
(for example, liquidity,
livelihood)
Competitive
differentiation
and positioning
Minimum necessary
for the customer to achieve
her or his buying objective
Enhanced product: 
How the customer receives the
 product—the way in which it is
delivered and serviced
(application turnaround time,
hours of operation, waiting room
facilities, and customer service—
friendliness, accessibility before and
after the loan is closed; product
knowledge of loan officers) 
Potential product:
Everything else that can
possibly be done to attract and
retain the client, especially
nontraditional ways to add
value, which requires intimate
knowledge of the customer
Figure 4.4 The Total Product
Source: Brand 2000.
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decision of where the poor deposit their savings
(Fontela 2002). Moreover, it is difficult to sustain a
competitive advantage in the actual product,
because it is easy to imitate features such as price or
packaging. 
Defining the value proposition means taking a
total product approach—understanding in great
depth what drives the customer’s buying behavior
(core product), responding to those needs (actual
product), and differentiating the offer from what is
available in the market (enhanced and potential
product.) As one industry periodical explained,
“product value proposition . . . articulates what the
product does, how it does it, why it is better, and
who would gain the most benefit by using it”
(McKinley 2002, p. 2). Taking a total product
approach, therefore, requires intimate knowledge
of the customer. This knowledge is developed
through market research, careful maintenance and
mining of the database, internal communication
loops, and the other sources of marketing intelli-
gence described earlier in this chapter.
It is imperative that a transforming MFI consider
its total product mix and how its products will, in
part, define the institution in the eyes of its clients.
The product mix the MFI decides to offer will sig-
nificantly influence the type and strata of clients
attracted to the MFI, particularly after becoming a
regulated institution. An important part of strategic
analysis and planning when an MFI transforms is to
consider its overall product fit (how the current
portfolio of product offerings fits with the MFI’s
positioning strategy), the process for new product
development (how the MFI successfully takes a
product from the idea phase to the market), and
ultimately how it will price its products (how prod-
ucts are priced in relation to each other; how pric-
ing is adjusted based on the target segment and rel-
evant competition; and how pricing interacts with
financial and social performance goals). These deci-
sions will feed directly into the business planning
process as well as shape the future funding structure
of the transformed MFI.
Product Fit
Analyzing the product “fit” requires examining the
entire portfolio of products to determine how well
the various products—both existing and new—
complement each other and how well they are
aligned with the strategy of the organization. 
Strategic consistency. Product fit examines the
competitive position of the institution, which prod-
uct design should reinforce. For example, if a newly
transformed MFI has decided to position itself as
providing the fastest service in the market, all of
its products should have simple application proce-
dures, straightforward eligibility requirements, and
quick delivery times to reinforce this stance in the
marketplace. Moreover, products must build off the
core competencies and capabilities of the institution
(for example, personalized customer service, tech-
nological sophistication, speed of delivery, skilled
staff). Alternatively, an institution that has posi-
tioned itself as pro-poor and thus competes based
on the in-depth relationship it builds with each
client might not develop remittances products that
require fast service, many outlets, and client
anonymity. Finally, products must be aligned with
the capabilities of the institution, that is, the insti-
tution must determine the major impacts of all new
products on its operations including systems,
human resources, physical infrastructure, and
liquidity management.
Portfolio alignment. The second key aspect of
product fit is how well products reinforce each
other. Often, when a transformed MFI starts
expanding its portfolio of products, new products
cannibalize sales of existing products.11 For exam-
ple, the introduction of a home improvement loan,
which may be offered with lower interest rates,
might cannibalize sales of an MFI’s traditional
working capital credit product, because many
clients will access the former product for a wide
variety of needs, given that money is fungible.
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Sometimes products are intentionally targeted at
different segments—such as fixed term deposits tar-
geted at middle-class salaried workers to provide a
source of funding for the MFI. In this case, it is
important that the positioning of the new products
has a common thread to reinforce the MFI’s mar-
ket position in the eyes of all its target segments.
Product fit becomes even more important for a
transformed MFI because it is likely trying to devel-
op a new image as a regulated institution. When
inconsistencies appear in the message—for example,
when an institution does not deliver on its promise
because of a failed product—the entire image is
jeopardized.
Transforming MFIs should be aware of the ten-
dency among transformed institutions to diversify
their financial services because they can. Regulatory
restrictions limit what NGOs can offer, so once an
MFI transforms, it feels the need to develop all the
products its regulated competitors are offering.
However, just because an MFI can legally develop
new product offerings, does not mean it should
from a competitive or strategic standpoint. Portfo-
lio diversification should be a by-product of careful
strategic analysis, based on a financial, competitive,
or customer service justification. For the reasons
discussed in chapter 1, Mobilizing Savings from
the Public: 10 Basic Principles, a few well-designed
products are far superior to a wide array of less well-
thought-out ones. 
Product Development Process
A commercial approach to product development
includes the process of taking a new financial prod-
uct or service from the idea phase to the ready-to-
market phase in a manner that creates a high prob-
ability of client acceptance and positive returns to
the MFI. 
Successful product development centers on the
concept of the total product, the components
of which are built upon a deep knowledge of the
client, the competition, the market context, and
the institution’s core competencies. The client is
first, because a product’s value proposition is relat-
ed directly to how well it satisfies needs and desires
from the point of view of the customer. The compe-
tition frames the rules of the game. For example,
individual loans were a key success for Caja Los
Andes in challenging the Bolivian microfinance
market leader BancoSol because no other MFI in
the market—NGO or regulated—offered this prod-
uct. However, today in Bolivia, individual loans
alone are no longer a guaranteed customer draw—
an MFI must now decide what additional products
or services it will offer to add value for customers
and lure them away from the competition. The
value an institution brings to a client is the differ-
ence between the customers’ expectations (defined
by the competition and the context) and their expe-
rience with the product. Here is where the core
competencies and capabilities of the company come
into play. If an MFI offers a product that it is not
very well equipped to sell (for example, offering a
technologically sophisticated product even though
the MIS is weak), the value to the client will be mar-
ginal. Finally, the MFI must take into account the
context within which it is operating. For example,
highly inflationary or otherwise volatile environ-
ments suggest that interest rates should be pegged
to variable benchmarks. 
A detailed example of taking a product to the
ready-to-market phase is provided in appendix 1,
Sequencing the Introduction of Public Savings in
Regulated MFIs. The following is a summary dis-
cussion of this process as it applies to all product
development (credit, savings, or other). 
Effective product development involves careful
planning and a methodical approach. The systemat-
ic approach to product development involves four
key phases: 
• Evaluation and preparation: includes evaluating
the market potential and assessing the institu-
tional readiness to incorporate the product into
operations. It involves analyzing the four C’s
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described above, usually through investigation of
secondary research (central bank statistics, indus-
try data, existing market studies) and getting the
institution ready for the product development
process through naming a product champion to
garner institutional buy-in, organizing a multi-
disciplinary team, and developing a budget and
time line.
• Design of the prototype: involves conducting
primary market research with clients and evaluat-
ing the financial and operational impact the new
product will have on the institution. Qualitative
market research will allow the product develop-
ment team to design the preliminary product
features and benefits. Then, the multidisciplinary
team can diagram operational procedures using
flowcharts both to identify bottlenecks and
incorporate internal control measures. Once the
basic features have been defined and the proce-
dures mapped out, the team can begin the finan-
cial analysis of the product to estimate break
even. 
• Pilot testing: is the phase in which the MFI
introduces the product prototype in a controlled
way to the marketplace. As a pilot, it involves a
limited rollout, usually confined to one or two
branches or market segments. Moreover, pilots
have a fixed duration (usually the length of one
product cycle, at a minimum) and are closely
monitored to analyze the market’s acceptance
and the institution’s readiness to offer the prod-
uct. Pilot testing is a key phase to make sure
costly mistakes are caught and fixed before full
rollout.12 That is why, for example, transformed
MFIs will test new savings products on their own
staff before trying to present the product to
salaried workers, who are often a new target mar-
ket. Often more than one pilot test needs to be
carried out before launching the final product. 
• Launch: is the final rollout, after the modifica-
tions called for in the pilot(s) have been made to
the total product. Rollout involves developing a
full-fledged marketing plan to integrate the
product more completely into the MFI’s com-
petitive strategy. In addition, in this final phase
the MFI will usually invest in the necessary sys-
tem upgrades and full staff training necessary for
institutionwide commercialization.
Each of the four phases includes specific activities
and tasks that are undertaken to complete the prod-
uct development process. However, the process
should be thought of as iterative rather than linear,
as reflected in the circular diagram in figure 4.5.
Successful product development is really a process
of continual refinement. Roadblocks can surface in
any particular phase. For example, the regulatory
analysis required in phase I may uncover legal prob-
lems with offering the product. The cost analysis
undertaken in phase II might uncover a rate of
return that is below an institution’s hurdle rate, the
minimum rate of return an institution demands that
all new projects must achieve to warrant the invest-
ment.13 Phase III’s pilot test might produce out-
comes that are below the institution’s targets. All of
Evaluation and
preparation
• Client
• Competition
• Company
• Context
Pilot
test
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Design
Go
No
Go
No
Go
Go
No
No
Figure 4.5 Systematic Process for Product
Development
Source: Author.
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these obstacles require the institution to return to
the previous phase and reassess, redesign, and
relaunch. The “Go-No” arrows in figure 4.5 are
decision points that require check-ins at the end of
each phase. The process is continual because clients’
needs (and the competition) evolve over time, so an
MFI must periodically decide which products need
to be developed or phased out. 
Pricing
When an MFI transforms, it must take a more
sophisticated approach to pricing its products and
services than it took as a credit-focused NGO or
project. It is not sufficient to simply price or bench-
mark based on what competitors offer (as some
transformed MFIs do with new savings products)
or to calculate the price based on profitability
targets without testing client price sensitivity. A
comprehensive pricing strategy needs to include all
of these aspects, as well as the elements described
below:
Cost. Cost is the starting point for pricing and the
focus of most financial institutions in general, not
just MFIs. Most institutions base interest rates on a
percentage markup over administrative and finan-
cial costs. Thus, it is common to see MFIs charge
less for repeat clients, given that their larger loan
amounts and more streamlined analysis make these
loans relatively less expensive to administer (costs as
a percentage of loan amounts). The challenge for a
transformed MFI as it becomes a multiproduct
institution offering a variety of financial services is
to correctly calculate and understand the cost of
each product to gauge relative profitability and
determine appropriate margins. The microfinance
field has progressed far in this respect, with a variety
of publicly available tools—including cost alloca-
tion, marginal cost pricing, and activity-based
costing—to more accurately price products (CGAP
1998; Cracknell, Sempangi, and Wright 2004;
Helms and Grace 2004). 
Risk. MFIs typically incorporate risk into the inter-
est rate based on the client’s capacity to pay. For
example, repeat borrowers with good credit histo-
ries should be charged less than first-time clients
because the risk that the former will become delin-
quent is lower. Risk-based pricing, whereby an MFI
adjusts interest rates based on the predicted risk of
a given client segment, is an important skill for the
transformed MFI to develop as it expands into new
markets and product categories. In general, con-
sumer lending is typically riskier than microcredit,
because in the former the loan funds are not being
used productively to improve capacity to repay.
Home improvement loans tend to be less risky than
shorter-term working capital loans, because bor-
rowers place a high value on maintaining this source
of larger, longer-term funding (Brown 2003). Pru-
dent pricing practices require that interest rates
reflect these distinct risk profiles, therefore con-
sumer credit typically commands higher interest
rates and housing loans lower ones. More sophisti-
cated MFIs employ statistical tools, such as credit
scoring, to support these risk-based pricing
strategies.
Competition. Competitive benchmarking is another
key component in developing a pricing strategy, as
a first step in “reality checking” the price with the
market. An MFI should have someone responsible
for updating, on a quarterly basis, prices offered by
its main competitors (unless the market is very stag-
nant) to determine the competitive minimum
price.14 It is not, however, necessary to match com-
petitive prices, unless the MFI is trying to position
itself as the “low-cost provider.” For example, if the
competition is pursuing a loss leader strategy,
whereby they offer a product or service at a consid-
erable discount and loss of profit to attract future
business, pricing becomes a more important aspect
of the way the transformed MFI presents its new
products. It does not mean that the MFI has to
copy the strategy and compete on price, but rather,
it will need to explain why its product or service is
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worth more. The MFI must clearly and convincing-
ly articulate the value proposition it is offering the
client that justifies its higher price. For example,
MFIs are often able to withstand competition from
subsidized government programs because they
offer a quick, nonbureaucratic, apolitical process
that is worth more to the client than a lower inter-
est rate. Continual competitive analysis is also criti-
cal for the most valuable, repeat clients, because
they are the ones most coveted by other financial
institutions.
Client preferences. Market research is critical to
determine the true benefits that can justify price dif-
ferences from the point of view of the client and to
test client price sensitivity. Testing customer aware-
ness and sensitivity to interest rates is done by deter-
mining how salient price is in the client’s decision-
making process, using specific techniques such
as “top of mind” and “attribute ranking.”15 The
research should include an analysis of preferences
and purchasing habits to determine if payment
frequency or amounts need to be adjusted. Price
must be differentiated by client segment, because
each segment will have different preferences and
buying habits, and will also have different values
to the institution. For example, borrowers who
renew or take more than one type of product are
more profitable for the institution because of
increased individual revenue and potential new sales
from referrals. These clients should be treated
as preferential either through the interest rates
they are charged or by other value-added benefits,
or both.
Profitability targets. Pricing across the portfolio as
a whole should reflect the institution’s margin tar-
gets and desired capitalization rate from retained
earnings (CGAP 2002). These targets are estab-
lished based on expansion plans, investor expecta-
tions, debt-to-equity ratios (which limit the amount
of funds an institution can commercially borrow),
and external factors such as inflation. Ultimately,
the targets reflect the growth strategy of the insti-
tution and thus, desired margins should be estab-
lished jointly by the board and senior management. 
Macroeconomy. Pricing strategies should include
assumptions about inflation so that the MFI is fore-
casting in real terms rather than nominal. Further-
more, any anticipated devaluation of the MFI’s
local currency must be taken into account, espe-
cially if there are foreign currency sources or uses
of cash.
Regulation. Interest rates on individual products
are sometimes controlled by regulatory authorities.
In some countries usury laws limit what an institu-
tion can charge for a consumer finance loan or a
microfinance product. In addition, some govern-
ments or supervisory bodies establish minimum
amounts that must be paid on deposits. Any pricing
scheme must ensure compliance with regulatory
and legal norms.
Social considerations. Numerous studies demon-
strate that MFIs can bring much more value to
clients by quick approval and disbursement, appro-
priate loan amounts and terms, and credit aspects
other than the interest rate (CGAP 2002).
Nonetheless, important social considerations must
still be taken into account when developing a pric-
ing strategy. The first is transparency, so clients
understand the effective interest rates they are pay-
ing. Trying to hide true pricing by charging flat
interest rates (rather than declining balance) is a
short-term win, at best, which can ultimately dam-
age the credibility and image of an institution. The
second key aspect is reciprocity—providing value
(speed of delivery, quality customer service, or
other benefits) for the price charged. By this token,
discounts given to preferential clients should incor-
porate factors such as character as well as average
loan size—a lesson reflected in most credit scoring
systems. Finally, the institution should be commit-
ted to a continual pursuit of efficiency and sharing
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gains with its customers through rebates or
one-time discounts. These social strategies can have
a considerable impact on the hearts and minds of
clients, which ultimately benefits shareholders
through higher client retention, enhanced image,
and the profitability the two can generate. 
An MFI may not be able to viably charge clients
a price that will cover all the administrative, finan-
cial, risk-based, and forecasted costs while being
competitive and complying with local regulation. In
these cases, the MFI has a variety of options. The
first is not to offer the product until conditions
improve through, for example, internal reengineer-
ing (to lower administrative costs), fund diversifica-
tion (to lower cost of capital), or regulatory lob-
bying (to remove artificial limits on pricing). The
second strategy is to take a “lifetime value,” which
assumes that losses on introductory products are
recouped later in the customer life cycle. This “loss
leader” strategy is commonly employed in individ-
ual microcredit programs—MFIs typically lose
money on the first loan, given the intensity of the
analysis that must be completed and the relatively
small loan size. Of course, this strategy counts on
retaining clients, which is increasingly difficult as
clients become more demanding and competition
increases. The final strategy is to try to recoup losses
on one product through gains on another using a
cross subsidy. An example of a cross subsidy for
deposit-taking institutions is larger time deposits
subsidizing microsavers (Maisch and others 2005).
Cross subsidies can also occur when recently
transformed MFIs offer microsavings to their
borrowers—even though these small deposits are
money losers on a unit-cost basis, MFIs can recoup
the losses by strengthening customer loyalty and
fomenting additional borrowing. In general, a
portfolio-based approach to pricing ensures coher-
ence among the products and alignment with the
competitive strategy. The portfolio approach is crit-
ical for deposit-taking institutions because savings
products should be priced in relation to each other,
as illustrated in box 4.2.
Delivery Channels
In microfinance, as in any retail business, the deliv-
ery or distribution channel is a critical component
of the value proposition the MFI offers to its
clients. The importance of channel is even stronger
when deposits become part of the MFI’s product
mix because of clients’ preferences to have a safe,
familiar setting when handling their savings. In a
survey conducted by MicroSave in Uganda in
2003, channel aspects such as the physical appear-
ance of the financial institution and ease of access
were given as the predominant reasons for choosing
financial services (table 4.3).
Thus, the transforming MFI must analyze its dis-
tribution channels through which clients receive
products and services. Traditional microfinance
business models involve a high-touch strategy in
which loan officers go to clients where they live and
work. This field focus made the branch little more
than an operational support center for the MFI staff
and simply a point of entry for the client. Many
credit-focused MFIs use their branches primarily for
information sessions and client intake, partnering
with regulated institutions for disbursements and
repayments. Transformation for an MFI becomes a
physical as well as a legal process, as the newly reg-
ulated entity brings many of these functions in-
house. Moreover, clients’ and regulators’ expecta-
tions are much greater for regulated financial
institutions that mobilize savings than they are for
NGOs. Below are some considerations the trans-
forming MFI must take into account in developing
its channel strategy. Many of these factors are dis-
cussed in greater detail in chapter 13, Customer
Service and Operations.
Retail Format 
Retail format refers to the overall appearance and
feel that a seller presents to customers, including
its looks, physical layout, and the mix of products
it sells. The goal of analyzing retail format is to
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Table 4.3 Reasons for Choosing Financial Service Providers for Savings
Position Reason
1 Physical appearance (premises, guards, weapons, and others)
2 Ease of access to savings (liquidity of savings)
3 Perceptions of institutional stability
4 Ownership of institution
5 Interest paid on savings
6 Operating hours
Source: Mukwana and Sebageni 2003, from Cracknell 2005.
In the process of designing a new savings mobiliza-
tion campaign, FIE in Bolivia developed its pricing
structure around a base rate, in relation to which
the remaining deposit products were priced. A base
rate was established based on average deposit size
as well as term as illustrated in the table below. Both
base rates (for term deposits and for basic savings)
were a function of the country’s prime rate, the
interbank lending rate, currency (Bolivianos versus
U.S. dollars) and exchange rate, risk of devaluation,
and competitors’ pricing. Certificates of deposit
Interest rate on Interest rate on 
Account type U.S.$ Bolivianos 
Term deposits Base rate  (percent) (percent)
Term Pricing Policy Markup (percent) 2.28 9.15
30 days base rate  0.00 2.28 9.15
60 days base rate  0.50 2.78 9.65
90 days base rate  1.00 3.28 10.15
180 days base rate  1.50 3.78 10.65
360 days base rate  2.00 4.28 11.15
Basic savings Base rate  2.14 7.57
Amount Pricing Policy Markup (percent)
U.S.$0–50 Fixed  0.20 0.50
U.S.$51–500 base rate  0.00 2.14 7.57
U.S.$501–1,000 base rate  0.25 2.39 7.82
U.S.$1,001–5,000 base rate  0.65 2.79 8.22
>U.S.$5,000 base rate  1.00 3.14 8.57
Source: ACCION savings project in Bolivia.
with a term of 30 days were priced equal to the base
interest rate. Longer term deposits were paid at the
base rate plus the markup listed below. For a basic
savings account—with no fixed deposit term—the
interest paid was based on average balances: the
higher the average balance, the better the markup
over the base interest rate. Average deposits up to
U.S.$50 received a low, fixed rate of interest based
on the institution’s administrative costs, independ-
ent of the base rate. No interest was paid on current
accounts.
Box 4.2 Setting Interest Rates on Savings Products 
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enhance the customer’s experience while maximiz-
ing operational efficiencies. Thus, the MFI must
reexamine its branch from the client’s point of view,
reviewing traffic flows (where do clients need to go
and what does staff need to do to undertake differ-
ent transactions? what volume of activity does the
MFI expect at different times of the day, week, and
month?), points of contact (with whom does the
client need to speak?), and layout (is the space flex-
ible enough to grow with the institution and permit
future changes in format?).
Customer Service
Clients’ expectations regarding service quality,
security, and stature of financial service providers
differ greatly when dealing with credit and savings.
With credit, the onus traditionally is on the client to
convince the institution that he or she is creditwor-
thy. For savings, the positions are reversed—the
institution must sell clients on why they should
deposit their money in this MFI rather than the
other options they have used historically. Trans-
formed MFIs become the new players in the savings
market, and must “earn” their position to compete
at all. Thus, the channel strategy must include a
thorough analysis of key customer service dimen-
sions, including wait time (is there an area for cus-
tomers that is clearly designated and comfortable to
sit or stand while they wait to be attended?), com-
munications (are the signs legible, visible, and writ-
ten in language clients understand? does their place-
ment take advantage of “hot spots”16 and personal
care, that is, is there designated staff who can help
orient the client or assist them with procedures,
forms, and questions?). For example, Uganda Micro-
finance Union (UMU) identified that Western
Union had taken advantage of UMU’s branch hot
spots, displaying its own signage more in the cus-
tomer’s direct line of sight than UMU’s materials,
thus making it easier for a client to see how to trans-
fer money through Western Union than to see
UMU’s various offerings. 
Coverage
As an MFI prepares to transform, it needs to con-
sider how to expand its distribution network and its
corresponding area of influence. This expansion is
necessary both because of anticipated growth in
lending as it receives new infusions of capital, as well
as development of new products that will increase
demand and stretch its existing capacity, especially
as it explores new markets. For example, mobilizing
time deposits requires attracting salaried workers
in higher income markets outside the MFI’s tradi-
tional area of influence. Mibanco in Peru opened a
new branch in the more affluent Lima suburb of
Miraflores, specifically to attract higher income
savers more prone to making larger deposits for
longer terms. Location is also a consideration for
microsavers and clients of other products such as
remittances, where convenience (in addition to
confidence) is a primary driver of where they will
take their business. Of course, these customer serv-
ice considerations must be weighed against meas-
ures of market density and anticipated market share,
because building traditional bricks and mortar
branches is an expensive way to expand. In Kenya,
Equity Bank uses mobile banking vans to expand
its coverage while avoiding the cost of building
branches. Although each van is expensive, it can
service a wide area, eliminating the need for several
branches.
Cost
Transformation is an expensive process, so an MFI
must consider alternative distribution strategies as it
expands as a regulated institution. Many regulated
MFIs have begun developing alternative points of
sale where certain branch operations can be
conducted—such as client intake, loan application,
and payment. For example, Banco Solidario of
Ecuador set up mini-branches at markets, both to
facilitate loan payment for its borrowers and reduce
congestion at its branches, where savers continued
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to deposit money. Recently, Banco Solidario entered
into partnership with a payment service provider
called ServiPagos that offers additional cashier
services—including check cashing, savings with-
drawal and deposits, as well as utility and other bill
payments—at its own agencies. Though Banco
Solidario pays for each transaction, it is actually less
expensive than conducting the same transaction
within its own branches. Another strategy regulated
MFIs use to increase branch efficiency and thus
reduce costs is to install automated teller machines
(ATMs) as a complement to teller service; however,
encouraging client acceptance and use of ATMs can
often be a challenge. Some MFIs, like retail banks
in the United States, offer clients financial incen-
tives to use less expensive channels such as ATMs
by waiving account fees for limiting teller use below
a specific threshold (that is, a limited number of
free withdrawals and deposits per month at a teller
window). Again, given that the channel is a critical
part of the value proposition to the client, the MFI
needs to compensate the client for forgoing the
benefit and comfort of transacting with a live teller
versus a machine.
Technology
Over time, technological alternatives such as ATMs,
debit cards, and internet banking will reduce
dependency on branches. But the viability of these
alternative channel solutions is dependent on the
cost, reliability, and availability of the technology.
Connectivity is a critical issue even with regular
branch expansion, because reliable “real-time” net-
work connections are needed to settle accounts
remotely and to allow clients the flexibility of using
different outlets without the risk of fraud. Some
MFIs have dedicated network lines to facilitate
communication among distribution points and
increase operational efficiency. For countries where
the telecommunications infrastructure is weak,
MFIs have begun pursuing alternative technologies
to expand their distribution network—such as the
Remote Transaction System (RTS) that was
designed and pilot tested In Uganda by a consor-
tium of MFIs and Hewlett-Packard (Magnette and
Lock 2005). Another wireless channel option uses
cellular technology to allow clients to receive loan
disbursements and send payments remotely via
mobile telephones.17 In considering these techno-
logical alternatives, the MFI must explore safe-
guards to prevent identity theft, and use of redun-
dancy (running dual systems as well as creating
backup systems) in case of communication failures. 
Risk
As a transforming MFI expands its operations, it
needs to strengthen its security measures to manage
its new distribution channels and reduce risk of
fraud and theft. The risks become greater when the
MFI diversifies its channels because the procedures
are different, technologies new, and interests less
aligned (as is the case when working with partners
to provide alternative points of sale). The MFI must
address each risk in turn, tightening internal control
procedures to discourage employee fraud, strength-
ening physical security and monitoring (including
both guards and cameras) to prevent robberies, and
instituting control mechanisms (from personal
codes to biometrics)18 to avoid identity theft. The
more difficult risk to control is the dilution of brand
equity and lost opportunities for cross-selling that
come, respectively, when working with partner
organizations and substitute channels to expand a
distribution network. 
Image 
Once the MFI transforms, image takes on great
importance because of the new functions and mar-
ket position the legal, regulated entity assumes.
Safety and security are paramount concerns for
savers worldwide and a regulated MFI’s image must
reflect this serious responsibility. As described in
more detail in the next section on branding, an
institution’s image is determined from the point of
view of the customer, but an MFI can influence the
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consumer’s perceptions by strengthening and stan-
dardizing its look and feel. At the most basic level,
image building involves creating consistency in the
colors used inside and outside the branch, unifying
the look of the façades and visual communications
(posters, placards, billboards), and conveying solid-
ity (by using bold colors, capital letters, and lami-
nated signage). Standardizing the MFI’s image
across distribution channels is critical, especially if it
explores points of sale other than its branches. For
example, Western Union requires that its black and
yellow sign (with its name in bold capital letters)
be visible near the cashier, regardless of whether it
is in its own outlet or using a teller of another
institution. 
Branding
A brand represents a collection of information
about a product or an institution19 and typically
consists of a name, identifying mark, logo, and dis-
tinguishing visual images or symbols. A brand is
built not only through effective communication but
also through the total experience that it offers the
client (Bates 2003). Brand in its fullest definition
carries connotations of a product’s promise—the
product or service’s point of difference among its
competitors that makes it unique. 
Branding and its role in positioning the institu-
tion relative to the competition takes on renewed
importance for the transformed MFI as it tries to
define the unique space it occupies in the market
and in the mind of the consumer. The transformed
MFI is regulated, but it is not a conventional bank.
Similarly, it is still engaged in microfinance but in a
way that can be distinguished from its NGO coun-
terparts. In marketing terms, the transformed MFI
is in a new institutional category that has elements
of traditional commercial financial institutions as
well as characteristics of NGOs or more socially
driven financial institutions. The change in legal
status affects how different stakeholders view the
institution. The transformed MFI has to convinc-
ingly convey messages of caring, quality service (for
its existing customers), stability and professionalism
(to attract clients from new segments), and reliable
return on investment (for shareholders). The trans-
forming MFI wants to be able to affect the market’s
perception of itself. For example, it wants to be per-
ceived as formal and professional rather than cold or
exploitative, though both attributes could charac-
terize brands of banks in the minds of the con-
sumers. Therefore, branding is a powerful way for a
transformed MFI to influence its image and com-
petitive positioning in the market.
For MFIs that have transformed to mobilize
deposits from a broad cross section of clients, one
positioning challenge to overcome is the perception
clients have of them being lenders focused on
the poor. To avoid the confines of this narrow asso-
ciation, the MFI must redefine its competitive
category—the cluster of market players that cus-
tomers group together for easy identification and
classification. In the minds of the consumer, MFIs
are not the same as banks, just as they are different
from money lenders, even though they may have
characteristics of each. For example, an MFI can be
fast and nonbureaucratic like informal sources of
financing, or can build the trust and goodwill that a
good bank might earn. The goal for the trans-
formed MFI is to have the consumer associate it
with a new category with more positive characteris-
tics than other categories such that the consumer
begins to conduct all of its financial services with
the transformed MFI (figure 4.6).
Branding is the process of creating and dissemi-
nating the brand and its major components: corpo-
rate identity (including the total product and
personality), image (including the visual aspects of
brand), and promise (the unique selling or value
proposition). Branding is a vital component in solid-
ifying competitive position in the market. It is fun-
damental to enhancing the image of the transformed
MFI so that it can expand the scale and scope of its
operations. For the transformed MFI to mobilize
savings, it does not necessarily have to build upscale
branches like a bank might. Cooperatives and credit
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unions, for example, have successfully mobilized sav-
ings by providing reliable service, cultivating a sense
of ownership among members, and offering prod-
ucts tailored to the needs of their target markets.
Corporate Identity 
Corporate identity is based on the associations and
values encompassed in an institution’s total prod-
uct, core competencies, personality, and vision for
the future. 
An institution’s identity is defined first and fore-
most by its total product, based on the tangible and
emotional benefits it offers its customers. Brand
identity is built from the institution’s core compe-
tencies and competitive advantages, because these
all help define the value proposition. However, it is
the institution’s culture or personality that helps
give life to its identity and brand. Some institutions
use mascots20 or a spokesperson to help invigorate
a brand. In Canada, for example, the Royal Bank of
Canada uses Leo the Lion as its mascot, which
makes people think the institution is strong and the
“king of the jungle.” In addition to conveying mes-
sages, building the personality of a brand helps
make it memorable. For this reason, Interbank in
Peru uses a pig mascot as part of its savings cam-
paign targeted at children. To the delight of the
children who accompany their parents to the bank,
all the employees wear pig ears, helping establish
it as the place to go to open children’s savings
accounts. However, mascots are not necessary to
give an MFI a personality and sometimes can be
viewed as infantile by certain segments (as was the
case with Compartamos in Mexico21), so it is
important to test ideas with the target market. 
Corporate identity becomes relevant for the
transformed MFI as it shifts from a nonprofit
organization to an institution owned by private
shareholders. As with all social enterprises (institu-
tions that pursue social goals through market
mechanisms), sometimes the profit-driven forces
come in conflict with the mission, driving fears that
the MFI will become too corporate (vaults, security
guards, more rigid requirements for compliance) or
lose focus on the poor (or both). 
To realize the potential of becoming a regulated
institution to further its social goals, an MFI must
1. Safe
2. Expensive
3. For rich
4. Bureaucratic
Banks
1. Trustworthy
2. For poor
3. Loans
4. Limited in scope
1. Exploitative
2. Emergencies
3. Fast and no
    questions
Credit MFIs
Competitive
categories Money lenders
New
category?
Figure 4.6 Competitive Categories
Source: ACCION International, Marketing and Product Development Unit.
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clarify and crystallize its corporate identify. This
soul searching begins with a well-articulated vision
and mission that supersede the operational charac-
teristics of the transformed MFI. More important,
shareholders solicited for investment must under-
stand the double-bottom-line implications of being
a social enterprise, with social as well as financial
goals. Equally important, the MFI must infuse its
staff with this sense of purpose so that professional-
ism and compliance do not equal distance and
rigidity in the eyes of the client.
Image
Though many use “image” and “brand” inter-
changeably, image refers to how the institution is
perceived by clients relative to the competition, that
is, the client’s perception of the institution based on
his or her experience (direct or indirect) through
purchases of the institution’s products and services
or through publicity, word of mouth, or other
interactions. In this way, image is strongly influ-
enced by the more tangible aspects of the brand,
such as the look of the branches or how personnel
dress and behave. Because it is based on customer
perception, image can differ markedly from the
institution’s self-defined identity. Thus, the MFI
must make sure its external identity—how it pres-
ents itself to the public—transmits these values in
the most visible aspects of its brand, including the
name, tagline, logo, and color scheme:
Name. An MFI must decide how it will refer to
itself, for example, whether to include “bank” or
other regulatory distinction as part of its official
name. Some transformed MFIs solve this problem
by including these regulatory distinctions in smaller
letters after a comma or as part of the tagline.
Most transformed NGOs in Bolivia include
“FFP” in their name to signal they are regulated.22
Compartamos in Mexico, however, is questioning
whether it will include the word “bank” in its name
after it transforms, because low-income Mexicans
have a negative image of this category. In some
countries, MFIs regulated under a separate tier
are not allowed to use the word “bank” in their
name.
Taglines help clarify corporate identities and make
them memorable. FINCA Uganda’s tagline—
“small loans, big changes”—helped clarify its core
product and the hope it wanted to inspire in its
clients. Teba Bank in South Africa used its slogan—
“No one is too small for Teba Bank, or too big”—
to reinforce its message that it wanted to grow with
its customers. Taglines are extensions of the corpo-
rate name (they always appear together) while slo-
gans are used periodically, as part of specific cam-
paigns or with certain products. 
Logos are graphic representations used by an insti-
tution to help it define itself. Marketers hope to sear
or “brand” these mental concepts into the con-
sumer’s mind so that he or she associates the brand
with the product’s quality. The Uganda Microfi-
nance Union had a diamond as part of its logo
when it was an NGO. Given UMU’s leadership
position in the Ugandan market, it did not wish
to abandon all vestiges of its corporate identity
when it transformed, though it did want to have a
more professional look. Therefore, UMU main-
tained the diamond, but used cleaner letters
(nonitalicized) and bolder colors to profession-
alize its image without losing the positive associa-
tion (see chapter 15, The Creation of Uganda
Microfinance Limited, for more detailed analysis).
Many financial institutions use blues or bold
colors to convey confidence, professionalism, and
strength.
Promise
Promise is the pledge of satisfaction and quality
implied by “identifying and authenticating a product
or service” with a brand.23 The brand promise is
based on the “set of assets (or liabilities) linked
to a brand’s name and symbol that adds to (or
subtracts from) the value provided by a product or
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service . . .” (Aaker 1996, p. 7). This promise and
the anticipated value it implies is the reason cus-
tomers are willing to pay more for a brand name
product. Brand promises are articulated in position-
ing statements, which define an institution’s unique
selling or value proposition—a distinctive message
an institution develops to differentiate itself from the
competition that should be used consistently in its
advertising and promotion.24 The brand promise is
the key message communicated to clients to estab-
lish or modify its image and thus should adhere to
the following rules:
• Focus: An institution cannot be all things to all
people. The MFI must determine what attrib-
utes are most important to its clients and choose
an area in which it has a comparative advan-
tage or at least a core competency upon which it
can build. The institution should choose the sin-
gle benefit or value component that the institu-
tion will actively communicate through its
brand.
• Distinction: What is important in positioning is
to provide a unique benefit that differentiates the
MFI in the minds of consumers (Wright et al.
2004). The transformed MFI does not have to
be safer than traditional banks or even offer as
many products. Instead, the transformed MFI
needs to simply establish a strong position
among its target market and respond to their
needs in particular. Likewise, the transformed
MFI does not need to provide the same gamut
of savings products that a bank does, for exam-
ple: it just needs to have a few basic offerings—a
liquid savings account, term deposits, and maybe
a programmed savings account—with flexible
characteristics tailored to the needs of its target
market. 
• Emotional connection: An MFI offers its clients
both functional benefits and emotional ones,
reflecting how clients feel about the institution
and the total product it offers. The unique sell-
ing or value proposition must speak to a client’s
own priorities and needs to create a real point of
differentiation from the competition. For trans-
forming MFIs, this emotional connection with
clients is often the most powerful competitive
weapon at their disposal because it is very diffi-
cult to emulate. Akiba Bank in Tanzania, for
example, uses the emotional power of being
100 percent Tanzanian owned as well as its focus
on the common person to extend its success in
microcredit into savings mobilization. 
• Credibility: Too often, transforming MFIs try to
become “just like” banks, which is a weak posi-
tional strategy. This kind of me-too approach
rarely works because it is difficult to beat some-
one at their own game, and it does not leverage
the strengths of the MFI. To change customers’
perceptions, the MFI must be able to deliver on
its desired positioning. For example, an MFI
cannot position itself as the fastest if it has not
streamlined its processes and procedures and
decentralized control. Customers are not easily
fooled, so the positioning strategy must be cred-
ible and consistent with the MFI’s ability to
deliver.
Branding includes all of these components to
influence how customers experience the institution.
Branding is an emotional, value-laden process
rather than the physical representation—it conveys
the way people think, feel, and respond when they
hear or see the brand. Given the complexity and
importance of branding, it is best for an MFI to use
an overall look and feel that encapsulate all the
products and segments rather than trying to brand
individual products. 
Building a Brand
A transforming MFI can take certain clear steps to
shape its image in the marketplace and build its
brand.
Define the customer’s critical values and how they
prioritize each. Successful brands connect in an
intimate way with the customer. For the MFI to
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know the aspects of its identity it should try to con-
vey in its image and brand promise, it must under-
stand what customers value and why. It is also
important to understand the customer purchasing
process, including who influences decision making
and what the relevant substitutes are, both direct
and indirect. Finally, the transformed MFI must
understand the biases clients have about banks and
regulated institutions in general, because these atti-
tudes might create either barriers or opportunities
for the new institution.
Understand current position of the MFI and its
competitors in the market, using the marketing
intelligence techniques discussed earlier in this
chapter. The transforming MFI must determine its
target market (current and potential) and the rele-
vant categories to analyze (banks? unregulated
MFIs? cooperatives?). It needs to understand the
competition and the context within which it will
operate once regulated to determine the parameters
of its target market. Based on market research with
the target market about the most valued attributes,
the MFI can determine how clients currently view
the institution and its competition.
Explore opportunities and open “spaces” in the
market by asking key stakeholders (including
clients, investors, and staff) what attributes differ-
entiate the MFI from its competitors. In identifying
opportunities for differentiation, the MFI should
take into account attributes strongly valued by the
customer, including those used to describe their
ideal financial institution and products, as part of
their feedback on actual institutions and offerings.
The transformed MFI should also take a long-term
outlook, identifying opportunities for differentia-
tion that are sustainable as it redefines its position in
the market.
Define a brand position and values that differenti-
ate the institution from its competition and builds
on its strengths. The MFI can leverage its trans-
formed status to differentiate itself from the com-
petition and identify the position it desires in the
marketplace. For example, is it the fastest and sim-
plest (few requirements, quick approval time)?
Does it offer additional security with flexibility? Is it
the “friendlier” financier? Is it on the cutting edge
of technology? Defining the brand position should
be looked at as an institutional effort involving
different functions of the institution, including
marketing, sales and credit, operations, field staff,
human resources, and senior management. 
It is important that the MFI be able to complete
the brand promise in each customer touch point.
Like customer service, branding is as much an inter-
nal strategy as it is external. The MFI must live and
breathe the brand, which is based on the values of
the organization. Each customer contact is an
opportunity either to strengthen the brand or to
cause it to lose some of its luster and prestige. From
the look of the branches to the dress and attitude of
the personnel, the MFI must remember that brand-
ing is based on the customer experience. Thus, brand
values should be used as part of the screening
process when recruiting new employees and evalu-
ating the performance of existing personnel.
Communicate the brand and reinforce it through
internal standardization and communication. Brand
begins from within, by standardizing the look and
feel across distribution channels. Symbols, graphics,
and colors that are part of the corporate identity
should be echoed in the color scheme of the
branches, uniforms of personnel, content of pro-
motional material, and design of business cards to
reinforce and strengthen the brand identity and
create a consistent image throughout the institu-
tion. Given the importance of standardization in
establishing image, many transformed MFIs devel-
op a manual of corporate images that specifies the
exact hues of the corporate logos and how the logo
should appear on letterhead and business cards
(with sizing dimensions and locations) and explains
how the logos and graphics appear if the back-
ground is dark or light, or if it is to be printed in
black and white or color. This manual is presented
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as part of the staff orientation and reinforced with
refresher training to ensure understanding and to
emphasize its importance. Many MFIs also use
newsletters and other internal communications to
emphasize the importance of branding efforts and
keep staff updated on developments. Furthermore,
senior management should lead by example,
making sure all communications (memos, presenta-
tions, fax sheets) clearly display corporate letter-
head, logo, taglines, and other key components of
the brand.
The MFI’s brand—both the concrete aspects
(name, logos, taglines) as well as the intangibles
(values, personality, emotion) should be integrated
into all communications—both mass media and tac-
tical. (See Communications Strategy section of this
chapter.) To build awareness and recognition in the
minds of the consumer and dilute misguided
impressions, newly transformed MFIs should plan
communications campaigns targeted solely at brand
development. Professionalizing and standardizing
image is critically important to branding and estab-
lishing the MFI’s position as a serious, regulated
institution (box 4.3).
Measure and monitor for consistency and impact.
Like any major undertaking—whether developing
a new product or transforming to a new legal
structure—thorough training and close follow-up
are critical to success. Markets are dynamic and even
the best defined plans can be misinterpreted or
poorly implemented. Many organizations use a vari-
ety of tools, including recall (the ability of a client
to remember the institution’s name, tagline, or
other attribute), top of mind (the ability of the
client to recall without aid), and other survey tech-
niques, to measure the impact of publicity and
other external communications. Internal monitor-
ing is equally important to ensure even remote
branches are following the image guidelines and
staff are being true ambassadors of the brand.25 It is
critical that MFI management adequately staff these
monitoring teams and follow up diligently and
proactively on their recommendations to maintain
the institutional image and reinforce brand quality.
Some MFIs even use contests with prizes to reward
branches that are exemplary in representing the
brand.
Communications Strategy 
Marketing communications for a formal financial
institution comprises more than just publicity. In
general terms, there are two levels the transforming
MFI must consider these:
1. Institutionwide campaigns that build brand and
strengthen image, and 
2. Tactical, product-driven communications. 
Box 4.3 UMU Follows its Brand
Statement
The ultimate expression of an organization’s
identity is its brand statement. Uganda Microfi-
nance Union’s (UMU’s) brand statement was
developed from a detailed review of its business
plan, market research, and interviews with
clients and staff. The draft statement was vetted
by senior management, who found it fitting and
representative of UMU’s corporate identity.
UMU’s brand statement encapsulates the brand
experience—what a stakeholder or client should
expect when working with the institution. 
UMU’s experience in microfinance enables it
to approach clients with honesty, respect, and
sensitivity. Michael Kasibante, UMU’s assistant
director of research and development says, “Our
goal is to create a permanent financial institution
that provides opportunities for entrepreneurs.”
“In every interaction with the UMU brand,
several key messages should be clearly communi-
cated. This is expressed through the branch
appearance, employee dress code and product
design.”
Source: The New Vision 2005.
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Achieving success at the first level, image-
building communications, makes the second level
(the tactical campaigns) a more straightforward and
successful process. Brand building communications
strategies should complement the MFI’s product-
related promotional efforts, though they are dis-
tinct, complex processes.
Key Components
Key components of marketing communications
include advertising, promotion, direct marketing,
and public relations.26
• Advertising: For most MFIs, product-specific
advertising—typically flyers, brochures, posters,
or billboards—is the primary focus of their mar-
keting efforts. A transforming MFI might also
begin to sponsor mass communications, through
television, radio, or newspapers, to help raise its
profile or change its image, or both. Such adver-
tising involves significant investment and thus
should be part of a broader brand development
strategy.
• Promotion: Promotion relates to all marketing
activities designed primarily to persuade mem-
bers of a target audience to take a specific action
such as a trial purchase. Common promotions in
microfinance include free gifts (t-shirts, pens),
lotteries or raffles (for a television or household
appliance), or discounts (one month’s worth of
fees waived for each referral). Promotions are
most effective when the buying behavior is
habitual and “sticky” or difficult to change—as
in the case of savings. The goal is to inspire the
client to try the services, though the MFI will
only win over the customer with a superior value
proposition. 
• Publicity: Publicity is information designed to
attract attention to a company, product, person,
event and that is disseminated through various
media. Publicity is the aspect of marketing most
familiar to MFIs, which typically use brochure or
other written materials (like signs or posters in
the branch) or perhaps newspaper advertise-
ments, to promote their product and services. As
MFIs grow in sophistication and market size,
they begin relying on media with greater reach—
like radio or billboards. The goal of publicity is
to package ideas, shape messages and reach audi-
ences that may go beyond current customers, to
include any other group the MFI wishes to influ-
ence, such as prospective clients, investors, regu-
lators, or new market segments (maybe wealthier
time-deposit holders).
• Direct marketing: Direct marketing involves
targeting communications directly to individuals,
typically a large number at a time using direct
mail or call centers,27 rather than through mass
media. Though direct marketing has historically
not been used much by traditional MFIs, the
increased practice of data mining can enable
MFIs to better target their communications and
more finely tune marketing messages. Informa-
tion stored in databases can come from the MFI’s
own MIS or outside sources such as third-party
market research databases. For example, FIE, a
transformed MFI in Bolivia, used an employer’s
staff list to promote a time deposit product tar-
geted at teachers and parents of students. 
• Public relations: Public relations (PR) involves
mass communications for which, unlike advertis-
ing, there is no direct payment from the MFI
to the media outlet carrying the information.
The most common type of PR is client stories
picked up by news media, but PR also includes
company-controlled activities such as annual
reports or special events—the opening of a new
branch or the approval of a license application by
the authorities. PR is related to publicity, the
purpose of which is to build awareness of and
foster a desired attitude toward a particular com-
pany, product, or service. Many transformed
MFIs create external communications functions,
sometimes separate from the marketing depart-
ment, to issue press releases and organize events
to publicize information about the MFI and its
products and services. 
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The traditional model of the purpose and proper
flow of marketing communications and direct sales
efforts is captured by the acronym AIDA—create
Attention, generate Interest, develop Desire, initi-
ate Action.
Executing the Strategy
In executing a communications strategy, an
MFI typically will solicit the support of a pub-
licity agency to help develop the creative content
and the most appropriate media channel to pursue
its positioning strategy and redefine its brand.
The MFI should develop a creative brief and
solicit bids from promotional firms to develop an
implementation plan with media spots (brief
excerpts of a television or radio commercial to be
used during a campaign that convey its core mes-
sage) and recommended channels for the MFI to
evaluate. The creative brief should specify the
following: 
• Objectives: Clarify two to four communications
objectives of the desired campaign, which should
be tied to overall marketing goals and be consis-
tent with the institution’s brand, both tangible
aspects (colors, logos, taglines) as well as intan-
gibles (emotions and values, such as security,
confidence, trust, and reliability).
• Audience: Define target audience, describing not
only the composition of the target audience
(demographics of the people, households, or
organizations that the MFI wants to read, view,
or hear a particular marketing communication)
but provide relevant background on consumer
insight. These insights could come from market
research and marketing intelligence. 
• Message: These are the key concepts to com-
municate (the unique selling or value proposi-
tion of a given product, benefits offered, and
support of brand promise). The message should
be focused and consistent with the desired posi-
tioning strategy.
• Resources: The available budget must be deter-
mined. If the budget is limited, this section
could also include preferred media channels.
The proposals from the creative agencies should
include the following: 
• Tools and techniques: Communications is
about storytelling. The creative agency should
indicate what techniques it plans to use, for
example, an engaging narrative, humor, human
interest angle (like testimonials), or arresting
imagery. It should also indicate the medium it
recommends—print (newspaper, billboards),
broadcast media (radio, television), internet, or
some combination. 
• Budget: The budget should include a break-
down of costs including the creative develop-
ment as well as media placement, if the agency
will handle both.
• Implementation plan: The proposal should out-
line the intended communications plan (pre-
ferred media channels, frequency, geographic
coverage) and the time frame for execution.
• Evaluation and amendment: The MFI must have
explicit mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness
of the campaign, both before and after it is
launched. Ideally, the agency should offer visual
and written summaries of alternative creative
“spots” to be publicized, for the MFI to evaluate
through informal focus groups with clients
as part of the pre-test. The key aspects to evalu-
ate are
– Recall: Ask participants to write down every-
thing they remember from the message to
determine which aspects of the message are
most impressionable.
– Understanding: Ask participants to describe
how they interpreted the message to see if
they understood the principal messages. 
– Credibility: Ask participants if they believe
the message; it is important that the partici-
pants not only understand the message but
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believe it. Otherwise, it will not motivate
them to change their attitudes or buying
behavior. 
– Impact: Ask participants to jot down all the
positive and negative aspects of the message.
This feedback is critical because sometimes
small details—like phrasing or a person’s
expression—can interfere with the message
delivery.
– Motivation: End by asking the participants
what they would do after seeing the message
(nothing, seek more information, purchase
immediately), to determine not only their
thoughts but their likely actions. 
Once executed, the MFI or its advertising
agency should monitor the effectiveness of the cam-
paign based on the stated objectives. One way is to
measure the number of prospects generated by dif-
ferent campaigns by dividing the number of
inquiries by the estimated target audience (for
direct marketing, it would be divided by number of
clients actually contacted). Often different phone
numbers or offers are used based on the medium to
evaluate which one generated a greater impact. If
the campaign is for awareness building, the metric
to measure effectiveness would be recall—not sales
volume because there are a variety of factors that
influence whether the customer buys the product or
service (attractiveness of the value proposition,
image of the institution, loyalty to current
provider). Based on the campaign’s performance,
the MFI should have the ability to amend it if it is
not generating the desired reaction.
Implementation: Consolidating
the Pieces
The final step in developing a marketing strategy for
a transforming MFI is to consolidate the critical
aspects—marketing intelligence, the product mix,
product development, pricing strategy, positioning
and branding, and communications strategy—into
a marketing plan. To permanently integrate market-
ing into the regulated institution and establish
accountability for ultimately developing the plan
and implementing it, most transforming MFIs cre-
ate a marketing unit or department.
Marketing Department
Formalizing and centralizing its marketing func-
tions in one specialized department brings together
activities that were formerly dispersed throughout
the organization. These functions almost always
include marketing intelligence gathering, product
development, and promotion. Some formal market-
ing departments also play an important role in more
broad-scale efforts such as competitive positioning
and customer service. Because marketing is typically
a new department in recently transformed MFIs,
the staff usually report to the sales department or
“commercial unit,” which is generally what the
credit department evolves into once the portfolio
of the transformed MFI includes more than just
loans. 
Over time—as markets grow more competitive
and clients become more sophisticated—marketing
takes on an increasingly important role in the
organization and thus the marketing director gen-
erally moves to the same level as the sales or com-
mercial director, both reporting to the general
manager or chief executive officer of the MFI. (See
the sample organizational chart in figure 4.7, which
highlights the reporting relations for those depart-
ments most directly involved in business strategy
and competitive positioning.)
Marketing Plan
Once the transforming or transformed MFI has
used the marketing intelligence it gathered and
developed its product portfolio and pricing strategy,
as well as its planned positioning and branding, it
needs to develop a marketing plan.
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The simplest way to develop a marketing plan
is to start with a thorough diagnosis of the four
C’s (client, competition, company, context) of
marketing intelligence followed by a strategy built
around the classic four P’s—product, price, pro-
motion, place—as outlined in annex 4A, Sample
Outline of a Marketing Plan. 
Most of the time spent (at least 60 to 70 per-
cent) developing a marketing plan is invested in the
diagnosis of the four C’s (that is, gathering market-
ing intelligence). It is in this part that ad hoc charts
or analysis tools are developed that will be used to
define the objectives, marketing strategy, and action
plan. The problems and opportunities identified
in the diagnosis phase, if well done, will spell out
the possible solutions and strategic routes to be
recommended in the strategy and action plan. It
may be useful for the MFI to engage a marketing
consultant to help develop the marketing plan.
See annex 4B, Sample Terms of Reference for
Development of a Marketing Plan.
Brand development is typically presented as part
of the “promotion-communications” P, while
sales-related activities are elaborated in the “place-
distribution” P. For well-developed markets with
high brand differentiation, the brand development
plan is tackled at the corporate strategy level and
thus is separate from the marketing plan. Similarly,
the competitive strategy should be fleshed out in
the business planning process that precedes the
development of the marketing plan. 
Annex 4C provides a summary checklist of the
major aspects of marketing and competitive posi-
tioning covered in this chapter. 
Publicity and
promotion
Product
managers
Branch
managers
Systems
Channels
(including ATMs)
Customer
service
Product
development
Market
intelligence
Regional
directors
Marketing
director
Business strategy / competitive positioning
Operations
Commercial
director (sales)
General
manager
Figure 4.7 Proposed MFI Organizational Structure Incorporating
Marketing 
Source: Author.
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Annex 4A Sample Outline of a
Marketing Plan
I. Executive summary of business objectives,
strategy, and positioning goals 
II. Diagnostic 
a. Client—market segmentation, consumer
buying behavior, attitudes and preferences
b. Competition—SWOT (strengths, weak-
nesses, opportunities, threats) analysis,
image and positioning, relative market share,
and value proposition
c. Company—sales by product and channel,
profitability, core competencies, capabilities,
capacity (channels, staff), technology, and
other institutional analysis 
d. Context—regulatory, macroeconomic, and
market overview (size, trends)
e. Analysis of opportunities—SWOT and gen-
eral conclusions 
III. Objectives 
a. Business objectives—sales growth, market
share, profitability and margin targets 
b. Marketing objectives—target market, value
proposition (positioning, product, service,
price, channel, and so forth)
IV. Strategy and action plan (summary of activities
to be undertaken)
a. Product—strategy and plan of action
b. Price—strategy and plan of action
c. Delivery channels—strategy and plan of
action
d. Promotion and communications—creative
strategy, media channels, publicity plan
V. Resources—who, what, when, and how much 
a. Time line
b. Budget
Annex 4B Sample Terms of
Reference for Development of a
Marketing Plan 
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and so forth.
Objective
The main objective of this consultancy is to assist
MFI A to conduct market research and to develop
a Marketing Plan. With the anticipated launch of a
new voluntary savings product once licensed as a
deposit-taking institution, MFI A has prioritized
the completion of a comprehensive marketing
strategy. MFI A requires support to develop a com-
prehensive marketing strategy, particularly with
regard to image building, branding, and competi-
tive positioning. The consultancy will be completed
in two phases to allow for gathering of marketing
intelligence before marketing plan is developed.
Tasks
Phase 1:
1. Prior to arrival in country, gather and review
background materials on MFI A’s operations,
prior market research, competitors, and future
growth plans (all materials provided by MFI A
to the consultant three weeks prior to the in-
country trip). 
2. Once in country, spend three days becoming
familiar with MFI A’s operations and corporate
culture. This will include meetings with senior
staff, front line staff, and a visit to the field.
3. Work with senior staff and marketing depart-
ment to develop a market research plan, begin-
ning with defining the target market, the specific
topics to be investigated, and the hypotheses
to test. The market research could be focused
on one of various marketing intelligence needs,
including branding, competitive strategy, cus-
tomer satisfaction with current offering, and
product review. To help define the scope of the
primary market research, the consultant should
carry out an investigation of secondary sources
of information on the industry, competition, and
the context. Based on this review of secondary
sources, the consultant will determine the need
for primary market research, which could include
a series of focus groups and questionnaires to be
delivered by a local market research firm. 
4. Participate in the hiring of local market research
firm to carry out the market research and devel-
op a terms of reference and time line for the
research. The terms of reference should include
objectives, recommended sampling frame, and
recommended research techniques to solicit bids
from local market research firms. 
5. While the market research is being carried out,
be available for questions and feedback from the
market research team (MFI A staff and the mar-
ket research firm). Ensure adequate completion
of market research and collection of quality data.
It is expected phase 1 will require 15 to 20 days
to complete.
Phase 2:
1. Upon completion of market research, review
findings and conduct thorough analysis to deter-
mine MFI A’s relative position in the market
including strengths and weaknesses, opportuni-
ties and threats.
2. Using the market research and discussions with
various staff and, if necessary, clients or potential
clients, summarize the market research findings
and draft a marketing strategy going forward.
3. Facilitate an off-site, two-day workshop with
MFI A senior management on MFI A’s market-
ing strategy. Focus of workshop should be on
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honing corporate brand strategy (brand attrib-
utes and positioning statement, branding com-
munications plan, corporate identity, corporate
communications) and reviewing current product
strategy (target market, brands, taglines, sales
strategy, and product development). 
The morning of Day One of the workshop
will be spent working with key marketing and
other staff to further define the goals for the
workshop. The afternoon of Day One will be
spent with branch managers who have direct cus-
tomer contact. Day Two of the workshop would
be spent with senior executives—in the morning
focusing on developing the brand of MFI A and
in the afternoon focusing on sales strategies for
individual products.
4. Using results of the workshop, and continuing
to work with MFI A’s marketing managers and
other staff, develop a draft marketing strategy for
each product. The deliverable under this task is a
Marketing Plan Matrix for MFI A as a whole and
for each product. The matrixes for individual
products should identify 
• Product name and product characteristics
• Target market(s)
• Positioning strategy—how tied to corporate
strategy
• How product characteristics, features, and
benefits relate to product positioning; how
benefits can be sold to position product; the
primary message
• Branding and image
• Likely media and channels for promotion and
communications
• Other, including cross-selling strategies
• How MFI A will position itself against its
main competitors with a note on MFI A’s
main competition and their strategies
In addition, a separate document should
spell out the main elements of MFI A’s corpo-
rate marketing strategy, and what it can do to
create the desired branding and image in the
marketplace. 
5. Present marketing matrixes completed in task
number 4 to MFI A’s senior management and
solicit input.
6. Finalize marketing plan matrixes off-site in close
coordination with MFI A.
It is estimated phase 2 will require up to 30 days
to complete.
The consultant will work closely with MFI A’s
staff on the above activities, building their skills
and ability to better manage the roll out going
forward.
Deliverables
There are two primary deliverables:
1. MFI A Marketing Plan, including Marketing
Plan Matrixes for MFI A and for each product of
MFI A
2. Brief completion report including description of
tasks completed during both phases and final
recommendations for follow up
Level of Effort
It is expected that up to 50 days will be required to
complete this assignment, including the two phases.
Annex 4C Checklist for Marketing
and Competitive Positioning
Marketing Intelligence
• Do you have a deep level of understanding of the
client, including demographic profile, needs and
preferences, beliefs and attitudes, and buying
habits? 
• Have you thoroughly analyzed your competi-
tion—understanding their objectives, business
strategy, growth and profitability, cost structure,
organizational culture, image and positioning,
and barriers to entry and exit—to define your
institution’s competitive strategy? 
• Have you analyzed your institution’s capabilities,
defined its core competencies, and understood
its organizational culture? 
• Do you have a good grasp of the context in
which your organization is operating, including
macroeconomic and political environment,
financial sector policies, and regulation and
supervision?
• Have you defined the objective of your market-
ing intelligence gathering—what questions
are you trying to answer and what are your
hypotheses? 
• Have you consulted existing sources of
intelligence—research reports, databases, staff
knowledge—before embarking on the more
costly primary market research? 
• Have you determined what type of market
research technique is most appropriate to answer
your business objective (quantitative or qualita-
tive) and what tools are most applicable?
• Have you decided whether you have the staff
availability and expertise to conduct the market
research in-house or if you should hire an out-
side specialist? 
• Have you assigned a person or a team to oversee
the implementation—to review the tools,
observe the implementation, and analyze the
results? 
• Have you developed an action plan based on the
strategic and operational implications of the
intelligence gathered?
The Total Product
• Do you know what the core product is—why
your clients buy the product?
• Have you enhanced the product to differentiate
it from the competition? 
• Have you tested the total product with the target
market to make sure that both the features and
benefits add differential value in the client’s eyes?
Product fit
• Is the product aligned with the institutional
vision and competitive strategy?
• Do the products build on your institution’s
strengths?
• Do you have the institutional capacity to com-
mercialize the products?
• Is your institution in a financial position to sup-
port the investment product development
requires? 
Pricing
• Have you considered the financial implications
of your pricing strategy, including loss leaders
and cross subsidies? 
• Have you analyzed the competitive implications
of your pricing strategy? 
• Is your pricing strategy consistent with your
clients’ needs and preferences? 
• Have you adjusted your price for the risk implic-
it in the product, as well as overall assumptions
regarding inflation and devaluation? 
• Does your pricing strategy allow your institution
to meet its profitability targets and desired rates
of recapitalization? 
• Are your prices in compliance with regulatory
and legal norms?
• Have you considered the social implications of
your pricing strategy? 
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Product Development
Evaluation and preparation
• Have you discussed the strategic vision for the
product portfolio?
• Have you estimated the market appetite using
secondary market research?
• Have you assembled a multidisciplinary product
team?
• Have you garnered institutional buy-in for antic-
ipated changes?
Design of the product prototype
• Have you segmented the market to identify mar-
ket needs and preferences using primary market
research?
• Have you analyzed the competition to determine
comparative advantage?
• Have you diagrammed operational procedures
(bottlenecks, internal control, and so forth)?
• Have you tested the systems?
• Have you estimated costs to the institution and
borrowers?
• Have you projected revenues and cash flows?
• Have you verified legal and regulatory compli-
ance?
• Have you tested prototype and marketing mes-
sages with focus groups?
• Have you finalized the prototype?
Pilot testing
• Have you defined the objectives and milestones
of the pilot test?
• Have you designed the pilot test protocols?
• Have you prepared the pilot test site (systems,
operational flows, and so forth)?
• Have you executed the pilot test?
• Have you monitored the pilot test?
• Have you evaluated the results of the pilot test?
• Have you made a decision about launching the
product full scale?
Launching the product
• Have you developed an implementation plan?
• Have you trained staff and developed incentives?
• Have you developed a marketing strategy?
• Have you upgraded the MIS?
Delivery Channels
• Do your distribution channels comply with reg-
ulatory requirements? 
• Have you developed your desired retail format
(overall look, layout, and mix of products and
services) to offer through different outlets? 
• Have you retrofitted the branches from a cus-
tomer service point of view to address wait time,
client communications, and customer care? 
• Does your network of distribution channels pro-
vide broad coverage, including the new markets
it wants to serve? 
• Have you considered alternative channels to
reduce cost? 
• Have you explored technological alternatives
such as ATMs or remote transaction systems? 
• Have you built in control mechanisms and secu-
rity measures to deal with fraud, internal control,
identity theft, and other risks? 
• Have you upgraded and standardized your
image across channels? 
Branding
• Do you understand the preferences and priorities
of the target market?
• Have you conducted an image study to under-
stand how your actual and potential clients view
you and your competition?
• Have you developed a positional strategy by
segment?
• Have you developed a clear, concise, and credi-
ble unique selling or value proposition that will
be the basis of your brand promise? 
• Have you created a new image—including colors,
logos, slogans, and taglines?
• Have you decided what personality you want
your brand to have and developed a strategy to
help create it in the minds of consumers?
• Have you undertaken efforts to standardize
the look and feel of your brand across channels
and internally to enhance your institution’s
image?
• Have you developed a promotional strategy to
help communicate your new image to your
clients and hired a specialized firm to help imple-
ment it?
• Have you established a follow-up strategy to
measure impact and monitor compliance?
Communications
• Have you planned advertising campaigns for the
new image and products as a transformed MFI?
• Have you developed promotional campaigns to
inspire new clients to try your services? 
• Have you considered direct marketing efforts to
target specific niches? 
• Have you built a public relations function to
communicate information about the MFI and
your products and services to new audiences? 
• Have you developed a creative brief to solicit
bids from different agencies to help you with the
development of different elements of the creative
campaign? 
• Do you have mechanisms to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of different campaigns? 
Marketing Plan
• Have you determined how you will incorporate
the marketing function within your institution? 
• Have you determined how you will develop a
marketing plan and who will be responsible? 
Notes
1. See chapter 5, Strategic and Business Planning, for
developing a business plan.
2. Mystery shopping is a research method whereby peo-
ple posing as regular customers anonymously visit or
contact a place of business (a branch, for example) to
assess customer service, product quality, employee
performance, cleanliness, or overall experience
(Brand 2003, p. 18).
3. Industry experts also use the term marketing research
to differentiate the action-oriented focus of market-
ing intelligence from classic market research (Reid
and Plank 2004).
4. Classic marketing usually just includes the first three
C’s, with the third C often referred to as “company,”
but given the important macroeconomic and political
realities of developing markets, the fourth C “context”
is included here.
5. See http://www.microsave.org and Brand 2003.
6. Quantitative market research techniques use statistical
analysis to identify tendencies among client groups,
determine correlations between variables, and mea-
sure the depth and frequency of specific trends. Qual-
itative research techniques use conversational formats
to probe in depth attitudes and preferences of clients,
and usually answer the questions “why” and “what”
rather than “how often” or “how many.”
7. Attribute ranking is a method for determining what
elements of financial services matter most to clients
and the relative importance of each (Wright et al.
2003).
8. For concrete examples of how marketing intelligence
is concretely applied, see Brand (2003, pp. 14–17).
9. “Commercial manager” refers to the person manag-
ing the MFI sales force (typically its loan officers). 
10. For additional discussion of how to build effective
feedback loops within MFIs, see McCord (2002).
11. Cannibalization occurs when sales of one product
displace or “eat” income that had been generated by
another product.
12. In a recent virtual conference on pilot testing, partic-
ipants emphasized the importance of these dry runs,
except when markets are changing quickly or in situ-
ations where demand far exceeds supply (digests from
the MicroSave Virtual Conference on Pilot Testing,
March 14–18, 2005; Arunachalam 2005). 
13. Banks and other regulated institutions typically use a
variety of benchmarks to set this minimum “hurdle”
rate of return, including the weighted average cost
of capital, historic return on equity, or other profit-
ability targets.
14. Boston Consulting Group refers to this competitive
minimum as the “commodity offering” that estab-
lishes the base price point (BCG n.d.; consultant
interviews and www.bcg.com).
15. Top-of-mind tests whether price is the first thing
customers mention when explaining their purchas-
ing decision or evaluation of competing products.
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Attribute ranking for pricing analysis compares price
to other product characteristics to determine how
important interest rate is relative to other decision-
making factors. Both of these tests can be performed
using qualitative techniques (for initial impressions)
and quantitative methods to validate the results—
such as determining price elasticity, a quantitative
measure of consumer’s sensitivity to price (Brand
2003).
16. “Hot spots” are those areas within a branch upon
which client attention is focused because of the layout
and traffic flow. A critical hot spot is the wall behind
the cashier or any other area that clients stare at for
long periods while they wait to be attended. 
17. MFIs in both South Africa and the Philippines are
experimenting with loan payments and tracking via
cell phone.
18. PRODEM in Bolivia has developed a variety of tech-
nologies, including digital fingerprint recognition
and voice-driven smart ATMs rather than data inputs
(like personal identification numbers), to create
secure alternative channels tailored to a population
with low levels of written and technological literacy
(Hernandez and Mugica 2003). 
19. Branding can be applied to the entire corporate iden-
tity as well as to individual product and service names.
20. A mascot is an animal or person adopted by an insti-
tution for promotional purposes or by a sports team
to bring it good luck.
21. In 2003, Compartamos undertook market research
to understand the “personality” of its corporate iden-
tity by exploring images and concepts its clients
associated with its brand. To its surprise—given the
modest profile of its typical female, rural client—they
rejected caricatures and animated mascots. The
clients of Compartamos perceived it as a parental
figure and the mascots seemed juvenile. 
22. FFP stands for Fondo Financiero Privado, loosely
translated as Private Finance Company—the regula-
tory structure the Bolivian superintendent created for
MFIs to become regulated.
23. Advertising legend, Walter Landor, as cited in
Camper 2000, p. 59.
24. As defined by the pioneering advertising agent,
Rosser Reeves, who invented the term. A unique sell-
ing proposition is a distinctive message an institution
develops to differentiate itself from the competition
that should be used consistently in its advertising and
promotion.
25. Many leading corporations refer to their employees as
“brand ambassadors,” recognizing they are the lead
representatives of the brand and its face in front of the
client.
26. Other key elements—like corporate communications
(such as those targeted at investor relations) or inter-
nal communications (with MFI personnel) are not
included because they are typically undertaken by
areas outside marketing.
27. Direct marketing by mail is not viable in many devel-
oping countries. 
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Strategic and Business Planning
Any organization, particularly one contem-plating a significant strategic change, needsa road map for its future. Typically embod-
ied in a business plan, this road map is an output of
both strategic and operational planning. A funda-
mental planning tool, it identifies the key strategic
goals of the organization and outlines the opera-
tional implications for achieving these goals. It
allows decisions to be made regarding the allocation
of resources and quantifies the likely results of
actions, helping institutional leaders set realistic
goals and make decisions. Furthermore, it provides
staff, management, board members, and external
stakeholders with a documented description of not
only what the institution looks like today, but more
important, the institution’s vision of what it hopes
to accomplish in the future. 
Such a tool is particularly important for an
institution that has decided to transform from a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) to a deposit-
taking financial intermediary. While most microfi-
nance institutions (MFIs) already have some type of
business plan, the transformation process represents
such a fundamental change to the organization’s
internal and external operating environment that
drafting a new plan is unavoidable. As detailed in
various other chapters, transformation is typically
characterized by the addition of new products and
services, and thus entry into new markets, the
recruitment of new staff, significant investment in
training, upgrades in systems, and infrastructure
changes. Additionally, with transformation, the
organization is launched into a new competitive
environment and is forced for the first time to
abide by a range of new regulatory, legal, and tax
requirements. And it is beholden to various new
stakeholders. Each of these changes has funda-
mental implications for the institution’s business
strategy. 
While most transforming MFIs are already famil-
iar with general business planning, this chapter
presents the unique characteristics of incorporating
an institutional transformation into the business
planning exercise. The first section provides a brief
overview of the business plan development process.
The second section discusses the various options
MFIs need to consider to effect the actual transfer
and establishment of the legal entity which will
carry on the microfinance business as a regulated
company. This is followed by a discussion of the
core elements of a business plan, highlighting those
aspects unique to transforming MFIs. The next sec-
tion focuses on key considerations for financial
modeling of the regulated entity’s projected results
Chapter 5
134 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
that are ultimately included in the business plan.
The financial modeling section includes the effects
of transformation on the projected balance sheet
and income statement, recommended indicators
and benchmarks to consider, and suggestions on
accommodating investor requirements into the
modeling exercise. Finally, given the significant
impact of tax regulations on an MFI’s business
strategy and resulting return expectations, the chap-
ter concludes with a targeted look at tax strategy
and compliance. Any future tax liabilities as a for-
profit shareholding company must be considered in
the business plan for the transformed institution. 
Throughout this chapter reference is made to
other chapters in this book because much of the
strategic and operational decisions that need to be
made, and the institutional capacity that needs to
be developed in a transforming institution, in turn,
affect the development of the business plan. As
such, the business planning process will likely con-
tinue, to some extent, throughout the transforma-
tion process as decisions are made and capacities
developed. Thus, this chapter is not intended to
be read in isolation from other chapters because
much of the business planning process will require
knowledge and understanding of all the issues that
affect an MFI when transforming. It is placed near
the front of the book because the business planning
process should begin at the time the transformation
process begins, as the institution will require a busi-
ness plan (even one that continues to change) to
refer to internally and a version of it to share with
prospective investors, regulators, and other stake-
holders along the way.
Developing a Strategy
As is often the case with the development of any
kind of plan, the very process of planning is often
more important than the plan itself. Strategic and
operational decisions, followed by detailed financial
modeling, need to precede the actual drafting of
the plan, and lie at the heart of business planning.
Unlike various business plans that are developed in
a last minute flurry (often with little input from
staff) only to be handed over to a donor and then
placed on a shelf and referenced at year’s end, the
business plan for a transforming MFI becomes a liv-
ing document. A business plan that is developed in
isolation and thus does not reflect a hard-won con-
sensus among the stakeholders of the MFI will most
likely not succeed in implementation. The efforts
leading to the creation of the business plan and the
multiple versions that ensue are often reflections of
the level of buy-in that has been achieved with a
broad range of internal and external stakeholders. 
As highlighted in chapter 3, Planning for
Transformation, successful transformations require
investment in a structured change management
process. Successful change cannot be mandated by
management. Staff members need to be convinced
of the need for change and understand why a new
strategic push—such as converting into a share
capital, regulated institution—is needed and desir-
able. Involving staff in investigating the market,
brainstorming about new products and services,
and setting targets—all key components of the busi-
ness planning process—are important to gaining
their buy-in and ultimate ownership of the results of
the business planning exercise. 
In addition to the internal audience—the man-
agement and staff of the MFI—the audience for the
business plan of a transforming MFI expands to
include a range of new external stakeholders:
• Investors: The business plan, or a summarized
version of it, is typically one of the primary doc-
uments used by the MFI to market the institu-
tion to outside investors. This has significant
implications for the depth of financial analysis
that needs to be included in the document. For
example, the business plan of a transforming
MFI should include detailed information on
projected rates of return over an extended
period. Many prospective investors request up to
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10-year pro forma balance sheets and income
statements.
• Regulators: A comprehensive business plan is
typically one of the documents that must be sub-
mitted with the MFI’s application to the central
bank in the licensing process. In Uganda, for
example, the requirements for the components
of the business plan are quite specific.1
• New staff hires, in particular senior management:
Key conclusions of the business plan may be used
to recruit some of the new senior staff needed to
support the transformation and the institution’s
future operations.
Traditional business plan development typically
occurs over a period of two to three months,
depending on how developed the organization’s
overall strategy is at the outset, the depth of market
research that is conducted, and the planning
approach taken. For a transforming MFI, this
process is likely to absorb both more resources and
time than anticipated and certainly more than the
business planning process may have absorbed his-
torically. Competition and the overall operating
context will be different for a regulated financial
institution and will require new skills to evaluate
and understand. Consideration will also have to be
given to regulatory implications for the new institu-
tion and, as discussed in chapter 4, Marketing and
Competitive Positioning, a broader target market
will need to be defined and analyzed, the appropri-
ate product mix determined, and the strategy for
positioning the new MFI in the marketplace devel-
oped. This will result in potential changes in mar-
keting channels, and increased access to broader
sources of funding. Finally, new investors and
regulators demand a new level of accountability for
results that management will need to recognize
in the planning process. All of these factors under-
score the importance of a structured planning
process that acknowledges early on the fundamen-
tal changes to a business plan implicit in an institu-
tional transformation.
The business plan development process can be
broken down into the four stages presented in
figure 5.1: vision setting, marketing intelligence,
business model definition, and business plan devel-
opment. The first three stages reflect the key com-
ponents of strategic planning. Using its decision
to become a regulated deposit-taking institution,
the MFI establishes (or redefines) the mission and
goals for the organization; the strategic direction
that, in turn, leads to the definition of the target
market. It then conducts market research to further
Business model
definition
• Products and
   services
• Marketing and
   delivery channels
• Institutional
   resources 
Vision
setting
• Vision
• Mission
• Values
Marketing
intellegence
• Client
• Competition
• Company
• Context
Business plan
development
• Action plan
• Projections
• Indicators
Figure 5.1 The Business Plan Development Process
Source: Author.
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understand its anticipated client base, the competi-
tion, the organization’s own core competencies,
and the overall context in which it is operating. This
internal process of self definition leads to the devel-
opment or refinement of the MFI’s business
model—the operational plan. The business model
includes the proposed products and services to be
offered; marketing and delivery channels to be
used; and the institutional resources, both human
and financial, needed to achieve the goals of the
organization. The last stage, business plan develop-
ment, pulls these components together to develop
the road map for the organization going forward.
Vision Setting
As discussed in chapter 3, Planning for Transforma-
tion, the vision and mission statements of trans-
formed organizations need to be modified to take
into account changes in the target market and the
broadening of relevant stakeholders including
investors, new board members, and probably, a new
or revised management team. Vision setting and
market research tend to be iterative—the results
from preliminary market research may force a rede-
finition of vision and mission, which itself may
generate the need for additional research.
Marketing Intelligence
A business plan is typically built on the results of
comprehensive market research. While MFIs may
have a good sense of their current market, transfor-
mation implies a shift or expansion in target market
as new products are introduced and new customer
relationships are developed. Before embarking on
new product development, marketing and promo-
tion strategies, financial projections, or a broader
expansion strategy, MFIs need to have a clear
understanding of who their target market is, what
the customers’ needs are, who their competitors
are, and what their potential is for substantive mar-
ket penetration. For a more detailed discussion of
this topic including a discussion of how quantitative
and qualitative market research support marketing
intelligence gathering, see chapter 4, Marketing and
Competitive Positioning.
Business Model Definition
According to the work completed during the vision,
mission, and values formulation; the findings of the
market research; and the decisions made regarding
the position of the new entity in the market, the
transforming MFI needs to closely examine its cur-
rent business model during the process of develop-
ing its business plan. Is the current model sufficient
to achieve the new vision and mission and the
position in the marketplace the organization has
planned? And, most important, will decisions made
regarding these questions result in a financially
viable and ultimately marketable new institution?
This is what the business plan, once developed, will
help to determine. To develop the business plan,
the transforming MFI needs to confirm and quan-
tify the products and services the regulated institu-
tion will offer; the marketing and delivery channels
it will use; and the human, physical, and financial
resources it will need to operate effectively as a
deposit-taking institution. These key issues will
substantially influence the results of the final busi-
ness plan.
Products and services. Most institutional transfor-
mations result in refining, and often expanding, the
MFI’s product offerings—at the very least, trans-
formation results in the addition of voluntary sav-
ings services. Offering deposit services to the public
requires the MFI not only to develop appropriate
savings products, but also to examine the complete
product mix including credit, savings, money trans-
fers, and insurance in light of new or expanded
target markets.
The addition of new products and services also
changes the way revenue is earned and costs incur-
red. Fee revenue often goes up with the addition of
new services and the cost of funds often decreases
over time as cheaper deposits fund more and more of
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an institution’s loan portfolio. Costs, however, also
increase with the added responsibilities of compli-
ance reporting to the central bank, increases in man-
agement information systems (MIS) and infrastruc-
ture requirements, higher staff costs, and increased
overall management needs resulting from the
increase in the range of products offered.
Marketing and delivery channels. For an MFI that
has historically relied on regulated financial institu-
tions or the “village bank” (or “center” depending
on loan methodology) to disburse and collect loans,
transformation into a deposit-taking institution will
have significant implications for its marketing and
delivery channels. Infrastructure and security
requirements imposed by the regulator will proba-
bly prohibit deposit mobilization outside of a
formal branch structure. (Some regulations, such as
the State Bank of Pakistan’s Microfinance Regula-
tions, may have provisions for mobile banking
although this is likely to require significant security
and internal control measures to be in place.) The
result is that the MFI will have to reexamine its cur-
rent infrastructure and possibly make significant
changes in its overall retail strategy.
Institutional resources and capacity. Given the
above, what are the institutional resources—human,
physical, and financial—that will be needed to sup-
port the delivery of these products and services
through the anticipated channels? This question
requires the MFI to evaluate its overall organiza-
tional structure, staffing plans, branch network
system, and MIS. See part III, Transforming the
Institution: Operational Implications, for more
detailed discussion on each of these and other topics.
Institutional Transformation 
and the Role of the NGO
Before moving to the fourth phase of the business
planning process—developing the business plan—
the transforming MFI needs to make some key
strategic decisions about how it will legally trans-
form, and what will be the continuing role, if any, of
the NGO going forward. While regulatory require-
ments will typically define the type of institutional
form required for licensing as a deposit-taking
institution, the way the MFI transforms into a for-
profit, share company and, if applicable, how it
transfers its assets and liabilities to the new entity,
and what the NGO will do after transformation,
need careful consideration and analysis. 
“Transformation” as used in this book results
in an MFI operating as a licensed deposit-taking
financial institution. Depending on the form and
purpose of the original MFI, transformation can
ultimately result in just the one legal entity—the
licensed financial institution—or more than one
including the licensed company as well as the orig-
inal MFI (usually an NGO or project) or other
companies. An MFI that wishes to operate with
only one entity can do so through reorganizing the
existing organization to meet the requirements for
licensing (which may require a change in legal
form) or, if already operating in the legal form
required for licensing, simply change other aspects
(such as ownership, or services offered) to meet
licensing requirements. For example, in the case of
FINCA Uganda, the original NGO was reorgan-
ized into a new share company and the NGO was
closed. When Faulu Uganda decided to pursue
transformation, it was already operating as a share
company (the legal form required for microfi-
nance deposit-taking institutions in Uganda) so it
simply needed to expand the number of sharehold-
ers to meet the ownership requirements for micro-
finance deposit-taking institutions.2 In both cases,
the licensed financial institution was the only legal
entity.
An MFI that wishes to operate with the licensed
entity as well as the original MFI and possibly other
companies often must create a new company sepa-
rate from the original MFI (usually an NGO) to
meet the requirements. The Uganda Microfinance
Union, for example, created a new company sepa-
rate from the founding NGO and transferred the
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NGO’s assets and liabilities to the new company.
Even after licensing, it continued to operate with
two entities, the licensed financial institution and
the original NGO.3
Creation of the New Company
As mentioned above, the transforming MFI can
plan to operate after transformation with just one
legal entity or with two or more entities. The actual
process the MFI will undertake differs depending
on the approach chosen.
The one-entity or reorganization approach. In this
approach, the required process depends on the legal
form of the original MFI. If it is operating with a
legal form that is not the one required for licensing,
the MFI will need to be reorganized into the nec-
essary legal form. Its charter documents need to
change to reflect its new legal status, but its assets
and liabilities do not move. Its capital base is con-
verted from one composed of donated capital and
retained earnings to one composed of share capital.
Those with an economic interest in the original
company (such as FINCA International in the case
of FINCA Uganda) are issued shares. New share-
holders may also be invited to invest in the reor-
ganized company, either at the moment it is reor-
ganized or at a later time. For this approach to be
feasible, the identified party who takes ownership of
the NGO’s capital must be acceptable to both the
central bank and the original donors. If the trans-
forming MFI is already operating under the legal
form required by the regulatory authorities, it sim-
ply needs to ensure it meets all other requirements
including ownership limitations, capital require-
ments, and so forth.
The two-or-more entities or transfer approach. In
this case, the original MFI transfers those assets
(such as its loan portfolio, investments, staff, physi-
cal assets) and liabilities (such as its debt obliga-
tions) related to its microfinance business to a new
company that has been created or purchased
expressly for this purpose and is in the legal form
required by bank regulatory authorities.4 In
exchange, the original organization receives debt or
equity or both in the new institution. In most trans-
formations to date, other investors are then invited
to purchase additional shares in the new company.
The new institution’s capital base is thus composed
of share capital issued to both the founding organ-
ization (NGO) and other external investors. The
founding organization remains a legal (and in most
cases, operating) entity, but may or may not offer
financial services.
Each approach has different implications for the
structure of the new entity and must be carefully
evaluated in light of the relevant regulatory, legal,
and tax frameworks. In addition, the chosen
approach reflects a critical strategic decision that has
significant implications for the opening financial
structure of the new entity, and as such is important
for financial modeling purposes. (See Financial
Modeling section later in this chapter.) Finally, the
approach chosen is greatly influenced by strategic
decisions concerning the future role of the NGO
(if applicable). 
Role of the NGO as an Investor
In the reorganization approach, the original NGO
survives but only as the licensed institution. No sep-
arate company is established, and thus, no assets or
liabilities are transferred to a new company. Instead,
the original NGO that undergoes reorganization
merely changes its form to a private share company
so that it can act as a regulated financial intermedi-
ary (or if already in the appropriate legal form,
changes other necessary aspects). Thus, the original
company continues its business of making loans
and, once licensed, accepting deposits. Its capital
base, however, has been transformed to facilitate
share ownership (or, if applicable, expanded owner-
ship). The presence of other lines of business may
influence the approach chosen, because often it is
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best to separate nonfinancial (and presumably, but
not always, unprofitable) activities from financial
services. Otherwise, the cost of providing these
services will negatively affect the returns to
investors in the MFI, and distort financial ratios
monitored by the supervisory authority.
In the transfer approach, the original NGO sur-
vives as an investor or lender (or both) in the new
organization. At the same time, it may retain some
assets and liabilities related to other lines of busi-
ness, such as literacy, health, or business develop-
ment, as happened in the case of K-Rep Bank in
Kenya (box 5.1).
If the transfer approach is chosen (most common
to date), the role of the NGO as investor in the new
entity is influenced by the way in which the assets
and liabilities are transferred. MFIs that have trans-
formed by means of creating a new entity while
maintaining the original organization typically have
done so in one of three ways: 
• Complete transfer model: The NGO makes a
direct sale of its microfinance assets (and all of its
related liabilities are assumed) all at once in
exchange for debt or equity (or both) in the new
company.
• Branch transfer model: Over an extended
period, the value of individual NGO branches
are sold to the new entity in exchange for cash,
debt, or equity in the new entity, or some
combination.
• Client transfer model: Outstanding client loans
to the NGO remain on the NGO’s books until
they are paid off (which, given the relatively
short-term nature of most microloans, rarely
exceeds two years), at which time the NGO
invests this liquid cash in the regulated entity as
debt or equity or both. All other assets and the
institution’s liabilities are typically transferred
according to the complete transfer model.
In the complete transfer model the transfer
happens on one specified date. The new regulated
entity picks up the relevant closing balances from
the NGO, such as the portfolio, fixed assets, and any
debt that has been transferred from the NGO to the
new entity. External investor debt and equity injec-
tions are then reflected as cash (or investments) on
Box 5.1 The Transformation of K-Rep
and the Creation of the K-Rep
Group Ltd. 
The transformation of K-Rep into a commercial
bank required the creation of three legal entities
under the umbrella of K-Rep Group Ltd., a hold-
ing company. K-Rep Bank Ltd. is a private, for-
profit shareholding company owned primarily by
K-Rep Group, as well as others. K-Rep Advisory
Services (Africa), Ltd., or KAS, is a private, for-
profit consulting firm wholly owned by K-Rep
Group. K-Rep, the NGO, was not created anew,
but was reincarnated as the K-Rep Development
Agency (KDA), with substantial changes in its
internal operations. 
K-Rep Group transferred the financial assets,
liabilities, and activities of the financial services
division to K-Rep Bank. The assets, liabilities, and
activities of the nonfinancial services division
remained with KDA, which was then divided
into microfinance research and innovations,
and microfinance capacity building. In 2001, the
microfinance capacity-building division was spun
off to K-Rep Advisory Services, which was incor-
porated to provide fee-based microfinance
consulting services.
The new structure was intended to protect
K-Rep’s original vision of providing both financial
and nonfinancial services to the poor. Each
institution provides different services within
the microfinance and microenterprise sectors. The
institutions within the K-Rep Group are separate
legal identities. Each has its own board of direc-
tors and own mission, vision, core values, and
organizational culture.
Source: Nyerere and others (2004).
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the asset side in the new entity, and as debt and
shares on the liability and equity sides, respectively.
Likewise, the relevant value of the NGO’s assets
that are “sold” to the new entity typically are
reflected as a combination of debt and equity shares
on the liability and equity sides of the new entity.
The NGO’s balance sheet posttransformation
would reflect the reverse: the outstanding loan and
investment (the equity stake) in the new regulated
MFI would appear as the NGO’s assets. Assuming
all the debt of the NGO was transferred to the new
entity, the right-hand side of the NGO’s balance
sheet would be pure capital. In this scenario, a key
consideration is estimating the projected actual
transformation date. Table 5.1 shows this process
using t-accounts, a common accounting device. For
financial modeling purposes, the analyst will proba-
bly have to select a best-guess date in the future.
However, this date will likely shift a number of
times, thus requiring various versions of the projec-
tions model. 
With the branch transfer model, the transfer hap-
pens over time. Branches are sold based on condi-
tions established at the time the decision is made to
select this model. Conditions for sale include
achieving a certain level of profitability, being
appropriately upgraded to operate as a regulated
branch, or relevant geographic considerations. This
model can be used if the NGO wants to continue
microfinance operations in a distinctly different
geographic area or wants to serve a distinctly differ-
ent market niche (such as a lower income clientele)
than the new regulated entity, both of which may
initially require continued donor subsidies or pres-
ent too much of a financial drain on the regulated
entity. The potential for competition between the
NGO and the new regulated entity, however, will
need to be addressed in such a case, because geo-
graphic and market distinctions may become
blurred over time (see box 5.2).
For institutions that pursue the client transfer
model, the NGO invests a portion of its available
cash (as shares or debt) in the new institution. As
the loans on its books are paid off, the NGO uses
the proceeds of these repayments to purchase more
and more shares in the new entity (or provide
debt). Over time, the NGO’s assets shift from being
largely composed of microenterprise loans to being
Pretransformation Posttransformation
ABC NGO ABC NGO ABC MFI
Loans
MF assets
Non-MF assets
Total 13 Total 13
Debt 6
Non-MF liabs 2
Grants/equity 5
7
5
2
8
3
2
Investment in
MFI
Non-MF assets
Total
Non-MF liabs 2
Grant /equity 5
Total 7
Loan 8
MF assets 3
Total 11
Debt 6
Equity 5
Total 11
Note that both pretransfer and posttransfer, the net assets (grants and equity) of the NGO are unchanged. On the asset side, it has
swapped loans and microfinance assets for an investment in the new MFI, and the MFI has assumed the related liabilities (debt). 
Table 5.1 The Accounting Impact of a Complete Transfer Approach
Source: Contributed by Lloyd Stevens, DFID Financial Sector Deepening Programme Uganda.
Note: MF  microfinance.
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primarily composed of investment in the new entity.
Alternatively, as the loans are repaid, the NGO can
elect to dedicate the funds to charitable activities
separate from microfinance.
See box 5.3 for an example of the way in which
unique country circumstances can influence the
transfer strategy.
A combination of these various models is also
possible. For example, in the transformation of
Uganda Microfinance Union, all client loans with
payments greater than 30 days past due were left
with the NGO, with the assumption that over time,
as these loans were repaid, the NGO would invest
this surplus cash in the new regulated entity.
Each of these scenarios has different implications
for the initial level of independence (or depend-
ence) between the two organizations. At one end
of the spectrum, the branch transfer model can
continue indefinitely: new branches are continu-
ously launched by the NGO, and over time trans-
ferred to the regulated entity once they have
achieved a certain level of sustainability or size. This
scenario, however, creates built-in dependence
between the two institutions (and could ultimately
create direct competition between the two, as
described in box 5.2). At the other end of the spec-
trum is the complete transfer model, where the
assets and liabilities are transferred all at once,
creating two independent entities: one, the new
operating entity (the regulated institution) and the
other, a shell company with investments (debt and
equity) in the operating entity. The client transfer
model typically falls somewhere in between these
two, depending on the outstanding terms and
repayment rates for the remaining loans. 
Future Role of the NGO
The strategic decisions made by the NGO stake-
holders regarding the future mission of the NGO
ultimately affect the nature and focus of the
NGO as shareholder. Will the NGO carry out its
own operating activities, related to microfinance or
not, or simply act as a lender and investor in the
Box 5.2 PRODEM-BancoSol Transfer
Strategy
Upon the creation of BancoSol, the directors of
PRODEM decided to continue as a microfinance
NGO, but to operate in different geographic
areas. Based on the assumption that it was not
cost effective to provide credit in rural areas,
PRODEM initially retained all rural and semirural
branches, transferring only its profitable urban-
based branches to BancoSol in exchange for
share capital. PRODEM’s success at developing a
sustainable model of rural microfinance lending
combined with a shift in strategy to increase out-
reach in some of the semiurban markets as well,
led to a discontinuation of this branch transfer
strategy in late 1994. Ultimately, PRODEM
decided to transform again (to PRODEM FFP) and
discontinued selling its profitable branches to
BancoSol. PRODEM FFP and BancoSol thus
found themselves in competition for the same
clients, a situation greatly complicated by the
ownership and governance ties between the two
organizations.
Source: Adapted from Campion and White (1999).
Box 5.3 Constraints on Transfer Strategy
In some countries, such as India, certain forms of
nonprofit institutions, such as societies or trusts,
face restrictions on their ability to transfer their
assets in exchange for debt or equity in the new
regulated entity. In particular, such entities can-
not be investors in a for-profit company without
losing their tax-exempt status. Therefore, institu-
tions facing this constraint have had to mobilize
fresh capital for the new regulated entity and
shift their client base, client by client or branch
by branch, to the new entity, slowly winding
down the microlending operations of the NGO.
Source: Authors.
142 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
new regulated entity? The answer to this question
will influence such important factors as the expected
return on investment, rates charged on debt,
and conditions (if applicable) placed on the use of
the NGO funds, to name a few. If, for example, the
NGO was to become involved in its own commu-
nity development activities, it might want to ensure
a steady income stream for its own operations, a
decision that could dictate taking debt in the new
institution, given the relative illiquidity of equity, as
well as more commercial rates on debt. These deci-
sions all have financial modeling implications.
Transforming MFIs must also consider the
sources of funds that make up their equity bases
when thinking about the future role of the NGO.
Most MFIs built their equity bases with donated
funds and retained earnings generated from these
charitable funds. For profitable MFIs, this capital
base can grow to be quite substantial. Having the
original NGO as a shareholder—that is, exchanging
the NGO’s net assets for debt or equity or both in
the new entity—permits the value of these funds to
stay with the NGO, eliminating possible donor
concerns that such funds may end up in the pockets
of private individuals or for use in other, nonchari-
table activities.
This option, however, is only viable if there is a
genuine interest in continuing the existence of the
founding NGO and if the regulators approve
the founding NGO as a shareholder in the new reg-
ulated MFI. It is often argued that the NGO as
shareholder is important for ensuring an ongoing
commitment to the original vision and mission. If
the NGO takes on a new strategic mission, such as
becoming involved in community development
work other than microfinance, or if the NGO
remains a nonoperating entity with individuals pre-
pared to act as trustees for its investments, this
option is possible. However, if all individuals associ-
ated with the organization shift to the regulated
entity, or if other investors with a commitment to
the same target market are brought on board, is
there a role for the NGO as an investor?
Even if the NGO takes on a new strategic vision
and mission, it will likely want to access some of the
resources tied up in the new regulated MFI. If it
does sell its shares or recall its debt, will it continue
to be accountable for proper use of these grant
funds? The question of how and for how long this
donated capital should be protected should ideally
be proactively addressed by donors at the grant-
making stage and transparently discussed by MFIs
during the transformation process. For some
donors of granted funds, it is not enough that
the recipient simply be characterized as charitable.
The organization may be required to continue to
use the funds “in furtherance of the original grant
purpose,” a distinction that requires clear guidance
on the use of proceeds from any future sale or
divestment from the new regulated entity. 
Development of the Business Plan
The business plan document serves as a key com-
munication and marketing tool for both internal
and external stakeholders and turns the strategic
objectives and goals into an operational plan. While
structurally it reflects a traditional business plan
format, the business plan for a transforming MFI
needs to reflect the new business paradigm. And
while the general categories will not be new, the
business plan will need to address particular issues
and topics unique to transformation. Sometimes
MFIs will find it helpful to contract out the devel-
opment of the business plan, although it is key that
the business plan is ultimately accepted and
“owned” by the MFI. Sample terms of reference for
doing so are included in annex 5A.
Some MFIs maintain two variations of their
business plan: one for internal use, which includes
significant details on expansion plans, new product
initiatives, funding plans, and so on; and a simpli-
fied version for use with external stakeholders. The
external version is also sometimes converted into
the prospectus discussed in chapter 7, Ownership
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and Governance. The prospectus is the marketing
document used to attract external investors or other
potential partners. 
The following template covers the key categories
and relevant issues for a business plan for a trans-
forming MFI.
Vision and mission. As discussed previously, the
expanded target market and addition of new prod-
ucts and services, typical in transformations, is likely
to require revising or creating a new vision and
mission for the regulated organization. This sec-
tion may also include a summary of the overall
objectives and strategy of the organization going
forward.
Ownership and governance. The anticipated plans
for the new MFI’s ownership structure should be
clearly outlined in the business plan. Depending on
the level of commitment of the investors, this sec-
tion may include a more general discussion of the
preferred investor types, or may actually detail back-
grounds and investing philosophies of those specif-
ic investors who have made a commitment to the
transformed institution. This section should also
spell out the institution’s vision for the NGO going
forward (if applicable)—specifically, whether it will
be a shareholder in the new institution and, if so,
whether it will have its own operations or will serve
primarily as a trust for its investment. Finally, this
section should provide a brief description of the
proposed governance structure for the transformed
institution including the number of board members
and committees.
Market and marketing. Using results from the var-
ious market research initiatives, the business plan
should lay out the overall market framework and
clearly identify where the MFI’s target market falls.
This includes a brief description of the overall mar-
ket size; the expanded competition, including each
primary competitor’s core products and geographic
presence; the MFI’s market share, both current and
potential, given the addition of voluntary savings
services; and its plans for geographic expansion.
Plans for geographic expansion should include the
organization’s branch expansion plans as well as
the use of any planned innovative technologies to
expand outreach to clients beyond the traditional
branch network. (MFIs should be aware that once
they are licensed, the opening of any new branches
or “mobile banking” arrangements might require
approval by the regulatory authorities.) 
Products and services. Both the core products and
services currently offered by the institution, and
new products or services planned for the future,
need to be outlined in the business plan, including
a general description of each product type and
anticipated product expansion plans. Specific out-
reach targets and a summary of key assumptions
underlying these targets should be included.
Human resources. Transformation significantly
affects an MFI’s staff requirements. The projected
outreach for loans and savings will undoubtedly
require substantial increases in staffing as well as a
probable reorganization of the institutional struc-
ture to better support the expanded operating
strategy and meet regulatory requirements. The
business plan may include the organizational chart,
a description of management positions and man-
agement committees, as well as anticipated plans for
building staff capacity through external training
programs or the expansion of in-house training
capabilities.
Management information systems (MIS). The
transformation process is typically accompanied by
a significant upgrade in the MFI’s MIS. This
includes both a reengineering of basic processes
for managing the flow of data and information in
the organization, as well as significant investments
in the institution’s technology infrastructure. A
business plan should lay out the new MFI’s infor-
mation technology plans, including anticipated
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hardware and software purchases and other MIS
purchases.
Funding strategy. Increasing access to a broader
source of funding is often one of the primary rea-
sons MFIs pursue transformation. In addition to
the infusion of investor capital that accompanies
conversion to a share company, transformation
generally facilitates access to a wider range of fund-
ing sources, including savings, commercial borrow-
ing, and in some cases the ability to approach the
capital markets with such mechanisms as private
placements. The funding options for a for-profit
regulated MFI are thus significantly broader than
those for an unregulated NGO. The business plan
should identify the amount of funding needed and
the various funding sources available. This involves
exploring the range of possible debt and equity
combinations that will ensure adherence to regula-
tory requirements for leverage, but also provide
adequate liquidity and sufficient returns for the
investors. In addition, available alternative funding
sources, both current and new, should be consid-
ered and incorporated into the business plan. (See
chapter 6, The Funding Structure, for more
detailed discussion of this topic.)
Projected balance sheets, income statements,
and cash flow statements derived from decisions
and assumptions made on the above issues are key
documents that either accompany or become an
integral part of the business plan. The methods,
tools, and approaches to generating these state-
ments, referred to as “financial modeling,” are dis-
cussed in detail below.
Financial Modeling Tools and Methods
Financial projections are an integral part of any
business planning exercise. They help managers see
the financial implications of their strategic and oper-
ational decisions and understand the cause and
effect of a range of different variables. Whereas the
annual budgeting process uses a fiscal year time
horizon and is typically extremely detailed (budget
assumptions are usually calculated for each of the
major line items to facilitate budget-to-actual analy-
sis throughout the year), the financial projections
incorporated in a business plan are by definition
long term (five years or more) and thus less
detailed. The Chief Financial Officer or finance
manager will typically spearhead the development
of both—in fact, the annual budget should be
developed with the longer-term financial projec-
tions in mind. Both the budget and projections will
require initial strategic input from other senior
management members and operational input from
the branches, though in general, long-term finan-
cial projections will require more of the first, where-
as the annual budget process will require more of
the second.
For a transforming MFI, an already challenging
exercise can become that much more complicated
because of new regulatory and fiscal considerations,
the shifting structure of the new entity’s proposed
capital structure, the need to incorporate a range
of untested assumptions about product growth
(particularly savings mobilization) and market pen-
etration, the likelihood of significant new liabilities,
and numerous unknown variables regarding cost
implications for a regulated institution. Compliance
with prudential ratios, such as capital adequacy and
liquidity, must also be projected. 
In general, MFIs large enough and sustainable
enough to be considering transformation into
regulated deposit-taking institutions are likely to
have used a business plan model before. A business
plan model is used to project the financial impact of
business growth.
Business plan models can also be used to project
investor returns, but transforming MFIs may want
to consider creating a separate investor model given
the range of scenario analyses needed for this exer-
cise. An investor return tool is used to project the
return implications of various debt and equity
combinations, taking into consideration a range of
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factors including tax implications, exit strategies, and
purchase and sale price. Such a model will need to
link to the business plan model, but should allow the
user to modify key assumptions about overall fund-
ing (debt and equity) parameters. The investor
return tool is discussed in more detail in the Investor
Considerations section of this chapter. Similarly,
most business plan models do not calculate compli-
ance with local regulatory requirements, but the
data required to do so can usually be easily extracted
into an Excel spreadsheet. The calculation of pru-
dential ratios is detailed in the Benchmarks and
Indicators section of this chapter.
Financial Modeling
Given the complexity of the modeling exercise, this
section highlights various considerations for the
business planner related to developing the projected
balance sheet and income statement for the new
entity, which indicators to incorporate, and how to
address investor needs. For institutions pursuing
the one-entity or reorganization approach, one
business model may suffice to reflect the transfor-
mation process. For institutions pursuing the two
or more entities or transfer approach, it is recom-
mended that two separate business models be
created—in this approach some or all of the assets
and liabilities from the NGO are transferred to the
new entity.
Balance Sheet Considerations—Assets 
Cash. For institutions pursuing the transfer app-
roach, the opening balance for the cash or bank bal-
ances of the new entity will need to include any cash
or other bank deposits that will be transferred from
the NGO as well as the infusion of fresh investor
capital unless immediately invested, in which case it
would be placed in “investments” (matched by the
relevant debt or equity on the right-hand side of the
balance sheet). The business planner will need to
determine the amount of funds to be injected and
when. MFIs pursuing the reorganization approach
will also need to capture any new investor contribu-
tions in these accounts.
Investments. All investments that are transferred
from the NGO to the new entity need to be cap-
tured in the opening balances of the investments
(assuming they are transferred as of the date of the
launch of the regulated entity). This may include all
the NGO’s investments, or a portion of them if
some are left on the NGO’s books. As mentioned,
if the investors’ capital contributions are initially
placed in an investment, that value would be cap-
tured here.
Loan portfolio. As a reflection of the MFI’s strate-
gic plan, the financial projections should incorporate
assumptions about both the expansion of current
products and the introduction and growth of new
products. The MFI’s market research results will be
critical here to support the MFI’s assumptions
regarding the projected number and volume of
loans, growth in average loan size, and fee struc-
tures (see chapter 4, Marketing and Competitive
Positioning, for a discussion on pricing of loan and
savings products):
• Number of products: If introducing new loan
products, the business planner will need to
gather the relevant information about product
attributes, potential market size, and institutional
implications for these products.
• Average growth in loan size: As clients grow with
the institution and with the introduction of new
loan products to serve a wider target market, the
average loan size should be closely examined in
the modeling exercise.
• Outreach assumptions: The business planner will
need to carefully consider market potential for
each of the loan products. These assumptions
should be based on comprehensive market
research.
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Fixed assets. The projection of fixed assets will be
driven by marketing and delivery channel deci-
sions. Transformation will likely require significant
investments in infrastructure and information tech-
nology that will need to be reflected in the business
plan. MFIs should expect to conduct a thorough
evaluation of their system capacity as part of the
transformation planning process. In addition, any
projected new branch openings and the related
fixed assets need to be considered. Some of the
more significant fixed asset purchases include com-
puter hardware, computer software, communica-
tions equipment, electrical assets, safes, as well as
upgrading the branches (such as remodeling to
accommodate tellers and safes), and overall “face
lifting” of branches and the head office. Costs will
vary significantly among transforming MFIs
depending both on the operating and regulatory
requirements to which they need to adhere and
the state of the MFI’s infrastructure before trans-
formation. (Some of the costs associated with
infrastructure may not be capitalized and thus
would be recorded as expenses on the Income
Statement.)
Balance Sheet Considerations—Liabilities 
and Equity
A key aspect in financial modeling of a transforming
MFI is the structuring of the liabilities and equity
side of the balance sheet of the new entity. The ini-
tial capitalization of a regulated financial institu-
tion is typically determined by three interconnected
factors—capital regulatory requirements, the insti-
tution’s growth plans, and the level of leverage
necessary to attract outside investors.
Capital adequacy and leverage. Regulators are
interested in seeing solid capital bases, with conser-
vative leverage ratios. Investors, eager to maximize
their return on investment, generally like to see
more aggressive leverage ratios. Balancing these
different interests is crucial in the financial model-
ing process. Key considerations are outlined in the
following discussion:
• NGO debt and equity (if applicable): As dis-
cussed above, the mechanisms for transferring
the assets and liabilities of the NGO to the new
regulated entity can vary. For modeling purposes,
there are three critical components:
– How much of the NGO’s assets and liabilities
will be transferred to the new entity and when
will the transfer occur? This transfer can occur
in one transaction or can be structured to
occur over time. The first option tends to be
cleaner, and is certainly easier from a model-
ing perspective. 
– How will the NGO be compensated? Will the
new entity pay for the net assets (assets less lia-
bilities) directly in cash, through debt, or issue
shares to the NGO, or a combination?
– How will the NGO’s assets and liabilities be val-
ued? The valuation of the NGO for purposes of
determining exact compensation is discussed in
chapter 7, Ownership and Governance. For
modeling, this is a critical issue because the
agreed on value has direct implications for the
NGO’s stake in the new entity, including con-
sideration of maximum ownership limitations.
• Tax considerations: Tax implications also need to
be considered if the transfer approach is taken in
the modeling of the debt and equity split during
the transfer and also for the new entity and its
investors. The differences in tax liabilities for
interest payments as opposed to dividends can be
substantial. These differences can have a signifi-
cant impact on investor preferences and will
affect the financial modeling exercise.
• Investor return expectations: The MFI will need
to ensure attractive returns for prospective
investors; therefore, the business planner will
need to experiment with various leverage scenar-
ios that meet the investment hurdles of external
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investors while providing sufficient comfort to
central bank regulators.
• Projected growth: The determination of the
appropriate capital structure needs to be consid-
ered in light of the MFI’s current and projected
asset growth. Capital adequacy considerations
(discussed in Benchmarks and Indicators, below)
will ultimately be a key factor in the institution’s
ability to finance expected growth.
Deposits. Transforming MFIs will introduce vol-
untary savings products, many for the first time.
MFIs need to be realistic about their growth expec-
tations. While transformation can significantly
expand funding resources, an MFI’s entry into vol-
untary savings mobilization may or may not result
in an immediate significant effect on the balance
sheet. Transforming MFIs tend to overestimate
growth in the volume of individual savings
accounts, yet underestimate the number of
accounts. A realistic estimate of the savings volume
is important because it affects the overall debt-to-
equity structure of the new entity. In addition, care
will need to be taken to ensure that projected sav-
ings balances are matched by regulated liquidity lev-
els on the asset side. See discussion of liquidity ratio
in Benchmarks and Indicators section.
Commercial debt. Becoming a regulated financial
institution often results in the MFI being able to
access commercial funding. Some MFIs will have
existing loans as well as access to new loans, and
others may be borrowing commercially for the first
time. For existing loans, the debt agreements
between the NGO and any current creditors need
to be renegotiated in the transformation process.
Options include leaving the debt obligation with
the NGO, which then on-lends to the new entity;
transferring the debt obligation to the new entity;
or using newly injected cash from investors to pay
off the debt. An estimation of new borrowings that
the new regulated entity will access will need to be
made and should be done in parallel with assump-
tions about the institution’s equity base, thus taking
into account capital adequacy requirements and
investor considerations.
Retained earnings and dividend payments. By
definition, a nonprofit NGO is typically required
to reinvest all retained earnings back in the insti-
tution. A for-profit share company, however, can
choose to reinvest all its earnings, or reward its
investors with dividend payments, assuming
adherence to all regulatory and legal require-
ments. Assumptions concerning the amount and
timing of these dividend payments will need to be
incorporated into the projections. Also, as reiter-
ated in the investor return discussion below, with-
holding tax should be anticipated for dividend
payments. 
Share capital. Projections will need to accommo-
date both the starting capital of the institution and
any additional capital injections required over time.
This will be an iterative process, taking into consid-
eration regulatory requirements, growth plans, and
investor leverage targets.
Income Statement Considerations—Revenue
On the revenue side, the business planner will need
to incorporate assumptions about interest rates and
fee structures for current and any anticipated
revenue-generating products, including credit
products and others. For example, if money transfer
or foreign exchange services are offered, the rev-
enues from these services need to be included.
These assumptions should take into consideration
the likelihood of an increasingly competitive envi-
ronment, and thus the potential need to reduce
interest rates in the future.
Also, nonfinancial income such as training fees or
others needs to be considered and estimated (if
applicable). Many transformed MFIs have set up
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visitor programs whereby the MFI charges visitors
from other countries to learn from their transforma-
tion experience. Although this may be hard to esti-
mate at the early stages of transformation, it is some-
thing the MFI might consider in the long term.
Income Statement Considerations—Expenses
One of the biggest risks of modeling the future
financial performance of a transformed MFI is
underestimating the true cost of both the process
itself and future operating costs. The costs of trans-
formation can be divided into short-term initial
costs and longer-term ongoing costs. See chapter 3,
Planning for Transformation, for a detailed
discussion of the costs of transformation. A brief
summary of these costs is provided here; however,
not all will be recorded by the transforming MFI,
particularly if a donor is willing to pay some of the
expenses directly.
Cost of transformation. Transformation entails sig-
nificant costs. While the total price tag will depend
on the MFI’s starting point, estimates for transfor-
mation range from U.S.$700,000 to U.S.$1.5 mil-
lion, with an average around U.S.$1,000,000.5
Most of these costs will be incurred by the NGO. If
subsidized directly by donors, these expenses may
not even pass through the NGO’s profit and loss
statements. Those that do, however, will likely have
a significant impact on the NGO’s bottom line at
the time of transformation, so will be important to
reflect in the projections for the NGO.
• Feasibility study and capacity-building technical
assistance: This is a significant expense. While
historically this expense has largely been funded
by donor sources (and thus may not typically
appear in an institution’s profit and loss state-
ment), institutions planning to transform should
budget for this line item. These anticipated
expenditures should be carefully estimated and
either budgeted by the relevant department or in
a separate transformation budget. Any antici-
pated donor funds to cover these costs should be
shown as operational grant income (except if
grants are being used to cover fixed asset pur-
chases needed for transformation, in which case
they would be capitalized, because the fixed asset
would be shown as an asset). Note that an MFI
unable to source external funding and thus
financing many of these costs internally will often
be able to amortize transformation costs over
time. As such, their “start-up” costs could be
passed on to the newly transformed institution
and spread out over a period of three to five years.
• Registration fee or license fee: Regulated financial
institutions often have to pay an initial registra-
tion or license fee, as well as annual renewal fees,
which in many countries are tied to the number
of branches that the bank has. While these are
typically not significant costs, they do need to be
planned.
• Legal costs: Significant legal support is usually
needed with an institutional transformation. This
includes drafting shareholders’ agreements,
structuring debt clauses, drafting new by-laws
for the regulated entity, and structuring a myriad
of asset and liability transfer documentation, if
needed. In addition, it is useful to have a legal
(and ideally regulatory) expert review the license
application.
• Upgrading of branches and enhancement to MIS:
With the introduction of savings services, MFIs
are often forced to upgrade their branches to
portray a more professional image to both the
central bank and prospective depositors, and
enhance their MIS to manage additional prod-
ucts and to meet regulatory requirements.
While most of these costs would be capitalized
and thus have been discussed under fixed assets
above, there will be some costs, such as refine-
ments to reporting systems, annual fees for
software licenses, increases in stationery costs,
and so forth, that should be projected under
expenses.
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• Additional staff training and training materials
development: The transformation process
requires a significant investment in staff training.
A separate training budget should be developed
that includes both external training and an
increase in in-house training material develop-
ment and delivery. 
New costs as a regulated institution. Once an insti-
tution is regulated, it faces additional costs that did
not exist when it was an NGO.
• Interest costs on debt: With the introduction of
voluntary savings, MFIs will incur interest costs,
some for the first time. In addition, as commer-
cial borrowings increase, MFIs’ financing costs
will increase and need to be projected.
• Provisioning: Loan loss provisioning require-
ments stipulated by the regulator need to be
incorporated into future projections, as do real-
istic assumptions about the institution’s portfolio
quality going forward. This may increase the
loan loss provision expense of the regulated insti-
tution relative to the NGO.
• Audit fees: As institutions expand operations,
audit fees typically increase. Fees are often priced
based on number of branches.
• Competitive salary increases: As a for-profit enti-
ty, the MFI may need to reposition its salary scale
to remain competitive and retain key staff. This
should include an evaluation of the organiza-
tion’s broader remuneration scheme, including
the staff incentive scheme.
• Other employee costs: Transformation to a for-
profit, regulated company typically requires full
compliance with standard benefits in the coun-
try, including social security and health insur-
ance. Depending on the status of the MFI’s
human resources policies and procedures at the
time of transformation, additional expenses
could be incurred. 
• Additional staff: The growth ensuing from
transformation will require the addition of vari-
ous staff positions in addition to new senior
management or branch staff. These include
internal auditors, accountants, information tech-
nology support staff, trainers, treasurer, and
other support staff. The appropriate timing for
the addition of such staff should be linked to rel-
evant factors, such as number of loans, number
of savings accounts, and so forth.
• Additional training: Usually with new prod-
ucts (voluntary savings, new credit and other
products) and with new line functions (treasury
management, internal audit, tellers) a significant
amount of training needs to take place to
develop and refine new skills, usually on an
ongoing basis. Often this requires that an in-
house training department be established. Costs
associated with this must be anticipated and
projected.
• Board fees: Board members of private, share-
holder companies generally require some
kind of remuneration for their service, in addi-
tion to the direct costs of travel, meals, and
lodging. MFIs will need to estimate the num-
ber of board meetings anticipated per year
and include these costs in their expense
projections.6
• Costs related to deposit mobilization:
– Depositors’ insurance: Depending on the
country and regulatory framework, public
savings may or may not be insured. For exam-
ple, in Pakistan, the Microfinance Ordinance
requires that microfinance banks credit 5 per-
cent of their annual after tax profits to a
depositors’ protection fund.
– Marketing: As a deposit-mobilizing institu-
tion, marketing and branding costs are likely
to go up significantly. This may be reflected in
the creation of a marketing department,
increased production of promotional and
advertising materials, and increased trans-
portation costs.
– Security: Savings mobilization will typically
require an increase in security measures at the
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branch level. In addition to infrastructural
upgrades, necessary expenses may include
additional guard shifts and costs associated
with additional training needed for guards.
• Legal fees: Basic corporate legal fees increase
with transformation to a regulated, for-profit
entity. 
• Tax implications: As detailed in the Tax Strategy
Considerations section below, transformation to
a for-profit company can have significant tax
implications for the MFI.
Benchmarks and Indicators
A crucial component of the modeling process will
be the identification of critical benchmarks and
targets for success. 
Financial ratio analysis plays an important role in
business planning. Whether included in the actual
business plan model or shown separately on a linked
spreadsheet, financial ratios are a key output of the
modeling process. For a regulated financial inter-
mediary, monitoring these ratios is particularly
critical. Failure to operate within certain risk param-
eters can lead to the suspension of banking activity
by the central bank. Important ratios to incorporate
into the modeling for the purposes of complying
with the regulations of the supervisory body
include the following:
• Liquidity ratio: For institutions that mobilize
savings, most regulatory frameworks require a
certain portion of these savings to be held in a
very liquid or safe form. Reserves are usually
specified to include short-term market-yield
government securities purchased from the central
bank. These requirements are usually expressed as:
– reserves as percentage of demand deposits,
– reserves as percentage of savings and time
deposits.
For example, in Uganda, liquid assets must be
a minimum of 15 percent of savings deposits. In
Pakistan, microfinance banks must hold at least
10 percent of time and demand deposits in liquid
assets.
• Capital adequacy ratios: The ratio of total capi-
tal to risk-weighted assets needs to be closely
tracked in the modeling exercise to ensure that
the projected capital base remains sufficient in
future years. The calculation of this ratio
depends on two critical factors:
– Risk weighting calculation: The denominator
in this ratio is calculated by applying a par-
ticular risk weighting to each asset category on
the balance sheet. Assets with relatively little
risk, such as cash, normally carry a risk weight-
ing of zero percent, but those with higher risk,
such as an MFI’s loan portfolio, will often
carry a risk weighting of 100 percent. Each
country will have its own approach to risk
weighting, depending on local bank risk, his-
torical trends, and relevant collateral options.
– Minimum capital adequacy ratios: The pre-
scribed minimum percentage is dictated by
the central bank and will differ both between
countries and the different tiers of capital—
tier 1 or primary capital and tier 2 or second-
ary capital. Key ratios to incorporate into the
modeling for management purposes include
tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, and total
capital (including secondary capital) to risk-
weighted assets.
• Operating efficiency: The ratio of operating costs
to average loan portfolio is a key indicator for
efficiency. While not usually an enforced pruden-
tial ratio, the operating expense ratio is used as a
key benchmark by the Bank of Uganda, for
example. Institutions that offer savings, however,
need to recognize that they will compare unfa-
vorably to those that do not if gross loan portfo-
lio is used as the denominator; therefore, average
total assets may be a more appropriate denomi-
nator for financial intermediaries when calculat-
ing the operating expense ratio.
• Profitability ratios: The institution’s return on
assets (net income to average assets) and return
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on equity (net income to average equity) are of
particular interest to investors. In addition,
investors will be interested in various return
calculations, such as the internal rate of return
(see the Investor Considerations section below
for more explanation). 
• Portfolio quality ratios: Portfolio at risk greater
than 30 days and the loan loss reserve ratio (loan
loss reserve as percentage of portfolio) are two
indicators that management should track when
evaluating the quality of the portfolio. 
Additional ratios that should be incorporated
into modeling for investor purposes are discussed in
the following section.
Investor Considerations
In addition to projecting the operations, the busi-
ness planner should also be prepared to include pro-
jections for prospective investors on the internal
rate of return. The traditional return on equity or
adjusted return on equity ratios7 provide manage-
ment and investors with the institutional rate of
return on the institution’s equity base for that par-
ticular year. It does not provide an indication to an
investor of what his or her particular return will be,
because this will depend on dividend payout ratios,
the composition of debt and equity the investor
holds in the institution, and the relevant tax rates.
While each investor will undoubtedly conduct indi-
vidual due diligence and generate individual invest-
ment return projections, the MFI should be able
to present general return projections to potential
investors. This analysis goes beyond showing the
average return on equity, and incorporates key
investor considerations, such as debt/equity split,
time and price of exit, discounting, tax, and so forth.
Investor return tool. Given the impact of various
debt and equity structures on the return calcula-
tion, a separate modeling tool should be developed
to provide maximum flexibility in projecting the
various options. This tool should link with the
financial projections, pulling through key asset and
liability categories, including total assets (cash, loan
portfolio, and fixed assets), any projected savings,
and previously negotiated or relatively secure exter-
nal debt balances. This gives the user flexibility to
input various debt and equity balances, as well as a
variety of debt conversion scenarios (assuming
some portion of convertible subordinated debt).
Likewise, the projected earnings before interest and
taxes from the business projections can be pulled
through, allowing the user to calculate the impact
of a variety of interest rate assumptions, including
portfolio yield, savings rates, and commercial debt
rates , on the MFI’s net income. 
Important considerations for calculating a
prospective investor’s return include the combina-
tion of debt and equity, time and prices of exit,
applicable taxes, macroeconomic variables, and div-
idend assumptions.
Combination of debt and equity. As discussed in
chapter 7, Ownership and Governance, investors
will be looking to maximize their returns, often
through a combination of debt and equity. The
projections should allow the user to input a variety
of different combinations of debt and equity, based
on the expected returns, and liquidity needs of both
the MFI and investors (see exit strategy below).
This should include regular term debt, convertible
debt, and equity. The model should allow the user
to shift convertible debt from the liability to the
equity section as needed.
Time and price of exit. Despite the growth in
investment funds, investing in microfinance contin-
ues to be a relatively illiquid business. Three key fac-
tors investors will be considering are (a) estimated
investment horizon, (b) to whom will they be able
to sell, and (c) at what price. For purposes of mod-
eling investor return, the first and third issues are
critical. Most of the investment funds for MFIs
today are limited life funds; that is, they are
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required by their investors to divest within a seven-
to ten-year horizon. Scenario analyses will therefore
need to reflect the minimum time horizon (gener-
ally seven years). For purposes of calculating an
internal rate of return, it is recommended that a
range of sale price values be used (for example, one
times book value, or 1.25 times book value). 
Tax. Investor return figures should incorporate the
relevant tax rates including tax on interest (for any
kind of debt instrument), tax on capital gains (for
the eventual sale), and withholding tax (the tax the
institution will need to withhold and remit to
the relevant tax authority on any payment to an
external party). Figures should be provided both for
international and local shareholders, because tax
rates tend to differ between residents and nonresi-
dents in most countries. 
Macroeconomic considerations. Currency devalua-
tions can significantly affect the return on invest-
ment for local currency debt holders. A variety of
scenario analyses should be included showing the
impact of various currency fluctuations. 
Dividend assumptions. Although it is unusual for
start-up companies to pay dividends in their first
few years of operations, investors will probably want
to see some kind of dividend return after year two
or three. Withholding tax should also be anticipated
for dividend payments.
See box 5.4 for tips on how to use Microfin, a
popular business planning model when making pro-
jections for a transforming MFI.
Tax Strategy Considerations
MFIs need to consider potential tax liabilities dur-
ing the business planning process and incorporate
taxes into the transformed institution’s obligations
in the business plan.8 Even if an MFI has received
a comprehensive tax exemption, this may change
with transformation; thus, tax planning and man-
agement should play an important role in business
and strategic planning processes. Such planning
should consider the financial impact if the MFI
were to lose any exemptions it may currently enjoy.
Furthermore, an exemption from paying tax does
not necessarily convey an exemption from comply-
ing with tax reporting and filing requirements.
MFIs may be required to meet tax reporting and fil-
ing requirements even if they owe no tax at all. 
A comprehensive tax management strategy is
grounded in (a) tax compliance and (b) tax plan-
ning. First and foremost, a tax management strategy
must be based on a firm understanding of often
complex rules for tax filing and payment obliga-
tions. Only after an MFI fully comprehends its tax
compliance obligations should it begin to develop a
plan for legitimately minimizing any taxes due. 
Tax Compliance
The importance of tax compliance cannot be over-
stated. A failure to meet, on a timely basis, require-
ments for filing, paying, or remitting withheld
amounts to local tax authorities can lead to sizeable
fines and penalties. For example, in Tanzania, a late
filing of a tax return is subject to a 2.5 percent
penalty, and a late payment of income tax (more
than six months after the accounting period) is sub-
ject to a 25 percent penalty. In Uganda, late pay-
ments are subject to a penalty of up to 20 percent
of the amount of payable tax. Accordingly, an MFI
should be aware of both its tax filing and payment
obligations, and of its obligations to withhold taxes
on payments that it makes to others. The changes in
tax position that may come about because of trans-
formation must be closely studied.
The following are basic questions that an MFI
should be asking its tax advisors to ensure that it is
complying with its tax obligations:
• What tax forms are required to be filed? When
are these forms due?
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Box 5.4 Microfin Tips
One of the more widely used business plan models
for MFIs is Microfin, developed by Chuck Waterfield
and Tony Sheldon with initial funding from Women’s
World Banking and the Consultative Group to Assist
the Poor (CGAP). This model is a sophisticated Excel
spreadsheet that has been designed to assist MFIs to
develop detailed financial projections, including
projected balance sheets, income statements, and
cash flow statements after capturing a wide range
of assumptions related to products and services,
staffing, branch openings, funding sources, and so
forth. It can be downloaded for free from http://
www.microfin.com. The following provides some
tips to Microfin users when modeling the transfor-
mation process.
Microfin Tip #1: Create Two Models If Using the
Transfer Approach
It is recommended that the user create two separate
models to model the transformation process. The
first models the NGO. The second picks up the clos-
ing balances of the NGO model as the opening
balances for the new regulated entity. Note that
Microfin 4.0 has a feature to automate the shift in
portfolio from one model to another.
Microfin Tip #2: Loan Modeling
Microfin versions through 3.5 allow the user to
model only four term loan products. Version 4.0 and
above, however, permit 10 term loan products and
also support two lines-of-credit products.
Microfin Tip #3: Determining NGO Stake
Assuming the NGO sells its net assets to the new
entity and receives a combination of debt and
equity in return, the user can create NGO debt
and equity line items in the FinFlows sheet.
1. Create NGO debt line item on the FinFlows sheet.
2. Create NGO equity line item on the FinFlows
sheet.
3. Set value of NGO equity equal to appropriate
amount.
4. Set value of NGO debt equal to equity of NGO in
closing balance from NGO model, less portion of
equity, less any discount.
Microfin Tip #4: Savings Modeling
In addition to support for compulsory savings,
Microfin 3.5 allows the user to model four savings
products. Microfin 4.0 increases this to five savings
products and provides a redesigned, more versatile
method of projecting savings activity.
Microfin Tip #5: Financing
When projecting future financing in Microfin 3.5 or
4.0, you can enable the “automated default financ-
ing sources” on FinFlow and choose a blend of debt
and equity financing with trigger levels to bring in
new equity when leverage levels get too high or
capital drops below minimum capital requirements.
Microfin Tip #6: Financial Ratios 
Versions 3.0–3.5 of Microfin include some of the key
ratios used by management. It is recommended,
however, that the user replicate the projected finan-
cial statements onto the user-defined sheet and
generate the full range of ratios required by regula-
tors. Note that Microfin 4.0 includes additional ratios
that are useful for commercial bank transformations,
particularly a number of liquidity and reserve ratios.
Microfin Tip #7: Time Frame
Microfin only models for a five year period, because
projections beyond five years are rarely particularly
useful. For purposes of calculating basic investor
return rates, however, it is recommended that the
analyst extend the institution’s projections out by a
couple of years, using conservative growth rates.
These extended projections can be modeled on the
user defined sheet. An alternative is to link two
Microfin models by having the year five figures from
the first model feed into the initial balances of the
second model.
Source: Author.
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• If taxes are owed, when are payments due?
• What are the penalties for missing a filing or pay-
ment deadline?
• What recordkeeping is required?
In some jurisdictions the change in corporate
status undertaken to affect a legal transformation
may change the answers to some of the above ques-
tions. Thus, as part of an MFI’s legal transforma-
tion, it is important to have competent tax counsel
advising the transforming MFI on tax compliance
issues, as well as more forward-looking, tax plan-
ning issues. 
Tax Planning
Tax planning is the second leg of a comprehensive
tax management strategy. Tax planning, however, is
appropriate only when undertaken in a manner that
does not compromise the MFI’s tax compliance
requirements. That said, the earlier tax planning is
begun the better, because tax planning considera-
tions can inform many business decisions under-
taken by an MFI during the transformation process.
(See, for example, the discussion in chapter 6, The
Funding Structure, regarding the difference in tax
treatment of dividends and interest in determining
whether to issue stock or debt to raise capital.)
Key to tax planning is a basic understanding of
how taxable net income is calculated and if this will
change with the change of legal form (if applicable)
or as a result of becoming regulated. This includes
understanding what income is subject to tax, what
types of expenses are deductible from gross rev-
enues for purposes of calculating net income, and
how long tax losses can be carried forward. 
A first challenge facing any transforming MFI is
to determine what types of taxes it will be subject
to. This is not always a straightforward determi-
nation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the deci-
sion to either reorganize the NGO as a share com-
pany or create a new company and transfer the
assets and liabilities is heavily influenced by the tax
implications of one approach over another. In many
countries, an asset transfer is likely to trigger a num-
ber of “transaction” taxes related to the transfer of
assets from the original company to the new com-
pany. (See box 5.5.) While such taxes can some-
times be waived, a transforming MFI will need to
thoroughly investigate the implications of the dif-
ferent options.
Box 5.5 Reorganize or Transfer: Two
Unique Approaches in Uganda
As in most countries, the sale of assets from one
company to another creates a potential tax lia-
bility in Uganda. Even if no profit is made on the
sale of the assets, the fact that the seller (the
NGO) has been exempt from paying income tax
on the profits generated from these assets over
the years can raise a number of tax issues for rev-
enue authorities. In FINCA Uganda’s case, the
decision to reorganize as opposed to creating a
new legal entity avoided the potential for this
asset transfer tax. The NGO simply reorganized
itself from a company limited by guarantee to a
company limited by shares, thus avoiding
any transfer of assets from one company to
another. In Uganda Microfinance Union’s case,
however, the interest in having two separate
companies, the NGO and the new regulated
entity, required the institution to create a new
company. This decision was also based on legal
advice provided to UMU that outlined options
for seeking an exemption from the asset transfer
tax, including the argument that the sale of
assets is occasioned by a change in legislation,
with which the NGO is trying to comply, and that
there is no new benefit to the organization.
UMU ultimately received a tax exemption from
the Uganda Revenue Authority on this basis. 
Source: Author.
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Different types of taxes may be triggered at dif-
ferent points in an MFI’s life cycle depending on
the MFI and the tax exemptions available to it.
Most MFIs are subject to one or more of the fol-
lowing types of taxes: employer payroll taxes (such
as social security funds, or tax liabilities of their
employee but collected and remitted by the
employer on behalf of its employees), value added
taxes for services received or taxable supplies con-
sumed, stamp taxes, capital or net worth taxes,
transfer taxes, and other national or local taxes. 
Taxes on income. In some jurisdictions, taxes are
imposed on the net income or profits of all MFIs,
irrespective of the designation of the MFI as a
charitable organization or the use to which such net
income is put (for example, reinvested in the busi-
ness of the MFI, rather than paid out as dividends
to shareholders). In other jurisdictions, a form over
substance approach is taken by tax authorities such
that the legal form an MFI takes will determine its
tax status.
As part of the planning process, an MFI should
determine whether it will likely qualify for exemp-
tions from any of these taxes. As a general rule, the
chances of qualifying for an exemption from an
income or profits tax tend to diminish as the MFI
becomes more overtly commercial in its ownership
structure, operations, and activities. However, if an
exemption appears likely, it is important to deter-
mine the extent of the exemption and the process
by which to apply for it.9
Deductible expenses. In planning, the MFI needs
to determine what types of expenses can be
deducted from income for purposes of calculating
its net income. This analysis normally depends on
the sources of the income and may change with reg-
ulation. Therefore, as a general rule, expenses that
are incurred wholly and exclusively in the produc-
tion of income should be deductible when calculat-
ing net income. For example, because interest
payments made on microfinance loans are a source
of income to the MFI, expenses incurred directly in
connection with generating those loans typically
would be allowed as a deductible business expense. 
However, the rules for what constitutes an allow-
able deduction vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
and will likely depend on the type of financial in-
stitution license the MFI receives. For example,
depreciation schedules may or may not change with
regulation but they will certainly affect the amount
of deductible expense allowed by the tax authori-
ties. Furthermore, in most jurisdictions, the onus of
proving that an expense is an allowable deduction is
on the taxpayer. Accordingly, tax counsel should be
consulted in determining the deductibility of
expenses for the regulated company. To ensure that
tax authorities permit a deduction, it is also impor-
tant to maintain appropriate records to support the
requested deduction. This requires the develop-
ment of back-office operations that maintain accu-
rate and transparent records that will be acceptable
to local tax authorities. 
Another deductible expense that formal, com-
mercial financial institutions typically are permitted
to take by tax authorities is for specific provisions
made for “bad or doubtful debts.” The timing of
when such a deduction can be taken may differ
depending on the type of financial institution license
the MFI has. In some jurisdictions, tax authorities
will defer to bank regulatory rules regarding the
timing of making provisions for bad or doubtful
debts. In other jurisdictions, however, tax authori-
ties apply a different set of rules than those applied
by bank regulators. This means that the regulated
financial institution may need to keep two sets of
records regarding its loans—one for bank regula-
tory purposes and one for tax regulatory purposes.
Losses carried forward. Another forward-looking
tax planning issue relates to the extent to which
losses of an MFI may be carried forward to future
years. This issue may be of particular relevance to
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institutions that incur losses in their first years of
operation as transformed institution. A first ques-
tion for tax planners is whether those losses can be
offset against future years when the transformed
institution is operating at a profit. A more complex
question is whether losses generated by the MFI
before transformation can be carried forward to off-
set the future profits of the regulated entity. In
some jurisdictions, the answer to this second ques-
tion turns, in part, on how significantly the owner-
ship of the transforming MFI has changed since
the losses were incurred. Where a new institution
separate from the original MFI is incorporated to
conduct deposit-taking business, it may be difficult
to make the case that losses incurred by the original
MFI should be carried forward to the new, deposit-
taking entity. 
Annex 5B provides a summary checklist of the
major aspects of strategic and business planning
covered in this chapter. 
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Annex 5A Sample Terms of
Reference: Development of the
Business Plan
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and so forth.
Objective 
The focus of this assignment is to work with MFI A
to (1) identify the future strategic goals for the
organization, including its vision and mission as a
regulated deposit-taking institution; (2) outline the
operational processes required to operate as a regu-
lated MFI; and (3) project the future financial goals
as a regulated MFI using a financial projection tool.
The primary output will be to develop a draft long-
term business plan with MFI A. This plan will out-
line the core strategic thrusts of the organization for
the next three to five years as it transforms and
becomes a deposit-taking intermediary. With the
senior management team and findings from avail-
able market research, it will identify future markets
for the transformed MFI, identify the appropriate
products and services, and set institutional targets
for key indicators. The plan will also address the
human resources, system, infrastructure, and finan-
cial resources needed to achieve these targets.
Finally, it will provide projected financial statements
for the organization.
Tasks
The business planning assignment will follow a stan-
dard business planning approach, one that first
addresses strategic planning, then tackles operational
planning and financial modeling. The consultant
will work together with MFI A senior management
in all aspects of this assignment. Knowledge transfer
will be a critical aspect of this assignment, particu-
larly concerning the use of the financial projection
model. Specific tasks include the following:
1. Prior to arriving in country, gather and review
key reference documents including transforma-
tion plan, most recent budget, historical finan-
cials, market research reports, relevant banking
laws, and so forth.
2. Facilitate a one-day strategic planning workshop
with core senior management team members.
Topics to be addressed will include
a. MFI A’s mission and goals
b. definition of markets and clients
c. analysis of competitive positioning and
general operating environment
d. analysis of MFI A’s transformation plan and
goals including proposed ownership structure
and capital structure
e. a review of plans for transferring assets and or
setting up a new company and the process for
doing so
f. development of a strategy to achieve trans-
formation as well as maximize outreach and
profitability
3. Conduct interviews with senior management
staff to develop key aspects of operational plan:
a. Products and services
b. Marketing channels
c. Resources needed
d. Financing strategy
4. Meet with MFI A’s legal counsel to better under-
stand tax implications of transformation and tax
considerations as a for-profit, share company.
5. Working closely with MFI A’s Finance Manager,
develop or utilize an existing long-term financial
projections model that models implications of
the operational plan.
6. Use the model to determine how realistic the
proposed transformation strategy is and what, if
any, additional strategic and operational changes
will be needed to transform. Ensure knowledge
transfer by thorough training in use of model.
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7. Create a projected balance sheet, income state-
ment, cash flow statement, and key ratios for the
new organization. 
8. Using results of projected financials, develop a
separate investor return tool that can be used to
model various liability and equity scenarios. The
model should be user friendly and allow the
user to analyze return implications of different
scenarios.
9. Develop a draft strategic business plan.
Deliverables
Long-term business plan in final draft form includ-
ing financial projections.
Level of Effort
It is expected that the consultant will spend approx-
imately 20 days in country and a total of 30 days to
complete this assignment.
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Annex 5B Checklist for Strategic
and Business Planning
Strategic Planning
• Do you have a new strategy for the regulated
entity, distinct from the NGO strategy?
• Have you incorporated a revised vision, mission,
and values into the plan?
• Have you ensured maximum stakeholder buy-in
to these new values?
• Have you conducted sufficient market research
to understand the market, and in particular, the
market potential for the goods and services
you both offer today and plan to offer in the
future? 
• Do you have a good feel for your current com-
petitors and any new competitors that may arise
with transformation?
• Have you investigated the different options for
transferring assets and liabilities?
• Have you developed a strategy for the ownership
and governance of the regulated institution?
• Have you thought about and examined existing
and potential marketing and delivery channels as
a regulated MFI?
• What are the products and services you plan to
offer? 
• Have you been realistic with your assumptions
about additional staffing and infrastructure
needs to operate as a deposit-taking institution?
• Have you developed a funding strategy to sup-
port the anticipated growth, as well as one that
will attract the kind of investors you seek? 
• Have you set financial and social benchmarks for
measuring success? 
Financial Modeling
• Do you have an updated financial projection tool
for your current business?
• Have you investigated the different options for
transferring assets and liabilities?
• Have you determined the capital structure of the
new organization?
• What will be the debt-equity split for your
investors?
• How much is the NGO worth?
• Assuming a net asset transfer from the NGO
to the new entity, how will the NGO be
compensated?
• Have you incorporated all the relevant regula-
tory ratios into the projections?
• Have you accurately budgeted for the costs of
transformation?
• Have you accurately budgeted for the new costs
you will incur as a regulated institution?
• Have you developed a model to facilitate
investor return analysis?
• Have you considered your investor exit
strategies?
• Have you investigated the applicable taxes for
resident and nonresident investors?
• What are your assumptions for dividend
payouts?
Tax Management
• Prior to transformation, does the MFI pay any
taxes? 
• If so, what taxes?
• If not, why not—available exemptions, chari-
table (not-for-profit) status, treaty exemption,
other?
• Will transformation cause previously exempted
or other taxes to apply? 
• If so, what taxes?
• Will allowable deductions also increase?
• Have you determined the following with respect
to income tax:
• How is this tax calculated—on gross receipts,
net income, or some other measure?
• What is the applicable tax rate?
• What types of payments likely to be received
by the MFI will be included in gross income?
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• If taxed on net income, would the following
payments be deductible against gross income
for purposes of determining the MFI’s net
income? (Are there any limitations to the
deductibility of such payments?)
– Regular business expenses (salaries, rent,
and so on)
– Interest payments (to shareholders, to
other third-party lenders)
– Provisions for writing off bad debts or
reserving for bad debts (and if provisions
are deductible, how must the MFI estab-
lish that the bad debt will not be paid?)
– Other expenses
• Is it possible for the MFI to apply losses
incurred in prior years to offset income in the
current year? If so, what limitations apply to
the carry forward of losses?
• Have you determined the following with respect
to withholding taxes:
• What types of payments are subject to with-
holding taxes? What withholding rate applies
to each type of payment? 
– Applicable to payments to residents
(including employees)?
– Applicable to cross-border payments?
– Availability of bilateral tax treaty to reduce
or eliminate withholding tax?
• When and how is an MFI required to remit
such withholdings to tax authorities?
• Do you know how the amounts of other taxes—
payroll taxes, value added taxes, transfer taxes,
capital or property taxes, other—are determined? 
• Have you considered the following compliance
issues:
• What tax forms are required to be filed? When
is each of these forms due?
• If taxes are owed, when are tax payments 
due?
• What are the penalties for missing a filing or
payment deadline?
• What recordkeeping requirements are im-
posed by local tax authorities?
Notes
1. These include mission statement and overall goals,
market research, ownership and corporate gover-
nance, management, financial analysis, business strat-
egy, organizational chart, projected balance sheets,
and profit and loss accounts. 
2. This does not preclude the MFI from issuing more
shares rather than simply selling existing shares to
new investors, particularly if additional capital is
being provided.
3. MFIs that provide other services in addition to finan-
cial services likely need to separate out the financial
services before becoming a licensed financial pro-
vider. They can create new companies to carry out
either the financial services or the nonfinancial
services, whichever makes more sense. 
4. Sometimes the new company is not actually a new
entity, but rather is an existing company that may
have been regulated previously as a nonbank financial
intermediary but now has few or no assets or liabili-
ties (often called a “shell company”). At least one
transforming MFI in Ecuador found it useful to buy
such a shell company to benefit from grandfathering
of certain regulatory requirements, such as smaller
minimum capital requirements, than were likely to be
imposed on a new start-up company. In India, a num-
ber of MFIs are pursuing acquisition of or merger
with a preexisting nonbanking financial company,
particularly those that already have obtained permis-
sion from the Reserve Bank of India to accept public
deposits. This path is pursued with the belief that the
acquisition or merger can be implemented much faster
than obtaining a fresh Non-Banking Financial Com-
pany registration from the Reserve Bank of India.
5. Estimations drawn from various discussions with a
range of MFIs.
6. A recent study by the Council of Microfinance Equity
Funds (2005) reported that only 7 of the 21 MFI
respondents reported policies in place to remunerate
directors for their board service. A number of institu-
tions, however, did report that they reimburse their
directors for travel, meals, and lodging expenses. For
international social investors, these expenses are, of
course, significant and generally exceed the amount
of remuneration reporting institutions pay to their
directors. A number of investment funds, however,
will cover their own direct costs; a few of them have
separate technical assistance grant facilities to cover
certain direct costs of the MFI. 
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7. Adjusted return on equity is calculated by incorporat-
ing the effects of subsidies, inflation, loan loss provi-
sioning, and other items in an MFI’s net operating
income.
8. This section was contributed by Deborah Burand.
9. An MFI might look to several sources for applicable
tax exemptions. The local tax code is one. If an MFI
is a current grant recipient from a foreign donor
country, another source of tax exemptions can be the
bilateral agreement or treaty that governs generally
the donor-recipient relationship between the donor
country and the recipient country. While the plain
language of many of these treaties appears to offer
substantial tax havens to MFIs, the scope and dura-
tion of tax exemptions enjoyed under these treaties
often are subject to local tax authorities’ interpreta-
tions of their treaty obligations. Moreover, once the
grant period ends so too does any exemption enjoyed
under the treaty. (In some jurisdictions this has caused
MFIs to ask bilateral donors for “no-cost” extensions
of their grants to prolong their tax-exempt status.)
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The Funding Structure
One of the key outcomes of the businessplanning process is an estimate of the fund-ing required for the regulated institution to
achieve its operating and outreach goals as a trans-
formed microfinance institution (MFI). Accessing
and structuring this funding is often a new chal-
lenge for transforming MFIs. Because the tradi-
tional microfinance nongovernmental organization
(NGO) or project normally starts with some form
of grant capitalization, such organizations tend to
focus in their initial years on the asset side of their
balance sheets—building up the loan portfolio,
procuring the necessary fixed assets to support
operations, and maintaining an adequate supply of
liquid cash. In contrast, the MFI’s liabilities are
normally relatively small and underdeveloped. For
microfinance NGOs that have achieved a level of
sustainability, retained earnings may provide some
funding, but for the most part, donor funds pro-
vided as grant capital are likely to have been the
most prevalent funding source.
As the microfinance industry has matured, some
microfinance NGOs have been able to increase their
liabilities by borrowing from donors, social funds,
commercial banks, and other sources, either on
commercial or noncommercial terms. Some of this
debt has been provided by local banks, possibly
with credit enhancements such as guarantee mech-
anisms, and some has been provided by interna-
tional lenders or international funds capitalized by
donors. To date, most international lenders issue
loans denominated in foreign rather than local cur-
rency, a condition that raises foreign exchange risk
to a level many MFIs are unprepared to face.1
The amount of debt that microfinance NGOs
can access rarely exceeds one or two times their
equity base. This can prove to be a significant con-
straint on an MFI’s ability to rapidly scale up oper-
ations and widen its client base, because growth is
ultimately limited by the ability to fund an increase
in assets. Without access to capital markets, NGO
MFIs must often rely on donor funding to sustain
their growth. Relying on donor funds for capital
accumulation places the MFI at the mercy of oner-
ous bureaucratic hurdles as well as changes in polit-
ical priorities. Funding loan capital needs with
retained earnings, although helpful, is a slow road
to growth. And the amount of local and interna-
tional debt available to fund the loan capital needs
of microfinance NGOs has not yet reached a scale
that can significantly fuel the growth of many
microfinance NGOs. Accordingly, it is no surprise
that the results from a recent CGAP/MIX survey of
140 MFIs indicated that MFIs generally perceive
Chapter 6
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the lack of funds as the greatest constraint to
growth (CGAP/MIX 2004). As a regulated institu-
tion, the range of funding options available widens
substantially. This potential increased access to cap-
ital often initiates the desire of a microfinance NGO
to consider transformation. 
As regulated financial institutions, MFIs are sub-
ject to ongoing supervision by a regulatory author-
ity, providing depositors, commercial investors, and
other banks a greater sense of security. As such, the
MFI has the potential to leverage its equity by a
range of multiples more than it can as an NGO.
Leverage occurs when an MFI uses its equity base
to access debt from external parties. The amount a
financial institution can leverage is determined by
capital adequacy standards to which they must
adhere as a condition of their license. According to
the capital adequacy requirements set under the
Basle Convention (the international standard for
regulated financial institutions), an institution’s
capital base or equity as a percentage of its risk-
weighted assets should be at least 8 percent. That is,
if a financial institution had U.S.$1 million in
equity, it could support total assets of at least
U.S.$12 million (implying at least U.S.$11 million
in debt and other liabilities), depending on the risk
classification of its assets. In many countries, how-
ever, regulatory bodies impose higher capital ade-
quacy standards for MFIs to compensate for the
perceived higher level of risk of microfinance activ-
ities. Thus, regulated MFIs cannot leverage their
equity base as highly as commercial banks. How-
ever, the ability to leverage the equity base at all
provides a great advantage for regulated MFIs over
unregulated MFIs to fund their portfolio growth
and ultimately reach more clients.
The transformation process provides MFIs an
opportunity to proactively create a new funding
structure that will support their vision for the
future. Determining what this structure should look
like and the options available (and the pros and cons
of these different options), as well as determining
the optimal mix of these different options, are all
decisions the transforming MFI must make. This
chapter begins by outlining the various funding
sources available to regulated MFIs, then highlights
the factors to consider when developing a funding
strategy. The myriad of financial instruments avail-
able to MFIs is then examined, with examples pro-
vided of how other transformed MFIs have incor-
porated these instruments into their funding
structures. The chapter concludes with a summary
of key findings for optimal leverage that emerge
from this review of various financing strategies.
Funding Sources
Transformation from an NGO to a regulated
deposit-taking intermediary allows MFIs to both
diversify and augment their capital funding sources.
Capital represents the broad source of funds used
by financial institutions, including deposits, bor-
rowings, subordinated debt, bonds, private equity,
and retained earnings. The term “equity capital” is
a subset of this and refers exclusively to the equity
portion of the balance sheet, including share capi-
tal, retained earnings, and various reserves. A bal-
ance needs to be established between the amount of
debt (for example, deposits, commercial bank loans,
private placements, and publicly issued bonds) and
the amount of equity that form the capital structure
of the transforming or transformed MFI.
With transformation (which usually implies the
creation of a shareholding company) MFIs gain
access to two important new sources of capital—
private equity and public deposits.
As a share company, the equity base is converted
from one funded by grants to one composed of share
capital, retained earnings, and in some cases subor-
dinated debt. As highlighted above, NGOs are typi-
cally limited in their ability to leverage equity. The
average leverage ratio (debt to equity) among NGO
MFIs that report to the MicroBanking Bulletin
(MBB)2 is 2.2:1 compared to 10:1 among banks in
the reporting sample (The Mix, 2003 benchmarks).
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Not surprisingly, increased leverage correlates with
larger portfolio size, which ultimately can enable an
MFI to improve its return on equity, thus providing
the potential to attract additional equity capital.
Table 6.1 identifies typical funding sources avail-
able to an MFI as it matures from a start-up NGO
to a newly transformed financial institution to a
mature, regulated financial institution. The propor-
tion of commercial debt in relation to subsidized
debt generally begins to grow as the MFI’s funding
needs expand beyond what subsidized funders can
support. At this stage, however, MFIs tend to con-
front limitations in the amount of funding lenders
are willing to make available, as their debt in rela-
tion to the equity base begins to exceed funders’
comfort levels (this usually happens when debt-
to-equity ratios reach 1:1 or 2:1).
Funding Considerations
Traditional capital planning states that a company
should adopt a capital structure that maximizes the
price of its stock. The amount of debt included in a
company’s capital structure will impact earnings per
share and, consequently, the company’s stock price.
The use of fixed rate instruments (usually debt) to
raise additional capital magnifies the potential return
on equity (MCRIL 2005). For example, more debt
in a capital structure (relative to equity) will eventu-
ally push up the price of this debt, as lenders raise
their interest rates to respond to the increased risk of
lending to a highly leveraged borrower; at the same
time, the higher the percentage of debt relative to
equity, the greater the leverage, and hence the
potential for higher returns on equity.
However, for most transforming MFIs, capital
structure planning is about much more than share
price maximization. Most MFIs focus on providing
financial services to a target group at a lower eco-
nomic level than traditional clients of commercial
banks. As such, these MFIs seek to advance a
“double bottom line”—in addition to achieving
financial objectives, they are also intent on meeting
development or social objectives (CGAP 2004a).
Table 6.1 Evolution of Funding Sources for Maturing MFIs
Self- Newly Mature
Start-up sufficient Mature transformed transformed 
Funding sources NGO NGO NGO MFI MFI
Stages of growth for maturing MFI 
Deposits from public
Term deposits X X
Demand deposits Xa Xa
Debt
Commercial debt X X X
Subsidized debt X X X
Bond offerings X
Equity
Retained earnings X X X X
Donated equity X X X
Share capital X X
Source: Author.
a. MFIs licensed under legislation specific for microfinance are typically not allowed to offer current accounts, a type of demand deposit that allows
the account holder to transact using checks. Such a product is generally only permissible with a commercial bank license.
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This double bottom line concept is what currently
sets most transformed MFIs apart from traditional
financial institutions. This raises the obvious
question—how does the double bottom line influ-
ence the balance between the appropriate amount
of debt and equity?
The fundamentals of financial management
assume that a value-maximizing firm will establish a
target optimal capital structure and then raise new
capital in a manner that will keep the actual capital
structure on target over time (Brigham and
Houston 1998). For an MFI seeking to maximize
its double bottom line, this target capital structure
will depend on a range of variables, all of which
need to be considered in the transformation
process. These variables can be grouped into four
main categories:
• Institutional ideology
• Business model
• Investor considerations
• Regulatory and fiscal environment 
Each of these factors needs to be examined in depth
in any strategic planning exercise. 
The range of capital models used by transform-
ing MFIs is almost as broad as the number of insti-
tutions that have transformed. This section, there-
fore, does not provide a recipe for the optimal
capital structure, but instead lays out key factors to
consider.
Institutional Ideology
The appropriate capital structure for a transformed
MFI is ultimately a reflection of the MFI’s institu-
tional ideology. The relationship of debt to equity,
the type of debt sourced, the characteristics of the
types of investors that are invited to the table,
are all influenced by the ideology of the MFI. As
discussed in more detail in chapter 9, Human
Resources Management, ideology combines an
organization’s core values (the guiding principals
of the organization) and core purpose (the organi-
zation’s reason for being) (Collins and Porras
2000). It represents the envisioned future of the
organization and, as such, needs to be clearly com-
municated to and understood by both current as
well as prospective stakeholders. In concrete terms,
and as discussed in chapter 3, Planning for Trans-
formation, the MFI management and board need
to be clear about the vision and mission for the
organization before they attempt to attract out-
siders to share in that vision.
Not surprisingly, many investors in microfinance
share the goal of achieving a double bottom line.
Microfinance investment funds (debt and equity)
are gradually moving toward greater commercial-
ization, but very few are purely commercially
oriented.3 Each investor, however, will have his or
her own interpretation of this double bottom line
concept, the clarification of which is the first step in
investor negotiations. (See chapter 7, Ownership
and Governance, for a more thorough discussion of
investors and return objectives.)
The choice between local and international
investors, for example, is a key strategic decision
that ultimately plays an important role in the insti-
tution’s overall funding strategy. This discussion
may be moot if local law does not permit foreign
ownership of financial institutions. However, where
local law is silent on this question, it is important to
ask whether local ownership is an important goal
for the key stakeholders of the institution. If so,
how much, if any, foreign ownership is acceptable?
Although local investors can provide important
connections to additional sources of local financing,
they may have limited resources (relative to interna-
tional investment funds). International investors
may bring sizable resources, both financial and in
the form of expertise, but they may also be looking
for returns that justify the perceived country risk.
What is the right mix? To answer this question, the
pros and cons of different types of investors need to
be viewed through the lens of the institution’s own
ideological framework.
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Two additional considerations that affect capital
structure planning are (a) the level of institutional
priority given to savings mobilization, and (b) man-
agement’s appetite for risk. For some transformed
institutions, the introduction of savings products
and the importance given to their mobilization are
seen as intrinsic to the overall mission of the organ-
ization, and a core reason for transformation. These
institutions often develop savings products that are
intended to be used by the institution’s target cus-
tomer base—generally low-income clients. For oth-
ers, savings is seen more as one funding source
among many. These differing perspectives will
influence the proportion of additional external bor-
rowings (excluding savings) that will be mobilized.
Likewise, although regulatory requirements will
determine the maximum degree of leverage a finan-
cial institution can take on, an MFI’s management
and board members will still need to make decisions
about the ideal amount of leverage based on the
risk-return trade-off for various types of liability
options. This will ultimately influence the level of
volatility and thus the types of liabilities considered
acceptable for the MFI’s longer-term funding
strategy.
Business Model
The MFI’s business model is another determin-
ing factor in capital structure planning. The types
of financial products the institution plans to offer
in the medium to long term—both assets and
liabilities—need to be considered. On the asset side,
the range of loan sizes and terms anticipated in the
future is an important consideration. As mentioned,
the launch of voluntary savings often expands the
types of clients being served by the MFI and the
products and services demanded by these clients.
With transformation, the popular short-term—four
to six months—working capital loan is often sup-
plemented by longer-term individual loans, such as
for home improvement, home purchase, or more
open-ended lines of credit.4 These products need
a more flexible range of funding sources, ideally
longer term and lower cost.
The funding strategy for a deposit-taking finan-
cial intermediary, however, involves more than just
matching terms of assets and liabilities. Liability
management itself becomes a key component of an
institution’s funding strategy. Clearly, savings prod-
uct design (whether savings will be offered, what
kind of savings products will be offered, average
account size, interest rates, term, growth potential,
and so on) will factor into any funding projections.
In addition, the type and availability of various
forms of funding expand with transformation,
allowing for a more discriminating approach to
funding decisions. Each funding source will need to
be evaluated from the perspectives of amount, term,
interest rate, currency, and time and collateral or
other credit enhancements required to access it. As
such, any funding strategy analysis will need to
evaluate implications for interest rate risk, foreign
currency risk, and asset-liability term mismatch.
(See chapter 10, Financial Management, for a more
detailed discussion of key financial risks and funding
gap management.)
Investor Considerations
The capital structure of a regulated MFI is affected
by various issues related to investor demands and
preferences, including ownership requirements,
return expectations, and exit strategies.
Investor ownership requirements. Individual
investor requirements (or regulatory restrictions)
for minimum or maximum ownership stakes as well
as the ownership role of the NGO (if applicable)
affect the capital structure of the regulated institu-
tion. For international investment funds in particu-
lar, the costs involved in making an investment,
including both up-front costs of carrying out due
diligence and ongoing costs of managing the invest-
ment, are not insignificant. Thus, most funds will
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have minimum amounts of investment both in
terms of currency amounts and percentage amounts
they are willing to consider. This can range from
U.S.$500,000 to U.S.$1 million for some of the
smaller social investment funds to several millions of
dollars for the larger funds. The relative size of
the investment will also be shaped by the role the
investor anticipates playing in the new organization.
Many of the current social investment funds prefer
to hold a minority stake, but require a board seat as
a condition to investing.
As discussed in chapter 5, Strategic and Busi-
ness Planning, if the transforming NGO creates a
new company that becomes the regulated financial
institution, it transfers all or a portion of its assets
and liabilities to this company in return for some
combination of debt and equity in the new institu-
tion. The NGO becomes a shareholder of, and
more often than not, also a lender to the new insti-
tution. The value of the net assets (assets less liabil-
ities) of the NGO at transformation and the per-
centage of the NGO’s ultimate ownership stake in
the new institution are thus two important factors
that need to be incorporated into the capital struc-
ture plans. In addition, the nature and focus of the
NGO going forward (that is, does it continue with
financial operations? does it continue with other
nonfinancial operations? does it remain solely a
trust?) have critical implications for the structure of
the debt or equity arrangements and therefore for
other investors. A going concern, for example, will
likely want access to a steady stream of income, and
thus prefer a certain amount of debt with reliable,
fixed interest payments. A nonoperating trust, on
the other hand, may be less concerned with realiz-
ing short-term income and more interested in
longer-term capital appreciation, thus preferring to
hold more of its investment in share capital. The
future role of the NGO thus needs to be clarified
early on in the transformation planning process
because this and investor ownership requirements
ultimately influence the overall capital structure of
the institution.
Investor return hurdles. Different investors will
have different return expectations that will need to
be clarified up front. The specific return demanded
by each investor will vary, based on how much risk
can be tolerated and the time horizon of the invest-
ment. As discussed in more detail in chapter 7,
Ownership and Governance, many microfinance
investment managers expect to see returns on
equity of 20–25 percent in their portfolio, which
after devaluation and operating costs, will generate
internal rates of return of around 12–15 percent.
Scenario analysis exercises that facilitate testing the
return implications of a range of different debt-
equity combinations are important to the planning
process (box 6.1).
Investor exit requirements. Different investors will
likewise have different expectations regarding the
term of their investments. Some funds are limited
life funds, implying that the fund will in 7 to 10
years have to sell its shares in various investments to
refund either the initial investor group or make new
investments. Others may not have a mandated time
frame to exit, but will likely have expectations about
the preferred length of their investment. Each
investor’s investment horizon needs to be under-
stood up front and incorporated into capital struc-
ture planning decisions. In some cases this will
require a legal analysis to determine if the trans-
formed MFI is allowed to buy back its shares from
exiting investors. Some regulators prohibit such
buybacks, thereby putting the burden of such a
possible exit on the other shareholders of the insti-
tution or forcing the institution to bring in new
shareholders. (See chapter 7, Ownership and
Governance, for a more detailed discussion of exit
strategy.)
Regulatory and Fiscal Environment
A host of legal and regulatory issues can shape the
form (debt or equity) and amount of financial
sources that an MFI seeks to attract. These include
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tax considerations, the regulatory framework, and
the level of development of capital markets.
Tax considerations. Tax law considerations can
influence the optimal capital structure of a trans-
forming or transformed MFI, particularly if the
MFI is subject to profits (income) tax. Differing
tax treatment applied to payments of dividends as
opposed to payments of interest may influence an
MFI’s determination of whether to issue stock
(equity) or source debt to raise capital. For exam-
ple, in most countries, for purposes of calculating
net income (gross revenues less deductible
expenses), payment of dividends to shareholders
is not a deductible expense. In contrast, the pay-
ment of interest to lenders is normally deductible.
Hence, an MFI may find important tax advantages
by funding a significant amount of its capital needs
with debt rather than equity.5 Note, however, the
MFI must also consider the relevant tax policies
applicable to the investor—investors will also want
to minimize their own tax liability and maximize
their return. Withholding taxes on dividend
income, for example, may or may not be the same
as the taxes on interest income.
Table 6.2 shows how it can be tax advantageous
to an MFI to fund some of its required capital with
debt rather than equity. It assumes, rather simplisti-
cally, that three MFIs have the same gross income
and deductible operating expenses, and that the
shareholders of all three MFIs expect an annual
return of 25 units. (This example does not address
the implications for the investor of different tax
treatments for dividend income and interest
income.) MFI A shareholders provided equity only
and receive a dividend of 25 units. MFI B share-
holders provided a mix of equity and debt and
receive 10 units of interest and 15 units of dividends.
Box 6.1 Risk vs. Return
The type of financial instrument is directly related
to the level of risk involved. This can be seen in the
order of payments made to creditors and investors
in the event of the bankruptcy of the company. If
the company is wound up (liquidated), the pro-
ceeds from the bankrupt estate are used to pay its
Compulsory savings
Voluntary savings up to protected amounts
Liquidator’s expenses
Wages and salaries due
Secured lenders
Voluntary savings in excess of protected amounts
Unsecured lenders in order of seniority
Preferred shareholders
Common shareholders
obligations. Those at the front of the line have the
best chance of being repaid, while those at the end
of the line (the common equity holders) may receive
little or nothing. The figure below shows a typical
order of payment priority. 
Less risky, lower return
More risky, higher return
Source: Adapted from the Ugandan MDI Act, Section 73, part 2.
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MFI C is much more highly leveraged than either
MFI A or B. It pays 20 units of interest on its share-
holder loan and only 5 units of dividends. MFI C
ends up with more retained earnings although its
shareholders received the same amount (25 units) as
the shareholders of MFIs A and B.
Furthermore, as noted in chapter 5, Strategic
and Business Planning, if an MFI seeks to access
sources of commercial capital outside its country of
operation, it needs to consider whether its home
country has any bilateral income tax treaties in place
that would reduce the rate of withholding taxes that
would otherwise be imposed on the cross-border
payments that it will make to its equity and debt
holders.
Regulatory framework. The type of license (bank,
nonbank financial institution) the regulated financial
institution has is an important determinant in capi-
tal structure planning. Meeting minimum capital
requirements (the minimum amount of equity need-
ed to start a financial institution) and capital ade-
quacy requirements (the amount of equity needed
relative to assets), are fundamental to the funding
strategy planning process. Moreover, the type of
capital (core capital and total capital) required to
meet capital adequacy requirements differs depend-
ing on the type of license the financial institution
holds. (core capital, or tier 1 capital, refers to paid-
up share capital and certain disclosed reserves. Total
capital refers to core capital plus secondary, or
tier 2, capital including loan loss provisions, hybrid
capital instruments,6 subordinated debt, and other
undisclosed reserves. See chapter 10, Financial
Management, for a more detailed description of
regulatory capital.
In Uganda, for example, the prescribed mini-
mum capital requirement is approximately
U.S.$270,000 (500 million Uganda shillings) for
Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDIs).
This is substantially lower than commercial banks in
Uganda, which are required to have U.S.$2.2 mil-
lion (4 billion Uganda shillings) as minimum capi-
tal, and nonbank financial institutions, which are
required to have U.S.$550,000 (1 billion Uganda
shillings).7 Capital adequacy requirements, however,
are higher for MDIs, requiring core capital of not
less than 15 percent and total capital of not less than
20 percent of risk-weighted assets. For commercial
banks and nonbank financial institutions, core capi-
tal of not less than 8 percent and total capital of not
less than 12 percent are required.
Although minimum capital requirements cer-
tainly provide a starting point for estimating capital
requirements, the anticipated growth projections,
combined with leverage limits (embodied in capital
adequacy regulations) will ultimately determine the
amount of equity needed over time. In Uganda,
Table 6.2 Tax Implications of Equity and Debt Financing
MFI A MFI B MFI C
Gross income 150 150 150
Deductible expenses
operating expenses (30) (30) (30)
interest payments on shareholder loan 0 (10) (20)
Net income—before profit taxes 120 110 100
Profit taxes (assume 30% of net income) (36) (33) (30)
Net income after profit taxes 84 77 70
Dividend payment to shareholders (25) (15) (5)
Retained earnings 59 62 65
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where the stronger MFIs have asset bases in excess
of U.S.$5 million, the prescribed minimum capital
adequacy ratio of 20 percent for MDIs will
undoubtedly require equity bases significantly
higher than the prescribed minimum capital
requirement of approximately U.S.$270,000. An
MDI with U.S.$5 million in risk-weighted assets,8
for example, would need a minimum of U.S.$1 mil-
lion in total capital or U.S.$0.75 million in core
capital to be in compliance.
The types of savings products permissible under
the particular regulatory framework selected will
also affect capital structure planning. In many coun-
tries, regulated MFIs are permitted to offer time
and nonchecking demand deposits but not current
accounts. In Uganda, MDIs are prohibited from
on-lending compulsory savings that are taken as
a collateral substitute. In Bolivia, the Fondos
Financieros Privados (FFPs or private financial
funds) likewise cannot directly offer current
accounts or foreign exchange services. These limita-
tions typically translate to lower minimum capital
requirements than for commercial banks, and ulti-
mately affect the range of funding options available
to an MFI. The inability to offer a client the full
complement of financial services can negatively
affect the institution’s ability to capture a certain
market segment. Small or medium businesses seek-
ing savings and checking facilities in one institution
will be difficult to attract. In addition, in countries
such as Uganda where the prescribed minimum
capital adequacy ratio for MDIs is almost twice that
for commercial banks, the need for a greater pro-
portion of higher-priced equity in the institution’s
funding structure will also affect the institution’s
overall pricing strategy, and in particular its ability to
offer competitive interest rates on savings accounts.
Maturity of capital markets. In some countries,
capital markets are simply too underdeveloped or
too shallow to support more sophisticated financial
instruments normally used to match risk with
return. This is particularly evident in the limited
sources of medium and long-term financing found
in many developing countries. República Bolivariana
de Venezuela and Zimbabwe, for example, have
interest rates so high it is impossible to find
medium-term financing, much less long-term
(Lopez 2005). In other markets, the investment
appetite has yet to be developed, a key factor in
understanding the risks involved in liquidating an
investment opportunity. In such markets, which
typically lack an active public stock exchange and
have very few viable investors looking for invest-
ment opportunities, the exit strategy for a microfi-
nance investment is problematic. Although various
clauses can be included in shareholders’ agreements
to provide viable exit options for an investor, the
risk of not being able to redeem an investment is a
genuine issue in many countries.
Funding Structure Options
With a target capital structure in mind, an MFI will
need to develop a financing strategy that considers
the range of funding options available including
deposits, commercial borrowing, and equity as it
develops financial projections and begins to negoti-
ate with external funders. As depicted in Table 6.3,
funding structures for transformed MFIs tend to
evolve quite significantly, especially in the first few
years of operating as a regulated financial institution.
This section examines the range of funding
options available to transforming MFIs. While dif-
ferent regulatory environments will permit different
instruments, this section is meant to provide MFI
managers and board members with an understand-
ing of how these instruments compare with each
other. Transforming MFIs may wish to engage
external advisers to help examine the funding
options available and determine the ideal funding
structure. Annex 6A, Sample Terms of Reference:
Funding Structure, provides a sample terms of
reference for a consultancy to assist in developing a
funding structure for a transforming MFI.
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General Note on Cost of Capital
The cost of capital, used here to refer to all funding
sources, is determined by a variety of factors,
including interest rates, tax rates, the administrative
costs of sourcing the funds (particularly relevant for
savings), regulatory restrictions, capital structure
policy, dividend policy, and investment policy.
Although the interest rates set on externally
accessed debt and the overall tax rates in the coun-
try are typically beyond the control of an MFI, most
of these factors are influenced by the institution’s
own operating, financing, and investment policies,
thus underscoring the importance of more proac-
tive funding strategy planning. Although a full cost-
ing exercise is beyond the scope of this chapter,
experience has shown that transformation initially
results in a general increase in the cost of liabilities
for the institution as the MFI shifts away from sub-
sidized loans to more commercial debt, followed by
an overall decrease once the institution has devel-
oped a proven track record and is able to begin
tapping public deposits. Table 6.4 highlights the
downward trend in financial costs evidenced by
some of the more mature Bolivian transformed
MFIs (those with at least five years experience as
regulated institutions). It is important to note,
Table 6.4 Cost of Funds
(financial costs as percentage of average balance of savings and debt)
Transformation
Bolivian MFIs date 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BancoSol 1992 9 9 7 5 5 5
Banco Los Andes 1995a 10 10 9 6 5 5
FFP FIE 1998 10 11 9 7 6 5
FFP PRODEM 1999 n.a. n.a. 8 7 5 5
Source: Web page of Superintendency of Banks and Financial Entities of Bolivia (http://www.sbef.gov.bo).
Note: n.a.  not applicable.
a. Reflects date of Caja Los Andes’ transformation to FFP. The institution underwent a second transformation in 2005 when it received its commercial
bank license (now Banco Los Andes ProCredit).
Table 6.3 Evolution of Funding Structures
(percent)
XacBank Banco Los Andes Mibanco
(2000) (1995)a (1998)
2002 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004
Demand deposits 32 15 3 7 0 12
Term deposits 22 35 24 43 18 43
Loans from financial institutions 18 33 54 32 28 11
Other liabilities 2 2 8 7 5 11
Equity 26 15 11 11 49 24
Sources: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Entities of Bolivia (http://www.sbef.gov.bo); Superintendency of Banks and Insurance Companies of Peru
(www.sbs.gob.pe); ACCION International network affiliate database, December 31, 2004, quarterly report information; Munhmandah.O, XacBank.
Note: Years in parentheses are dates of transformation.
a. Reflects date of transformation to FFP. The institution underwent a second transformation in 2005 when it received its commercial bank license.
The bank is now known as Banco Los Andes ProCredit.
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however, that these figures do not adjust for the
administrative costs of mobilizing savings, estimates
of which vary significantly, ranging from as low as
2 percent to as high as 30 percent of total operating
costs (de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz 2004).
Transforming MFIs also need to consider the
cost of equity in their cost of funds analysis. For
MFIs accustomed to grant capital, the cost of these
funds (in addition to the very real cost of actually
seeking, negotiating, and accounting for them) has
generally been limited to the cost of inflation. For
institutions capitalized by investor share capital,
however, the cost of capital is the rate of return paid
to the investors, a rate that will be higher than that
demanded by depositors and lenders given the
higher risk associated with equity versus debt. In
general, equity will thus be the most expensive
source of funding for a transformed MFI; it will
also, however, be the most useful for raising addi-
tional sources of funding.
Deposits
With transformation to licensed deposit-taking
institutions, regulated MFIs have the potential to
offer new services through the addition of savings
products. Over the last decade, MFIs have become
increasingly aware of the importance of voluntary
savings services to meet the needs of poor house-
holds. At the same time, the mobilization of volun-
tary savings offers MFIs access to a relatively stable
and inexpensive source of funds denominated in
local currency. However, the challenges and costs
incurred in carrying out cost-effective savings
mobilization strategies that respond to different
client needs should not be underestimated. In addi-
tion to the challenges inherent in launching any
new product, savings mobilization often requires
MFIs to invest in infrastructure for marketing, sales,
and service of deposit accounts. (See appendix 1,
Sequencing the Introduction of Public Savings in
Regulated MFIs, for more detailed discussion.)
Savings services are generally offered as either
demand deposits (accessible anytime) or time
deposits (locked in for a specific period). Time
deposits tend to be more sensitive to interest rates
than demand deposits, and thus give management
a degree of control over the amount of time
deposits they mobilize. An increase in interest rates
on larger time deposits can mobilize needed
resources relatively quickly, though at a price. (At
the same time, however, such depositors will be
quick to withdraw their funds if the interest rate
decreases, assuming other more lucrative options
are available.)
The choice of the kinds of savings products a
transformed MFI will offer depends on a wide vari-
ety of factors, including client preferences, compe-
tition, costs, and funding resources, among others.
The following provides a brief summary of some of
the more popular product offerings:
Demand deposits. Demand deposits (or savings
accounts) are fully liquid accounts in which the saver
may deposit and withdraw any amount at any time
with no advance commitment (although there may
be charges for each transaction). The saver must
generally maintain a minimum required balance.
Examples of demand deposit accounts include:
• Passbook savings accounts: Clients receive a
record book in which their deposits and with-
drawals are entered to keep track of individual
transactions. Such account holders can easily
deposit money and typically earn some interest
income. Most accounts are remunerated at rela-
tively low rates to compensate for the relatively
high expense of administering them.
• Sight deposits: Such accounts do not require a
minimum or maximum amount and withdrawals
are typically possible without notice. The
account, however, does not pay interest. The
transaction may be made using passbooks, debit
cards and ATMs, or point-of-sale devices, or a
combination. 
• Current accounts: These accounts are demand
deposit accounts that allow the account holder
to transact using checks. As noted in table 6.1,
the offering of current accounts usually requires
a full commercial banking license.
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Time deposits. Time deposits are savings products
in which a client makes one or more deposits that
cannot be withdrawn for a specified period without
a penalty. At the end of the term, the client can
withdraw the entire amount plus the interest
accrued. The financial institution offers a range of
possible terms and usually pays a higher interest rate
the longer the term, although at some point rates
tend to decline as the risk of interest rate changes
increases. Because time deposits tend to be larger
than other types of deposits, have contracted with-
drawal times, and involve fewer transactions, time
deposits can provide a significant source of relatively
low-cost funds that facilitate asset liability manage-
ment. This is particularly true if an MFI can attract
large and institutional depositors.9
• Certificates of deposit (CDs): A CD is a debt
instrument issued by a bank that locks in interest
for a specific period (six months, one year, five
years, for example). Such instruments usually
carry penalties for early withdrawal. A number
of transformed institutions have issued CDs
successfully. Most have been issued locally and
tend to be bought by local institutional
investors. In some cases, however, MFIs have
issued CDs internationally as a way to tap into
the foreign capital markets. The first well-known
example of this strategy was BancoSol in Bolivia,
which issued six-month CDs on the U.S. market
in 1995. Today, more than 50 percent of
BancoSol’s liabilities are in CDs.
• Programmed savings: Programmed (or contrac-
tual) savings plans require clients to deposit a
fixed amount on a regular schedule. They usually
pay interest, and can be a popular product for
families trying to save for a large purchase—a
home, school fees, or a special occasion, such as
a marriage. 
Experience to date has shown that as trans-
formed institutions mature, deposits as a percentage
of funding liabilities increases (see box 6.2). As of
December 2004, 69 percent of BancoSol’s liabilities
were in the form of voluntary deposits (demand and
term deposits), and 27 percent were borrowings
from other financial institutions. (BancoSol is the
oldest transformed MFI, and despite having a com-
mercial bank license, BancoSol does not offer
checking account facilities.) In addition, ACLEDA
Bank in Cambodia, which transformed in 2000 into
a bank specialized in microfinance and again in
2004 into a full-fledged commercial bank, was
already funding 47 percent of its assets from public
deposits at year-end 2004. Although some of
ACLEDA’s depositors are large companies, the
government, and NGOs, the primary users of this
service are small savers (Fernando 2004). Last,
XacBank in Mongolia, which transformed into a
commercial bank and started mobilizing deposits in
2002, was financing approximately 58 percent of its
assets through public savings by the end of that
same year.
In addition to deposits making up a large per-
centage of overall liabilities funding, transformed
Box 6.2 Mobilizing Savings from 
the Public
Mibanco in Peru and BancoSol in Bolivia are two
institutions that have implemented successful
savings programs. At December 31, 2004, 72 per-
cent of Mibanco’s total liabilities were classified
as public deposits, representing 71 percent of the
total portfolio. Of these public deposits, 19 per-
cent were demand deposits, while the remaining
81 percent were time deposits. Mibanco had
46,170 clients with demand deposit accounts,
with an average balance of U.S.$361. At BancoSol,
public deposits represented 69 percent of total
liabilities at December 31, 2004, of which 19 per-
cent were demand accounts. The bank had
58,622 demand deposit accounts, with an aver-
age deposit of U.S.$256.
Sources: ACCION International network affiliate database,
December 31, 2004, quarterly report information; Curran 2005.
The Funding Structure | 175
Table 6.5 Deposits from Public as Percentage of Total Loan Portfolio
Regulated 
MFI (transformation year) Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BancoSol (1992) Bolivia 68 73 77 79 78 76
Banco Los Andes ProCredit Bolivia 30 30 41 54 60 63
FFP FIE (1998) Bolivia 50 53 41 49 50 43
FFP PRODEM (1999) Bolivia n.a. 75 78 77 79 71
Banco ProCredit El Salvador El Salvador n.a. 50 47 51 53 68
Mibanco (1998) Peru 26 25 43 46 59 68
K-Rep Bank (2000) Kenya n.a. 74 55 69 75 65
ACLEDA Bank (2001, 2004)c Cambodia n.a. n.a. 9 21 32 48
CARD Rural Bank (2002) Philippines 51 60 55 36 45 72
Source: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Entities of Bolivia (http://www.sbef.gov.bo); Superintendency of Banks and Insurance Companies of
Peru (www.sbs.gob.pe); ACCION International network affiliate database, years 2000–04 quarterly report information; CARD Rural Bank Annual
Reports (1999–2003); the Microfinance Information eXchange (http://www.themix.org). 
Note: n.a.  Not applicable.
a. In early 2005, FFP Caja Los Andes was converted into a commercial bank and renamed Banco Los Andes ProCredit.
b. In June 2004, Financiera Calpiá was converted into a full-service bank and renamed Banco ProCredit El Salvador.
c. In December 2003, ACLEDA Bank was issued a full commercial banking license, after operating for over three years as a Specialized Bank. 
MFIs increasingly rely on deposit taking to fund
their loan portfolios as is evident in table 6.5.
Time deposits versus demand deposits. Although
the figures in table 6.5 point to a general trend
among regulated institutions toward using public
deposits to finance an increasing percentage of their
loan portfolios, these deposits have tended to be
time deposits captured from institutions or related
parties rather than the public at large. Very few
transformed institutions have mobilized significant
demand deposits to fund their portfolios.
Many transformed MFIs look first to capture
time deposits, although some may start by offering
various liquid and semiliquid services to their exist-
ing borrowing customer base. Others start by try-
ing to offer time deposits to institutions such as
local medium to large corporations or donor agen-
cies that might have excess liquidity that needs to
be banked. Often, members of the public are hesi-
tant to place their hard-earned savings with a new
institution that has yet to prove itself—even though
the parent NGO of a newly transformed MFI may
have had a solid reputation in the marketplace, the
newly regulated institution should not expect this
to translate into the public confidence needed for
successful savings mobilization. However, this
varies depending on the context in which the MFI
is operating. If there are no other options, or if the
positioning process during the transformation is
handled exceptionally well, savers may readily come
to the new institution. Furthermore, as mentioned
above, the particular regulatory framework under
which the MFI is licensed may limit the types of
deposits the institution can offer, which may limit
the uptake of services by the public.
Finally, there are significant cost implications
with mobilizing large numbers of small deposits,
compared to a smaller number of larger and longer-
term deposits. Although a number of transformed
institutions have initially been able to mobilize a
sizable amount of institutional savings10 (often
referred to as the “Robin Hood” strategy, whereby
savings are mobilized from higher-income commu-
nities and on-lent to lower-income clients), such
depositors tend to be more interest rate sensitive
176 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
than smaller, individual microsavers seeking con-
venience and safety. Mobilizing microsavers tends
to take time as well as large investments in market-
ing and infrastructure to achieve a significant level
of outreach.
Deposit services constitute an important part of
the complete relationship most regulated financial
institutions aim to establish with their clients.
Although safety and access are key determinants for
most microsavers, as competition increases, MFIs
may be forced to offer deposit services at more
competitive interest rates.
Commercial Borrowings
Although mobilizing savings may be important
in the long run to satisfy both the clients and finan-
cial needs of the MFI (such as a more stable and
lower-cost source of funds), commercial borrowings
can offer expedient access to large volumes of funds.
Unlike savings mobilization, which requires invest-
ment in infrastructure for marketing, sales, and ser-
vice, accessing commercial debt in the private and
public markets can be initiated without significant
operational changes or costs. This assumes, however,
relatively strong financial performance of the MFI as
well as the existence of available sources of financing
to the MFI. Establishing funding relationships with
other financial institutions and financial markets is an
important aspect of determining the funding struc-
ture of a transformed MFI and a crucial aspect of
liability management. 
This section examines some of the key debt
instruments used by transforming and transformed
MFIs to tap into a broad range of debt financing.
Pretransformation debt. In the period leading up
to transformation, many MFIs purposely seek to
borrow from investors who express interest in
potentially taking an equity stake in the transformed
institution. These “relationship-motivated” bor-
rowings can act as a sort of courtship, allowing
both the lender and the borrowing MFI to get to
know each other. Sometimes the likelihood of the
possible conversion of debt into equity is estab-
lished up front and spelled out clearly in the loan
documentation—such as a convertible debt instru-
ment, whereby the financial terms (for example,
conversion ratio or price) and trigger events (condi-
tions precedent to a conversion into equity) for con-
version are described in detail. In other cases, the
financial terms of the loan are developed to function
as a quasi-equity–quasi-debt instrument to permit
the lender to engage in a form of profit sharing with
the borrower. This, for example, was one of the
motivations behind an investment company formed
by the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
and FINCA International to invest in FINCA’s
operations in the Kyrgyz Republic. This investment
company (now called FMCC) invests in “participa-
tions” in FMCC, which, although held on the
books of FMCC as debt, allow the investment com-
pany to share in the profitability of FMCC’s assets
in lieu of more conventional interest payments. The
return is based on a formula that considers FMCC’s
return on assets and then allocates to the participa-
tions a relative share of that return.
Seeking commercial loans (if possible) in the
lead-up to a transformation results in at least two
other important, although sometimes overlooked,
benefits. First, leveraging the assets of a transform-
ing institution before the actual transformation may
significantly improve the return on equity of the
transforming institution, thereby attracting a
greater number of potential equity investors. Sec-
ond, borrowing commercially offers managers of a
transforming institution the opportunity to begin
managing the liability side of the MFI’s balance
sheet and setting up an asset-liability management
function. Managing interest rate risk and liquidity
risk are important skills to master before engaging
in mobilizing and intermediating deposits from the
public. Borrowing commercially offers managers
valuable exposure to these issues before public
deposits are put at risk. (See chapter 10, Financial
Management for more information.)
However, although commercial borrowing
before transforming may make enormous practical
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sense, such borrowings may complicate the trans-
formation process unless lender-borrower relations
are well managed. As a general rule, any medium-
to long-term borrowing relationship initiated with-
in 24 to 36 months of the scheduled legal transfor-
mation should involve an in-depth discussion of the
borrower’s transformation plans with the potential
lender. Care should be taken to negotiate loan
agreements that are flexible enough to accommo-
date the likely change in legal form (and ownership)
as a result of transformation.11 And at the time of
transformation, the MFI will need to seek consent
(typically in writing) from each of its existing
lenders to the legal transformation and, if applica-
ble, the transfer of the debt.
Choosing private finance or public finance. A
preliminary question when developing a funding
structure with commercial debt, although not one
often asked by borrowing MFIs, is whether to
tap private (such as commercial bank loans and pri-
vate placements) or public markets (such as public
bond offerings). In part, this question is rarely
asked because the public debt market has generally
not been available to MFIs, transformed or not.
However, in recent years the industry has witnessed
a few of these transactions, such as Mibanco’s pub-
lic offerings in 2002 and 2003. (See annex 6B,
Additional Information on Microfinance Bond
Offerings, for more information.)
Accordingly, for MFIs considering both private
and public markets as possible sources of commer-
cial borrowing, the following general factors should
be evaluated:
• Business terms (pricing, tenor, collateral,
covenants, grace period) 
• Liquidity of debt instrument (extent to which
debt instrument can be freely resold to ideally, a
broad group of potential buyers)
• Disclosure requirements
• Market visibility
• Debt management opportunities (possibility of
restructuring, getting covenant waivers)
• Speed and transaction costs of accessing debt
• Documentation requirements
• Legal liability concerns
All of these factors are interrelated. For example,
the more sophisticated the lender or investor, the
less disclosure is required. The less disclosure
required, the less liquid the asset and, finally, the
less liquid the asset, the higher the interest rate. If
considered on a continuum, private financing—in
particular, commercial bank loans, which require
the least amount of disclosure and are among the
least liquid of all debt issuances—would be more
expensive than public financing.
As highlighted in table 6.6, both markets have
their advantages and disadvantages. Transforming
Table 6.6 Advantages and Disadvantages of Private and Public Finance
Advantages Disadvantages
Private market
Public market
• Faster
• Less disclosure than in a public offering
• Less legal liability risk
• Easier to restructure or get covenant
waivers if necessary
• More accessible, historically, for MFIs
• More liquidity (more easily traded among
investors)
• Cheaper (price)
• Greater market visibility
• More expensive
• Contains more restrictive covenants
• Offers the MFI less market visibility than a
public offering.
• Disclosure requirements more onerous
• Legal liability risk greater
• Can be slower to issue
• More difficult to restructure or renegoti-
ate terms
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MFIs will need to evaluate their commercial bor-
rowing options in light of these factors.
Term loans and lines of credit. Two of the more
common forms of commercial borrowing are basic
term loans and lines of credit. Sometimes loans are
credit-enhanced, whereby a third party provides
some form of guarantee or collateral to make them
more accessible.
Generally less common than loans, credit lines
can constitute a significant source of financing for
MFIs and can also prove to be an important tool for
contingency planning should the transformed insti-
tution find itself in an unexpected liquidity crunch.12
Credit lines do not appear as a liability unless they
are drawn upon. A variation of a line of credit is the
revolving line of credit. Under the terms of a revolv-
ing line of credit, the borrower can borrow and
repay repeatedly, up to the limit of the revolving line
of credit. Banks typically charge a commitment fee
for this option, which is applied in lieu of interest to
the amount of funds that it has committed but that
the borrower has not accessed. A revolving line of
credit is particularly useful to MFIs that experience
seasonality in their loan capital needs because it
allows them to repay unused amounts when they
have excess cash but then borrow again when cash
requirements increase. In some countries, however,
such as Tanzania, revolving lines of credit can be
difficult to find because local banks have not devel-
oped the technology to manage them.
Loans and lines of credit can come from a myriad
of sources,13 including local foundations, interna-
tional funds specializing in microfinance, local gov-
ernments, international financial institutions (such
as multilateral agencies or development banks), and
commercial banks. Although the characteristics of
these types of funders, which in general provide
both debt and equity financing, are explored in
more detail in chapter 7, Ownership and Gover-
nance, a short analysis of the availability, pricing,
and term of the types of debt they provide is out-
lined below. 
• Local foundations: At the local level, a number
of countries have private foundations that have
been established, often by donors, to promote
the micro or small enterprise sector. Such organ-
izations are usually small and thus do not often
provide a significant amount of funding over the
long term; however, they can provide access to
relatively low cost funds.
• Local governments: Government agencies inter-
ested in facilitating economic development have
also made available loan facilities or guarantees
to assist MFIs to access local sources of funds.
These facilities encourage banks that might oth-
erwise not see business potential in microfinance
to consider wholesaling funds to MFIs. In some
cases, guarantees from donor agencies or gov-
ernments have helped reduce the amount of cash
collateral necessary to be pledged by the bor-
rowing MFI.
• Specialized international funds: These funds,
such as Deutsche Bank Microcredit Development
Fund, Dexia Blue Orchard Micro-Credit Fund,
Hivos-Triodos Foundation, OikoCredit, Novib,
and ResponsAbility, offer loans to MFIs at close to
market interest rates. Their risk profiles largely
reflect the risk profiles of the investors in the funds,
ranging from commercial or private investors
(Dexia Micro-Credit Fund) to donors (Deutsche
Bank MC Development Fund). Although very
few of the funds are fully commercial, most use a
commercial approach to investment analysis and
monitoring. They tend to take greater risks and
accept lower return, however, than investors that
purely maximize profit (CGAP 2005).
Loans from these funds are typically made in
foreign currency and thus need to be evaluated
closely for foreign exchange risk and who ulti-
mately takes this risk. Such foreign currency
loans can create adverse foreign exchange posi-
tions for the institutions, namely the mismatch
of foreign currency liabilities and local currency–
denominated assets. Although many specialized
laws aimed at deposit-taking MFIs prohibit them
The Funding Structure | 179
from engaging in foreign exchange transactions,
this prohibition does not always apply to bor-
rowing in foreign currency.14 To mitigate this
risk, some borrowing MFIs use the proceeds of
these loans as cash collateral to secure local loans
or lines of credit denominated in local currency.
Although this kind of “back-to-back loan” struc-
ture can partially limit the foreign exchange risk
that arises when borrowing foreign currency but
lending local currency, the MFI effectively pays
twice for the funds—once to its international
lender and once to its local lender (the interest
paid by the local lender on the cash collateral
provided by the MFI is often minimal). In addi-
tion, the MFI takes on the credit risk of the local
bank where the deposit is located as well as the
country transfer risk—the risk that the hard cur-
rency may be blocked from leaving the country
to repay the international lender due to central
bank restrictions or national debt rescheduling.
A recent Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP) Focus Note highlighted that although
many MFIs are taking on hard currency debt
because the interest rates appear lower in nomi-
nal terms, they are not factoring in the significant
foreign exchange risk they are creating. “Of the
105 MFIs in the survey that reported foreign
debt, only 25 fully hedged their currency risk”
(CGAP 2005, p. 11). Although a certain level of
currency exposure may be manageable, MFIs
should have very clear guidelines for managing
their foreign exchange gap. 
Often as a condition of borrowing, some inter-
national lenders require prospective borrowing
MFIs to be rated by a microfinance specialized
rating agency. The Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) and CGAP offer matching grants to
MFIs to help cover these costs. As of October
2005, 19 rating agencies had been approved for
CGAP matching grant eligibility.15 In addition to
satisfying the requirement of the lender, ratings
provide useful information for the management
and board of the transforming MFI about the
strengths and weaknesses of the institution. As
such, the rating often serves more than just the
purpose of meeting lender requirements. Howev-
er, the effort involved in preparing for a rating
should not be underestimated. The level of detail
and thoroughness applied by a rating agency is
undoubtedly significantly more than that applied
in a typical donor assessment. It is suggested that
MFIs carefully review the various publicly
available rating reports as one step in preparing
for the rating exercise.16
• International financial institutions: The invest-
ment arms of bilateral and multilateral devel-
opment agencies, such as IFC, Germany’s
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW), or IDB,
can provide sizable loan capital at relatively com-
petitive rates, though typically in hard currency.
MFIs, however, need to be aware that the
bureaucratic hurdles in these agencies can add
significant delays to accessing these funds. In
spite of this, the majority of direct foreign
investment—debt and equity—in microfinance
(U.S.$648 million, or 56 percent), however, con-
tinues to comes from these institutions (CGAP
2005). When investments in microfinance by mul-
tilateral agencies, bilateral agencies, and govern-
ment programs are aggregated, the public sector
finances at least 75 percent of all foreign capital
investment in microfinance (CGAP 2005).
• Commercial banks: Local or international com-
mercial banks can provide a key source for both
term loans and lines of credit. Transformation
into a share company, with investor capital at
risk, generally provides banks a greater sense of
comfort in extending financing. In addition,
depending on the particular regulatory frame-
work under which the MFI has transformed,
transformation can bring MFIs access to the
interbank market in the country. This market
offers financial institutions access to relatively
short-term funding sources.
To date, most commercial bank loans to MFIs
have been structured as one lending bank to one
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borrowing MFI (often called single bank loans),
although the emergence of syndicates of lending
banks coordinated by an agent bank (often called
syndicated loans), seems probable as commercial
banks and other lenders attempt to share risks
and experiences in lending to MFIs. 
Documentation for a commercial bank loan
typically includes a credit agreement, possibly
with an attached promissory note. Some micro-
finance investment funds, particularly those
funded by European investors, document their
loans as stand-alone promissory notes. As well,
some local commercial banks use loan documen-
tation in the form of a note (particularly for over-
draft facilities) rather than a credit agreement.
Subordinated and convertible debt. The term sub-
ordinate means “below” or “inferior to.” In the
event of bankruptcy, liquidation, or reorganization,
subordinated debt can only claim assets after senior
debt (bank loans and all other debt) has been paid
off. Due to its higher risk, such debt typically carries
a higher interest rate.
Because of the nature of subordinated debt,
central banks often permit its inclusion in calculat-
ing an institution’s supplementary (tier 2) capital
(but not in the core capital, or tier 1, calculation).
The portion of subordinated debt that can be
included in the capital adequacy calculation is
often a function of the term (final maturity) of the
debt. In Uganda, for example, MDIs can include
100 percent of the face value of any subordinated
debt in their supplementary capital calculation
(the value of which, however, is limited to 50 per-
cent of the face value of tier 1 capital) as long as
the debt has at least five years remaining until
maturity. Once the debt reaches the five-year term,
it loses 20 percent of its face value on an annual
basis. See table 6.7 for an example of a relevant
calculation.
Table 6.7 Simplified Example of Capital Adequacy Calculation with Subordinated Debt
Total value
(thousands) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Tier 1
Common shares 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0 300.0
Retained earnings 30.0 45.0 65.0 85.0 110.0 140.0
Total Tier 1 capital 330.0 345.0 365.0 385.0 410.0 440.0
Tier 2
Subordinated debt
Book valuea 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 500.0 0
A. Value with 20% 400.0 300.0 200.0 100.0 0
annual deduction
B. Max. allowed: 50% of 165.0 172.5 182.5 192.5 205.0 220.0
Tier 1
Value for Tier 2 calculation 172.5 182.5 192.5 100.0 0
(greater of A or B)
Total capital 517.5 547.5 577.5 510.0 440.0
Risk-weighted assets (RWA) 1,000.0 1,500.0 1,700.0 2,000.0 2,300.0
Tier 1/RWA (percent) 35 24 23 21 19
Total capital/RWA (percent) 52 37 34 26 19
Source: Author.
a. Example assumes subordinated debt contract expires in year five.
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for International Development (USAID), U.S. reg-
ulations incorporated by reference into USAID
grant agreements will also be relevant.17
Before pledging a loan portfolio or any MFI
asset, including establishing a cash collateral
account as part of a back-to-back loan structure,
MFI management should ensure its lawyers carry
out legal due diligence of its existing credit agree-
ments, as well as engage in strategic thinking about
future borrowings. With respect to any existing
credit agreements, the MFI should note if there are
any “negative pledge clauses.” This is a clause, often
found in unsecured credit agreements, whereby the
borrower agrees not to pledge its assets (or not to
pledge more than an agreed amount of its assets,
thereby leaving room for a possible future pledge of
some lesser amount of assets). Once a negative
pledge clause has been agreed with one borrower, it
can become very difficult to provide a significant
pledge of assets to future lenders without first
returning to that lender with a request for a waiver
of the negative pledge clause. Typically, the original
lender will, at that point, require a commensurate
amount of pledged assets for its loan as well.
With respect to future borrowings, it is also
important to recognize that once a pledge of assets
has been made to one lender, it is unlikely that
many future lenders will be content with unsecured
loans because they effectively will stand behind the
secured lender should there be any repayment
problems. This race for assets to pledge, in and of
itself, can reduce the overall amount of borrowings
that can be undertaken in the future because even-
tually the MFI will run out of assets to pledge.
Hence, some borrowing MFIs have consciously
decided to pay a higher interest rate for unsecured
loans rather than to start borrowing, albeit more
cheaply, on a secured basis.
A second legal question commonly posed by
potential lenders is whether the MFI is legally
authorized to borrow and on-lend the proceeds of
such borrowings to its clients. This can be a difficult
question to answer in some jurisdictions due to a
Box 6.3 K-Rep Convertible Income
Notes
“As part of the asset and liability transfer from
the NGO to the new bank, a portion of the NGO’s
net worth was invested in convertible income
notes. This long-term debt instrument resembles
equity in that it does not have a fixed return
and is only retired when all shareholders agree
to retire it or when it is converted into equity; it
does not have a predetermined term. The income
notes generate returns only when dividends are
declared, and appreciate through retained earn-
ings. This mechanism allows K-Rep automatic
access to additional funds to maintain its owner-
ship percentage if needed.”
Source: Campion and White 1999, p. 56.
Subordinated debt instruments are also often
convertible into equity, allowing investors flexibility
based on estimated returns (box 6.3). Although
convertible debt usually carries a lower interest rate
than nonconvertible debt, convertible debt offers
investors a chance to participate in the profitability
of the MFI in exchange for the lower rate. (In some
environments, however, having an option to con-
vert debt into equity limits the debt’s qualification
as tier 2 capital.) (See chapter 7, Ownership and
Governance, for a detailed discussion of subordi-
nated and convertible debt.)
Legal issues in accessing commercial debt. Given
the overwhelming dominance of the loan portfolio
in an MFI’s asset structure, the legal authority of an
MFI to pledge its loan portfolio as collateral is par-
ticularly relevant when accessing commercial debt.
The ability of an MFI to do so depends on the
pledge law of the jurisdiction where the MFI’s
assets are located. Additionally, if an MFI has been
a recipient of donor grants, underlying grant agree-
ments may limit the institution’s ability to pledge
grant-funded assets without grantor approval. If the
donor is a bilateral agency such as the U.S. Agency
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lack of clarity in local law. Some countries have
sought to address this issue in the specialized laws
or regulations that are being adopted to support
the microfinance industry. In the Kyrgyz Republic,
for example, the question of legal authority to bor-
row and on-lend is directly addressed in the special-
ized microfinance law that was adopted in 2002.18
Bonds. Bonds offer an investment opportunity to
investors willing to take more risk than with a sim-
ple loan, but less risk than taking an equity stake.
Bonds are a form of loan agreement under which a
borrower agrees to make payments of interest and
principal on specific dates to the holders of the
bond. Differences in contractual provisions and
the underlying strength of the company backing the
bond lead to major differences in bonds’ risks,
prices, and expected returns (Brigham and Houston
1998). MFIs looking to place bonds will need to
consider both internal and external factors in their
pricing. They will need to match the coupon inter-
est rate (the stated annual rate of interest on the
bond) and the term with their own needs—both
what they can afford as well as the strategic needs of
the company. In addition, they will need to have a
clear understanding of the pricing and terms for
other similar bond issuances in the market. Bonds
are offered either to a select group of potential
investors (private placement) or made publicly avail-
able and thus evaluated by the financial markets in
terms of yield versus risk (public offering). The lim-
ited market for private placements means higher
costs than public placements, due to a more limited
base of potential buyers, higher perceived risks, and
limited secondary markets (Lopez 2005). 
• Private bond placements: Private bond place-
ments offer MFIs an opportunity to tap a
broader range of investors than straight loans
from commercial banks, though reaching a nar-
rower market than public offerings, discussed
below. A private placement is debt that is sold
directly to institutional investors, such as banks,
mutual funds, insurance companies, pension
funds, and foundations. In many countries
around the world, securities laws allow borrow-
ers (issuers of these privately placed notes) to
avoid normal securities registration requirements
because the debt being issued is offered to only
a small group of sophisticated investors.
Documentation for a private placement gen-
erally includes a stock or note purchase agree-
ment, and a private placement memorandum
(a form of a disclosure document about the
issuer). A number of legal restrictions specified in
the documentation limit the sale and resale of
privately placed notes (including time limits that
require buyers to hold the notes for a specified
period before reselling). 
The first private bond issuances in microfi-
nance were made by BancoSol in 1996 and 1997
for a total of U.S.$5 million. Both of these were
private placements and both were backed 50 per-
cent by a guarantee from USAID and held 720-
day maturity terms.19 Since then, a few other
MFIs have made private placements. Comparta-
mos in Mexico, for example, decided to first sub-
ject itself to Mexico’s securities regulatory
authority rather than bank regulatory authorities
when it opted to issue debt securities in the
Mexican capital market rather than transform to
a bank to offer deposit-taking services to the
public.20 Compartamos has issued and placed
four tranches of debt, the first three of which
were private placements: the first in 2002 for 100
million Mexican pesos (U.S.$10 million), the
second and third in 2003 for 50 million Mexican
pesos (U.S.$5 million) each.
• Public bond offerings: A registered public bond
offering has the broadest range of possible
investors of all the forms of debt financing dis-
cussed here. Because of the presumed lack of
sophistication of public investors in registered
public offerings, the securities laws of many
countries require the issuer to register the offer
of securities with a national securities regulatory
authority before making public offers and sales.
These registration requirements impose a high
The Funding Structure | 183
level of disclosure responsibility upon the issuer.
Documentation typically includes an indenture
(a formal agreement between the issuer of a
bond and the bondholders), an underwriting
agreement (the agreement between the issuer
and the lead underwriter of the syndicate, which
makes explicit the public offering price, the
underwriting spread, the net proceeds to the
issuer, and the settlement date), an agreement
among the underwriters, and a prospectus (dis-
closure document). 
Public bond offerings are a relatively new phe-
nomenon in the microfinance industry and have
been largely limited to Latin America. Mibanco
in Peru launched a 20 million Peruvian nuevos
soles (U.S.$5.8 million) public bond in 2002,
then again for the same amount in 2003, fol-
lowed by a U.S.$2.9 million bond later in 2003.
(See annex 6B, Additional Information for
Microfinance Bond Offerings, for more detail on
this transaction as well as more information on
bonds and securitization.) In Compartamos’
case, a public offering was pursued after the
three private placements discussed above. A
bond issuance for U.S.$50 million was approved
in 2004 and the first tranche in the amount of
U.S.$19 million was issued soon thereafter, tar-
geting local institutional investors. A 34 percent
guarantee from the IFC enabled the five-year
bonds to receive a AA rating by the local affiliates
of Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. 
Debt issued in the public market can take the
form of Eurobonds or registered public offer-
ings. Eurobonds are public offerings of debt
securities outside the United States that are not
registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission or any other national securities
regulatory authority. Often this type of bond is
issued to foreign investors outside the country of
the issuer. Eurobonds are listed on either the
London or Luxembourg securities exchange.
These listings impose certain requirements on
the issuer—such as to file an offering circular
with the securities exchange and undertake to
provide corporate documents, annual reports,
and financial statements to the exchange on
an ongoing basis. Documentation used in
Eurobond offerings typically includes an invita-
tion telex, indenture or fiscal agency agreement,
subscription or underwriting agreement, agree-
ment among managers and selling group, and
offering circular (disclosure documentation).
Bond placements bring challenges. With the
exception of the BancoSol placements and some
bonds recently announced, most bond issuances seen
in the microfinance industry to date have been made
locally. As with foreign credit lines, foreign exchange
risk continues to present hurdles to international
foreign currency placements. In addition, although
private placements can be made in a range of operat-
ing environments, public bond issuance typically
requires the approval of the country’s securities
exchange or banking regulators, or both, depending
on the particular regulatory environment. Further-
more, successful bond issuance requires a relatively
deep financial market and well-placed brokerage
support, not always readily available in many devel-
oping markets. In many countries where MFIs oper-
ate, the capital markets are simply not sufficiently
developed for this kind of debt product.
Moreover, taking an MFI to the capital markets
requires long and detailed planning. Two key steps
in the process are the completion of an external
rating and the development of investor prospectus
materials. For publicly traded bonds, a rating by
one of the specialized microfinance rating agencies
will not satisfy the broader investor base that typi-
cally invests in bonds. Accordingly, issuers usually
turn to one of the three major global rating agen-
cies: Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s
Corporation, and Fitch Investor Services.
In Mibanco’s case, for example, the bank had to
obtain two ratings to meet Peruvian regulatory
requirements. The local agencies—Equilibrium and
Class & Asociados—rated the first bond issue AA,
qualifying Mibanco’s paper for purchase by the reg-
ulated pension funds (Conger 2003). A road show
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was then organized to present Mibanco and the
characteristics of the bond issue to potential buyers.
As Mibanco’s first bond issuance, this initial offer-
ing was only slightly oversubscribed and the price at
12 percent (690 basis points above the corporate
interest rate for low-income bank clients) was con-
sidered relatively high (Lopez 2005). Mibanco’s
third bond issuance, in 2003, however, reflected a
significant change in market perception: the third
issuance was oversubscribed by 70 percent and
obtained a yield of 5.75 percent.
Although bonds can help extend the average
term of an MFI’s liability structure, they do tend to
require a relatively large amount of management
time as well as incur significant legal expenses. As a
general rule, issuing bonds will also subject the MFI
to some form of securities regulation, particularly if
it is issuing in a local capital market (as opposed to
a private placement or Eurobond offering). This
kind of regulation is different from the regulation
that bank supervisory authorities impose. The goal
of securities regulation is aimed at transparency and
information sharing with the view that the market
will then discipline the issuer in response to the
information it receives. Stiff financial and possibly
even criminal penalties may be exacted on the issuer
and its officers for inadequate or misleading disclo-
sure about an issuer’s financial condition.
Equity Capital
The common equity portion of a transformed insti-
tution’s capital is composed of two principal
accounts: retained earnings and shareholder’s equity.
The retained earnings account is built up over time
as the institution reinvests a portion of its net income
back into the company, rather than paying it all out
in dividends. The shareholder’s equity arises from
the issuance of shares in exchange for capital.
Bank regulators usually require regulated,
deposit-taking institutions to be formed as compa-
nies where ownership is evidenced by shares. There-
fore, most transformations involve the establishment
of a new share company and the issuance of shares
to equity investors. There are various options for
structuring these shares, including issuing common
stock and preferred shares. Common stock repre-
sents an ownership interest in an institution, but to
the typical investor, a share of common stock entitles
the owner to the following:
• Receive dividends if the company has earnings
out of which dividends can be paid, and only if
the board, with shareholder approval, chooses to
pay dividends rather than retain and reinvest all
the earnings. Whereas a bond contains a promise
to pay interest, common stock provides no such
promise.
• Sell the shares or a portion thereof at some future
date, perhaps at a price greater than the purchase
price although as previously mentioned, there
are currently limited secondary markets for MFI
shares; as well, the sale of shares could give rise
to capital gains or losses depending on the valu-
ations assigned to the shares when bought and
when sold, which could trigger a tax liability.
Most share offerings of transformed MFIs are for
common stock, although there have been a few
cases where preferred shares have also been offered.
Preferred stock is a hybrid—it is similar to bonds in
some respects and to common stock in others
(box 6.4). Like bonds, preferred stock has a par
value and a fixed amount of dividends or a fixed for-
mula for determining the amount of dividends that
accrue to the preferred stock, which must be paid
before dividends can be paid on the common stock.
However, if the preferred dividend is not earned,
the directors can omit it without forcing the com-
pany into bankruptcy. In addition, preferred stock
rarely carries the same voting rights as common
stock, because it is viewed as more akin to debt
than equity. Whether preferred shares are treated
as debt or equity for purposes of calculating capital
adequacy ratios depends on their characteristics.
According to the Basle guidelines, preferred shares
can be included as core (tier 1) capital if they are
perpetual (have no maturity date on which they
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must be repaid) and are noncumulative (if a divi-
dend is forgone in a given year, the shareholders do
not have the right to claim the skipped dividend in
future years).
Whether the regulated institution’s stock is struc-
tured as common or preferred, determining a value
for these shares can be particularly challenging.
Shareholders investing their own risk capital look for
a return (through both capital appreciation and div-
idend payout) that matches the risk of their invest-
ment. Although some socially responsible investors
may be more patient and less demanding of this
return, the realities of political instability; currency
devaluations; and burdensome tax, reporting, and
holding period requirements for the repatriation of
funds (not uncommon in many developing coun-
tries), create MFI risk profiles that will only be
appealing if matched by impressive returns.
For the purpose of this chapter, which is to
provide information to help a transforming MFI
determine the appropriate funding structure, it is
important to understand that the agreed on share
price will influence the amount of equity, and thus
the amount of debt, an MFI will need or can carry.
Thus the ideal funding structure is influenced in
large part by the amount at which shares are valued.
Financing with more debt increases the expected
rate of return for an investment, but debt also
increases the risk of the investment to the owners,
thus requiring an even greater return to match
this risk. As with many aspects of transformation,
negotiations with equity investors and with lenders
become somewhat iterative as investors are secured
and share price finalized (and the amount of invest-
ment to be received is known) while at the same
time debt capital is negotiated and offers secured.
(See chapter 7, Ownership and Governance, for a
detailed discussion of shareholder and equity
financing.) How it all looks at the end may not be
similar to how the transforming MFI envisioned it
in the original draft of the business plan.
Legal issues in accessing equity capital. An MFI’s
legal authority to conduct microfinance business is
likely to be questioned several times in several dif-
ferent forms over the course of investor negotia-
tions. The question may first arise in connection
with due diligence conducted by the potential
investor. It may then be raised in the documenta-
tion that evidences the proposed loan or invest-
ment, often in the form of a representation and
warranty in a loan agreement or stock purchase
agreement whereby the MFI is asked to state that it
has all governmental authorizations necessary to
conduct its business. Local counsel also may be
asked to confirm the accuracy of this representation
in its legal opinion. 
It should not be surprising that the lack of a
straightforward answer to this question can have a
chilling effect on even the most enthusiastic of
investors. Unfortunately, however, due to ambigui-
ties in local law, sometimes it may be very difficult
for an MFI to give a clear answer. Indeed, one value
of transforming into a regulated, deposit-taking
financial intermediary, according to some investors,
is that the licensing and registration process of a
transformed institution makes clear the institution’s
legal authority to conduct its microfinance business.
Although potential lenders may focus on donor-
imposed prohibitions about the pledging of donor-
funded assets, potential equity investors are likely to
be more concerned with whether the MFI in which
Box 6.4 Mibanco Issues Preferred 
Shares to CAF
The Corporacion Andina de Fomento (CAF), a
multilateral financial institution, holds 3.82 per-
cent of Mibanco. Its shared ownership is struc-
tured as nonvoting preferred shares. The pre-
ferred dividend is the highest of the weighted
average annual interest rate in foreign currency
paid by the three largest banks in the Peruvian
banking system and the common dividend. The
dividend must be distributed when there is dis-
tributable net income, otherwise it accumulates. 
Source: Mibanco’s 2004 Annual Report, p. 64.
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they are about to invest actually owns its assets. Put
differently, it is not unusual for potential equity
investors to ask for some form of comfort, either in
writing or otherwise, that former or current donors
will not exert claims of ownership over the assets of
the transformed institution. In one case in Kenya,
however, several donors were reluctant to state in
writing their position with respect to the ownership
of donor-funded assets. As a compromise, these
donors agreed to meet with potential investors to
give verbal assurances that the donors would not
seek to seize control of the assets that had been
acquired with donor funds. In other cases, as
occurred in Uganda, donors, including the USAID
Kampala Mission and Oxfam Novib, provided let-
ters to the transforming MFIs that made clear that
the capital grant funds provided for fixed asset pur-
chase or the financing of the loan portfolio were
fully controlled by the transforming institutions.
Approaching past and current donors for letters of
this sort, however, can be a time-consuming and
cumbersome process and should be started well in
advance of the actual transformation. In other cases,
donors have addressed this ownership issue with
grant recipients at the time that grant agreements
and obligations end—the “close-out” period of
grant agreements. 
Going public. Although a few MFI transformations
have eventually resulted in public listings, including
Mibanco’s listing on the Lima stock exchange and
BancoSol’s listing on the Bolivian stock exchange,
transaction volume has been minimal. Most trades
are prearranged and conducted separately through
private firms. As financial markets deepen in various
countries, however, this may change. 
Optimal Leverage?
Regulators and industry participants often suggest
that regulated MFIs should not be permitted to
leverage themselves as highly as commercial banks.
Given the typical characteristics of microfinance,
such as the volatility of the loans (usually short-term
and unsecured), regulators have argued that MFIs
need to maintain a higher proportion of capital
relative to their risk-weighted assets than commer-
cial banks. They argue that the traditional commer-
cial bank limit of 8 percent capital to risk-weighted
assets does not provide MFIs sufficient cushion to
weather unforeseen hurdles. This perspective is
reflected in the ACCION CAMEL (Capital, Asset
quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity)
guidelines, which recommend that an institution’s
risk-weighted assets represent a maximum of six
times its equity, or a minimum capital to risk-
weighted assets of approximately 17 percent (the
inverse). In Uganda, the MDI legislation is even
more conservative, setting a minimum ratio of
20 percent for total capital to risk-weighted assets.
(See chapter 2, Regulation and Supervision, for
more discussion of this topic.)
Box 6.5 shows the extent to which Indian MFIs
are leveraged.
Capital structure policy involves a trade-off
between risk and return and as highlighted above,
organizational mission, management and board’s
appetite for risk, and regulatory requirements all
influence the target capital structure for an MFI.
The appropriate degree of leverage for each institu-
tion is ultimately dependent on its ability to manage
the increase in risk that it brings. As evident from
figure 6.1, leverage ratios for a sample of trans-
formed MFIs vary significantly, reflecting each insti-
tution’s own institutional objectives, respective
operating environments, and varying expectations
of their respective ownership groups. In addition, it
is important to note the dynamic aspect of capital
structures. What may be appropriate for today’s
operating environment may not be appropriate a
year or two years from now. Recently transformed
MFIs, for example, are likely to have lower debt-to-
equity ratios than more mature regulated institu-
tions with a few more years of regulated operations
behind them. This is demonstrated by the relatively
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higher debt-to-equity ratios of the Bolivian institu-
tions (FFP Prodem, FFP FIE, Banco Los Andes
ProCredit, BancoSol) shown in figure 6.1.
Table 6.8 summarizes the funding structure as of
year-end 2004 of a selection of transformed MFIs
with at least one year of operating experience as a
regulated institution. With the exception of the
operating and regulatory environments, which will
be common between MFIs operating in the same
country depending on where they operate and how
they are licensed, respectively, these variables are
unique to each institution. A few guidelines, how-
ever, can be synthesized from the experience of
these institutions: 
• Savings as source of financing: Savings can ulti-
mately provide MFIs with a cheap and reliable
source of funds. Institutions, however, should
not underestimate the time and resources, as well
as costs, required to build up a sizable savings
portfolio. 
• Types of savings products: Most of the transfor-
mations reflected in table 6.8 involved licensing
as a form of nonbank financial institution,
Box 6.5 Equity and Leverage in Indian
MFIs
In India, commercial, cooperative, and local area
banks are required by the Reserve Bank of India
to maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio of
9 percent, while the minimum capital adequacy
for nonbank finance companies is 12 percent if
they do not accept public deposits and 15 per-
cent if they accept public deposits. An analysis of
the most recently available information on capi-
tal adequacy for 110 of the leading Indian MFIs
demonstrated that the average capital adequacy
ratio (CAR) of Indian MFIs is 18.4 percent. Only
four of the eight largest MFIs (portfolio size
above 100 million Indian rupees [approximately
U.S.$2.3 million]), however, have CAR in excess of
12 percent, indicating that the larger Indian MFIs
have become highly leveraged. As highlighted in
the analysis, this is largely due to the fact that a
sizable number of them have yet to generate
sufficient profits to contribute to their capital
from internal accruals.
Source: MCRIL 2005.
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Figure 6.1 Debt to Equity Evolution, 2000–4
Sources: www.themix.org; Superintendency of Banks and Financial Entities of Bolivia www.sbef.gov.bo; ACCION Quarterly Reports;
www.xacbank.com; ACLEDA Bank Audited Financial Statements (note: subordinated debt considered as a liability not as equity for this
analysis); Caja Los Andes Audited Financial Statements; BancoSol Audited Financial Statements; K-Rep Bank Annual Reports; Compar-
tamos Annual Reports; CARD Bank correspondence.
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Table 6.8 Comparison of Funding Structures, December 2004 
(percent)
Com-
Indicator BancoSol Los Andes FIE Mibanco K-Rep PRODEM ACLEDA partamos CARD XacBank
Date of transformation 1992 1995a 1997 1998 2000 2000 2001/2004b 2000 2002 2002
Deposits from the public 60 52 38 55 51 57 38 0 62 50
Checking 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Savings 11 7 9 12 43 13 27 0 62 15
Term 47 43 29 43 8 43 11 0 0 35
Other 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Loans from other 23 32 42 11 5 29 29 30 8 33
financial institutions
Bonds 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 28 0 0
Subordinated debt 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 0 0 0
Other 4 5 7 4 16 4 3 2 7 2
Total liabilities 87 90 88 76 72 92 80 61 77 85
Preferred shares 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0
Common shares 10 8 7 17 18 6 15 5 10 13
Retained earnings 3 1 3 5 0 1 2 33 6 2
Other 1 1 3 1 10 0 3 1 0 0
Total equity 13 10 12 23 28 8 20 39 23 15
TOTAL SOURCES 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Debt to equityc 6.41 8.30 7.11 3.26 2.54 11.6 3.89 1.55 3.3 5.5
Source: http://www.themix.org; Superintendency of Banks and Financial Entities of Bolivia http://www.sbef.gov.bo; ACCION Quarterly Reports; http://www.xacbank.com; ACLEDA Bank
Audited Financial Statements 2004 (note: subordinated debt considered as a liability not as equity for this analysis); Compartamos Annual Report 2004; CARD Bank correspondence.
a. Caja Los Andes FFP underwent a second transformation in 2005 when it received its commercial bank license. The bank is now known as Banco Los Andes ProCredit.
b. ACLEDA recently conducted its second transformation, converting from a microfinance bank to a commercial bank in 2004.
c. Ratios calculated using actual values, so rounding may lead to slight differences from simply dividing “total liabilities” row by “total equity” row.
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prohibited from mobilizing current accounts.
The balance between time and noncurrent
demand accounts in Latin America has tended to
be weighted in favor of time deposits, because
many of these institutions have proactively tar-
geted higher balance institutional savers for its
CDs. K-Rep, however, has successfully mobi-
lized a significant number of microsavers, savers
from the same target group as its current loan
products.
• Loans from other financial institutions: As MFIs
transition to mobilizing public savings, their
reliance on borrowing from banks will likely fall
because savings can be a cheaper source of local
currency debt. 
• Bond issuances: Only a few MFIs to date
have mobilized resources by issuing bonds. As
highlighted above, this avenue requires both
relatively liquid local capital markets and a sig-
nificant investment of resources and manage-
ment time.
• Preferred versus common shares: Very few MFIs
have included preferred shares in their initial
share offerings. However, this appears to be
changing as institutions have begun to incorpo-
rate different classes of investors in their share-
holding groups. In Uganda Microfinance
Union’s case, for example, the NGO retained
preferred shares in the new MDI, but is not a
significant common shareholder. Thus, the
NGO receives an income stream from these
shares, but does not hold any voting rights. (See
chapter 15, The Creation of Uganda Microfi-
nance Limited.)
• Maximum leverage: Among the selection of
institutions shown in table 6.8, FFP PRODEM
reflects the highest debt (which excludes
deposits) to equity ratio, at 11.6. (FFPs in
Bolivia are required to maintain a minimum cap-
ital adequacy ratio of 8 percent, one of the low-
est in the sample of institutions presented.)
Given both restrictions at the regulatory levels
and the perceived higher risk found in micro-
credit portfolios, the industry is likely to contin-
ue to see more conservative leverage ratios for
microfinance than for commercial bank lending. 
Annex 6C, Checklist for the Funding Structure,
provides a summary checklist of the major aspects
of the funding structure addressed in this chapter.
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Annex 6A Sample Terms of
Reference: Funding Structure
Background
Background on the organization including its
mission, target market, client outreach, portfolio
size, and so forth.
Objectives
The objective of this consultancy is to advise MFI A
on an appropriate capital structure to meet regula-
tory requirements. In addition, the consultant will
assist MFI A to achieve the following:
• Determine appropriate funding mix as a licensed
deposit-taking institution for the next five
years, given MFI A’s business needs and social
mission.
• Review and refine the business plan with the
proposed capital structure in mind.
• Review funding sources available to MFI A.
• Identify prospective risks given the proposed
capital structure.
Tasks
To develop an appropriate funding structure for
MFI A, the consultant should complete the follow-
ing tasks:
1. Review the ownership and governance require-
ments stipulated in the law and regulations, such
as capital adequacy, deposit to loan ratio, and so
forth.
2. Review, if applicable, the rating or valuation
report (or both) for MFI A. (The valuation
report provides an indicative valuation estimate
of the market value of the shares of MFI A.)
3. Review the business plan, with emphasis on the
growth projections and proposed funding needs.
4. In coordination with the Finance Manager
and the Transformation Manager, refine the
business plan (having in mind the proposed
capital structure).
5. Propose potential funding sources the MFI A
could access.
6. Develop recommendations for MFI A to deter-
mine appropriate and effective ways to 
a. diversify funding sources, with a view toward
managing liquidity and market risks;
b. lower financial costs;
c. balance leverage with required investor
returns; and
d. secure permanent access to a pool of available
funds to meet MFI A’s planned growth.
7. Complete sensitivity analysis showing different
rates of return for investors based on different
capital structure options.
8. Outline possible risks of the proposed capital
structure.
Deliverables
1. A comprehensive report that proposes the ideal
or preferred capital structure for MFI A to meet
regulatory requirements and to operate on an
ongoing basis as a licensed deposit-taking
institution.
2. A refined business plan that includes the pro-
posed ideal capital structure.
Qualifications
The firm or individual should have the following
qualifications:
• MBA or master’s degree in finance or related
studies
• At least two years of working experience in
microfinance or banking (or both) in developing
countries
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• Extensive experience in financial modeling for
microfinance in a regulated setting
• Extensive experience in accessing capital markets
• Banking experience in the areas of treasury,
governance, or risk management
• Familiarity with the work, interests, and scope of
various investors, both social and private.
Timing
It is estimated this consultancy will require 12 to
15 days to complete. Because the capital structuring
is an input to several of the next steps in MFI A’s
transformation process (securing and negotiating
with potential investors, among others) the consul-
tancy should commence as soon as possible.
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Annex 6B Additional Information
on Microfinance Bond Offerings
Despite difficult market conditions, a wave of bond
issues for MFIs occurred over the last few years in
Latin America, helping develop longer-term fund-
ing sources for transformed institutions. Table 6B.1
provides details on transactions for two institutions:
Mibanco and BancoSol.
In July 2004, the first offering (for U.S.$40 mil-
lion) of Blue Orchard Microfinance Securities I was
held, the largest microfinance bond issued from
U.S. capital markets. In May 2005, a second offer-
ing for an equivalent amount was held. This offer-
ing supports MFIs in nine developing nations, and
both offerings were enabled in large part by a guar-
antee from the Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration. This guarantee was secured by two socially
responsible investment firms, Geneva-based Blue
Orchard Finance and U.S.-based Developing
World Markets. These two organizations, along
with Grameen-USA, joined with a few other equity
investors to form a special purpose company called
Blue Orchard Microfinance Securities I to issue the
bond (Baue 2004). The international consulting
firm IPC also recently announced a bond deal of its
own: Euro 6 million worth of bearer bonds (unreg-
istered bonds on which interest is paid out to the
holder, regardless of to whom they were issued),
Euro 3 million in 3-year bonds at 5 percent, and
Euro 3 million in 6-year bonds at 6.5 percent were
offered.
Table 6B.1 Examples of Recent Bond Issuances
Mibanco BancoSol
Year of issuance 2002 2003 2003 1996 1997
Amount 5.8 5.8 2.9 2.0 3.0
(U.S.$ million)
Currency Peruvian soles Peruvian soles Peruvian soles U.S.$ U.S.$
Coupon 12 5.75 5.75 13 9
(percent)
Tenor 2 years 2 years, 3 months 1 year, 6 months 2 years 2 years
Credit 50% USAID 50% CAF None 50% USAID 50% USAID
enhancement
Sale Public offering Public offering Public Private Private
mechanism offering placement placement
Main buyers Local pension Mutual funds Public entities Bolivian Bolvian
funds (83%), (33%), public (60%), mutual institutions institutions
mutual funds entities (29%), funds (21%),
(17%) pension funds pension funds 
(26%) (20%)
Raters Class & Class & Class & n.a. n.a.
Asociados Asociados Asociados 
S.A., S.A., S.A., 
Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium 
Clasificadora Clasificadora Clasificadora 
de Riesgo S.A de Riesgo S.A de Riesgo 
S.A
Source: Adapted from Conger 2003.
Note: n.a.  Not applicable.
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Note on Securitization
Securitization refers to the pooling of assets with an
income stream and the repackaging of those assets
in the form of marketable securities for sale to
investors. The securities are secured (or collateral-
ized) by the assets themselves or by the income
derived from them. The resultant income from the
assets represents the primary source of payment of
income to the investors. Although used extensively
in the United States by mortgage lenders and cred-
it card companies, securitization has not been
widely used in the microfinance industry. As high-
lighted by Jansson (2003), this is due to a range of
variables, including the typically large (greater than
U.S.$25 million) amount needed to be cost effec-
tive and various legal requirements that make secu-
ritization of a large number of small loans a
prohibitively onerous and expensive process.
Although not unique to transforming MFIs,
securitization can offer an interesting option for
MFIs in need of funding or those constrained by
limited leverage ability. In a securitization deal,
assets of the MFI, such as the loan portfolio, are
sold to another institution providing an infusion of
cash into the MFI, and perhaps even more relevant
for transformed MFIs, removing the assets from the
MFI’s balance sheet, thus reducing the amount of
required reserves that are associated with the assets
being “sold.” As such, instead of having to wait for
loans to be repaid to realize liquidity, securitization
results in cash for the regulated MFI as well as
frees up the amount of capital required to be held
on reserve. As mentioned above, however, the
transactions costs and legal requirements associated
with a securitization limit its cost effectiveness for
most MFIs.
194 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
Annex 6C Checklist for the 
Funding Structure
Funding Strategy
• Is the mission and vision of the new institution
clearly documented?
• Do key stakeholders share the same mission and
vision of the new institution?
• Does the institution have a “double bottom line,”
and if so, is it understood by all stakeholders?
• Have financial projections been developed for
the new institution? Do these projections allow
the user to use various combinations of debt and
equity to model projected growth?
• Have the regulatory and legal implications of
various funding options been clearly explored? 
• Are the tax implications of paying dividends
versus interest expense clearly understood?
• Is the nature and focus of the NGO going for-
ward clear? (Does it continue with financial oper-
ations? Does it continue with other nonfinancial
operations? Does it remain solely a trust?)
Deposits
• Have the goals for savings mobilization been
clarified?
• Has the target market for the savings product
been clearly defined?
• Have the implications of launching a voluntary
savings product on other product offerings been
thoroughly thought out?
• Have the necessary investments in marketing,
security, internal controls, financial management,
and so forth been made?
• Has a complete product costing exercise been
conducted to establish appropriate interest rates
and fees?
Commercial Borrowings
• Does the MFI have a clear sense of what the debt
options in its market are?
• For the relevant debt instrument 
• Are the terms, including pricing, tenor, and
grace period, transparent and clear? How do
they compare to the overall financing strategy?
• What are the liquidity implications, including
the extent to which the debt instrument can
be freely resold to a broad group of other
investors?
• Does the MFI understand the relevant disclo-
sure requirements associated with this debt
instrument?
• Does the MFI understand the implications for
market visibility?
• Has the MFI analyzed the various debt man-
agement opportunities (possibility of restruc-
turing, getting covenant waivers)?
• Has the MFI analyzed the speed and transac-
tions costs of accessing this debt?
• Has the MFI closely evaluated the documen-
tation requirements?
• Are there legal liability concerns?
Equity
• Has the institution developed a list of prospec-
tive investors who share the same goals?
• Have the various prospective investors clarified
their expectations for expected return, term, exit
strategy, governance, and so on?
• Can the NGO exchange noncash items (portfo-
lio, fixed assets, and so on) for shares in the new
company? If not, does the NGO have sufficient
liquidity to pay in cash? If not, have other alter-
natives been examined?
• Does the new investor group agree on an appro-
priate valuation approach? If not, can a compro-
mise be reached?
Notes
Contributions to this chapter were made by Deborah
Burand, former Director of Capital Markets, FINCA
International. She also is the source of tables 6.2 and 6.6.
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1. CGAP (2005) highlights that 92 percent of debt is
issued to MFIs in hard currency. 
2. The MicroBanking Bulletin is one of the principal
outputs of the MIX (Microfinance Information
eXchange). It is a publication that presents financial
and portfolio data on MFIs around the world, organ-
ized by peer group. The MIX is a nonprofit organi-
zation that supports the growth and development of
the microfinance industry through various means of
information dissemination. See www.themix.org for
more information.
3. In fact, a recent CGAP survey of development
investors and social investment funds (see CGAP
2004b, p. 1) highlighted that almost 90 percent of
the almost U.S.$1 billion in foreign investment in
microfinance comes directly or indirectly from public
sources. Of the U.S.$250 million invested directly by
social investment funds, half can be traced to devel-
opment investors, the private-sector funding arms of
bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. These social
investment funds typically hold a longer-term invest-
ment horizon and are willing to forgo some financial
return for deeper market penetration.
4. The range of products a regulated MFI can offer,
however, will also be constrained by the relevant leg-
islation or regulations under which the MFI is oper-
ating. In Uganda, for example, the Microfinance
Deposit-Taking Institutions Act specifies a two-year
limit on the term of loans. This limitation is likely to
affect an MDI’s ability to offer housing loans.
5. It should be noted that when such debt is issued to
shareholders, rather than to third parties, regulatory
concerns may reduce some of the tax advantages
to the MFI of issuing debt. For example, there may
be prudential bank regulatory concerns that limit
or influence the financial terms under which debt can
be issued to shareholders of deposit-taking institu-
tions. Also, there may be tax regulatory concerns that
interest payments on shareholder loans are, in effect,
disguised dividend payments and should be treated
as such.
6. “Hybrid” instruments are those instruments, such as
convertible bonds or preferred shares, that exhibit
qualities of both debt and equity.
7. In Uganda, currency points are used to determine
minimum capital required. For MDIs, the minimum
currency points are 25,000; for nonbank financial
institutions, minimum capital is 50,000 currency
points; and for commercial banks, 200,000 currency
points are required. At the time of publication, a cur-
rency point was worth 20,000 Ugandan shillings.
8. An MFI’s risk-weighted assets will typically exclude
the value of all cash, and include 20 percent of the
value of certain bank deposits and the full value of the
remaining assets, such as the loan portfolio and fixed
assets. The process of risk weighting assets is discussed
in more detail in chapter 10, Financial Management.
9. Adapted from CGAP Savings Information Resource
Center Glossary site: http://microfinancegateway.
org/resource_centers/savings/glossary?PHPSESSI
D=a0799328b0d68f776781d1c57a6012af.
10. Examples include XacBank in Mongolia, Finamerica
in Colombia, and Caja Los Andes in Bolivia.
11. In some cases, the lender will prefer to have a right to
call the loan upon such a significant change in the
legal form and business of the borrower. If that is the
case, the borrower should make sure that an early
repayment of the loan will not adversely affect its cash
flow. MFIs may need to discuss with the lender how
the cost of such prepayments will be allocated among
the parties to the loan agreement. In other cases, the
lender may be willing to consent to an assignment of
the loan obligation to the newly created institution.
And, of course, there are endless variations between
these two positions that a lender may take.
12. However, if the unexpected liquidity crunch has also
caused the institution to breach one of its covenants
under the line of credit, the line may be unavailable.
13. The MIX (http://www.themix.org) provides infor-
mation on all microfinance investment funds that
report to them. The site currently includes 72 differ-
ent international investors.
14. Reports of a Ghanaian MFI that borrowed in foreign
currency without managing the foreign exchange
risk, requiring the Ghanaian central bank to intervene
when the value of the MFI’s local currency assets
were no longer in line with its foreign currency liabil-
ities, only serve to heighten growing concern over
this issue within the microfinance industry. As a
result, many practitioners and international lenders
are paying increasing attention to deal structures and
instruments that could be developed to assist MFIs to
hedge or otherwise mitigate foreign exchange risks.
15. Approved raters include ACCION International,
Apoyo and Asociados Internacionales S.A.C., BRC
Investor Services, Class & Asociados SA, CRISIL,
Ecuability, Equilibrium, Feller Rate, Fitch Ratings,
JCR-VIS Credit Rating Company Limited, MCRIL,
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Microfinanza srl, MicroRate, MicroRate Latin
America, Pacific Credit Rating Holding Inc., Planet
Rating, Planet Rating (ES), Planet Rating (FR), and
Standard & Poor’s. See http://www.ratingfund.org
for more information.
16. Examples can be found on http://www.ratingfund.
org.
17. Some commercial lenders have creatively sought to
avoid running afoul of such pledge prohibitions
imposed by donors by seeking a security interest in
only those assets that are acquired with the proceeds
of their loan. Given that money is fungible, it remains
to be seen how well this approach will work should a
borrowing MFI run into debt servicing problems—
particularly if the asset quality of the loan portfolio
that is securing the commercial borrowing suddenly
deteriorates.
18. See Chapter 1, Article 1. Definitions for “micro-
finance company,” “micro-credit company,” and
“micro-credit agency” in the Law on Micro-finance
Organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic (approved by
the Legislative Assembly of the Parliament of the Kyr-
gyz Republic, July 11, 2002; approved by the Peo-
ple’s Representative’s Chamber of the Parliament of
the Kyrgyz Republic, July 3, 2002).
19. BancoSol has not placed bonds since this time,
because it has been able to place CDs instead at
cheaper rates.
20. Compartamos became a licensed and supervised
financial institution in 2001 with its transformation
into a Sociedad Financiera de Objeto Limitado or
SOFOL (limited purpose financial institution) and in
2006 was in the process of transforming to a com-
mercial bank. Not surprisingly, given the financial dis-
closure requirements imposed on Compartamos by
Mexican securities regulatory authorities, Comparta-
mos received the first CGAP award to MFIs world-
wide for the quality of its financial reporting.
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Ownership and Governance
Institutional transformation has profound implica-tions for the ownership and governance struc-tures of a microfinance institution (MFI). Trans-
formation results in the capital base of the MFI
changing from one of donated grant capital and
retained earnings to one that includes investor share
capital. Whether the transformation is structured as
the creation of a new company or as a reorganiza-
tion of the old, the introduction of shareholders
with equity at stake significantly changes the nature
of the institution. Shareholders represent a different
type of stakeholder than donors providing grant cap-
ital. Their effect on governance, strategic direction,
institutional culture, management, and policies and
procedures cannot be overstated. Transforming
MFIs need to consider carefully the type of equity
investors they seek and be prepared for what can be
a time-consuming and resource-intensive negotia-
tion process. 
As in any industry, the types of investors seek-
ing to invest in microfinance vary. The particular
nature of the microfinance industry, with its focus
on financial and social returns, adds even more vari-
ation to investor profiles. Their investment objec-
tives, return expectations, time horizons, and
exit strategies may differ significantly from one
another, as do the implications for their role in
governance. 
This chapter begins with a review of key issues
associated with microfinance investors: What are
the desired characteristics of an investor in a trans-
forming MFI? What are the pros and cons of differ-
ent types of investors and what is the appropriate
number of investors? The answers to these ques-
tions are influenced by the MFI’s vision for the
future as outlined in previous chapters. The next
section provides an overview of how to seek and
attract potential investors. The process of securing
investors includes a significant amount of institu-
tional marketing and due diligence on both sides—
investor and investee. Such preliminary discussions,
however, mark only the beginning of the investor
negotiation process. As discussed in chapter 6, The
Funding Structure, the amount of equity and debt
a transforming MFI will seek is somewhat fluid. In
addition, some investors will want to begin with
debt, anticipating converting it to equity when the
MFI is licensed or after it begins operations. Others
may want to start with both debt and equity, while
others seek a pure equity investment. Thus, the
next section details a wide range of issues related
to the structure, timing, and commitment of
Chapter 7
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investments as well as the implications for manage-
ment and overall operations of the MFI. These
issues and more make up the negotiating phase—
key to solidifying the right ownership structure for
the new entity. Finally, the chapter examines the
implications of this new ownership group on the
governance of the institution, including ways to
build and grow an effective board and, in doing
so, how to ensure management accountability. 
Choosing the Type of Investor
The broad definition of investor includes an indi-
vidual or institution that invests money in any kind
of investment product whether it is debt or equity.
Shareholders represent those investors holding
equity in an institution; they may also hold various
forms of debt as well. The selection of investors,
and in particular the shareholders—the owners of
the institution—is one of the most critical steps in
the transformation process. Just as various investors
will have their own investment criteria to assist
them in their investment decisions, MFIs should
have a clear sense of the characteristics they are
looking for in investors. The financial and nonfi-
nancial value-added of each investor needs to be
closely evaluated in relation to the particular needs
of the MFI into the future. Key distinctions among
investors add complexity to this process, underscor-
ing the need for MFIs to clarify preferred investor
profiles up front. The relationship and balance
between the different investors will also need to be
considered in the selection process. 
Desired Investor Characteristics
Before embarking on the process of finding
investors, the key stakeholders of transforming
MFIs (typically board members and senior manage-
ment of the NGO) should think strategically about
the type of investors they are seeking. This strategic
analysis should consider the following crucial dis-
tinctions about the attributes various investors can
bring to the organization. Each of these attributes
should be envisioned along a continuum, because
investors seldom fit only at the extremes:
• Strategic or financial investors
• Majority or minority shareholders
• Local or international investors
• Microfinance experience or formal financial
sector experience
Investors in MFIs include a broad range of insti-
tutions and individuals with financial and social
motivations. Understanding where prospective
investors fall on the spectrum of each of these char-
acteristics can help the MFI’s stakeholders in the
negotiation process and will ultimately help craft a
more cohesive group of investors. Taking into
account the motivations and desires of potential
investors will help the MFI create the ideal mix to
meet the needs of the MFI into the future. 
Strategic or financial investors. In broad terms, the
types of investors transforming MFIs might con-
sider can be categorized along a continuum, with
purely strategic investors at one end and purely
financial investors at the other. While it is rare to
find investors motivated purely by strategic or
financial considerations when seeking an invest-
ment in microfinance, the distinction is useful for
providing MFIs a framework for thinking about
the different objectives that will shape investors’
actions and expectations. Strategic-focused
investors are likely to bring specific expertise or con-
nections or both. Of utmost importance to them
will be issues shaping the strategic direction of the
organization—its vision, mission, target market,
product mix and range of services, market share,
and social impact. They will want a board seat and
may want some degree of direct influence in the
overall management of the organization. In
extreme cases, strategic investors may be acquiring
shares with the ultimate (and possibly unstated)
goal of taking over the institution. 
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More financially focused investors will be con-
cerned with the results of the business, and may or
may not be as concerned with the mission and
vision of the MFI (see box 7.1). They will likely be
interested in using board representation to ensure a
healthy financial return and to protect their under-
lying investment, and will certainly seek to influence
operations if they feel their financial interests are
threatened in any way. 
While strategic investors may at times be per-
ceived as more active investors, with their focus on
operational issues, it would be wrong to categorize
financial investors as passive. In the microfinance
industry today very few investors, either strategic or
financial, are truly passive. Instead, through their
board representation, both types of investors
have sought to play an active role in overseeing
management and influencing the direction of the
organization. 
Majority or minority shareholders. During the
development of the business plan and the funding
strategy, the MFI’s vision of how much of the new
regulated entity will be sold to external sharehold-
ers should be decided. This decision is typically
directly linked to what portion of the new entity
will be retained by the founding NGO (if applica-
ble). If the NGO retains the majority stake in the
new entity, this limits the portion available for
external purchase to just a few minority sharehold-
ers. It is important to note that for external minor-
ity investors, a dominant NGO shareholder may
raise concerns about their ability to have much
influence over board decisions, particularly if there
are inadequate legal protections under host country
law for minority shareholders. 
While to date equity funds have generally come
in as minority investors (Profund, AfriCap, Gate-
way, ACCION Investments, and others), they have
tended to prefer to invest in MFIs with relatively
diverse shareholding structures where no one share-
holder is a clear majority owner. 
In an attempt to encourage more diversified own-
ership, a number of regulatory frameworks prescribe
maximum ownership holdings. In Uganda, for
example, no person or group, including the found-
ing NGO, may hold more than a 30 percent share of
a microfinance deposit-taking institution (MDI),
unless the shareholder is a wholly owned subsidiary
of a bank licensed under the country’s Financial
Institutions Statute, 1993,1 a reputable financial
institution, or in exceptional cases, a reputable pub-
lic company.
The total percentage of the new entity to be sold
sends a clear message to prospective investors
regarding the level of influence external investors
are likely to have. An MFI that will continue to be
owned 80 percent by the founding NGO will pres-
ent a very different investment opportunity than
one seeking external investors for 80 percent of the
new entity. Minority shareholders generally fear
being taken advantage of by majority shareholders.
Two of the bigger concerns of minority sharehold-
ers are their inability to change management if it is
not achieving the anticipated goals (financial or
Box 7.1 Aligning Shareholders with the
Mission
“In our experience we have had to deal with
short-term, profit-oriented investors vs. long-
term investors. In the first case these individuals
were attracted by the returns of the institution
and not so much by the social side. They also saw
some political opportunities from investing in a
microfinance institution because of its broad out-
reach and the economic sectors it reaches. Prob-
lems with this type of investor soon came up, but
fortunately the majority of the shareholders
were more social and long-term oriented, leav-
ing the other shareholders alone in their intent
to change the bank’s orientation. In the end the
minority profit and politically oriented share-
holders sold their shares.”
Source: Personal communication, Kurt Koenigsfest, BancoSol,
January 2006.
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social), and fear of expropriation of value by a
majority shareholder including misallocation of
investment resources, related-party transactions,
and inappropriate transfer pricing. To limit these
concerns, minority shareholders will try to obtain
provisions in either the Articles of Association or
the Shareholder Agreement to give them protection
in the decision-making process within the trans-
formed MFI, particularly in legal environments that
lack adequate statutory protection for minority
shareholder rights. Thus, offering prospective
investors a minority stake only results in a trade-
off—while it ensures control for the founding
NGO, the value of an NGO-controlled MFI will be
less to an investor than a non–NGO-controlled
MFI.2 As stated by valuation expert Aswath
Damodaran, “there is clear evidence that practition-
ers apply control premiums in private company
transactions, ranging from 15 percent to 20 percent
for a majority stake” (Damodaran 2005b, p. 58).
While empirical evidence is scant, Damodaran cites
a study that found that “minority transactions are
valued at a discount of 20 percent to 30 percent on
majority transactions in ‘market oriented’
economies like the UK and the U.S.” (Damodaran
2005b, p. 59). Minority discounts may well be
greater in emerging markets. For example, another
study conducted by Luis Pereiro (n.d.) finds that
the median discount for minority holders in
Argentina is 38.7 percent.
While each investor will have unique investment
goals and mandates, the transforming MFI should
also be aware of the tendency for ownership blocs
to form among investor groups. While individually
no one investor may have majority control, a group
of similarly minded investors (for example, local
versus foreign or nonprofit versus for-profit) might
ultimately form a majority bloc. While critical mat-
ters of governance will typically require more than a
51 percent majority vote, each investor will need to
be evaluated both on an individual basis and from
the perspective of how the investors as a group
might influence and interact within the broader
shareholding structure. (See chapter 8, Legal
Transformation, for a discussion of how the Share-
holder Agreement can be used to protect minority
rights.)
Local or international shareholders. Another key
strategic decision for the transforming MFI is to
determine the ideal balance between local and inter-
national shareholders (box 7.2). Some jurisdictions
may impose legal constraints on foreign
ownership—either prohibiting foreign ownership
altogether or limiting the amount of foreign owners
to a minority position. Where there are no such con-
straints, the ideal balance of local and international
owners will differ by country, and by institution,
depending on the MFI’s strategic vision, the depth
of local financial markets, and the general perception
by international investors of the country’s risk pro-
file.3 Local shareholders bring critical market knowl-
edge and local connections, and for those share-
holdings that are linked to board representation,
local shareholders may, but not always, also imply
active and consistent governance participation.
International shareholders, however, bring more of
a global perspective and international connections,
many of which may have the “deep pockets” so
valued by regulators. Such connections can be
particularly useful in times of capital increases.
Board participation by international investors, how-
ever, can be difficult and expensive because of the
distances involved in attending board meetings,
although this is not likely as much of an issue for
strategic investors.4 Sometimes this issue can be
addressed if the international investors appoint local
residents to be their representatives on the board.
Microfinance experience or formal financial sector
experience. Also of key importance is the investor’s
experience and knowledge of the sector, particularly
for those investors who intend to play a governance
role. While in general, board formation may or may
not be tied to shareholdings, this link has been a
more direct one among the MFI transformations to
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date, and thus should be considered an important
variable in the investor selection process. Because it
is assumed that the transformed MFI will continue
in the business of microfinance, the board will
undoubtedly require some microfinance knowledge
among its members. In addition, as a regulated
entity, the board as a whole will need to include
individuals with in-depth financial sector knowl-
edge, and a solid foundation in accounting, finan-
cial analysis, and legal expertise. While the NGO’s
future board members may not be the same as the
current ones (this will depend on the future role of
the NGO, if applicable), the NGO’s representatives
on the new company’s board will also need to bring
the expertise appropriate to the needs of the new
regulated financial intermediary. As such, the
NGO’s current board members will need to evalu-
ate their own credentials in light of the skill sets
needed for the new company. Achieving the right
balance between those with microfinance industry
experience and those with broader formal financial
sector experience will be important. 
Types of Investors
Investors in MFIs generally fall into the following
principal categories: founding NGO (if applicable),
founding directors and senior management, multi-
and bilateral institutions, socially responsible funds,
commercial (or private sector) investors, local
investors, employees, local government, and clients
or the community. 
Founding NGO. In most NGO transformations
to date, particularly those in Latin America and
other jurisdictions that have a civil law tradition, the
assets and liabilities relating to microfinance of
the founding NGO have been transferred to the
new regulated MFI in exchange for some combina-
tion of debt and equity (what this book refers to as
the “transfer approach”). Therefore, the founding
NGO becomes a lender to or shareholder in (or
both) the new entity and plays an important role in
maintaining the regulated entity’s commitment
to the mission, as well as providing intimate
knowledge about the microfinance business, the
Box 7.2 XacBank: Balancing Different
Types of Shareholders 
XacBank in Mongolia recently attracted a num-
ber of new international shareholders, including
Triodos Bank (through the Triodos Fair Share
Fund and Triodos-Doen Fund), Shorecap Interna-
tional, and MicroVest. These investors join an
already sizable group of local, privately owned
commercial entities. XacBank cites the following
benefits of foreign and local shareholders:
Foreign
• Governance standards (board) 
• Best practices for reporting and operations 
• Accounting standards 
• Contacts for possible additional investment or
new business 
• Possibility of additional debt 
• Possibility of technical assistance 
• Experience in other markets with successful
and unsuccessful products 
• Hard currency financing 
• Credibility to the organization (shows local
market that a foreign institution is willing to
invest) 
• Patience—foreign shareholders may be more
patient and willing to wait for returns 
• Sophisticated management practices
• Prestige
Local
• Knowledge of the local market 
• Contacts that can bring other business 
• Less sensitive to currency risk 
• Local currency financing 
• Dilution of foreign ownership 
• Less need for extensive legal process when
investing; less formal procedures; lower cost 
Source: Personal communication, Munhmandah O., XacBank,
November 2005.
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organization itself, and the local context. The trans-
forming MFI needs to decide the appropriate own-
ership percentage for the NGO and the appropriate
level of debt and equity (leverage) in the regulated
institution. A range of variables, including regula-
tory limits on ownership and the size of the NGO
at transformation, strategic decisions made by the
NGO stakeholders about the future mission of
the NGO itself, and who will negotiate on behalf
of the NGO, influence these decisions. 
While regulatory limits, if any, on maximum
ownership holdings will affect the percentage own-
ership for all prospective investors, it has particular
implications for the founding NGO. For example, if
ownership is limited to a 30 percent equity holding
and the value of 30 percent of the new entity’s start-
up capital base is less than the value of the assets the
NGO transferred (less liabilities assumed), this
“excess” value will typically be structured as debt
between the NGO and the regulated entity. If,
however, the NGO will not be an owner in the new
entity, these net assets (assets transferred less liabili-
ties transferred) could be exchanged for various
forms of debt provided by the NGO to the new
entity (assuming there is sufficient capital in place to
ensure compliance with relevant minimum capital
requirements and capital adequacy guidelines). By
investing debt in the MFI, the NGO could ensure
a steady cash flow from interest and principal pay-
ments, as compared to the relatively illiquid equity
investment that may not pay dividends.
What the MFI ultimately decides the original
NGO will do after transformation is important to
external investors in the new regulated entity. If the
NGO becomes a lender to or shareholder in the
new entity, the way in which it invests or deploys its
own resources (such as the funding that it has with-
drawn from the regulated entity) affects its own
financial position, the financial position of the reg-
ulated entity, and, by association, the reputation of
the other investors. Other investors will want to
know the terms and conditions of any outstanding
financial commitments held by the NGO, because
they may influence the NGO’s position as lender to
or shareholder in the new entity. Additionally, as
business partners to the NGO, other investors will
want to ensure that whatever the NGO does with
this funding adheres to accepted standards of pro-
fessionalism. The issue of reputation risk is impor-
tant for any new investor group, and though clearly
a sensitive one, will need to be addressed up front.
(It is generally recommended that issues such as
noncompetition and arm’s-length transactions be
contemplated and addressed in the Shareholder
Agreement.)
While the founding NGO can serve as an active
voice for the transformed institution’s mission,
assuming it has the requisite voting rights, regula-
tors (and other investors) may worry whether the
founding NGO, as a shareholder, would be able to
meet its share of future capital calls. This concern is
particularly troubling if the founding NGO con-
tinues to exist as a nonoperating entity with few
income-producing assets other than its investment
in the transformed MFI. In addition, an NGO’s
inherent lack of owners means there are doubts
about who is accountable. 
A final consideration with NGO ownership is the
question of who is actually responsible for negotiat-
ing the NGO’s investment interest. Depending on
the future role of the NGO, the NGO’s board
membership may change. Some NGO board mem-
bers may stay on the NGO’s board and ultimately
represent the NGO on the new regulated entity’s
board. These or other members may individually
also be investors themselves in the new entity,
creating a potential conflict of interest if they are
also negotiating on behalf of the NGO. 
Founding directors. The individuals responsible for
starting the original NGO may represent another
important shareholder group, as was the case for
both Uganda Microfinance Limited (UML) and
Uganda Finance Trust (U-Trust). While the con-
cept of sweat equity is difficult to apply when start-
up and ongoing capital has been provided by
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donors, mechanisms can be used to reward the ini-
tial efforts and personal sacrifices made by those
individuals who founded and built the transforming
institution. These can include special bonuses paid
to such individuals to facilitate their share purchases
just prior to the legal transformation by the NGO.
Other options include providing access to subsi-
dized loans from other investors or from the NGO
itself to allow these individuals to purchase shares
(though issues around the risk inherent in using a
loan to purchase equity should be closely evaluated).
In addition, some MFIs have offered key found-
ing individuals discounted share prices on the new
MFI shares (box 7.3). This can be done in a variety
of ways—either the new company sells shares to the
founders at a price less than that paid by other
investors or the other investors themselves sell some
of their existing shares to these founders for a lower
price than what they paid. Both scenarios represent
a reduction in the value of the shares for other
shareholders for the benefit of the founding direc-
tors. If the arrangement also includes options for
the purchase of additional shares in the future at a
discounted price, the value of the shares will be
further diluted. Local laws and regulations will need
to be analyzed to determine if there are any prohi-
bitions that would restrict funding made available
by the MFI (either the NGO or the new regulated
entity) to its directors. Restrictions on insider loans,
for example, will likely be included in the relevant
central bank regulations. In addition, tax consider-
ations might make one method of providing lower-
cost shares preferable to other methods.
Such mechanisms for facilitating participation by
the founders will likely require full buy-in from the
other investors unless completed far in advance of
Box 7.3 Uganda Women’s Finance Trust: Founder Members’ Shares
Formed in 1984, Uganda Women’s Finance Trust
(UWFT) was the oldest indigenous MFI in Uganda.
With the passage of the MDI Act in 2003, UWFT
decided to transform into a licensed deposit-taking
institution by creating a new company, Uganda
Finance Trust. Given the MDI Act’s restrictions on
ownership (no more than 30 percent by any one
party), it was decided that UWFT would own 30 per-
cent of U-Trust, with the remaining 70 percent
owned by UWFT’s founding members, employees,
and international investors that could bring expert-
ise and deep pockets to the table.
From the start, it was believed consideration
should be given to the 20 years of sweat equity that
the founder members, all local individuals, had put
into building UWFT. At the same time, it was recog-
nized that all of UWFT’s equity, including accumu-
lated earnings, had been acquired using donor
funds. The key was to strike a balance between
rewarding the founder members, while not putting
donor funds in the hands of private individuals. The
solution was to offer the founder members a limited
number of shares (5 percent of the total shares of
U-Trust), at an approximately 50 percent discount
to book value. This allowed the founder members to
be rewarded, while also ensuring that only those
who continued to be dedicated to the institution
participated (because they had to put up their own
funds to purchase the discounted shares). The trans-
action took place before other investors came in, so
the dilution caused by selling shares below book
value resulted only in a decrease in the value of
UWFT’s stake. Because the size of the discounted
sale was modest, it only reduced UWFT’s accumulat-
ed earnings by about 30 percent and did not affect
its donated equity at all. Accordingly, the donors
approved the discounted share program. Almost all
the founder members participated in the program,
and most bought additional shares at full book
value. U-Trust became the fourth licensed MDI in
Uganda in October 2005.
Source: Contributed by Lloyd Stevens, DFID Financial Sector Deepen-
ing Programme, Uganda, November 2005.
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the time of transformation. Potential investors may
also be concerned that the founding directors may
not be able to meet future capital calls. As well,
given the close association these individuals have
with the founding NGO and with the management
of the organization, their ability to put the interests
of the new regulated entity above those of the
NGO or the management may be compromised.
Both of these are important factors to openly dis-
cuss during the negotiation process. 
Multilateral and bilateral donors. Multilateral or
bilateral organizations such as the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) or the German Kredi-
tanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) represent an own-
ership group that can offer distinct advantages to a
transforming MFI. On the positive side, such
organizations bring significant cachet and are able
to attract other investors by offering stamps of
approval. In addition, they typically have large
amounts of capital to invest, although internal reg-
ulations of these organizations normally do not
allow for repeat investments. On the downside,
such entities can be extremely bureaucratic and at
times are less innovative in structuring their invest-
ments because of concerns about setting possible
precedents for future investments. Thus, their pres-
ence can cause significant delays in the shareholder
negotiation process. In addition, the representatives
of these institutions who play a governance role
tend to change frequently, creating problems with
consistent board representation.
Another important element to consider with
multilateral or bilateral organizations is their influ-
ence on how operations are run. Many of them
have specific social and environmental standards
that can significantly affect the operations of an
MFI. These include standard limits on the kinds of
businesses the MFI can service (for example, no
clients that trade in alcohol) and in some cases
include portfolio allocation requirements toward
gender, geographic outreach, or market segments
(or all). Meeting these requirements can be partic-
ularly difficult for MFIs employing a decentralized
framework for making credit decisions. 
Socially responsible investors. This group encom-
passes a broad range of funds looking for both
financial returns and social returns, including funds
capitalized specifically to invest in MFIs, such as
Profund in Latin America, AfriCap in Africa, or on a
more global level, Shorecap, Unitus, and ACCION
Investments, as well as general funds established to
invest in a range of socially responsible activities,
such as Triodos-Doen Foundation and Oikocredit.
A recent CGAP study on foreign investment in
microfinance identified 45 private social investment
funds dedicated to microfinance (CGAP 2004),
though most of these funds provide debt rather
than equity.5
Specialized equity funds are typically managed
by individuals with a solid understanding of and
experience in banking or finance or both as well as
in microfinance. These funds, therefore, can bring
important benefits to the governance of the institu-
tion. Because the fund’s main purpose is to realize
a gain on its investment, both socially and finan-
cially, it typically plays an active governance role
providing key input at a strategic level. Such funds,
however, do not usually have sizable amounts of
capital to invest although they can serve as a key
link to other, larger funding sources for both debt
and equity. While more flexible than the larger
funds, they, too, have investment committees that
need to be consulted, a process that can sometimes
delay any negotiation. 
Commercial investors. Commercial investors
include institutional investment funds, mutual
funds, private funds, or individual investors. Pure
commercial capital, however, has yet to play a sig-
nificant role in MFI shareholder options. Various
factors explain this, including commercial investor
limits on asset allocation,6 relatively unclear exit
strategies associated with most MFI investments,
the small size of investment being offered compared
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with transactions costs incurred, and the fact that
commercial investors are typically looking to maxi-
mize their financial return on investment—a goal
that may place little priority on social returns. A few
commercial banks, however, have shown interest in
investing in transforming NGOs, such as Citibank
in Finamerica7 in Colombia and Credito in Miban-
co in Peru; however, most have done so primarily
for public relations reasons. Others have created
separate service companies dedicated to microfi-
nance including Banco Pichincha in Ecuador,
Sogebank in Haiti, and ABN Amro in Brazil. 
Local investors. Participation by certain well-
known, reputable local investors can help enhance
the MFI’s image and credibility in the eyes of regu-
lators, depositors, and other key players in the local
financial sector (Drake n.d.). Similarly, local
investors (either private or public) can offer an
understanding of the local environment to board
discussions that a board composed of only interna-
tional investors may fail to have. It is important,
however, to select “like-minded” investors and
define their views regarding key issues upfront.
Employees. A number of transformed MFIs have
incorporated staff into their ownership structures,
ranging from the buy-in by BancoSol’s executive
management team at 5.95 percent of the organiza-
tion to more broadly based employee share owner-
ship programs.
Employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) vary
significantly in their design. K-Rep Bank in Kenya,
CARD Bank in the Philippines, and Banco ADEMI
in the Dominican Republic each developed an
ESOP to reward the contribution of staff to the
organization but did so in different ways. At K-Rep,
eligible members were awarded one share in addi-
tion to each share purchased—a scheme supported
with funding from CGAP. At CARD, eligible staff
were simply given shares (though staff only benefit
from dividends, they are not able to sell, transfer, or
convert the shares to cash), and at Banco ADEMI,
20 percent of shares were given to ADEMI employ-
ees by means of a special bonus based on accumu-
lated severance and pension benefits (Campion and
White 1999). In ACLEDA’s case in Cambodia,
however, the ACLEDA Staff Association (ASA) was
created as a profit-sharing plan whereby employ-
ees purchase stock at the same prices offered to
other investors and share in the same dividend
and share appreciation benefits (Clark 2006). See
Box 7.4.
The risks inherent in such schemes, however,
need to be clearly articulated and explained to
staff. For ESOPs that do not have a mechanism in
place to buy back employee shares, such shares are
relatively illiquid, especially for small blocs of
shares owned by individual employees. In addi-
tion, it is likely that a newly transformed MFI will
not pay dividends for some time. Finally, encour-
aging employees to invest money in the institution
where they work, even to buy discounted shares,
does not represent prudent risk diversification
for the staff themselves: if the company goes
Box 7.4 ACLEDA Staff Association, Inc. 
ACLEDA Bank’s employee share ownership pro-
gram was designed to allow employees to share
in the ownership of the bank. ACLEDA Staff
Association (ASA Inc.) is a corporation established
under Cambodia’s commercial law. It operates
as a Trust, whereby it owns in trust shares of
ACLEDA Bank for the employees who are in turn
stockholders of ASA. ASA has the right to pur-
chase shares from ACLEDA Bank to a maximum
of 19 percent of the share capital of the bank. In
addition, ASA has the right to appoint two direc-
tors to the ACLEDA board. At the end of 2004,
each staff member held on average 1,200 shares
of ACLEDA Bank stock, representing a total of
18.47 percent equity in the bank. 
Source: Clark 2006.
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bankrupt, the employees lose both their savings
and their jobs.
Furthermore, a poorly designed ESOP can cre-
ate a wide range of conflicts of interest between
board, management, and employees. Just as a dom-
inant NGO owner can make commercial investors
wary of investing, an employee group with a domi-
nant share of the transformed MFI can pose a sim-
ilar concern. The perception is often held, true or
not, that employees will not have the resources nec-
essary to meet additional capital calls and will make
decisions out of their own self-interest rather than
the MFI’s interests. For these reasons and others,
ESOPs have historically not played a dominant role
in NGO transformations. 
Other, and perhaps better, ways can be found to
provide incentives to staff and encourage their buy-
in to the transformation process—ways that are less
complicated and that pose less financial risk to staff
from the lack of liquidity in MFI shares than an
employee share ownership structure. Some have
considered, for example, a “shadow ESOP” that
rewards staff with a form of profit sharing in the
transformed MFI, but does not require the actual
buying and selling of shares. This obviates the diffi-
culty in giving employees an illiquid asset, as well as
eliminates the need to provide voting rights to
employees. However, before undertaking any
employee-related program, the MFI needs to be
clear about the goals and motivations that underlie
its interest in having employees hold equity or
equity-like interest in the transformed MFI.
Government. Another option for an ownership
group is the government. Such circumstances often
occur if donor funding for the founding MFI has
been channeled through a government ministry
resulting in effective “ownership” of the MFI by
government. This was the case of PRIDE Uganda,
which received funding from the Norwegian
Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)
through the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Gender in Uganda. While government owner-
ship may provide some comfort to regulators, it
may well dissuade private sector investors and carry
the perception of “special treatment.” In general,
local government ownership is probably more neg-
ative than positive. Furthermore, regulators will
likely encourage the government to divest owner-
ship sooner rather than later to ensure appropriate
governance and reduce political influence.
Community and clients. Clients and local commu-
nity members represent another ownership group.
Client ownership, in particular, is often pursued as
a means to both build wealth among the key target
group and encourage more active participation
by the clients in the design and implementation of
the institution’s products and services. However,
investing in shares in a financial institution does
carry more risk for the client than placing funds on
deposit, a difference that needs to be explained
clearly and transparently. In addition, regulatory
concerns that at least some portion of investors
demonstrate an ability to access more capital if
required (the “deep pockets” qualification) may
limit the level of client ownership. Finally, as with
any client owned and governed entity, the potential
for conflicts of interest will also need to be
addressed, as personal interests (lower interest rates
on loans, higher interest rates on savings, and the
like) have the potential to supersede what is best for
the institution.
A number of transformations, such as CARD
Bank in the Philippines and SKS in India, have
made ownership by clients a priority. In SKS’ case,
a donor provided capital to facilitate ownership by
the clients. Trusts were created to serve as vehicles
for this equity ownership. Alternatively, CARD
Bank issued stock directly to clients (box 7.5). 
Table 7.1 provides a summary of the key pros
and cons of the different investor groups.
Finding the Appropriate Balance
Given the options available, what is the appropriate
balance? The answer to this question ultimately lies
in the transforming institution’s reaction to many of
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Table 7.1 Pros and Cons of Various Investor Groups
Group Pros Cons
Founding NGO
Founding directors
Multilateral and
bilateral donors
Socially responsible
investors
Commercial
investors
Employees
Local government
Clients and
community
Can help maintain commitment to vision and
mission.
Personal commitment to success of institu-
tion. Example of private risk capital.
Can help maintain commitment to develop-
ment and poverty mission.
Allocate experienced staff and resources to
monitor performance of MFI; can make
quick decisions in case of capital call. Tech-
nical know-how can provide confidence
for other investors; availability of technical
assistance in some cases.
Profit and efficiency orientation; provide a
familiar face to the capital markets. 
Builds employee buy-in to financial future of
institution.
May help positive image of MFI; generally
have deep pockets; can positively influ-
ence regulators. 
Community shares in the success of the insti-
tution; provides sense of ownership.
With no owners, NGO itself may lack deep pock-
ets in eyes of central bank. Without an owner,
NGO may have a weak governance structure
and lack accountability.
Depending on how ownership is structured, may
present conflict of interest. May also lack deep
pockets.
Internal structure and operating procedures often
cause delays and may impede effective partici-
pation. Environmental and social mandates can
create operational challenges.
Limited capital; medium-term investment horizon.
Potential for conflict of interest when managers
of the fund also manage or are linked to the
technical assistance provided.
Danger of short-term, profit-maximizing investors;
seeking clear exit strategy. 
Can present risk to staff. Typically staff lack deep
pockets to make additional capital calls. Lack of
liquidity (market for shares) can also complicate
structures.
May scare away other investors; may politically
influence decision making with regulators; may
be perceived as receiving special treatment.
Difficulties in structuring and in determining who
represents the community; typically lack deep
pockets expected by regulators; potential for
poor governance and conflict of interest.
Source: Author.
Box 7.5 Client Ownership at CARD Bank
As stated by Dr. Jaime Aristotle B. Alip, the Founding
President and Chair of CARD Bank, “Only by creat-
ing a vehicle for asset ownership, can we ensure that
the poor will gain control over their own resources
and over their own destiny” (Campion and White
1999, p. 69) Created in September 1997, CARD Bank
was initially owned by CARD NGO, a few members
of the board of directors, and management staff.
Over time, this ownership structure has shifted away
from board and staff ownership to include greater
participation by clients through additional share
offerings targeted at clients, a process that started
in 2000. Part of this was facilitated by offering qual-
ified clients the option to convert their compulsory
savings into equity shares, an initiative that was also
accompanied by a significant amount of client train-
ing given the higher risk implications of equity over
savings. By the end of 2004, CARD Bank’s ownership
structure was composed of CARD NGO (43 percent),
CARD management and board (21 percent), and
clients (36 percent). Consistent with the CARD vision,
CARD plans to ultimately transfer full ownership of
the bank to the landless poor.
Source: Authors.
210 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
the factors discussed above. A few common guide-
lines can be summarized based on lessons learned
from the experiences of other NGO transformations:
• Limit excessive majority shareholding by any one
investor: Whether it is the founding NGO or
another shareholder, the presence of an overly
dominant shareholder with board control can
raise concerns from potential investors that they
will have limited influence in the governance of
the MFI. Having the NGO as dominant, major-
ity shareholder, for example, can raise concerns
by even the more patient commercial investors.
As mentioned, minority shareholders typically
have little ability to change a management team
whose objectives may no longer be in line with
those of the minority shareholder. 
• Build a diverse ownership group: Given the var-
ied expertise required to govern a regulated
financial institution, the MFI may find it useful
to try to balance the different investor groups’
skills. In addition, a broader group of investors
has the potential to offer the institution a wider
source of external financing as well as more
diverse governance representation. Also, abuses
that arise from concentrated ownership, particu-
larly in the banking industry, are well known.
While a diverse ownership group does not pre-
clude such abuses, it does limit the potential for
various conflicts of interest that can arise from
dominant control. 
• Introduce investors to regulators early on: In
many countries, the transformation of NGO
MFIs into regulated financial institutions is still a
new concept. The types of investors that are
common to microfinance (specialized equity
funds, NGOs, and the like) are often not typical
of bank shareholders. As a result, supervisors
may initially be skeptical of such entities qualify-
ing as “fit and proper.” Efforts need to be made
to inform and expose regulators and super-
visors to the range of equity investors active in
microfinance. 
• Ensure adequate deep pockets among investor
group: To avoid concerns by regulators that
additional capital may not be forthcoming if
needed, care should be taken to select at least
some investors with immediate access to addi-
tional resources. An NGO, which by definition
has no owners, will typically not be perceived as
having the deep pockets necessary to convince
regulators that additional capital could be easily
provided. 
• Select investors who are willing and able to play an
active governance role: While in theory building
a diverse group of shareholders allows the insti-
tution to benefit from a wide range of contacts,
technical know-how, and funding sources, these
benefits can only be realized if the investor takes
a sincere interest in the investment. There is cer-
tainly room for silent investors, but MFIs should
focus on bringing in active investors with ideas
and contacts to share.
• Select investors with an eye to enhancing image
and credibility in the local financial sector: As
discussed in more detail in chapter 8, Legal
Transformation, the challenges inherent in cross-
border investments underscore the importance
of encouraging greater local participation. Local
investors with positive reputations can both help
build the MFI’s image and credibility in the mar-
ket and provide critical market knowledge for
the institution’s business strategy. 
Table 7.2 presents the ownership structure
of various transformed MFIs. With the exception
of Finamerica, the sample reflects the prevalence of
socially responsible investors and the founding
NGO as investors. As mentioned, commercial
investors are only starting to enter the market. 
An important consideration the transforming
MFI should address before seeking potential
investors is the number of shares and thus the value
per share the new entity will issue. The per share
value is typically a factor of the anticipated investor
profile. The country’s laws normally set a minimum
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Table 7.2 Shareholding Participation in Regulated MFIs as of December 31, 2004
(percent)
Fin- Financiera 
BancoSol Mibanco america Compartamos K-Rep ACLEDA CARD
Founding NGO PRODEM ACP Corposol Compartamos AC K-Rep ACLEDA CARD
Country Bolivia Peru Colombia Mexico Kenya Cambodia Philippines
Participating Investors
Founding NGO 20 64 0 37 29 33 43
Founding directors 0 0 0 5 0 0 0
Multi and bilaterals 0 4 0 10 37 25 0
Socially responsible 46 27 9 22 24 25 0
investors
Commercial investors 28 5 91 26 0 0 0
Employees 6 1 0 0 10 18 21a
Clients and community 0 0 0 0 0 0 36
Source: ACCION Investments; K-Rep Bank Web site, www.k-repbank.com; ACLEDA Bank Web site: www.acledabank.com.kh; CARD Bank Web site:
www.cardbankph.com. 
Note: Participation may not add to 100 percent because of rounding.
a. Includes staff and board members.
par value and the MFI will thus likely be required to
specify in its documents of incorporation the
amount and number of shares of authorized capital
it will issue. If the MFI is expecting largely institu-
tional investors, with significant sums of money to
invest, it is likely to issue fewer shares at a higher
price per share than if it is expecting numerous indi-
vidual investors with limited resources to commit.
Because an increase in the number of authorized
shares will usually require the approval of a majority
of the board, the initial amount of authorized
shares should be sufficient to accommodate antici-
pated future issuances, but not so high above the
current level of subscribed shares to risk significant
dilution of shareholder value. 
Seeking Potential Investors 
The process of identifying, attracting, negotiating
with, and concluding a deal with a group of
investors is time consuming and prone to constant
setbacks. For this reason, as well as the ability to
extract a better valuation from investors later on,
some MFIs decide to delay the external investor
recruitment process until after the legal and institu-
tional transformation concludes (assuming the MFI
NGO is eligible to receive a temporary exemption
to any cap on shareholder percentage ownership).
Whether external investors are sought up front or
after the legal transformation, the process of finding
investors is a lengthy one and needs to be supported
with the necessary resources, both financial and
human. It is recommended, for example, that a
project manager be designated to head the process.
This individual will be responsible for communicat-
ing and managing relations with prospective
investors, responding to various queries, drafting
multiple versions of the business plan that end up
being required throughout the transformation
process including various financial projections, clar-
ifying and documenting the various decisions made
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throughout the negotiation process, and other
issues as they may arise—in short, this individual is
responsible for managing the MFI-investor rela-
tionship process and must establish clear and open
lines of communication and control. 
Depending on the skill set of the transformation
manager (see chapter 3, Planning for Transforma-
tion) and the skills needed to manage the share-
holder negotiation process, the investor project
manager could be the transformation manager or
someone in the finance department. Even so, the
MFI may want to hire an external consultant for
identifying potential investors. A sample terms of
reference for this is included in annex 7A.
There are four phases in the process of seeking
and securing investors:
• Marketing
• Due diligence
• Negotiation and documentation
• Funding
Marketing Phase
Having developed a general profile of the share-
holder types and characteristics the MFI is seeking,
the marketing and promotional phase can begin.
There are four critical steps in this phase.
Develop a shareholder prospectus. The prospectus
serves as an initial marketing tool, used to gener-
ate interest among prospective investors. It
includes a general overview of the institution
including its management, history, vision for the
future (outreach, products, geographic scope, and
the like), the overall financial projections, and
expected returns. This document is not as detailed
as the institution’s business plan but will certainly
draw from the plan as its basis. It should be pre-
pared as a promotional piece with the goal of
attracting potential investors, but also provide con-
crete, realistic numbers, for both outreach and
financial goals.
The prospectus should tell a story. While histor-
ical figures of outreach and portfolio quality will
indicate product demand and market knowledge,
the transforming institution will need to sell a vision
of its future with respect to client growth, expan-
sion of financial services, and improved financial
return. It will need to demonstrate an understand-
ing of the anticipated implications of becoming reg-
ulated, including capital requirements, operational
implications, and overall trends in the financial sec-
tor. The development of this document is typically
completed by the project (or transformation) man-
ager in consultation with the MFI’s senior manage-
ment and board, and involves numerous iterations
of the institution’s financial projections above and
beyond those included in the MFI’s business plan. 
The document should be developed for broad
dissemination. As such, the MFI will need to think
carefully about what elements of its future strategy
it feels comfortable sharing with various investors
who are invariably also considering other invest-
ment opportunities. Given the variation in prospec-
tive investor types (ranging from targeted microfi-
nance funds staffed by experts in microfinance to
private individuals with little or no technical knowl-
edge of microfinance), the prospectus should use
limited microfinance jargon, and instead use clear,
results-oriented language. As well the MFI needs to
tailor the document to the type of investor it is
seeking: commercial investors will want to see the
profitability potential while those seeking more of a
double bottom line may look for innovation, out-
reach, and other such goals.
Create a preliminary list of potential investors.
With the prospectus developed, the next step is to
target potential investors. Most MFIs at the stage of
transformation already have a number of contacts
in the investor community, either directly through
previous debt or grant arrangements or through
secondary contacts with board members, donors,
or other bankers. In addition, for those MFIs
seeking to attract international funds, a number of
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information sites maintained by the microfinance
community8 provide general contact information
on the various funds currently investing in microfi-
nance. Having already deliberated on the preferred
type of investor, the MFI should begin initial back-
ground research on various investors and create a
preliminary list of potential contenders whose pro-
files match what the MFI is seeking. 
Conduct a virtual “road show” for the initial group
of prospective investors. The project (or transfor-
mation) manager should send the prospectus to
potential investors that meet the MFI’s criteria and
begin a dialogue with those who demonstrate
interest. 
Set up one-on-one meetings. For investors that
have shown interest, an initial meeting is necessary
to present and expand the overview of the MFI and
the institution’s vision for the future as presented in
the prospectus. This will provide the opportunity
for prospective investors to become familiar with
senior management and the overall operating envi-
ronment, as well as raise any particular concerns.
For investors who make frequent visits to the region
or are already based in the region, such a meeting
can take place on-site at the MFI. For others, the
MFI may need to schedule a visit to the investor.
This second approach is less appealing because it
will likely need to be funded directly by the MFI
and furthermore, does not allow the investor to see
the MFI’s operations. However, if necessary, the
MFI should arrange to meet with a number of dif-
ferent investors on the same trip, if possible. 
The degree to which investment goals and the
overall vision and mission for the MFI are shared by
the investors will ultimately have a significant
impact on the level of cohesion within the investor
group. The marketing phase provides the MFI the
opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of
potential investors. Determining where each lies on
the strategic-financial investor spectrum is particu-
larly important at this stage, because it drives the
extent to which the investor will want to be
involved in the day-to-day management oversight
of the MFI. In addition, the desire regarding the
level of investment—majority or minority—will also
be important to understand at this stage. Both the
strategic-financial perspective and the majority-
minority perspective will have significant implica-
tions for dividend policy, exit strategies, board role,
and veto rights in constituent documents, among
other issues. 
Due Diligence Phase
Once preliminary interest has been expressed by an
initial group, a more in-depth due diligence exer-
cise is scheduled to allow potential investors to gain
a deeper understanding of the MFI, its manage-
ment, and its operations. The due diligence exer-
cise includes a review of the institution’s docu-
mented policies and procedures and numerous
interviews with senior management as well as
branch staff. In addition, the prospective investors
may meet with local legal counsel, tax experts, and
the regulatory body. So that a consistent message is
delivered by all employees (and board members)
involved in the due diligence exercise, a practice
session should be conducted in advance, during
which all the company’s presentations are made to
a neutral third party for feedback and critique. It
may be useful for the transforming MFI to encour-
age potential investors to coordinate such that they
perform their due diligence jointly. The due dili-
gence exercise typically focuses on the following
key areas:
• Management and board: One of the most
important elements of an investor due diligence
is the investor’s assessment of the quality of the
management team and staff of the MFI.
Through interviews and various discussions,
the potential investor will attempt to gauge the
vision, qualifications, and overall attitude of
the staff and will seek to understand the current
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governance structure and nature of those spon-
soring the transformation.
• Financial: The financial analysis includes a
thorough review of the MFI’s historical and pro-
jected financial position, including earnings
potential, operating efficiency, portfolio quality,
capital adequacy, and liquidity.
• Market: Through conversations with the MFI’s
senior management team and research and
development group, as well as through various
third-party sources, the potential investor will
evaluate the overall supply and demand for
microfinance services in the country.
• Economic and political: The relative stability
of the economy (currency, inflation, and so
forth) and the government are key factors in
any due diligence exercise. Potential investors
will likely assess the private investment climate
and any recent political developments, and
review the relevant regulatory framework and
government policy specifically with respect to
interest rate ceilings and foreign exchange
policies and risks.
• Legal and tax: Analysis of the overall legal and
tax framework in the country will include,
among other things, requirements regarding
share purchases and sales, requirements for reg-
istration of foreign investors with the appropriate
regulatory and government authorities, tax treat-
ment of payments of interest and dividends
(including any applicable withholding), rules for
determining capital gains, statutory rights of
minority shareholders, and litigation norms. 
The due diligence exercise requires the MFI to
share detailed institutional history and financial
information, not all of which the MFI may be com-
fortable sharing. Some of this information may be
considered by the MFI as proprietary and confi-
dential. It is thus important to discuss issues of
confidentiality up front with any participant in the
due diligence process. This may involve developing
and executing a written confidentiality agreement.
This is particularly important if prospective
investors intend to evaluate a number of different
MFIs in the same country before committing to
any one of them. (See chapter 8, Legal Transfor-
mation, for further information on confidentiality
agreements.)
A substantial number of follow-up information
requests often result from a due diligence visit by a
potential investor. The most important document
(and the one that requires the most time and
energy) is the MFI’s business plan including finan-
cial projections. While the prospectus mentioned
above is typically used for broad marketing of the
investment, potential investors who proceed to the
more in-depth due diligence phase will normally
want to see the much more detailed business plan.
The project or transformation manager should be
prepared to develop multiple drafts of this docu-
ment as the prospective investors weigh in on capi-
tal structure, overall pricing, return expectations,
and the like. This often includes requests for multi-
ple scenario analyses, more thorough market analy-
sis results, and explanations for the valuation of the
proposed NGO holding in the new entity. (See
chapter 5, Strategic and Business Planning, for a
discussion on developing the business plan.)
The due diligence exercise is resource intensive
and time consuming for both the MFI and the
potential investor. In general, the cost for this exer-
cise is typically born by the investor, though in some
cases, the MFI may be asked to contribute. Results
of the due diligence process will significantly influ-
ence the price the investor is willing to pay for
shares in the MFI.
Preliminary discussion of key issues. The due dili-
gence exercise presents both the MFI and potential
investors the opportunity to begin discussing
some of the more critical negotiation issues, includ-
ing how much control the investor will expect to
have over management, how frequently dividends
will be paid, and options for divesting from the
MFI. While an MFI investment deal will ultimately
Ownership and Governance | 215
involve a myriad of ownership and governance
issues (discussed in more detail below), these
three—control (or protection of minority share-
holder rights), dividend pay-out policy, and exit
options (or restrictions on share transfers)—are crit-
ical components of an investment strategy and
should be clarified up front. Therefore, the MFI’s
senior management and board will need informa-
tion and opinions on these different issues before
entering the negotiation process. The distinction
between strategic and financial investors is particu-
larly relevant for these issues. While both strategic
and financial investors will be looking for some
degree of influence in the overall management of
the company, the areas they focus on may differ.
However, both will have exit expectations that will
need to be addressed. 
Preliminary commitment by investors. Following
conclusion of the due diligence process, the
prospective investor will prepare an initial invest-
ment recommendation (typically referred to as the
preinvestment stage or stage 1 review that will
reflect a “go” or “no-go” recommendation from
the analyst). For institutional investors, the analyst
will likely have to present this recommendation to
the investment committee of the fund. 
Once prospective investors have indicated they
are interested in pursuing an investment, the long
process of negotiation begins, leading to decisions
on the various issues about the investment and the
finalization of the investor group.
Negotiation and Documentation Phase
This section highlights the more important issues
that transforming MFIs and investors need to con-
sider in the negotiation process, including capital-
ization, governance, management, financial poli-
cies, institutional mission, dispute resolution, and
share transfer and exit. 
To facilitate discussion of these various issues, a
term sheet is typically used to focus investors. The
term sheet is often introduced as an agenda-setting
document, and then filled in throughout the nego-
tiation process to help organize the negotiation and
ultimately the documentation process. Term sheets
are particularly helpful if multiple parties are partic-
ipating in the negotiation because they forces all
parties to focus on the same issues at the same time.
If the investor group is being represented by one
lead investor, a common term sheet is a simple way
to keep the other investors in the group aware of
the current status of negotiations. 
A term sheet is typically a nonbinding document
that outlines the parties’ agreements on key busi-
ness and legal conditions that will shape the invest-
ment. The agreements reached during the negotia-
tion of the term sheet will be incorporated into the
documents (primarily the Shareholder Agreement,
discussed in chapter 8, Legal Transformation) that
will govern the underlying investment transactions,
so all parties should pay attention to how issues are
resolved and expressed in the term sheet. The nego-
tiation of a term sheet also helps to clarify early in
the negotiation how the different issues combine or
interact to affect the interests of the different share-
holders. All parties should feel comfortable asking
for clarity in the language used in a term sheet if
it is new or confusing. Typically, the term sheet is
drafted by nonlegal participants reflecting the busi-
ness side of the agreement. Lawyers then transform
the term sheet (once agreed upon) into a Share-
holder Agreement and other legal documents. In
some cases, however, the term sheet may be drafted
by the same legal counsel that is charged with draft-
ing the Shareholder Agreement and Stock Purchase
Agreement. Counsel may be asked to draft and
redraft many versions of the term sheet over the
course of the negotiations.
Term sheets should accomplish the following: 
• Summarize the offering of shares.
• Identify the investee company’s purpose.
• Detail the legal structure of the investee
company.
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• Define the capital and share subscriptions
(including share price or formulas to be used to
determine pricing at the time of sale).
• Specify general terms and conditions for share-
holder meetings and board meetings, gover-
nance structure, and responsibilities of the
investee.
• Detail procedures for future sales of shares.
• Outline exit strategies, if any, and agreed restric-
tions on share transfers.
• Specify expectations for financial and accounting
practices to be adhered to by the investee, as well
as any key operational standards.
• Identify the governing law and dispute resolu-
tion procedures to be followed under the invest-
ment documentation.
• Any special conditions.
Annex 7B, Sample Term Sheet Outline, provides a
sample term sheet skeleton.
While the term sheet is used primarily during the
negotiation process, as mentioned above, agree-
ments reached during this process are documented
in the draft Shareholder Agreement. Because this is
a legal document ultimately drafted and finalized
by lawyers, its contents are discussed in detail in
chapter 8, Legal Transformation, and are thus not
discussed here.
Capital amount and instrument. Investors in micro-
finance have a range of investment instruments. As
discussed in detail in chapter 6, The Funding Struc-
ture, these include common and preferred shares,
straight debt, convertible debt, subordinated debt,
and any combination of these. The starting point in
the negotiation process is determining the actual
amount of capital, both debt and equity, to be
invested by the various shareholders, including the
absolute amount and the ultimate ownership per-
centage. In addition to the minimum requirements
imposed by bank regulators—minimum capital and
the capital adequacy ratio—MFIs and their potential
investors will need to consider the amounts and
types of investment instruments:
• Common versus preferred shares: Common
equity is the highest risk, highest reward equity
instrument. It increases in value as the MFI’s
retained earnings grow. In addition, common
equity shareholders can benefit from dividend
payments. Common shareholders also elect the
board of directors. Holders of preferred shares,
by contrast, receive a fixed dividend paid out of
the MFI’s earnings. Such shareholders are not
assured a dividend payout, but will receive their
dividend ahead of common equity shareholders,
and in case of liquidation, will have a prior claim
over common equity shareholders on the MFI’s
assets. Preferred shareholders typically do not
have any voting rights and consequently do not
have an influence on the selection of the board.9
• Debt-equity combinations: From an investor’s
perspective, the amount of equity and possibly
debt is determined by three key factors: liquidity,
return, and risk. Each investor will have unique
expectations for these three variables.
• Convertible or subordinated debt: In addition to
standard term debt, debt options can also
include convertible debt or subordinated debt as
discussed in chapter 6, The Funding Structure.
Convertible debt is defined as debt that can
be exchanged for another type of security (typi-
cally equity shares) usually at the option of the
holder (although there are obligatorily convert-
ible debt issuers). It is often structured to specify
the conditions under which it will be converted
from debt to equity. Some convertible debt will
expressly describe the specific number of com-
mon equity shares to be issued in exchange on a
specific date for the converted debt at a prede-
termined conversion price. Other convertible
debt will offer “trigger points” that give the
lender and borrower the option to convert debt
into equity and may specify a predetermined
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conversion price or may, instead, establish a for-
mula for determining the price at the point of
conversion. 
Subordinated debt is any debt that is junior in
claim on assets to other debt. Subordinated debt
gives priority for repayment, either structurally
or contractually, to more senior debt. Theoreti-
cally, the spread between subordinated and
senior debt should correlate to the risk of the
company. For a AAA risk, for example, the gap
between subordinated and senior debt should
be negligible. Lenders may choose to lend, at
least partially, on a subordinated basis because
of the typically higher returns subordinated
debt generates. A borrowing MFI also may
encourage shareholders to consider lending on a
subordinated basis rather than taking straight
equity because such debt may qualify, at least
in some jurisdictions, to be counted as tier 2 cap-
ital while at the same time helping the MFI
increase its return on equity due to this increased
leverage. 
Conversion is typically at the option of the
investor. The value of this option to convert
depends on the conversion price and the period
in which the holder can convert. For example, an
option to convert if the value of the company
doubles in six months will have very little value,
given how unlikely this would be. Convertible
debt will thus typically have a lower interest
rate than term loans, which have an established
date or term for repayment. (The value of the
option to convert will normally be reflected in a
lower interest rate.) Any savings on the cost of
funds comes at the expense of the shareholders
who must accept a smaller share of dividends or
net worth if there is a conversion. Typically, the
returns to a convertible holder in an MFI with
poor or mediocre performance will be below the
returns of other debt holders. The returns to a
convertible holder in an MFI with good or excel-
lent performance will be somewhere below the
original equity holders (because the conversion
price will likely be somewhat higher than the
original price at which the other equity holders
bought) but above the returns of other debt
holders.10
Conversion at the option of the MFI will have
the opposite dynamic. The value of the option to
convert will be added to the cost of the credit.
The amount of this addition again will depend on
the period in which the MFI is able to convert
and the price at which the MFI must convert.
Share price and valuation. One of the more diffi-
cult discussion points in the investor negotiation
process is establishing a “fair price” for the shares to
be sold to external parties. How much are the
shares of the MFI worth? What is the “true” value
of the assets that are being transferred to the new
company? Should there be a discount or a premium
paid to the NGO for these net assets? 
“Valuing a closely held business is like forecast-
ing the weather: Everyone wants an absolute,
scientifically determined, accurate answer, but
no one has come up with a way to achieve this
goal.”
Tuller 1994, p. 17
Business valuation in any industry is more an art
than a science and the microfinance industry is no
exception. No generally accepted standards, regula-
tions, or rules apply and no single methodology
or approach that will provide the right answer. The
“market price” for an MFI is particularly difficult to
determine because there are very few countries in
which the microfinance industry is fully integrated
into the financial markets, thus limiting the number
of comparable cases. In addition, as in any new
industry, there is unknown industry risk. Finally, in
most cases, shares are not yet freely traded (they are
illiquid), which adds further complexity to calculat-
ing the right price (Drake n.d.).
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While valuation techniques differ significantly, a
variety of common techniques and methods can be
used for estimating the value of any business. Rela-
tively small businesses, like most MFIs, generally
use one or a combination of the following valuation
methods: book value, price-earnings comparisons,
and discounted cash flow analysis.
• Multiples of net assets (book value method): In the
book value method, only those balance sheet
accounts that reflect assets expected to generate
earnings for buyers are included in the calcula-
tion. While relatively easy to understand and
readily calculated from basic financial statements,
book value seldom reflects the fair market value
of assets. In addition, the book value method
does not take into account the MFI’s ability to
generate future profits. Therefore, this method is
recommended only as a starting point in negoti-
ations. In most of the initial transformations that
occurred in Bolivia, shares were acquired at or
near book value. This was due, in part, to reluc-
tance on the part of the MFIs at the time to
charge any kind of premium on what was initially
donated grant capital, but was also a reflection of
the relative novelty of the transaction and the
fact that it was a “buyer’s market.” Over the last
decade, however, both sellers and buyers have
become more sophisticated in their analyses,
leading to more aggressive negotiation on both
sides. 
• Price-earnings ratio or price-to-dividends
comparisons: This method simply matches an
MFI’s prior year profits with an average price-
earnings ratio derived from published trading
records of public companies in similar industries,
providing MFIs a comparable with which to
start negotiations. However, because sales of
microfinance shares are few and far between and
sales of formal financial sector shares are likely
not relevant due to size and liquidity differen-
tials, comparisons are difficult. A recent analysis
of small financial institutions in developing
countries highlighted that multiples paid for
banks are much higher than those for MFIs,
averaging two to three times book value
(O’Brien 2006).
• Discounted cash flow: The generally accepted
definition of the value of a business is that it
equals the future benefits, usually cash benefits,
that will accrue to that business, discounted back
to a present value at an appropriate capitalization
(or discount) rate (Tuller 1994). Using the
MFI’s financial projections for the new regulated
entity, the financial analyst can develop prelimi-
nary cash flow projections for the institution.
The next step is to estimate the risk of actually
attaining the expected future benefits projected
by the MFI (or alternatively, determining the
premium for attaining even greater benefits than
anticipated). Risk is reflected in a business valua-
tion by determining the cost of capital of an
investment—that is, ascertaining the rate of
return available in the marketplace on compara-
ble investments. This is expressed as a discount
rate—the interest rate used in determining the
present value of future cash flows. 
Conducting a discounted cash flow (DCF)
analysis on an MFI raises two critical issues:
which cash flows and what discount rate
should be used? Financial projections produced
by the MFI are often used by prospective
investors as a starting point in estimating future
profitability. A number of important adjust-
ments, however, are typically made, most of
which present a more conservative picture of
return potential of the investment. These can
include more aggressive provisioning (for uncol-
lectible loans), more conservative macroeco-
nomic indicators (currency devaluation, infla-
tion, and the like), more conservative growth
and outreach projections, and less optimistic
improvements in operating efficiency (such as
scenario analyses with higher operating cost
ratios, or smaller loan officer case loads). These
revised projections are then used as the basis
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for calculating the “free cash flow” used in the
DCF analysis, defined as any cash in excess of
what is needed for growth (an analysis that will
also likely require additional dialogue and agree-
ment among the parties). 
The second issue, the discount rate to use, is
complicated by the level of subjectivity applied to
evaluating risk. The discount rate is determined
by two factors: the general level of interest rates
in the marketplace, and the amount of risk pre-
mium demanded by the market. It is the key
variable in calculating how much an investor
should pay today as a reflection of what the com-
pany will be worth tomorrow, a year from now,
five years from now. Although advanced markets
(the United States and Europe, for example)
yield a fair amount of information about correla-
tions between risk and return, the same is not
true for some of the less developed economies.
What is the risk premium that should be applied
to a small company, in a new industry, in a rela-
tively unstable political and economic environ-
ment, in a relatively illiquid market? These
issues—size, industry maturity, macro environ-
ment, and liquidity of shares—each influence the
perceived level of risk for an investment in an
MFI. Each investor is likely to have his or her
own perspective on these risks, underscoring the
level of subjectivity applied to the analysis and
the inevitable need to engage in a negotiation
process. 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is one
of the more widely used models for incorporat-
ing risk into business valuations. This model
attempts to construct a method to introduce
factors that measure the premium an investor
should expect as compensation for holding
high-risk assets (Tuller 1994). The model is
based on the assumption that any stock’s
required rate of return is equal to the risk-free
rate of return plus a certain risk premium. (See
annex 7C for a more detailed explanation of how
to develop a discounted cash flow analysis.) 
The choice of method largely depends on the
information available to the investor and the con-
text in which the MFI operates. It is typical, how-
ever, for a range of valuation methods to be used
and then triangulated with each other. Comparable
methods that draw on either previous transactions
in the industry or previous transactions in similar
entities are unlikely to be useful for MFIs trans-
forming in new regulatory contexts, and while
price-earnings ratios may be readily available for the
various banks in the country, traditional commercial
banks tend to have a very different profile from
MFIs, which by definition tend to be unique enti-
ties serving targeted markets. 
A number of MFIs contract with external firms
to assist with the overall valuation process, and
investors may engage a third party to review the
book value of the institution’s assets and liabilities.
This resembles an in-depth financial audit, although
it may also include delivering an opinion on the
institution’s financial projections. These valuations
can be costly. MFIs should think carefully about
the timing, because such exercises can become
obsolete if conducted too early in the transforma-
tion process. 
What is an appropriate valuation method for
microfinance? While the historical experience in MFI
transformations has been to use one times book
value, the shift to more commercial approaches to
microfinance has recently led to both discounts and
premiums being applied to the MFI’s book value. A
recent analysis of various MFI valuations highlights
price-to-book multiples of between 0.6 and 1.4 for
the purchases of equity in MFIs (O’Brien 2006).
For example, in December 2004, ACCION Invest-
ments, Pachamama Holdings Corp. Finanzas
Empresariales S.A. (FIMISA), and Mibanco together
purchased 47.2 percent of BancoSol for approxi-
mately book value. The average purchase price for
Mibanco shares in 2004 was 1.27 times book value.
And the most recent purchase of Finamerica by
the three cajas de compensacions11 was between
1.4 and 1.8 times book value depending on the
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calculation method, reflecting the premium paid for
control of the institution. See table 7.3.
In many countries with relatively undeveloped
equity markets, the market for traditional bank
shares is shallow. It follows that the market for MFI
equity would be even more illiquid. Thus, true
arm’s-length equity transactions in microfinance
equity, other than initial share purchases in trans-
forming entities, can be counted on one hand, and
even these cases have involved only a small handful
of specialized equity investment funds or multilater-
al and bilateral investors, rather than truly private
investors.
Return to investors. Nominal returns on equity for
more profitable MFIs can reach 20 to 30 percent
per year. The actual returns enjoyed by investors,
however, will vary depending on such factors as
Table 7.3 Precedent Transactions for Valuing MFIs
Percentage 
sold or Price to Price to net 
Country Entity Date purchased book value income
Peru Mibanco Dec 2004 5.02 1.48 6.52
Dec 2004 22.80 1.35 5.95
Oct 2004 7.80 1.36 5.99
Jul 2004 0.41 1.08 4.74
Jul 2004 4.61 1.07 4.71
Average for Peru n.a. 1.27 5.58
Bolivia BancoSol Dec 2004 47.20 0.98/1.00a 4.31
Colombia Finamerica Nov 2004 90.10 1.80/1.40a 42.80
Ecuador Solidario Oct 2004 2.60 0.85 4.32
Aug 2003 19.80 0.89/1.00a 4.69
Nicaragua Confia 2002 — 0.90a —
Average for Latin America n.a. 1.12 4.9b
Ghana First Allied S & L Apr 2004 33.50 — c 17.20d
SASL Aug 2004 100e 1.0 —
Kenya K-Rep Sept 2004 13.40 0.62 5.35
Equity Building Apr 2003 15.90 1.59 7.86f
Society
Malawi OIBM March 2003 30.5 1.13 —
Average for Africa n.a. 1.09 6.6g
AVERAGEh n.a. 1.09 7.5
Source: Drawn from O’Brien (2006, p. 11). 
Note: —  not available. n.a.  not applicable.
a. O’Brien (2006) obtained second number from Silva (2005). The differences in price-to-book value result from the time book value is measured,
that is, the day the transaction closes or the day agreement is reached. Thus, in some cases differing values are reflected for the same transaction.
b. Excluding Finamerica.
c. Using the price of U.S.$600,000 to be paid by AfriCap for new shares equivalent to 33.5 percent and existing equity as at December 31, 2003, an
approximate price-to-book ratio of 1.8 times can be deduced. 
d. Discussions with AfriCap suggest that the multiple paid was four to five times adjusted forecast earnings.
e. This was the original capitalization of Opportunity International’s commercial bank in Ghana.
f. Based on 2003 net income.
g. Excluding First Allied (see note d).
h. Based on the average for all Mibanco transactions and excluding the outlying values for the other transactions, being Finamerica at the top end.
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the dividend payout ratio, the possible devalua-
tion of the local currency in which the equity invest-
ment is denominated (if applicable), and taxes that
may be imposed on sales of stock and on dividend
payments. In addition, investment funds will need
to cover their own operating costs and balance
returns from “good investments” against “bad
investments.” 
Accordingly, many microfinance investment
managers expect to see nominal returns on equity
of 20 to 25 percent (in foreign currency terms) in
their portfolios, which, after operating costs and
averaging in losses from investments that did not
generate returns, will generate internal rates of
return of around 12 to 15 percent. Investment
funds generally have established hurdle rates for
potential investments. These rates reflect all
potential macroeconomic risk (foreign exchange,
inflation, and the like) and country risks as well,
though the latter may be difficult to estimate in
countries without active bond or stock markets.
Most investors in microfinance, however, are also
looking for a “social” return, although an equiva-
lent quantifiable formula is not as straightforward.
As a substitute, investors often look for achieve-
ments in reaching social goals, such as volume of
outreach, demographic penetration, average loan
size as a proxy for poverty, and others. 
Board seats and voting rights. Unlike in MFI
NGOs, the governance structure of an MFI with
shareholders tends to reflect the ownership struc-
ture of the institution. Decisions need to be made
as to what proportionate amount of equity (10 per-
cent, 15 percent, or more?) entitles an investor to a
board seat. To date, most transformed MFIs are
owned by a small group of investors with no
one single investor in a controlling position (with
the exception of those transformed MFIs in which
the founding NGO remains the majority share-
holder). The benefit is that investors generally
take governance seriously, with investor representa-
tives likely to attend board meetings regularly
and stay actively informed about the operations of
the MFI. 
Usually board seats are aligned with voting
rights. Unless expressly provided by the trans-
formed MFI’s charter, bylaws, or Shareholder
Agreement, shareholders’ voting rights are typically
governed by host country law. However, in most
countries, parties are allowed to reach express con-
tractual agreements providing an assignment of vot-
ing rights that are not allocated according to the
actual size of each shareholder’s relative ownership
interest. Where this is the case, shareholders enjoy a
great deal of flexibility to agree contractually to a
wide array of voting arrangements, particularly if
host country law also allows preferred nonvoting
shares to be allocated to investors. 
Often at issue in discussions of shareholder vot-
ing rights is the question of what constitutes con-
trol. While control is usually evidenced by a simple
majority shareholding, host country law may
require supermajority or unanimous votes on cer-
tain matters to protect the rights of minority share-
holders. Or minority shareholders may ask for con-
tractual agreements that impose supermajority or
unanimous votes on certain sensitive matters to
protect their particular interests. Once negotiated,
the Shareholder Agreement should reflect all of the
various agreements reached with respect to share-
holder voting rights to the extent permitted by host
country law.
While the link between ownership of shares and
board representation is an important one, it should
not undermine the equally important role of inde-
pendent directors—board directors who are neither
direct shareholder representatives nor members of
management. The use of independent directors is
important to ensure an objective, institutionwide
perspective. They can play an important role in areas
in which the interests of shareholders, management,
and the company may diverge, such as executive
remuneration, succession planning, changes of cor-
porate control, takeover defenses, large acquisitions,
and the audit function (OECD 2004). They can
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also bring an objective view to the evaluation of the
performance of the board and management and can
fill skills gaps in the board. (Despite such advan-
tages, very few MFIs currently have independent
directors.) 
Mission retention. With the majority of MFIs sub-
scribing to a double bottom line and the current
prevalence of socially responsible investors in micro-
finance, a key discussion point is the potential
investors’ commitment to the social goals of the
institution. Such social goals are often defined in
the company’s mission statement. Pushing share-
holders to articulate the importance they place on
mission-oriented goals is valuable because this will
help guide decision making at the board and with-
in management of the transformed MFI. Not all
investors will share these same values or goals. 
For those that do, however, the MFI’s ability to
report against agreed on social indicators becomes a
critical piece of board reporting. Board members
and shareholders may find it appropriate to request
that senior management prepare reports from time
to time that provide information about the trans-
formed MFI’s mission adherence. As with nearly all
of these issues, local counsel should be consulted
and asked to advise the parties as to the appropriate
scope of information to be shared and the rights
and responsibilities of shareholders who wish to
access such information. To assist management in
handling such requests for information, it may be in
the transforming MFI’s interest to reach agreement
up front (and to document that agreement in the
investment documentation) as to the form, con-
tent, and frequency of such reports. 
Role in management. The level of involvement an
investor wants to assume in the MFI’s management
is another important point of discussion. Both
strategic and financial investors may request the
right to appoint or approve a certain number of the
senior executives of the organization. This could
also include the right to veto the level of remuner-
ation granted to and the removal of the Chief Exec-
utive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer, or any
other senior management team member earning a
salary over a certain level. The cost implications of
high salaries and the commensurate effect on the
bottom line may make financial investors, in partic-
ular, sensitive to staff compensation issues. Discus-
sions should also be held about the potential
investor’s understanding of which management
issues would require board involvement or approval
(or both) and expected frequency of communica-
tion between the board and management. 
Future capitalization. The negotiation process will
need to address estimates of when, if ever, addi-
tional capital needs to be mobilized and how this
need is likely to be met and by whom. Shareholders
should discuss how they would respond to
requests from regulators for additional capital
contributions to be made to the transformed MFI.
While the low minimum capital requirements
imposed on regulated MFIs may make this issue
seem rather remote, regulated MFIs face higher,
more conservative capital adequacy requirements
than those imposed on banks.
This variance in capital adequacy requirements is
an important issue for investors because it can affect
the relative competitive position of specialized
deposit-taking MFIs if they are unable to be as
highly leveraged as banks. Similarly, as a trans-
formed MFI nears the capital adequacy limit, pres-
sure will be exerted to do one or more of the fol-
lowing (to the extent permitted by host country
law), all of which can affect investor positions:
• Increase its retained earnings (increase profitabil-
ity or reduce dividend payouts).
• Issue more equity.
• Issue subordinated debt (debt that can qualify as
tier 2 capital, depending on the jurisdiction).
• Reduce the size of its loan portfolio (through
securitization or sales), or slow growth in its loan
portfolio.
• Shift its loan portfolio and other assets to lower-
risk-weighted assets.
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Generally, solutions that encourage sustainable
growth and do not require a reduction in assets are
preferred although the industry is starting to see
some examples of securitization of loan portfo-
lios.12 Shareholders thus usually need to respond to
ensure the transformed MFI meets its capital ade-
quacy requirement. Shareholders can either forgo
dividends, make an additional equity investment, or
provide subordinated debt (if subordinated debt
qualifies as tier 2 capital in the jurisdiction in which
the MFI is operating).
In addition, potential investors should discuss
liquidation rights in the event the MFI is liquidated,
and preemptive rights that entitle all shareholders
to participate in any increase in equity capital.
Financial policies. Important financial decisions and
the standards for how the company’s financial infor-
mation is presented will also need upfront discus-
sion. These will generally include dividend policies
(conditions for payout, approval, veto rights), the
production of financial statements (frequency, for-
mat, timing, approval, and so forth), and the acqui-
sition and leasing of fixed assets. 
Approval of dividend payout is typically left to a
majority vote of the shareholders, although both
strategic and financial investors will probably want
some kind of veto ability over any declaration or
payment of dividends or other distribution. The
delivery of audited financial statements within a set
period following the end of the financial year is a
standard requirement of shareholders and they may
want the right to veto annual audited statements.
Significant purchases are business decisions that
affect the valuation of an investor’s interest and
the company’s operations as a whole. As a result,
investors will typically require a veto right on the
purchase of assets over a certain value.
Dispute resolution. Despite best efforts to forge a
cohesive group of directors, board disputes do
occur from time to time. Traditional approaches to
dispute resolution include an escalating set of steps
that the parties agree to take to reach resolution.
Some international investors leave little room to
negotiate these provisions; they require standard
dispute resolution provisions in all their invest-
ments. Others, however, may allow some flexibility
in determining the number of steps to take to
resolve disputes, the timetables involved, and even
the law that will govern arbitration. In general, the
four escalating steps are conciliation, mediation,
arbitration, and litigation. Each of these steps
should be clearly documented in the Shareholder
Agreement (or other investment document). (See
chapter 8, Legal Transformation.) It is important
however, for the MFI and potential shareholders to
at least consider the preferred method of dispute
resolution during discussion in the negotiation
phase. 
Restrictions on transfer and exit. At some point,
investors may want to divest their investments in
the MFI, either through the transfer or sale of
shares. Both options need to be discussed thor-
oughly and processes agreed upon before moving
forward with the investment decision. 
• Restrictions on transfer: Limitations on the
ability of parties to transfer their interests are
likely to be viewed differently by varying share-
holders depending on their respective invest-
ment horizons and return expectations. It would
be reasonable for an MFI to request a strategic
investor to agree to a two to five year restriction
on transfers. From the majority shareholder per-
spective, such a restriction would be important,
because a strategic investor is assumed to bring
important connections, perspective, and expert-
ise to the venture, which may take time to be
fully implemented. A financial investor, however,
will be wary of an extended period during which
transfers are prohibited. Although most financial
investors are looking at a three to five year invest-
ment horizon, they may be reluctant to limit
their ability to sell if the option presents itself. As
such, a one- to two-year restriction may be their
limit.
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Some of the most restrictive provisions
regarding share transfers are those that pro-
hibit any transfers unless all shareholders agree,
or the transfer takes place to an affiliate of the
transferor. 
• Exit strategy: Each investor will have his or her
own time horizon for exiting any investment
holdings. Because the market for microfinance
securities is still relatively underdeveloped,
investors may aim at this point to include specific
exit mechanisms in the Shareholder Agreement
to limit the risk of not being able to liquidate
their investments as needed. Relevant clauses
may include the following: 
– Drag-along right: Drag-along rights enable
one shareholder to force another to join in
the sale of the company. The owner doing the
dragging must give the other shareholder the
same price, terms, and conditions as any other
seller. Drag-along rights help to eliminate
minority owners and put a larger percentage
of the company up for sale—a potentially
more attractive purchase than only a portion
of a company and typically at or above a
prenegotiated price.
– Tag-along right: Tag-along rights are used to
protect shareholders from being left out of an
important sale. For example, if a majority or
other important shareholder sells its stake, the
other shareholder (often a minority share-
holder) has the right to join the transaction
and sell its stake in the company. The majori-
ty shareholder is effectively forced to include
the other shareholder in the negotiation. Tag-
along rights are extremely important to finan-
cial investors.
– Rights of first refusal: In the event that the
regulated entity decides to issue additional
stock, each investor has a right of first refusal
to purchase a proportional percentage of
shares of the new offering, based on the
holder’s percentage ownership interest in
the MFI. Some MFIs have expanded this
clause so that any sale by a shareholder will
first be offered to the other shareholders on
the same terms as a third party will be offered
(or has agreed to). The right of first refusal
may add time to the sale process and may also
reduce the value of the shares for every share-
holder. When a Shareholder Agreement pro-
vides for a right of first refusal, a number of
related legal and business issues will also need
to be addressed—for example, how much
time does the nonselling party have to con-
sider the offer to purchase the equity for sale?
What constitutes a legitimate offer? If all or
part of the consideration for the sale involves
noncash payments, who decides the value of
that noncash consideration? 
– Right of first offer: As implied, the right of
first offer requires that any shareholder wish-
ing to sell his or her shares must first offer the
shares to the other shareholders, before any
such offers are made to third parties. A right
of first offer is typically viewed as less of a
restraint on the selling shareholder’s ability to
sell its shares than is a right of first refusal. As
a result, financial investors are likely to prefer
a right of first offer to a right of first refusal.
However, this type of provision also requires
drafting clarity in specifying the period during
which the sale is to be made of the shares in
question. Issues of what constitutes equiva-
lent consideration may also need to be
addressed if shares can be acquired with non-
cash payments.
– Put options: Put options give the owner the
right, though not the obligation, to sell a
specified amount of an underlying security at
a specific price within a specific time. The
prenegotiated price is typically a function of
the MFI’s performance—the investor is thus
mitigating its liquidity risk but accepting the
venture’s business risk. These options are typ-
ically triggered by the passing of a specific
amount of time or the inability of the
company to meet specific financial goals. A
financial investor, particularly focused on
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issues surrounding the timing of exit and
return, may be more likely to insist on a put
option. (Note that other strategic investors
may also require a put option, given reputa-
tion risk and the typical lack of market for
shares.) A key point of contention when
negotiating a put option is determining who
will stand on the other side of the put, mean-
ing who will buy the shares being “put?”
Some investors may seek the right to “put”
their shares to the founding NGO or to the
MFI itself. For an NGO with its own illiquid
investments in the MFI or, alternatively, with
a range of other community development
commitments, the issue of liquidity will need
to be closely examined. As for the MFI, it is
unlikely that such an arrangement will be
accepted by the bank superintendent. The
MFI must check local laws to ensure that, as a
regulated financial institution, the MFI has
requisite legal authority to buy back its own
shares. In some countries, bank regulations
and laws prohibit or restrict the buying back
of shares by financial institutions because this
could unduly erode its capital base. In addi-
tion, while in the short term such a buy-back
plan will increase the relative shareholdings of
the other investors, the MFI’s decision to use
cash that otherwise could have been invested
in the loan portfolio or paid out as dividends
could ultimately have a negative effect on
shareholder returns. 
– Call options: Call options give a party the
right (but not the obligation) to buy from
other shareholders a specified amount of an
underlying security at a specified price within
a specified time. Call options have not been
widely used in MFI transactions.
Finalizing the investor group. The final steps in the
investor negotiation process are documenting the
many decisions reached among the various investors
and reaching consensus on next steps. As men-
tioned above, this process is best facilitated by
someone within the MFI who has the time to coor-
dinate the drafting of multiple versions of various
documents and in cases in which a group of poten-
tial investors is approached at the same time, this
process can be greatly facilitated if the group
appoints a lead negotiator. This often happens
among a group of socially responsible investors who
share many of the same investing philosophies. This
approach can save the MFI significant time and
resources, but may reduce the institution’s bargain-
ing position.
The Funding Phase
The final step in the process, the actual contribution
of the investors’ capital, can take longer than parties
expect. Once the final terms and conditions of the
term sheet have been converted into a draft Share-
holder Agreement (see chapter 8, Legal Transfor-
mation), institutional investors must present the
potential investment and key documentation to
their respective boards and investment committees
for final approval. Depending on the bureaucratic
hurdles that need to be overcome (generally, the
larger the investment, the larger the hurdles), this
final process can take a matter of a few weeks, or can
consume over a year. To avoid being surprised by
these kinds of delays, the types of approvals that are
likely to be required (and lead time involved in get-
ting such approvals) should be discussed early in the
negotiation process with each investor.
A useful tool in managing any complex transac-
tion, such as an equity negotiation, is to set out, up
front, a “drop dead date” (DD Date in box 7.6) for
the conclusion of the transaction. For example, for
NGO MFIs that have chosen to assemble their
equity investors before the actual legal and opera-
tional transformation, the drop dead date could be
the last date by which the MFI intends to apply for
its deposit-taking license from its bank regulators.
Working backward, the project manager can then
map out the next-to-last step that needs to be taken
before the drop dead date, and then the step before
that, and so on. Very quickly investors should begin
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to identify whether they will be able to meet these
deadlines and to identify the likely time frames they
will need to agree to a term sheet, finalize the
Shareholder Agreement, complete their legal due
diligence, and receive internal approvals to invest. It
also gives the project manager a time frame to work
with as he or she marshals resources of the trans-
forming MFI to support the negotiation process.
Even if actual dates are not assigned to this process,
the theoretical time line helps to ensure that the
negotiations are sequenced appropriately. 
Effective Governance 
A key challenge for any transforming MFI is to
ensure that its corporate governance structure, pro-
cedures, policies, and practices are aligned with the
regulated MFI’s new business strategy, operations,
and risks.13 For the purpose of this book, gover-
nance is broadly defined as the system of checks and
balances whereby stakeholders of the MFI (its own-
ers, senior management, donors, regulators, cus-
tomers) ensure that the MFI fulfills its institutional
mission and is managed effectively. As this sample
list of stakeholders suggests, both internal and
external governance agents form this system of
checks and balances. Before transformation, the
most significant external agent typically is the donor
community. After transformation, MFIs are sub-
jected to a much broader array of external gover-
nance agents, including most notably its owners
and prudential regulators.
In traditional NGO-to-share-company transfor-
mations, this change in governance is driven by the
new shareholders, as they seek representation on
the board in proportion to their shareholdings. The
board will likely include some representation from
the original NGO (but not necessarily from the
NGO’s board and depending on the future role
Box 7.6 Example of Time Line to Complete Investor Negotiations 
This is an example of a timeline to complete investor
negotiations if all is to be concluded before the MFI
is licensed. Sequencing and time frame will depend
on regulatory requirements and investor needs.
“DD Date” is drop dead date.
Investors fund capital contributions and shares are issued DD Date
Investors execute Shareholder Agreement DD Date minus 3 days
MFI receives license DD Date minus 5
MFI delivers license application (with list of expected DD Date minus 65
shareholders) to regulator
Investors commit to fund capital contributions DD Date minus 70
when MFI receives license
Investors secure all internal approvals necessary to invest DD Date minus 73
Investors agree to final draft of Shareholder Agreement DD Date minus 80
Last comments due on Shareholder Agreement DD Date minus 85
Near final draft of Shareholder Agreement DD Date minus 90
distributed for comment
Investors meet for face-to-face negotiations on last issues DD Date minus 100
Investors receive initial draft of Shareholder Agreement DD Date minus 110
Term sheet agreed DD Date minus 120
Source: Author.
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of the NGO, this board may also need to be
reformed). Additionally, the transforming MFI’s
new bank regulators will undoubtedly impose cer-
tain governance requirements.
A country’s banking law or specialized micro-
finance law and its implementing regulations
generally spell out desired qualifications (or
disqualifications) of board members and is often
accompanied by a requirement that the prudential
bank regulatory authority review the backgrounds
of all proposed directors, typically known as “the fit
and proper test.” In addition, regulations may dic-
tate the form of the MFI’s governance structure
(such as rules defining certain required board com-
mittees, their composition, and respective roles and
responsibilities), and liabilities of directors. As a
general rule, directors may be held personally liable
for their actions as board members, and if such
actions are found to fall short of the “standard of
care” expected of directors of financial intermedi-
aries (this standard is often defined in local law),
directors may be subject to civil and criminal penal-
ties. Thus, directors should pay particular attention
to their added fiduciary responsibilities resulting
from governing an MFI licensed to mobilize
deposits from the public. 
An important issue that confronts many trans-
forming MFIs is how to develop effective boards
that can respond to a growing number of internal
and external stakeholders, many of who may be new
to the MFI—such as its shareholders, regulators,
and new customers (depositors and new types of
borrowers). One of the more significant undertak-
ings is to develop and grow the necessary expertise
within boards of directors to ensure each member is
fully informed and able to understand the risks and
challenges that confront a deposit-taking institution
(box 7.7). Another challenge is to establish a gov-
ernance structure that sets clear boundaries
between management and governance, while also
Box 7.7 Improved Governance through Diverse Owners
In 1992, GTZ and the Mozambican Ministry of Labor
set up a lending and business advisory program that
was eventually transformed into an independent
and sustainable “credit-only” institution. SOCREMO
(Sociedade de Crédito de Moçambique) was created
in 1998, with the Mozambican state (94 percent)
and two local NGOs—CCM and UGC— (6 percent)
as shareholders. SOCREMO then sought additional
capital from investors to meet the share
capital requirements for microfinance banks in
Mozambique of metical 25 billion (approximately
U.S.$1 million). With investments of the financial
institution GAPI (Gabinete de Apoio à Pequena
Indústria) of approximately 20 percent and LFS (the
German management and consulting company LFS
Financial Systems GmbH) of approximately 9 per-
cent, the institution complied with the minimum
capital requirements and applied in 2003 for a
license as a microfinance bank. In May 2004, SOCRE-
MO received a license as a microfinance bank and
changed its name to Socremo-Banco de Microfi-
nanças, or Socremo. At this point, the state owned
approximately 61 percent of Socremo.
Under its new status as a regulated financial
institution, Socremo sought to further diversify its
ownership structure to strengthen the governance
of the institution and to increase the capital
base to at least metical 70 billion (U.S.$2.8 million),
the minimum capital requirement for commercial
banks. Through investments of the German
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW Entwicklungs-
bank), the Swiss State Secretary of Economy (SECO),
and the African microfinance investment company
AfriCap, plus additional capital contributions from
the existing shareholders GAPI and LFS, the share
capital of Socremo increased to metical 83.6 billion
(U.S.$3.4 million), clearly surpassing the minimum
capital requirements for commercial banks.
(Continued on the next page.)
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establishing policies and procedures for holding
management accountable for its performance. This
section addresses these two aspects of corporate
governance—building and growing an effective
board that can adequately respond to internal and
external stakeholders, and holding management
accountable.
Building and Growing an Effective Board
The extent and direction of changes required in the
board when transforming from an NGO to a share-
holding company can have a significant impact
on the overall performance and effectiveness of an
MFI. A forward-thinking, informed board can
stimulate and promote the maturation of the MFI
it governs while providing a stabilizing influence
that can mitigate the risks of rapid growth that
often accompany a transformation.14
Size and composition. The number of members on
MFI boards ranges from 5 to 25, with most falling
in the range of 7 to 9 members. In determining the
“right” size of a board, a number of factors should
be considered. Ideally, the board will be large
enough to complete work effectively, help secure
funding as needed, advance the reputation of the
MFI, provide continuity, and ensure that quorums
With the entry of the three new investors, the
share of the state was reduced from an initial
94 percent to only 21 percent. The selection of
the new shareholders was based on certain criteria:
(a) experience in commercial micro and small and
medium enterprise finance, (b) willingness to play
an active role in governance, (c) ability to provide
funds for refinancing the growth of the bank, and
(d) willingness to fund technical assistance. 
Currently Socremo has eight board members—
each shareholder is represented on the board. How-
ever, some of the board members were nominated
in 2003 (GPE [state], CCM, UGC, GAPI, and LFS) and
their terms expired in March 2006. At that point,
only shareholders with 10 percent or more owner-
ship were eligible to have a board seat with the
exception of the two founding NGOs, who share
one seat between them.
The active participation of all new investors with
experience in commercial banking and microfinance
has significantly strengthened the competency of
the board, something unlikely to have been
achieved without external investors.
Source: Christoph Diehl, Socremo, February 2006. 
January 2006
Shareholder Mozambican metical U.S.$ Percent
GPE 17,530,261,363 717,131 20.98
UGC 1,598,515,833 65,392 1.91
CCM 1,598,515,833 65,392 1.91
GAPI 10,229,584,477 418,473 12.24
LFS 7,490,476,262 306,422 8.96
KfW 15,274,135,096 624,837 18.28
AfriCap 15,168,055,000 620,497 18.15
SECO 14,667,000,000 600,000 17.55
TOTAL 83,556,543,865 3,418,145 100.00
Box 7.7 Improved Governance through Diverse Owners (Continued)
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are easily met for meetings—yet will be small enough
to allow for substantive decisions to be made and
for board members to establish a relationship of
trust and accountability with each other. 
Another factor is the number of shareholders
that want board representation and the number, if
any, of independent directors to be seated on the
board. In all cases, the final number of board seats
should be an odd number to avoid the possibility of
tied votes. (However, an effective board usually
operates on consensus making the possibility of an
evenly divided board vote highly unlikely.)
The composition of an MFI board is perhaps
more important than its size. It is not unusual for
bank laws and specialized MFI laws to authorize
supervisors to review the qualifications of each
director of a regulated financial intermediary to
determine his or her suitability. As a general rule,
this kind of supervisory assessment is focused on
screening out those individuals who are wholly
inappropriate to direct the activities of a regulated
financial intermediary, rather than determining the
ideal members.
Purpose. The work of the board of a regulated MFI
is largely focused on (a) establishing the business
strategy and organizational structure of the trans-
formed MFI, (b) ensuring the adequacy of
resources (financial, leadership, and reputation) to
execute the MFI’s strategy, and (c) designing and
implementing policies and procedures to manage
that strategy (the controls necessary to ensure man-
agerial accountability).
In practice, this means that the board will often
take the lead within the MFI on the following issues:
• Confirming the mission and purpose of the MFI
(this can be particularly thorny for transforming
MFIs in the process of redefining their mission in
the wake of transformation)
• Selecting the CEO, establishing compensation,
and supporting the CEO while monitoring his
or her performance
• Ensuring effective organizational planning
(including succession planning at both the board
and executive levels)
• Ensuring the MFI has adequate resources
(human and financial) to fulfill its mission and
purpose, and monitoring deployment of these
resources to make sure that they are used effec-
tively and efficiently
• Approving and monitoring performance of
the MFI’s strategy (CEO should have responsi-
bility for developing and creating such strategy
while the board approves and monitors its
execution)
• Representing the MFI to the public and, where
necessary, enhancing the MFI’s image; and act-
ing as the formal point of contact for all bank
supervisory concerns
• Serving as last resort for dissatisfied MFI staff 
• Identifying, and if possible, foreseeing risks and
ensuring that the MFI operates prudently to
mitigate or avoid such risks
• Approving external audits and ensuring proper
internal control (internal auditor reports to
board or board’s audit committee)
An MFI should seek out board members who
can contribute unique and needed skills to govern
the MFI effectively. To this purpose, some trans-
forming MFIs have “mapped” the expertise of their
existing board members to determine areas that
could use strengthening, and to build synergies
within the entire board. For a transforming MFI
this may mean consciously seeking out individuals
with experience in governing a financial intermedi-
ary or an understanding of the laws and regulations
to which the transformed MFI will be subject.
Board members of the MFI NGO prior to its
transformation face an important and in some ways
unique challenge. They must provide continuity
to the transforming MFI, including a reminder of
its history (and dedication to its social mission) as
well as acknowledge and respond to the very dif-
ferent challenges and risks faced by a deposit-taking
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institution. This includes understanding the differ-
ent role and time commitment that is likely to be
asked of board members of the regulated MFI.
Some transforming MFIs have secured board train-
ing for the NGO board members to help these
members comprehend the new roles they may be
asked to play in the governance structure of the reg-
ulated MFI. In other cases, NGO board members
may ask or may be asked to leave the board (or not
join the new board) as the MFI transforms.
The degree to which the new regulated institu-
tion’s board interacts or overlaps with the founding
NGO (if applicable) and its board is determined by
local law and regulations as well as by the ultimate
role of the NGO going forward. In many countries,
local law may not permit interlocking directors
between the NGO and the regulated institution.
Furthermore, a board member representing an
NGO that simply acts as a trust for its investment in
the new entity will have very different interests than
one who represents an NGO involved in similar or
even competing activities. The potential for con-
flicts of interest needs to be carefully evaluated
when defining this relationship. 
Roles and responsibilities. The responsibilities of
those members who are invited to join or remain on
the board of a transforming MFI should be clearly
articulated.15 At a minimum, board members of a
regulated MFI should do the following:
• Know the mission, purpose, and goals of the
MFI and its policies and programs.
• Understand the MFI’s strengths and weaknesses.
• Prepare for, attend, and participate actively in
board and board committee meetings.
• Ask substantive questions.
• Review and understand the MFI’s financial
statements.
• Support the majority view of the board and act
in a way that forges consensus.
• Maintain confidentiality of information shared
with and among board members.
• Maintain independence, objectivity, personal
integrity, and ethical standards.
• Make informed judgments.
• Avoid even the appearance of conflicts of interest.
Board members (existing and new) should also
understand the new legal liabilities they will likely
face as members of the board of a regulated finan-
cial intermediary. The bank law or specialized
microfinance law will specify the standard of care
that is expected of directors, including rules related
to conflicts of interest that are to be avoided by
insiders such as board members (box 7.8). These
laws and implementing regulations will also spell
out the penalties—civil and criminal—that may be
triggered upon a willful or negligent breach of this
standard of care.
Box 7.8 Conflicts of Interest
Many MFIs develop a conflict of interest policy to
protect the MFI and its reputation from actual or
even the appearance of conflicts of interest. For
regulated MFIs, the banking or specialized MFI
law typically defines what constitutes a conflict
of interest. However, MFIs can always take a
more conservative position than that articulated
in the law. At a minimum, a conflict of interest
policy will be in writing, will outline board pro-
cedures for determining whether a conflict exists,
and will make clear the answers to (a) who is to
be covered by the policy (who is an insider—
board members, officers, employees, members of
family of the above), (b) what types of transac-
tions are covered by the policy (all transactions,
only transactions above a certain material
amount, only financial transactions or also
employment or service contracts), and (c) what
the procedures are for bringing potential con-
flicts of interest to the attention of the board. A
sample Conflict of Interest policy can be found in
annex 8C to chapter 8, Legal Transformation.
Source: Author.
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Directors will often ask the MFI to procure some
form of insurance or provide an indemnity to cover
any civil penalties that might be imposed on direc-
tors or to pay legal costs should regulatory author-
ities pursue the directors for alleged misbehavior.
The extent to which such insurance or indemnity
can actually be obtained from a third party (direc-
tor and officer insurance) or given directly by the
MFI will depend greatly on local practice and laws
where the MFI is located. In some countries, for
example, director and officer liability insurance is
not offered. And even where such insurance or
indemnities can be obtained, directors should be
informed that such protection is not typically avail-
able when criminal liability is at issue.
Structure. A typical board consists of a board chair,
several board committees, and individual board
members. In each case, roles and responsibilities
must be defined to organize the efficient conduct of
the board’s work. The board chair, in addition to
his or her individual responsibilities as a board
member, will often serve as a partner with the CEO
or general manager to ensure that the MFI achieves
its mission and purpose. This often includes discus-
sions on an ongoing basis with the CEO about
issues confronting the MFI, especially issues of par-
ticular concern to the board. The board chair will
also provide leadership in policy setting and man-
agement oversight.
The board chair sets the agenda for board meet-
ings with the CEO and chairs the meetings. The
effectiveness of those meetings is often highly
dependent on the board chair’s ability to build an
agenda that is structured by priorities and by time,
and by his or her ability to manage the agenda. In
managing that agenda, the board chair will be
responsible for time management, encouraging par-
ticipation of board members, focusing the discus-
sion by framing the issue at hand, determining the
need for action during the meeting, assigning fol-
low-up responsibilities, and recognizing accom-
plishments. When the board determines to act, the
board chair’s responsibility is to ensure that such
actions are in line with the MFI’s organizational
priorities and governance concerns.
The board chair is also responsible for ensuring
that the board carries out its mandate and will typi-
cally delegate authority or appoint board committee
chairs. The board chair will also take on other
responsibilities as assigned from time to time by the
board.
A board’s responsibilities are diverse and labor
intensive, requiring significant time both in and
out of board meetings. With transformation, the
stakes are raised still higher, making it necessary
for the board of a transforming MFI to operate as
efficiently and responsibly as possible. Accordingly,
it is not unusual for a transforming MFI to rely
heavily on its board committees. These committees
guide the board in making informed decisions,
and, in some cases, are delegated authority to act
on behalf of the overall board. As discussed in
chapter 3, Planning for Transformation, many
transforming MFIs create a board transformation
subcommittee.
Regulated MFIs might form a range of board
committees, varying according to the needs of the
MFI and to the requirements of the MFI’s regula-
tor, which may mandate the formation of certain
types of committees. Some of the most typical
board committees established by transformed MFIs
and their usual functions follow:
• Executive committee: authorized by the board to
act on problems or delegated decision-making
responsibilities between board meetings, with
such decisions to later be ratified by the full board 
• Audit or finance committee: oversees expendi-
tures and budgets; ensures internal control and
financial analysis; recommends expenditure
power of executive director within board-
approved budget; hears reports of internal and
external auditors
• Personnel and compensation committee: reviews
strategic personnel issues; reviews overall
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compensation policy; makes recommendations
for compensation of CEO and other senior
management
• Risk management committee: monitors the ade-
quacy and implementation of the risk policy
strategy of the MFI 
• Nominating committee: develops board member
responsibilities; identifies potential board mem-
bers and judges qualifications; and conducts
board orientation for new members
• Ad hoc committees: formed to respond to specific
issues and usually for a limited period of time
Ensuring Management Accountability
Institutional transformation provides MFIs the
opportunity to clearly define the line between man-
agement and governance. Governance is not man-
agement. The board should not act as surrogate
managers of a transformed MFI. The extent to
which a board is willing to not take on a manage-
ment role will depend on its confidence in the
MFI’s current management and the policies and
procedures the board has put in place to review and
monitor the MFI’s management. The accounta-
bility of management to the board should be
accomplished through the following:
• A robust and meaningful reporting system for
delivering information from management to the
board
• Effective use of third-party reviews of the MFI’s
performance and operations
• Measurable performance benchmarks by which
management’s performance can be transparently
and fairly assessed
Reporting system. As an MFI transforms, the
amount, type, and frequency of reporting that a
board may expect to receive from management is
likely to increase. More information, however, does
not always imply better analysis. A board that is
deluged with information, or given information
without adequate time for review, will not be able
to monitor and oversee management effectively.
An appropriate reporting system addresses at
least two issues—reporting policies that govern the
flow of information from management to the
board, and infrastructure for providing reliable con-
tent in these management reports (typically sup-
ported by the MFI’s management information
system [MIS]).
The function of reporting policies is to establish
a mechanism for providing information from man-
agement to the board in a timely manner to allow
the board to perform its monitoring function.
Thus, an MFI’s reporting policies should clearly
outline the board’s expectations for the scope, tim-
ing, and manner (including level of detail, form of
presentation, and the like) by which management
reports to the board.
In determining the appropriate scope of infor-
mation presented to the board, the following is sug-
gested, at a minimum (FDIC 2003):
• Income and expenses of the institution 
• Capital outlays and adequacy 
• Loans and investments made in the reporting
period 
• Past due and restructured loans and investments 
• Problem loans (present status and workout plans) 
• Allowances for possible loan losses 
• Concentrations of credit 
• Losses and recoveries on sales, collections, or
other dispositions of assets
• Funding activities and management of interest
rate risk (if the MFI is borrowing in a foreign
currency, reports should also include informa-
tion about management of foreign exchange rate
risk) 
• Performance in all of the above areas compared
to past performance and benchmarked against
peers’ performance (trend analysis) 
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• All insider transactions that benefit, directly
or indirectly, directors, officers, employees, or
related interests 
• Activities undertaken to ensure compliance with
applicable laws (lending limits, interest rate
restrictions, consumer protection and truth in
lending requirements, tax obligations, and so
forth) 
• Any extraordinary event or development that is
likely to affect the integrity, safety, or profitability
of the MFI
In some cases, the MFI’s bank regulators will
require evidence that such information has been
delivered and reviewed systematically by the board.
Under some legislations the board must also take
notice of any communication from the regulator as
well as reports from ad hoc committees such as
those related to money laundering or others. 
A transforming MFI needs to establish early on
the types of information that will be presented at
each board meeting as opposed to the information
that is presented annually. Attached as annex 7D is
a sample board agenda, outlining types of informa-
tion that directors typically expect to see. Often the
minimum number of board meetings is set by the
regulators. While the depth of discussion held at
meetings is left to the board, it is not unusual for
bank regulators to ask for the minutes of recent
board meetings as part of their on-site audit.
Accordingly, the minutes of each board meeting
must fully and fairly reflect the extent of discussion
that took place. 
A second issue to address when building a robust
and meaningful reporting system is to ensure that
the MIS used by the MFI is providing reliable infor-
mation. To avoid the “garbage in, garbage out”
dilemma, the MFI should determine early in the
transformation process how to track and evaluate
the ongoing effectiveness of its MIS. It would be a
gross dereliction of board responsibilities for direc-
tors to assume that the need for consistent MIS
evaluations (in particular of the loan portfolio track-
ing and accounting systems) ends with receiving a
license to take deposits. (For further discussion on
reporting, see chapter 11, Management Informa-
tion Systems.)
The board must also understand how the MIS is
being used by management. Data are not the same
as information. An effective management team will
translate the data provided by its MIS into informa-
tion that enhances its decision making as well as
meets reporting requirements to the board and to
regulatory authorities. An inquiring board will look
for concrete evidence that management is using its
MIS to inform operations.
Making use of third-party reviews. In addition to
the steps that a board itself may take to monitor and
supervise management, third parties can offer a
valuable review of compliance with board policies
and procedures, as well as applicable laws and regu-
lations, and the accuracy of information provided
by management to the board. At least five sources
of this kind of third-party or independent review
can be tapped by a board: (a) bank supervisors,
(b) internal auditors, (c) external auditors, (d) legal
counsel, (internal and external), and (e) rating
agencies and consultants.
Management should make sure the board is
apprised of all reports submitted to and, just as
important, received from the regulators. However,
some information is delivered directly to the board
putting the onus on board members to ensure this
information is appropriately shared with manage-
ment. With respect to the audit function, sound
governance practice dictates that direct authority be
given to the board or its audit committee to hire,
fire, and evaluate its internal and external auditors.
(However, a regulated MFI may be limited by the
banking or MFI law with respect to the maximum
number of years that an external auditor can serve
the MFI, because rotating external auditors are less
likely to be hostage to the interests of the firms they
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audit. There may also be requirements for regula-
tors to approve the external auditor, or to limit the
MFI’s choice of external auditors to a specified class
of auditing firms.) As with supervisory reports,
boards or their audit committees should review all
findings with management and monitor manage-
ment’s efforts to resolve any identified problems. 
Boards should also have direct access to the MFI’s
internal legal counsel and, if necessary, be given
authority to hire outside counsel or other experts, at
the MFI’s expense. The reports of rating agencies
should be provided to boards as well because these
can provide useful information about how the MFI
compares with its peers. A robust rating report also
can uncover management weaknesses that the board
may not have observed or be aware of.
Establishing benchmarks for management’s per-
formance. An important part of the board’s over-
sight and monitoring responsibilities is to establish
transparent, fair, and measurable benchmarks
against which management’s performance can be
measured. Employees are most likely to complete
those tasks that are systematically measured and
evaluated. This setting of performance benchmarks
is easier said than done, particularly for a newly
transformed MFI in which both management and
the board are still sorting out what is reasonable to
expect of the transformed MFI’s performance. Per-
formance benchmarks should be established to
align with the achievement of the MFI’s business
plan. A well-designed performance benchmark can
operate as a red flag, highlighting to the board and
management disconnects between operations and
policy goals.
Transformed MFIs often use a form of ratio
analysis to manage and assess their performance.
A typical ratio analysis is a CAMEL evaluation—
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management effi-
ciency, Earnings, and Liquidity. Of these five
CAMEL elements, for most regulators the key
element is management performance. (See
chapter 2, Regulation and Supervision: The Policy
Framework, for further discussion.)
Often overlooked in the development of per-
formance benchmarks is the inclusion of elements
that can measure and encourage the advancement
of the social mission of a transformed MFI. Given
the strong interest of regulators in the ongoing sol-
vency of the deposit-taking institutions they super-
vise, combined with pressure by shareholders keen
to earn a return on their investments, financial per-
formance indicators are likely to absorb more of
management’s attention. Social mission-oriented
benchmarks often have a less vocal constituency to
pressure management to adhere to the MFI’s
avowed social objectives. It is often the MFI’s board
that takes responsibility for focusing management’s
sustained attention on maintaining the social mis-
sion. Accordingly, the board shares responsibility
for adopting and refining indicators to monitor the
MFI’s social performance. This is complicated,
however, by the lack of consensus within the micro-
finance industry on reliable indicators of social mis-
sion performance. 
Annex 7E, Checklist for Ownership and Gover-
nance, provides a summary checklist for use by
transforming MFIs in selecting potential investors
and ensuring competent governance.
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Annex 7A Sample Terms of
Reference: Advisory Services on
Ownership and Governance
Background
Background on the organization including its
mission, target market, client outreach, portfolio
size, and so forth.
Objectives
The objective is to assist MFI A to develop appro-
priate selection criteria as well as strategies for
sourcing and securing new investors to meet trans-
formation requirements. If applicable, the consult-
ant should also recommend strategies for divesting
a portion of ownership to the employees. Finally,
the consultant should provide information to
strengthen the board of directors to enable the
members to provide sufficient strategic support as
MFI A transforms as well as after transformation. 
Tasks
The consultant will, in close coordination with the
CEO and General Manager,
1. Develop strategies for securing new investors.
Specific tasks include
a. Discuss with current board and senior man-
agement the various types of investor profiles
and determine preferred potential investor
profile. Given the financial and technical
demands of operating as a regulated MFI, an
ideal investor is one with “deep pockets” or
that has the capacity to inject capital, if
required, and technical expertise that will be
of benefit to the company.
b. Develop a list of potential investors.
c. Prepare a draft prospectus jointly with staff
based on MFI A’s business plan to use as a
marketing tool; prepare various scenario
analyses to assist in developing the appropri-
ate capital structure.
d. Draft an initial term sheet for negotiations.
2. Explore the possibility of an Employee share
ownership plan (ESOP). Specific tasks include
a. Review staff financial capacity with regard to
compensation and incentive system.
b. Interview staff to assess level of understand-
ing and responsiveness to employee share
ownership.
c. Propose options for issuing shares.
d. Propose the structure of an ESOP.
e. Propose a trust, or other body to hold shares.
3. Develop strategy for developing or restructuring
the board and revising procedures. Specific tasks
include
a. Recommend additional expertise required to
strengthen the board in line with capacity
requirements.
b. Determine number of seats for the board.
c. Recommend rules relating to the representa-
tion of new shareholders on the board.
d. Recommend committee structure and deter-
mine which committees are advised.
Deliverables
1. Recommendations on securing new investors,
including, but not limited to, appropriate capital
structure and investor profile
2. Draft prospectus
3. Proposal for an ESOP (if determined appro-
priate)
4. Strategy for developing and restructuring the
board
5. Completion report summarizing the findings
and recommendations of the consultancy, high-
lighting follow-on activities
Timing
The consultancy is expected to take 15 to 20 days
to complete.
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Governance
15. Board of directors
16. Board meetings
17. Board voting rights and procedures
Subsequent Sales of Shares
18. Sale of shares
19. Agreements regarding exit strategies
Financial and Accounting Practices
20. Financial and accounting policies
Operating and Credit Policies
21. Operating policies
22. Target market
Coordination of Activities
23. Activities of investee (regulated MFI)
24. Activities of investee with affiliated parties
(such as original NGO or other shareholders)
Dispute Resolution and Governing Law
25. Agreed manner and procedures for resolving
disputes among parties
26. Governing law to be applied to designated
documentation
Annex 7B Sample Term Sheet
Outline
1. Issuer or Investee
2. Offering (amount and type)
3. Initial closing date
4. Sponsors/investors/shareholders
Company Purpose
5. Investee’s company purpose
Legal Structure of Investee
6. Incorporation
7. Licensing process
Capital and Share Subscriptions
8. Capital
9. Number of shareholders
10. Capitalization of the investee
11. Payment timetable (dates of initial and subse-
quent capital contributions)
12. Payment of subscriptions (amounts and form)
Shareholders Meeting
13. Shareholders meetings
14. Shareholder voting rights and procedures
Table 7B.1 The shares of the investee’s capital stock will be distributed between
the shareholders as follows:
Number of Percentage
Shareholder shares shareholding Local value U.S.$ value
MFI NGO
MFI ESOP
MFI founder
Technical partners
Investor A
Investor B
Socially responsible
investment funds
Investor C
Investor D
TOTAL
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Annex 7C Discounted Cash Flow
Valuation
Two basic elements are required to perform a dis-
counted cash flow valuation: the appropriate dis-
count rate and the appropriate cash flows.16
The Discount Rate
The discount rate is usually based on the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), according to which
ErMFI  rf  MFI[ErM  rf]
where
• ErMFI is the discount rate for the MFI
• rf is the risk free rate, or the return required by
investors in riskless assets
• MFI is the beta, or the correlation of the MFI’s
returns to the overall market’s return
• [ErM  rf] is the equity risk premium, or the dif-
ference in returns between what an equity
investor in the market as a whole expects and the
risk free rate
In developed equity markets much data are avail-
able that may be drawn upon to calculate the dis-
count rate. However, even in developed markets
determining these variables is more of an art than a
science. In emerging markets with less data avail-
able, the challenges are much greater. In some
countries, the CAPM may be impossible to calcu-
late and the local bank rate may provide a more
appropriate rate for the discount rate.
Risk free rate. The risk free rate should reflect
returns on investments that match the equity
investment horizon as closely as possible for which
there is no default risk and no reinvestment risk. In
developed markets, 10-year inflation-protected
government bonds are typically used. In emerging
markets, government debt carries significant default
risk and often significant reinvestment risk. Some
solutions are as follows:
• Use the rate that the most risk-less companies in
the country pay on local currency debt and then
adjust the rate slightly higher to reflect the fact
that these companies still have default risk
(Damodaran n.d.); or
• Use the U.S. risk-free rate, and then add on a
country risk spread between U.S. treasuries and
local government comparable bonds.
Beta. The beta reflects how a given company’s
returns correlate to the overall market’s returns. In
developed markets this is typically calculated using
a regression analysis of the market price of stock
and a market index (S&P 500, NYSE composite,
or the like) over a period. This information is
almost never available in MFI transactions. It is
possible to calculate an accounting beta by analyz-
ing the fluctuation of the company’s net income
relative to the market. It is also possible to use an
average of betas from comparable firms, adjusting
for differences in leverage between the comparable
firms and the firm being valued. However, it is
difficult to find firms comparable to MFIs that
have market prices. Usually, betas from small
financial institutions in developed markets are used
as a benchmark.
Equity risk premium. The equity risk premium that
investors have historically required is typically used
as the best measure of what investors expect equity
to return in the future. Generally, this is measured
by the historic spread between the geometric aver-
age return to stocks over the risk free rate. The
historical equity risk premium is calculated based
on the equity returns from large companies listed
on major stock exchanges. Therefore, many valua-
tion experts adjust the equity risk premium up to
reflect additional return that investors in small
companies expect.
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Illiquidity discount. Most MFI shares are very
illiquid. According to Damodaran, “studies of
returns in developed markets suggest that rest-
ricted (and therefore illiquid) stock traded at dis-
counts of 25 to 35 percent” (Damodaran 2005a,
p. 35). Many valuation experts apply such a dis-
count to illiquid assets—however, there is some
research that suggests that this discount is too
high. Also note that the equity risk premium for
small companies should cover a portion of the
illiquidity discount.
Minority discount. Significant empirical evidence
indicates that investors “apply control premiums in
private company transactions, ranging from 15 to
20 percent for a majority stake; conversely, this
translates into an equivalent discount for a minority
stake” (Damodaran 2005b, p. 58). However, little
research supports this practice. Lack of control
clearly reduces value, but measuring control is diffi-
cult. In countries with strong protection of minori-
ty interest, such discounts should be less. With high
performing MFIs, the value of control is less than in
troubled companies.
Cash Flows
Cash flows are derived from the MFI’s projections.
These projections should reflect a reasonable sce-
nario, because downside cases should be covered by
the discount rate rather than the cash flows. The
projections period should take the company to a
relatively stable period of growth. Dividends pro-
jected to be paid out are often taken as the relevant
cash flows to investors. However, more properly
free cash flows to equity should be calculated taking
into account.
Net income after taxes
 Depreciation
 Increases in fixed assets (“gross property,
plant and equipment”)
 After-tax interest on permanent debt
 Increases in operating net working capital
Permanent debt is typically long-term debt that
does not fund the MFI’s productive activities.
Operating net working capital includes items
such as accounts receivable, accounts payable, and
others.
Typically cash flows are projected until the MFI
reaches a stable growth period and then the termi-
nal value is calculated. This may be a projected sale
value, which may be calculated as the present value
of the sum of future cash flows into perpetuity;
however, terminal value is often estimated as a
multiple of projected book value at the end of the
period.
See example of discounted cash flow valuation in
tables 7C.1 and 7C.2.
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Table 7C.1 ABC Microfinance Projected Financial Statement
Historical Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected Projected
In local currency 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total assets 114,319 160,046 224,065 268,878 309,209 324,670 340,903 357,948 
Net loan portfolio 102,345 143,283 200,596 240,715 276,823 290,664 305,197 320,457 
Accounts receivable 2,211 2,874 3,737 4,858 6,315 8,209 10,672 13,874 
Gross property, plant, 8,648 9,513 10,464 11,510 12,662 13,928 15,320 16,853
and equipment
Depreciation 4,089 4,703 5,408 6,219 7,152 8,225 9,459 10,878
Total liabilities 87,134 129,986 193,362 235,744 272,191 283,117 293,772 307,479
Accounts payable 2,321 2,785 3,342 4,011 4,813 5,775 6,930 8,317
Permanent debt 2,000 2,000 2,000 3,000 3,000 5,000 7,000 7,000
Shareholders equity 22,864 25,275 25,360 26,123 29,205 30,777 33,201 35,153
Financial income 24,563 33,672 42,125 48,143 56,749 58,133 61,039 64,091
Financial expense 5,487 8,086 11,922 14,565 16,800 17,634 18,462 19,368
Other operating 1,354 1,567 1,876 2,234 2,362 2,988 3,348 3,348
income (net)
Provision expense 1,535 2,149 3,009 3,611 4,152 4,360 4,578 4,807
Administrative 11,258 15,618 21,664 25,275 28,236 29,066 29,909 31,405
expenses
Depreciation 533 613 705 811 933 1,073 1,234 1,419
Income before taxes 7,103 8,772 6,700 6,115 8,989 8,988 10,204 10,441
Taxes 2,131 2,632 2,010 1,834 2,697 2,696 3,061 3,132
Tax rate (percent) 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Net income after 4,972 6,140 4,690 4,280 6,292 6,292 7,143 7,308
taxes
Return on assets 4.35 4.48 2.44 1.74 2.18 1.99 2.15 2.09
(percent)
Return on equity 21.75 25.51 18.53 16.63 22.75 20.98 22.33 21.38
(percent)
Debt-to-equity 4.00 5.33 7.84 9.29 9.59 9.55 9.27 9.18
ratio
Exchange rate 5.65 6.64 7.67 8.70 9.73 10.76 11.79 12.82
Net income 4,972 6,140 4,690 4,280 6,292 6.292 7,143 7,308
after taxes
Dividend payout on 0 3,729 4,605 3,518 3,210 4,719 4,719 5,357
previous year’s 
income
Dividend payout 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
(percent)
Source: John Fischer, ACCION Investments, for purpose of example.
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Table 7C.2 Discounted Cash Flow Example for ABC Microfinance
INCOME APPROACH—Discounted cash flows to equity 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Periods from valuation date 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
Free cash flows to equity
Net income 6,140 4,690 4,280 6,292 6,292 7,143
 Depreciation 613 705 811 933 1,073 1,234
 After-tax interest on permanent debt 70 70 105 105 175 245
 Increases in net working capital 199 305 1,453 655 2,932 3,308
 Capital expenditures 865 951 1,046 1,151 1,266 1,393
 Terminal value — — — — — — 27,049
Free cash flows to equity $5,760 $4,209 $2,698 $5,524 $3,341 $3,921 $27,049
Discount rate multiple 1.00 0.78 0.61 0.48 0.37 0.29 0.23
Present value of cash flows $21,870 $5,760 $3,289 $1,647 $2,635 $1,245 $1,142 $6,153
Long-term growth rate 4.00%
Discount rate 27.99%
Risk-free rate of return 5.10% Long-term U.S. Treasury coupon bond yield 
Beta 0.70 Relevered beta from beta guideline companies
Market equity risk premium 7.20% Long-horizon expected equity risk premium
Small stock equity risk premium 5.10% Stock, bonds, bills, and inflation at 2004 yearbook (Ibbotson 
Country risk premium 12.75% Associates) 
Table 7C.3 Sensitivity to long-term growth rates and discount rates
Discount rate Long-term growth rate 0.50% interval
1.00% interval 3.00% 3.50% 4.00% 4.50% 5.00%
25.99% $23,129 $23,259 $23,394 $23,536 $23,684
26.99% $22,366 $22,479 $22,598 $22,721 $22,850
27.99% $21,666 $21,766 $21,870 $21,978 $22,091
28.99% $21,022 $21,110 $21,201 $21,296 $21,395
29.99% $20,428 $20,505 $20,586 $20,670 $20,757
Value indication $21,870
Source: John Fischer, ACCION Investments, for purpose of example.
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Annex 7D Sample Board Agenda 
for Transformed MFIs
The following provides an example of a board agen-
da for a transformed MFI.17
Annual Board Meeting
1. Performance to date in implementing the
strategic plan 
2. Annual plan 
3. Audit plan, including management letter from
external auditor and meeting with external
auditors 
4. Annual budget 
5. Management compensation 
6. Evaluation of management information sys-
tems (MIS)
7. Risk management parameters (credit limits,
borrowing limits, others) 
8. Staff development plans, including succession
planning 
9. Approval of financial statements 
10. Board development plans (evaluation of exist-
ing board, growing skill base, recruiting new
members)
Each Board Meeting
1. Review proposed agenda (include new items as
necessary).
2. Review minutes of last board meeting (revise as
necessary).
3. Deliver and review of management report on
action items from last board meeting.
4. Review financial performance indicators:
(a) Year to date versus plan (profit and loss,
balance sheet, key financial ratios)
(b) Asset quality (loan portfolio and any other
assets)
(c) Employee productivity
(d) Significant credit exposures (concentra-
tions by loan size, geographic distribution,
product)
(e) Problem loans
(f) Branch performance (using rating system so
that relative judgments can be made about
each branch and its operating efficiencies,
for example, profitable, break-even, loss)
(g) Other
5. Review of social mission performance indicators
(a) Year to date versus plan (size of loan port-
folio, average loan size, number of clients,
client profile, client retention, target client
outreach)
(b) Other
6. Delivery and review of market environment
report (changes in applicable laws and regula-
tions, peers’ and competitors’ performance,
new entrants to market, donor policies) 
7. Delivery and review of compliance report (how
has MFI complied with reporting requirements
of its stakeholders—donors, lenders, regula-
tors? any complaints? any delays in delivering
reports on time?) 
8. Delivery and review of treasury report 
9. Delivery and review of audit report 
10. Delivery and review of board committee
reports if not addressed above
11. Other action items
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Annex 7E Checklist for Ownership
and Governance
Investor Types
• Has the MFI’s board and senior management
developed general guidelines for the types of
investors being sought?
• Is the MFI seeking to attract strategic or finan-
cial investors, or a combination of the two?
• Are all regulatory and legal restrictions on share-
holders clearly understood, including
– restrictions on percentage ownership and for-
eign ownership,
– dividend repatriation limitations?
• Will the NGO continue to operate and if so what
will its relationship be to the new regulated entity? 
• If the NGO will become an investor in the new
regulated entity, have the board and senior man-
agement achieved consensus on the ideal per-
centage holding for the NGO? 
• Does the MFI plan to include some form of
employee ownership? Have the relevant tax and
legal implications been assessed?
Seeking Investors
• Has an investor selection plan been developed?
• Has a shareholder prospectus for the new regu-
lated MFI been developed, providing key in-
formation on the MFI’s management, history,
vision for the future (outreach, products, geo-
graphic scope, and the like), overall financial pro-
jections, and expected returns? 
• Has the prospectus been shared with prospective
investors?
• Is the MFI prepared to welcome prospective
investors, including gathering the historical
information needed for a comprehensive due
diligence process?
• Has a due diligence process been scheduled for
prospective investors?
• Has the MFI discussed issues of confidentiality
of information with the potential investors?
• Has the MFI clarified its own position on the
more critical investment negotiation issues,
including role of board in control of institution,
anticipated dividend payout policy, and options
for exit strategies?
Key Negotiation Issues 
Has the MFI determined its own position and has
agreement been reached with the prospective
investors for each of the following issues?
• Strategy for capitalization of the new institution,
including the amount needed and instruments 
• Governance assumptions: voting rights, share-
holder meetings, shareholder influence
• Management, including approval of senior
management, for day-to-day management of the
institution
• Financial policies, including dividend payout
policy, standards for bookkeeping and financial
statements, and acquisition and lease of assets
• Mission, including control of and adherence to
social mission goals 
• Dispute resolution process 
• Restrictions on transfer and various exit strate-
gies, including such clauses as drag along and tag
along rights, rights of first refusal, right of first
offer, put options, call options, and so forth
Governance
• Is the line between governance and management
clearly defined? 
• Does the MFI have a robust and meaningful
reporting system in place?
• Has the board defined an appropriate risk policy
and strategy that includes a reliable system for
monitoring?
• Has the board made effective use of third-party
reviews of the MFI’s performance and operations?
• Has the MFI developed measurable performance
benchmarks by which management’s perform-
ance can be transparently and fairly assessed?
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• Is there a climate of trust and candor?
• Does the board foster open dissent?
• Does the board rotate responsibilities among
board members to ensure a wide understanding
of the business?
• Does the board ensure individual accountability?
• Is a mechanism in place to regularly evaluate the
board’s performance?
• Are board committees working effectively?
Notes
The authors would like to thank John Fischer of
ACCION International for his very helpful comments
and additions to this chapter.
1. Note, the Financial Institutions Statute 1999 was
replaced with The Financial Institutions Act 2004.
2. MFIs may also offer preferred shares to minority
investors. This is discussed further later in the chapter.
3. In some countries, international investors are not per-
mitted to invest in financial institutions or, alterna-
tively, regulators insist on a minimum level of shares
to be held locally.
4. Some regulators will permit at least some board meet-
ings to be conducted telephonically. Holding meetings
by telephone can significantly lower the costs of a
board meeting for international investors, but if over-
used, may adversely affect the quality of the meetings.
5. See http://www.themix.org for a list of debt and
equity investors in microfinance.
6. See de Sousa-Shields and Frankiewicz for an interest-
ing discussion of asset allocation strategy. 
7. Citibank has since divested its holdings in Finamerica.
8. For a comprehensive list of investors in microfinance,
see www.themix.org. 
9. Most transformations to date have primarily issued
common stock, though there are increasing examples
of institutions issuing preferred shares to provide
investors with greater flexibility. Such shares provide
a mechanism for attracting more equity without
diluting board control among the common stock
shareholders. Depending on the terms and condi-
tions of the preferred shares, such shares may or may
not qualify as tier 1 capital. MFIs should carefully
review the regulatory framework to determine what
kind, if any, of preferred shares may count toward
tier 1 capital requirements.
10. Input provided by John Fischer, ACCION Invest-
ments in Microfinance, personal communication,
August 2005.
11. Cajas de compensacion are not-for-profit organiza-
tions in Colombia that redistribute and invest in
social services the mandatory payroll tax levied on all
Colombian companies. The recent purchase of
Finamerica included the following cajas de compen-
sacion: Colsubsidio, Cafam, and Comfandi.
12. India has recently witnessed an occurrence of various
securitization deals. The large volume of transactions
and homogeneity of loan products makes securitiza-
tion more feasible than in other countries.
13. This section was written by Deborah Burand.
14. For a thorough discussion on the role of boards, see
Natilson and Bruett (2001).
15. For more discussion of this topic, see Council of
Microfinance Equity Funds (2005).
16. This summary was provided by John Fischer,
ACCION Investments.
17. Contributed by Gail Buyske, independent consultant.
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Legal Transformation
The legal transformation of a microfinanceinstitution (MFI) is a complex and sophisti-cated transaction requiring significant expen-
ditures of resources, both human and financial. This
chapter highlights key legal issues to consider when
changing the legal form of an MFI from a nonprof-
it, unregulated institution with unspecified owners,
into a for-profit, regulated company whose owner-
ship is evidenced by shares. It addresses the general
legal issues that will affect the transformation
process. The issues are treated in the sequence of
the key decisions that often drive the transforma-
tion process. As such, some of the issues addressed
here have been highlighted in previous chapters;
this chapter, however, is intended to present a con-
solidated picture of the various legal issues facing
transforming MFIs.
This chapter faces the significant challenge of
defining in general terms legal issues that are, by
their nature, country-specific. There are sure to be
exceptions to every generalization made in this
chapter, possibly significant exceptions that could
trigger the need for further legal analysis to effect a
sensible legal transformation. Thus, the discussion
does not constitute and should not be treated as
legal advice. Any microfinance organization con-
templating a legal transformation should consult its
own counsel to advise it on the laws and regulations
that will shape this complex transaction.
The chapter begins with recommendations on
organizing the legal aspects of the transformation
process. It describes the jurisdictions whose laws are
likely to be relevant to a legal transformation and
emphasizes the important role that counsel can play
in spotting legal issues and advising MFIs intent on
transforming. The host country laws that are likely
to influence decisions of whether and how to trans-
form are surveyed as is the importance of proac-
tively managing existing contractual obligations of
transforming MFIs. Finally, the chapter addresses
crucial legal and related documentation issues likely
to arise in the course of attracting outside investors
into a transforming MFI.
Managing the Legal Aspects 
of Transformation
MFIs considering becoming regulated deposit-
taking institutions should conduct an in-depth
analysis of the legal and regulatory environment
Chapter 8
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before investing substantial time and resources in the
transformation process. Many of the important
choices regarding the transformation will be pre-
scribed by laws and regulations. A full understanding
of the scope and implications of those laws will
inform early decisions about whether to transform,
and then set direction for the transformation plan
and guide choices about legal counsel and technical
assistance. Annex 8A, Sample Checklist of Legal and
Regulatory Issues, provides a sample of key issues to
investigate when considering transformation.
Choosing Counsel
Given the complexity of the legal and regulatory
issues that accompany transformation, it is impor-
tant to retain counsel very early in the transforma-
tion process. Accordingly, local counsel should be
among the first expert advisers to be retained by a
transforming MFI.1 Typically the board members
of a transforming MFI are able to provide some rec-
ommendations for local counsel, especially if they
are based in the country where the MFI is trans-
forming. Local counsel would generally report to
senior management who in turn would advise the
board of any legal issues.
Given the various legal issues that may arise in
the process of conducting a legal transformation
and the variety of skills and knowledge necessary,
more than one lawyer will probably be required.
Therefore, it is not unusual for a transforming MFI
to choose lead counsel, typically a lawyer or law firm
charged with the responsibility for handling major
banking, corporate, tax, and securities law issues.
If all such expertise is not found within the lead
firm, lead counsel will delegate to (and manage)
other lawyers outside the lead firm in the analysis of
relevant specialized areas of law. For example,
FINCA Uganda used two Ugandan firms to advise
it on legal issues related to its transformation, com-
bining a law firm expert in Ugandan corporate,
securities, and banking law with tax counsel based
in the Ugandan offices of an international account-
ing firm.
Early in the process of selecting lead counsel,
transforming MFIs should attempt to identify the
range of potential areas of legal expertise needed to
support their transformation. As candidates for the
role of lead counsel are found, they should be asked
to indicate in which of these legal areas they are
expert, and, just as important, in which areas they
are likely to need outside legal support. If it becomes
clear that other counsel will be needed to supple-
ment the expertise of lead counsel, transforming
MFIs should also ask lead counsel candidates to
identify lawyers or other law firms that could provide
this expertise, particularly those lawyers with whom
they have worked successfully in the past. This last
line of questioning serves at least two purposes.
First, it helps the transforming MFI to identify other
candidates with legal expertise. Second, it may indi-
cate how well counsel is likely to perform the role of
lead counsel with responsibility for managing lines
of communication among an entire team of lawyers
serving the transforming MFI. 
Selecting local counsel early in the transforma-
tion process can help transforming MFIs avoid
costly mistakes. In addition, the local counsel that
guides an MFI through the process of legal trans-
formation may end up being the same counsel that
later handles complex legal issues that are outside
the competency or time constraints faced by the
transformed MFI’s in-house counsel.2 A well-
managed selection process also serves to inform
local counsel about the range of legal needs of the
transforming MFI and also serves as an opportunity
for the local lawyers of the transforming MFI to
begin identifying possible legal issues that may
require further analysis in the course of the MFI’s
legal transformation. When reviewing local counsel
candidates, another important consideration is the
extent to which such counsel is likely to inspire con-
fidence in not only the MFI’s senior management
and governing board, but also in outside investors
because these investors—local and international—
might require the MFI’s local counsel to offer local
legal opinions regarding the legality, validity, and
enforceability of certain investment documentation. 
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Given the newness of many of the specialized
laws and regulations being applied to microfinance
deposit-taking institutions, few local legal practi-
tioners will have much experience in interpreting
such laws and regulations. This lack of experienced
legal advisers, combined with the limited applicable
experience found within the regulatory authority
charged with implementing these new laws and reg-
ulations, can cause even the most optimistic MFI
managers to question whether to transform. How-
ever, waiting until there is absolute legal clarity is
not usually a realistic option. Legal and regulatory
risk is something that all regulated financial ins-
titutions face no matter where they operate, be it
Uganda, Uruguay, or the United States. Moreover,
some transforming MFIs believe that where there is
legal or regulatory uncertainty, it is better to be
one of the first institutions to transform to help
guide and establish the precedents being adopted
by the local authorities who will implement these
new laws and regulations. Time will tell whether
being a market leader is strategically sound.
Negotiating Counsel Fees 
Another issue that can add to the complexity of hir-
ing legal counsel is the question of fees. The trans-
forming MFI may have difficulty anticipating the
full range of legal support it will need in the course
of its transformation, especially when initial fee
negotiations take place with local counsel. For law
firms that prefer to bill on an hourly basis, the risk
to the MFI is that the billing clock will race out of
control and it may end up with a much larger legal
bill than anticipated. This is particularly likely to
happen if there is no clarity within the MFI about
who has the authority to request legal advice from
counsel. Lawyers, on the other hand, are reluctant
to negotiate a fixed fee, as opposed to hourly
charges, if they cannot delineate a detailed (and
often narrow) scope of work describing the legal
services they will be offering for the fixed fee.
One approach that some transforming MFIs
have taken when negotiating legal fees is to estab-
lish a cap on the overall amount of fees that will be
charged for producing a defined set of deliverables
as outlined in a detailed scope of work. This
approach tries to accommodate both the MFI’s
need for cost controls and the legal counsel’s need
to be reimbursed for the time it spends on a given
issue. This approach also forces an early discussion
of the kind of information and advice that will be
rendered by legal counsel within a defined scope of
work. While this conversation can be difficult,
because MFIs will try to broaden the scope of work
and legal counsel will try to narrow it, it is always
easier to have this discussion before, rather than
after, legal work is done and the bill for services is
submitted. It also puts the onus on counsel to initi-
ate additional dialogue with the MFI if and when
the scope of legal work expands beyond what was
originally anticipated. 
A third approach is to arrange to pay counsel on
a retainer basis. While there are many variations
on how retainer arrangements are structured, the
underlying principle is for the client to pay an
agreed amount for a set period during which coun-
sel agrees to make him or herself available to
respond to whatever needs the client has that are
within the counsel’s technical realm of competence.
Retainer arrangements tend to be used more often
for ongoing legal advisory relationships than for
complex transactional advice. Accordingly, certain
aspects of the legal transformation may lend them-
selves better to retainer arrangements than others.
For example, survey work done to map out the host
country’s legal and regulatory regime under which
a transformation might take place is more amenable
to retainer arrangements than the legal work that
would be involved in structuring and documenting
a complex Shareholder Agreement among multiple
investors. 
MFIs should also negotiate up front with their
legal counsel how administrative costs and expenses
related to legal advisory services will be shared.
Some law firms run their administrative and support
services as profit centers so clients can sometimes be
very surprised by the costs billed to them for items
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such as photocopying, phone calls, and delivery
services.
Annex 8B, Sample Terms of Reference: Hiring
Local Counsel to Support Legal Transformation,
provides Sample Terms of Reference that might be
adapted by transforming MFIs to guide their dis-
cussions with local counsel about the range of ini-
tial legal services that may be needed to support
legal transformation.
Surveying the Legal and 
Regulatory Landscape
Each jurisdiction has a unique set of laws and regu-
lations that will define the basic options for trans-
forming the legal structure of an MFI. Each juris-
diction organizes those laws and regulations in
different ways, and with varying degrees of clarity
regarding precedent and application.3 The follow-
ing discussion addresses basic legal issues that are
likely to govern the transformation process in most
jurisdictions.
Whose Laws Matter?
Transforming an MFI requires navigation through
a sometimes uncertain and complex landscape of
laws and regulations. It is therefore important to
identify early on the legal jurisdictions that will
govern the process. Most applicable laws and regu-
lations are found in the country where the transfor-
mation is taking place, that is, where the transform-
ing MFI will be incorporated and subject to
prudential bank regulation (referred to here as the
“host country”). However, when foreign stake-
holders such as equity investors, lenders, and
donors are involved with the transforming institu-
tion, the laws of other countries—those where for-
eign stakeholders are incorporated or resident—
may also be relevant to the analysis. For example,
foreign nonprofit organizations that plan to take an
equity shareholding in a newly transformed institu-
tion may need to analyze the impact of such a share-
holding on their tax-exempt status under their
country’s law. Similarly, the tax treatment of cross-
border payments by the transforming MFI to its
foreign investors (debt and equity) may vary
according to the terms of the bilateral tax treaty, if
any, between the host country of the transforming
MFI and the country where the cross-border pay-
ment is to be made. Even the laws and regulations
governing the conduct of bilateral donor agencies
may affect the capital structure or investor-seeking
strategies of a transforming MFI that has received
grant funds from such a donor.4
Forms of Legal Organization with
Authorization to Provide Financial Services
Many MFIs that begin as nonprofit organizations
are organized under local foundation laws or chari-
table organization laws. While the laws and regula-
tions governing transformed institutions vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, nonprofit MFIs are typ-
ically required by bank regulatory authorities to
change their legal form before they can be licensed
to take deposits from the public.5 Legal research
should begin with a survey of the various legal
forms of organization available to the transforming
MFI, including the authorization assigned to each
legal form related to financial intermediation, the
applicable supervisory regimes, and the criteria for
organization (registration process, licensing criteria,
ownership, governance, staffing, capital require-
ments, and the like).
Bank regulatory authorities are generally con-
cerned about the legal form deposit-taking institu-
tions take because they want to ensure that such
institutions have a clear ownership structure with
ownership rights defined by shares. A clear owner-
ship structure allows bank supervisors to impose
corrective actions on a weak deposit-taking institu-
tion and, very important, to hold the institution’s
owners accountable for responding to such actions,
including in some cases, providing additional
capital commensurate with their existing ownership
share.
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A growing number of countries are adopting or
considering the adoption of a multitiered regulato-
ry approach that applies a specialized prudential
bank regulatory regime to the conduct of microfi-
nance that reflects the varying risks different types
of microfinance services pose to the financial system
as a whole. See chapter 2, Regulation and Supervi-
sion: The Policy Framework, for further discussion.
Ideally, MFIs operating in such a system would be
able to transition from one tier to the next. This
tiered approach often presumes that MFIs will be
relatively unencumbered (other than in addressing
prudential regulatory concerns) in evolving and
transitioning from one tier to the next. However,
nonbank regulatory issues can cause such transi-
tions to stall. For example, corporate or securities
laws may inadvertently prevent MFIs from seam-
lessly transitioning from one legal form to another
without incurring significant expense or disrupting
existing business operations. Given that much of
microfinance is based on relationship lending,
putting even a momentary halt to lending opera-
tions to conform with corporate or securities law
requirements usually is not feasible. As a result,
MFIs intent on transforming may find themselves at
odds with host country laws and regulations that
never contemplated such corporate changes (see
box 8.1). 
In some situations, rather than establish a new
shareholding company, MFIs may decide to either
purchase a shell financial company or merge with an
existing financial institution. In such a case, the
transforming MFI needs to know what legal issues
to be aware of and should conduct a due diligence
exercise on the existing company. The transforming
MFI will also need to engage legal counsel to deter-
mine what documentation is required to complete
the merger and ultimate transfer of assets from the
NGO to the company.
Also important in evaluating various options is to
begin estimating the burden and costs of complying
with the prudential regulatory regime applied to
each legal form once the MFI begins to take
deposits. This is the time to determine whether
existing or potential competitors are likely to be
subject to similar regulatory requirements. How
level is the regulatory playing field for those inter-
ested in serving a similar customer base? If it is
uneven, what is the likely impact of these differing
regulatory burdens on the transforming MFI’s abil-
ity to maintain or grow its market share in relation
to competitors that are facing different, perhaps
more favorable, levels of regulation? 
Box 8.1 Transformation and Host 
Country Laws and Regulations
In Uganda, most MFIs are registered as NGOs
under the Nongovernmental Organizations Act
or as “companies limited by guarantee” under
the Companies Act (or as both). Others are reg-
istered as savings and credit cooperatives under
the Co-operatives Act. To apply to become a
deposit-taking institution, applicants must be
organized as companies limited by shares (a form
of limited liability company with share capital)
before the Bank of Uganda will entertain their
applications to become deposit-taking MFIs. This
requirement caused some transforming MFIs in
Uganda to worry about the time and expense
(including tax consequences) of unwinding own-
ership and shareholding structures if they are not
subsequently approved by the Bank of Uganda. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic, the National Bank of
Kyrgyzstan requires all microfinance companies
(the legal form of specialized finance and credit
institution permitted to offer microcredit and
take time deposits to fund such lending activi-
ties) to be organized as joint stock companies.
Formation documents of the applicant and its
state registration certificate must be submitted
to the National Bank as part of its license appli-
cation. Effectively this means that, as in Uganda,
all applicants for a license to operate as a micro-
finance company in the Kyrgyz Republic must
first become a joint stock company before sub-
mitting their license applications for review by
the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan. 
Source: Author. 
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Tax Laws
The host country’s tax laws will also shape the way
an MFI chooses to transform its legal form.
Because tax law is rarely neutral in its response to
the manner by which a legal transformation is
effected, tax planning and advice is important
before the change in legal form is undertaken. For
example, tax laws may influence how assets are
transferred (see chapter 5, Strategic and Business
Planning). A transfer is likely to trigger a number
of “transaction” taxes related to the transfer of
assets from the original company to the new
company. Some of these taxes can (but do not
always) include
• Capital gains taxes payable by the original com-
pany for the “gains” it realizes during the sale of
premises or shares to the new company
• Transactional tax (or stamp duties) on
conveyance of assets (including, possibly, the
entire loan portfolio transferred to the new
company)
• Income taxes payable by the new company if any
assets are transferred to it without delivery of
commensurate consideration for those assets (for
example, if a loan portfolio is given or donated
to the new company instead of sold to it for
shares, debt, or cash) 
Other assets such as office equipment, vehicles,
and even buildings may also need to be trans-
ferred to the new entity. In each case, MFI
management should integrate these asset transfers
into the overall asset transfer strategy and also
should seek an analysis of the tax implications of
such transfers to determine if they will give rise to
unexpected tax obligations (see box 8.2).
Establishing a credible fair market value for those
nonfinancial assets being transferred is also
important to protect the transferor and transferee
from future scrutiny by tax or bank regulatory
authorities.
Labor Laws
Labor laws also need to be addressed when chang-
ing an institution’s legal form. For MFIs that are
simply reorganizing or for MFIs planning to create
or buy a new company but expecting to continue to
conduct front-office operations out of the original
NGO, these labor law issues may be less substantial
because few or no staff members are being trans-
ferred from one institution to the next. MFIs trans-
ferring much of their staff to the regulated entity
may face substantial financial liabilities (tax, pen-
sion, and so on) that could be triggered by the ter-
mination of positions even if all staff members are
being immediately reassigned to the new entity. 
Box 8.2 Kyrgyz Microfinance Law
The specialized Kyrgyz law on microfinance
provides that shares of a deposit-taking microfi-
nance institution may be issued only in return for
cash. As a result, it is impossible to exchange an
existing loan portfolio for shares in the new
deposit-taking company. One possible rationale
for such a provision is to avoid confusion or
disagreement over the appropriate valuation of
transferred loan portfolios and, thus, the
resulting valuation of new share issuances. 
A potential solution to this problem is for the
transferor to “donate” most of its loan portfolio
to the new company. However, that solution is
very tax disadvantaged because Kyrgyz tax
authorities are likely to treat such a donation as
taxable income of the transferee and thus
subject to a 30 percent profits or income tax. As
a result, loan portfolio transfers from one institu-
tion to another can take a much more compli-
cated and lengthy route than might be expected,
particularly where cash proceeds of loan
repayments are applied on a rolling basis, by the
transferor, as consideration for shares in the new
company. 
Source: Author.
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Managing Constituent Documents
and Preexisting Obligations 
An MFI in the course of a legal transformation usu-
ally must amend or adopt new constituent docu-
ments (such as the certificate of incorporation,
articles of association, and bylaws) and add investor
agreements. These governing documents may have
different names in different jurisdictions, but their
basic functions are the same—they provide the cor-
poration its legal existence under the laws of the
jurisdiction in which it is incorporated and set out
the rules that apply to the corporation’s governance
structure, its internal management, and the collec-
tive agreements of its shareholders.6
Constituent Documents
Even where a legal transformation is effected by the
reorganization of a preexisting entity rather than
the establishment of a new entity, the transform-
ing MFI will still likely need to amend its existing
constituent documents. In both cases—a preexist-
ing entity or a new entity—these changes are often
motivated by factors ranging from responses to
requirements of regulatory authorities in the host
country to the transforming MFI’s new owner-
ship structure and business objectives. The kinds
of changes that are required will vary by jurisdic-
tion, but the following general guidelines will be
indicative.
Company charter. The constituting document of
the transformed MFI, usually the charter, typically
establishes the company’s name,7 the company’s
purpose, amount of authorized shares, and the
number of directors. Some transforming MFIs give
great thought to the language used in their charters
to describe their companies’ purposes. To some
extent this may reflect the broader discussions that
often take place over whether and how to modify
the transforming MFI’s mission statement once the
transformation is completed. And in some jurisdic-
tions this is prompted by host country regulators
that may require the transformed MFI to include
some reference to its broader social purpose or
products in the constituent documents.
Thus, the regulated MFI’s mission statement
may be included in the constituent documents or
other investment documentation. However, in
jurisdictions where the doctrine of ultra vires8
applies, it may make sense to opt for a broader com-
pany purpose than that currently contemplated by
the transformed MFI’s mission statement. In those
jurisdictions that adhere to the ultra vires doctrine,
company acts (acts the regulated entity carries out)
or acts of the company’s agents may be overturned
as void or voidable if it is found that such acts were
outside the scope of the company’s business pur-
pose as expressed in its constituent documents.
Similarly, because mission statements may change
from time to time, it may be wise not to include
them in constituent documents that are hard or
time consuming to amend. 
In addition to a mission statement, social goals
that define the target market and, in some cases,
specify guidelines for loan portfolio or client may
also be included in the constituent documents of
the MFI, such as its charter, particularly if required
by the regulators.9 An example of one such clause
would be
[MFI A] will not modify the nature or the
scope of the Project [typically defined in
the Shareholder Agreement], nor will it make
any significant change in the activities or oper-
ations of its business, so that at any time at
least 50 percent of the loan portfolio under its
management will be provided for the financ-
ing of small and micro entrepreneurs defined
as those businesses with less than . . .
The key, of course, in negotiating such language
is to strike the right balance. The language should
not curtail too severely the MFI’s ability to respond
to the changing market it serves. 
252 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
Company bylaws. The company’s bylaws will typi-
cally set out the rules for how the transformed MFI
will be run. Bylaws usually will specify the duties of
officers, appointment of corporate and board com-
mittees, election of directors, and rules and proce-
dures governing share transfers. The MFI’s bylaws
should also outline the conditions under which div-
idends can be paid. Because many of these issues
will be subject to bank regulatory standards or
requirements, a good starting place for drafting
bylaws is to first look at the prudential bank regula-
tory regime that will be imposed on the trans-
formed MFI to make sure that the proposed bylaws
are consistent with this regime. 
A transforming MFI will likely revisit many times
the question of which provisions governing investor
rights should be addressed in the constituent docu-
ments and which investor rights should be
addressed in investment documentation such as the
Shareholder Agreement. In some jurisdictions, local
law may require that investor rights and obligations
be addressed in the constituent documents to be
enforceable.10
Preexisting Contractual Obligations
The term legal due diligence refers to an exhaustive
review of all existing and, in some cases, prior legal
agreements that may affect or be affected by the
organizational change. Most nonprofit organiza-
tions have never had cause to conduct a legal due
diligence exercise. To ensure that the legal transfor-
mation does not disrupt existing contractual obliga-
tions, each contractual agreement to which the MFI
is party should be reviewed in detail. MFIs that are
pursuing purchase of or merger with an existing
nonbank financial company should also conduct
such a review for contracts of the existing company.
The agreements that may arise in a legal due dili-
gence exercise include these:
• Grant agreements
• Mortgages
• Credit agreements (where the MFI is the
borrower)
• Pledge agreements (where assets of the MFI
have been pledged to secure the MFI’s
borrowings)
• Guarantee agreements or related reimbursement
agreements (if the MFI is the beneficiary of a
third-party guarantee and the MFI has agreed to
reimburse the guarantor should the guarantee
ever be called)
• Leases
• Licensing agreements
• Service agreements
• Agency agreements (if the MFI has agreed to act
as the paying agent for other service providers
such as insurance providers)
• Vendor agreements
• Employee contracts
• The MFI’s own form of loan agreements with its
clients
Careful due diligence will prevent the inconven-
ience of a counterparty claiming that his or her loan
agreement, lease agreement, pledge agreement,
grant agreement, or the like has been violated by
the change in legal form or asset transfer of the
transformed MFI. Moreover, a violation of some
contracts may trigger cross-defaults in other con-
tractual obligations of the transformed MFI, pre-
cipitating a domino-like fall that will worry regula-
tors and stakeholders, and possibly other existing
and potential counterparties. Consequently, coun-
sel should be hired to conduct the legal due dili-
gence and it should be carried out early in the
process and comprehensively. The MFI (with coun-
sel) should also maintain accurate records of the
documents counsel has reviewed so these records
can be disclosed or form the basis of a future legal
opinion that may be required to give comfort to
outside investors that the legal transformation will
not violate any existing contractual arrangements of
the transforming MFI. Thus, the MFI should build
in lead time for receiving all necessary consents,
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waivers, and amendments to existing contractual
agreements. 
Liability transfers can be nearly as complicated as
asset transfers, particularly if the MFI has any out-
standing debt financings at the time of its transfor-
mation. A legal transformation may cause a bor-
rowing MFI to breach standard loan covenants
such as provisions that prohibit or severely curtail
disposal of the MFI’s assets, or prohibit mergers
and other significant changes in the management or
underlying business of the borrowing MFI. The act
of taking deposits may also result in the borrowing
MFI being unable to meet certain financial or debt
ratios previously agreed on with its lenders. 
Moreover, lenders do not always understand or
appreciate the rationale for a transformation, nor
might they be particularly well-informed about the
impact of a transformation on the quality and legal
priority of their outstanding loans to the MFI. As a
result, MFIs should be prepared to explain to their
lenders the ramifications of the legal and opera-
tional transformation on their outstanding borrow-
ings. While some lenders may take comfort in learn-
ing that the borrowing MFI is soon to be subject to
formal regulation and supervision, others may be
surprised to learn that once the transformed MFI
starts taking deposits, unsecured loans to the trans-
formed MFI are likely to be legally subordinated by
regulatory authorities to these depositors’ claims.
Other lenders may even take the opportunity of
the liability transfer to try to improve their position
relative to the borrowing MFI. In one case of an
MFI undergoing an asset and liability transfer in
preparation for transformation into a deposit-taking
institution, a lender conditioned its consent to the
transfer of its loan on a significant renegotiation and
changes aimed at improving the lender’s position in
certain key financial terms in the underlying loan
obligation. Had the loan not been so sizeable, and
had the lender not represented such an important
relationship to the MFI, the MFI might have sim-
ply prepaid the outstanding loan and ended the
borrowing relationship.
Of course, prepaying a loan is only possible if the
MFI has excess cash or access to another source of
financing (such as new investor capital) that it can
use for such prepayment. Also, some lenders are not
willing to allow a prepayment and will make sure
that their loan documents contractually prohibit
prepayments (or, at the very least, do not expressly
permit any prepayment). Still other lenders may
impose a significant financial penalty on any MFI
borrower wishing to prepay all or part of its out-
standing loan obligations. Should this be the case,
the cost of the transformation will clearly increase. 
One way to minimize this situation is to discuss
with all lenders, at the time the terms of new loans
are being negotiated, the likelihood that a legal
transformation will take place during the life of the
loan and to include in the loan documentation
the lender’s prior consent to a transfer of the loan at
such time to the new entity (see box 8.3). If that
prior consent is not possible, the borrowing MFI
should attempt to minimize the financial penalties
that would be imposed upon prepayment. Even if
the lender is unwilling to document its consent to
a transfer of its loan at such an early date, having
had the discussion with the lender before the loan
is disbursed may pave the way for a smoother nego-
tiation when the time comes for the liability to be
transferred or assumed by the new company.
If assets of the original MFI have been pledged as
collateral for a loan, it may not be enough to get the
lender’s consent to simply move the loan obligation
from the original company to the new company.
The lender may also need to consent to the transfer
of the pledged loan portfolio. An asset transfer con-
ducted in a series of transactions may pose the
added challenge of maintaining the proper balance
of debt and collateral (see chapter 5, Strategic and
Business Planning). The transitional period is likely
to make many secured lenders queasy and may
result in a long negotiation as the parties attempt to
reach agreement on the actual timing of the liability
transfer and related collateral transfer. Annex 8A,
Sample Checklist of Legal and Regulatory Issues,
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includes a sample checklist of issues to consider
when entering into loan agreements in which the
borrower is an MFI that anticipates transforming
during the life of the loan.
Negotiating Investor Documents 
Most MFIs that adopt a shareholder structure will
want to attract new equity investors. The trans-
forming MFI must know the legal and regulatory
requirements of its host country that are likely to
affect the investment appetite of its targeted
investors. Such knowledge will help the MFI
propose investment structures and exit strategies to
meet its potential investors’ needs and interests.
Annex 8A includes a list of issues that local counsel
should review and discuss with the transforming
MFI before negotiations commence with potential
equity investors.
Preparing for Negotiations 
with New Shareholders
As discussed in chapter 7, Ownership and Gover-
nance, potential investors will want to conduct cus-
tomary due diligence before making an investment
decision. From the investor’s perspective, the
purpose of due diligence is to fully understand the
business of the MFI, including its markets, cus-
tomers, financial condition, legal position, and all
other significant risks inherent in the business. This
understanding can only be reached by undertaking
a thorough examination of the MFI. At the same
time, the MFI has equal interest in conducting due
diligence of its own on potential investors. Not only
should the MFI be comfortable that its potential
investors are able to finance and close on any capi-
tal contribution commitments they make, but given
recent money laundering and antiterrorist financing
concerns, the MFI should also understand the iden-
tity and reputation of its potential investors and
their funding sources.
Before entering into negotiations with any
potential investor or allowing any due diligence
exercise to begin, the MFI should develop a stan-
dard confidentiality agreement for all potential
investors to sign. The agreement should oblige
each potential investor (and its agents) to keep con-
fidential any information provided in connection
with the due diligence process, and commit the
investors to not use the information for any purpose
other than to evaluate the potential investment.
The transforming MFI should learn all host coun-
try restrictions on ownership that might affect its
potential investors before entering negotiations.
Box 8.3 Possible Prepayment Clause
The following is an example of a prepayment
clause that might be used in a loan agreement to
allow an MFI borrower to prepay all or part of
the outstanding principal amount of loan (called
here the “Advance[s]”) and all accrued interest
thereon: 
The Borrower may, upon at least__business
days’ notice to the Lender (which notice shall be
irrevocable) stating the proposed date and
aggregate principal amount of the prepayment,
and if such notice is given, the Borrower shall,
prepay the outstanding principal amount of the
Advances in whole or ratably in part, together
with accrued interest to the date of such prepay-
ment on the principal amount prepaid; provided,
however, that if any prepayment of an Advance
is made on a date other than the last day of an
interest period for such Advance, the Borrower
shall also pay any amounts required to compen-
sate the Lender for any additional losses, costs, or
expenses that it may reasonably incur as a result
of such prepayment, including, without limita-
tion, any loss, cost, or expense incurred by reason
of the liquidation or reemployment of deposits
or other funds acquired by the Lender to fund or
maintain such advance. 
Source: Author.
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For example, local law may contain restrictions on
foreign ownership or require a certain minimum
percentage of ownership by nationals or residents
(see box 8.4). Local law may impose restrictions on
voting rights of foreign owners. Similarly, other less
direct laws and regulations may dissuade potential
investors from investing in a transforming MFI,
such as tax benefits that accrue to the MFI or its
investors only if certain local ownership or manage-
ment requirements are met, or notification and
registration requirements imposed on foreign
investments but not similarly required of local
investments. The MFI needs to be aware of these
limits or restrictions before it seeks foreign
investors, rather than late in the negotiations after
significant expense and time have been invested by
all parties.
Where distinctions are made in the host coun-
try’s laws and regulations between the benefits and
obligations imposed on local and foreign investors,
local counsel should advise on what solutions or
ownership structures could be used to minimize
such disparity. In some cases, for example, it may be
that local nominees can be used to hold the equity
interest of foreign investors in trust without trig-
gering the disparity in treatment accorded to for-
eign investors. Of course, this type of nominee
ownership must also be approved by the MFI’s
bank regulatory authorities.
Advice of local counsel will be critical for the
development of suitable documentation for invest-
ment transactions in the transformed MFI. Before
engaging potential investors, the MFI should be
clear about which documents are necessary for
the transaction, and which provisions should be
specified in which document.
The investment documentation can take several
forms. Most common is the Shareholder Agree-
ment. In many jurisdictions, most of the necessary
documentation will be contained in this one agree-
ment. All existing shareholders and the new
investors will sign it. The documentation may also
be divided among several agreements. For example,
sometimes the initial shareholders and the new
investors will enter into a Stock Purchase Agree-
ment (see explanation below) that governs the sale
of shares, and limit the Shareholder Agreement’s
scope to addressing issues related to how share-
holders will conduct themselves once their initial
allotment of shares has been issued. 
Shareholder Agreement
A Shareholder Agreement is a highly customized
document that defines the objectives and mission of
the company and its governance structure and
defines the particular objectives and concerns of the
various shareholders who are party to the agree-
ment. It also reflects the requirements of the host
country law where the investment is being made.
Shareholder Agreements typically attempt to inject
stability and rules of engagement into what may
otherwise be an uncertain investment. Often the
exercise of negotiating a Shareholder Agreement
provides the parties important insights into differ-
ing shareholder attitudes about key business issues. 
A primary objective of the Shareholder Agree-
ment is to spell out the rights and responsibilities of
the shareholders in relation to each other and also
in relation to the governing body of the company,
Box 8.4 Foreign Investment in India
The government of India allows foreign equity
investment in nonbanking finance companies
(NBFCs) subject to a ceiling of 51 percent and a
minimum amount of U.S.$500,000. MFIs feel that
this amount is on the high side. For full foreign
ownership of NBFCs, the minimum amount pre-
scribed by the government is U.S.$5 million,
which is considered out of reach for the microfi-
nance sector. As a result, not many investors are
reportedly showing interest in equity contribu-
tions to microfinance NBFCs.
Source: Staschen and Bhattacharjee 2004.
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its board of directors. The Shareholder Agreement
defines the rights and obligations associated with
different classes of shares, and clarifies the obliga-
tions of the different classes of shareholders in cases
of regulatory intervention or bankruptcy (see chap-
ter 6, The Funding Structure, for further discus-
sion). The Shareholder Agreement also attempts to
ensure that shareholders act appropriately with
respect to the investment’s interest. 
The following describes some of the more signif-
icant issues normally addressed in Shareholder
Agreements: 
Shareholder meetings. The investment documen-
tation typically outlines the procedures for share-
holders’ meetings. As with all of these issues, host
country law may set forth certain requirements with
respect to shareholders’ meetings, such as the min-
imum number of meetings, location of meetings,
and the like. However, where host country law is
silent, the shareholders must address at least the
following issues:
• When and how often will shareholders meet?
• Who has the right to call meetings?
• When can special meetings be called (by whom
and for what purpose)?
• What advance notice must be given to share-
holders of meetings? (Can such rights to notice
be waived, through attendance or by written
waiver or both?)
• What constitutes a quorum to make binding
decisions (presence of shareholders or their nom-
inees representing a simple majority of all share
capital)?
• Under what circumstances, if any, will share-
holders be authorized to act without a physical
meeting? Can telephonic meetings be held (do
bank regulatory authorities permit such tele-
phonic meetings)?
Board meetings. Investment documentation will
also contain provisions to address the procedures
for board meetings. The same questions raised with
shareholders’ meetings are relevant to board of
directors’ meetings. Similarly, host country laws
may dictate some of these procedures, particularly
where there is a bank regulatory interest present.
Local counsel should be able to advise the parties
about any statutorily imposed voting requirements
obliging the parties (shareholders or board mem-
bers) to obtain more than a simple majority vote
before taking certain actions. 
Management role. Investment documentation sets
out the powers and duties of the officers of the
transformed MFI. Accordingly, investment docu-
mentation should reflect any and all host country
requirements in this regard. For example, it is not
unusual for prudential bank regulatory authorities
to describe in detail the role and functions and
necessary credentials of the internal auditor. Day-
to-day management issues requiring board involve-
ment or board approval or both, as well as the fre-
quency of communication between management
and board, should also be clearly articulated in the
Shareholder Agreement. 
Future capitalization issues. The Shareholder
Agreement spells out shareholders’ rights and obli-
gations with regard to capitalization going forward.
• Sources of financing: Other sources of financing
are likely to include borrowings and third-party
equity investments. Investors may request the
right to approve major borrowings and may
impose a desired debt-to-equity ratio on the reg-
ulated MFI. Depending on the agreement
reached with investors, the Shareholder Agree-
ment could provide, for example, that indebted-
ness over a certain amount may not be incurred
except upon receiving unanimous shareholder
approval, or supermajority, or unanimous vote of
the MFI’s board. With respect to equity invest-
ments by third parties, the key issues will sur-
round the conditions under which such equity
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investments should be permitted. The board or
all shareholders will likely have to pass resolu-
tions to authorize the MFI’s issuance of shares
and the related capital increase resulting from
these new equity investments. 
The conditions for making subsequent capital
contributions are also likely to be specified in
the investment documentation. Depending on
local law, this can be included in the constituent
documents of the transformed MFI or it may be
contained in the Shareholder Agreement.
Among other things, this will set forth whether
such contributions are voluntary or mandatory.
If such contributions are mandatory, the docu-
mentation needs to specify the consequences if a
party fails to make the mandated contribution.
Similarly, if host country supervisors have the
authority to impose mandatory capital contribu-
tions on investors, the investment documenta-
tion should reflect these relevant regulatory
requirements. 
• Liquidation rights: In the event the transformed
MFI is liquidated, the investors’ shares entitle
them to participate in the liquidation proceeds
once all outstanding liabilities of the company
have been settled and paid. Generally, rights
to the liquidation proceeds will be allocated
in line with the relative size of each investor’s
shareholdings. However, host country laws may
provide special rules for the dissolution and liq-
uidation of regulated institutions. The invest-
ment documentation should be drafted in a
manner that is consistent with these host coun-
try requirements, if any. 
• Preemptive rights: Preemptive rights typically
entitle each shareholder to participate in any
increase in the equity capital. This gives each
shareholder the right to subscribe to newly
issued shares of the company according to its
respective ownership interest, unless this right is
waived. In some jurisdictions, host country laws
give investors such preemptive rights as a matter
of law. Local counsel should be able to advise as
to whether there are any circumstances under
which statutory preemptive rights exist and
whether they can be excluded by contractual
agreement in the investment documentation.
Financial policies. Relevant financial policies that
are included in investment documentation include
dividend payment policies and the production of
financial statements.
As mentioned, the MFI’s bylaws normally out-
line the conditions under which dividends can be
paid. Some countries impose mandatory profit
retention requirements on companies. Bank reg-
ulatory authorities, as well, are often authorized
under certain specified circumstances to restrict
the payment of dividends by regulated financial
intermediaries. 
Outside of such mandated requirements on
profit retention, shareholders may also agree to
retain a certain amount of reserves within the MFI
before paying out dividends to shareholders. This
required reserve amount can be expressed a number
of ways—as an absolute amount or as a fixed per-
centage of profits, for example. The Shareholder
Agreement should specify any such agreements
entered into by the shareholders of the trans-
formed MFI.
Host country laws, particularly those imposed
on regulated financial intermediaries, are likely to
shape the provisions found in investment documen-
tation regarding the appointment of auditors and
preparation and publication of the MFI’s financial
reports. The Shareholder Agreement generally
requires that the MFI also provide a monthly finan-
cial report to the board within a set time after the
end of each month, consisting of the monthly and
year-to-date financial statements on a consolidated
basis. The board may also require quarterly budget
figures. The right to veto the approval of the com-
pany’s annual financial statements may be included
in the Shareholder Agreement. A less actively
involved investor may be satisfied with the ability to
exercise a veto right only in the event that outside
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auditors issue a qualified opinion on the financial
statements. 
Dispute resolution. One important function is to
prevent shareholder disputes from arising in the first
place, and if such disputes are unavoidable, to pro-
vide dispute resolution mechanisms that allow the
parties to avoid a protracted and costly court battle.
While it is rare for boards to face significant conflicts
(because most are resolved in numerous side com-
munications that take place outside the board
room) the lack of clear guidance on how to proceed
if such a situation should arise can leave the institu-
tion exposed to a dangerous impasse. It is therefore
important to address the rules for how to handle
disputes up front, and clearly document the process
in the Shareholder Agreement or an equivalent
document. 
The following are some of the more typical pro-
visions for dispute resolution: 
• Conciliation measures: These are among the first
steps to be taken in the event of a dispute, con-
troversy, or claim arising among the parties.
Often the parties will agree to try to settle all dis-
putes amicably and in good faith. Sometimes
they may go so far as to agree to a process by
which notice of a dispute will be communicated
to high-level executives of all parties involved in
the dispute. For example, if the dispute was
among three shareholders, high-level executives
of these three companies would be notified.
These executives then have requisite authority
within their organizations to settle the dispute.
This consultation and negotiation period has a
clear time frame in which consultations and
negotiations will take place. If after the specified
time no resolution has been reached, any
involved party may escalate the issue to the next
step—either to mediation, arbitration, or litiga-
tion.
• Mediation: At this point, an independent and
impartial mediator is selected, as is the process
for determining where the mediation will take
place, and the language in which the mediation
will be conducted. If mediation fails to result in
a resolution of the dispute within a specified
time, the parties may go to the next step—
arbitration, the hearing and determination of a
dispute by an impartial referee agreed to by both
parties, or litigation, a legal proceeding in a
court.
• Arbitration: Many parties to joint venture
agreements favor arbitration over litigation,
believing that in some countries arbitral pro-
ceedings are shorter and less vulnerable to cor-
ruption than legal proceedings. Local courts may
still become involved in the dispute, because
redress to local courts may be necessary to
enforce the resulting arbitral award. However,
when parties agree to arbitrate their disputes,
they typically are agreeing to not pursue their
claims any further and may expressly state in
writing in the Shareholder Agreement that all
awards of arbitrators will be final and binding
upon the parties to the arbitration. In this case,
the parties also agree to forgo rights of appeal
once an arbitral award is rendered.
Arbitration provisions may vary, but they gen-
erally will include rules that outline these:
– The process for appointment of arbitrators
(often each party to the dispute will appoint
one arbitrator and then a chair will be
appointed by those arbitrators)
– Place of arbitration
– Language of arbitration proceedings and all
submissions
– Agreement to treat arbitral award as binding
and conclusive
– The law governing arbitration proceedings
Not unlike court proceedings, the parties will
also have agreed that all expenses related to arbi-
tration, excluding legal fees, will be borne by the
party against whom a decision is rendered, or
apportioned in accordance with the arbitral
award if there is a compromise decision. 
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• Litigation: Given that the purpose of dispute
resolution provisions is to avoid the costly alter-
native of litigation, the processes for litigation
itself are typically not included in a Shareholder
Agreement as a dispute resolution alternative.
As noted above, parties that opt for arbitration
generally forgo their right to take the issue to
court. 
Share transfer or exit. Shareholder Agreements
typically include or refer to a buy-sell agreement
(see Stock Purchase Agreement discussion below)
that places conditions on the shareholders’ rights to
acquire or sell shares (see chapter 7, Ownership and
Governance, for a thorough discussion of options).
If the company is privately held, as are most trans-
formed MFIs, the value of the shares cannot be
easily ascertained by the “market”; therefore, the
Shareholder Agreement may provide guidelines for
share valuations for transfer or sale. 
Competition with shareholders. It is not always
easy to engage shareholders in a discussion of
whether it is appropriate for them to invest in more
than one MFI in a given market. However, some
Shareholder Agreements will expressly address the
question of competition by including a provision
that requires all shareholders to agree not to com-
pete with the investee company in the business of
microfinance. In some jurisdictions, noncompete
clauses are not enforceable, so prior to negotiating
the language of such a clause, local counsel should
be consulted to determine if it is likely to be of
any use.11
In some cases, noncompete clauses will be
designed to apply rather narrowly, for example, only
to certain designated geographical areas or target
customer bases. If a shareholder balks at agreeing
to a noncompete clause, even if narrowly drawn,
the transformed MFI still has a few options. For
example, the Shareholder Agreement can include a
clause that would prohibit a shareholder from
using or disclosing any confidential information it
receives about the transformed MFI’s customers,
business practices, or other sensitive data to advance
its own business interests. This may be sufficient
protection for the transformed MFI, particularly if
coupled with a broad confidentiality agreement
requiring the shareholder to keep confidential all
information it acquires pursuant to the Shareholder
Agreement. 
Business dealings with shareholders. Host country
law is likely to encourage arm’s-length dealings
between the transformed MFI and its shareholders,
directors, and officers. This encouragement may be
advanced in the bank, regulatory, or specialized
microfinance law, tax law, or even in corporate law. 
Other investors will want to ensure that all deal-
ings between the transformed MFI and any of its
shareholders, directors, and officers are conducted
on an arm’s-length basis or at least work to the ben-
efit of the MFI. The Shareholder Agreement may
address this issue directly with a provision that
requires any and all future transactions between the
transformed MFI and any of its shareholders, direc-
tors, and officers be made on an arm’s-length basis.
Sometimes the Shareholder Agreement also will
require all shareholder or director business dealings
with an investee company to be reported to and
approved by the board of directors. Directors
appointed by the affected shareholders then are typ-
ically required to recuse themselves from voting on
the appropriateness of any such dealing. Some
transformed MFIs have gone one step further and
developed conflict of interest policies that all board
members are required to sign when appointed to a
board seat. Annex 8C, Sample Conflict of Interest
Policy, provides an example of a conflict of interest
policy that addresses some, but not necessarily all,
of the possible conflicts of interest that may arise for
directors and officers in their dealings with the reg-
ulated MFI they govern and manage.
This part of the Shareholder Agreement is par-
ticularly important in MFIs with shareholders who
also play a material role in its management and
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operations. In some MFIs, a shareholder may also
be contracted with to manage operations, or
provide technical assistance to management. In this
case, the Shareholder Agreement needs to ensure
that such arrangements are governed by terms and
conditions that treat the shareholder the same as
any third-party service provider, and provide for
termination of the agreement if necessary.
Stock Purchase Agreement 
The basic provisions that govern the sale of the
shares may be included in the Shareholder Agree-
ment, or in a separate Stock Purchase Agreement.
The documentation typically provides the due date
of the capital contribution, identifies the bank
account to which payments should be made, and
describes any other legal or contractual require-
ments that are preconditions to the making of
the capital contribution or issuance of shares.
More specifically, the documentation often will
provide for the following:
• The number of shares to be issued or sold and
the purchase price of the shares
• Representations and warranties of the issuer and
seller of shares warranting, among other things,
that the issuer of the shares
– Is a company in good standing,
– Has the requisite legal authority to enter into
the Stock Purchase Agreement (or Share-
holder Agreement) and to perform its obliga-
tions, and
– Has provided to shareholders financial state-
ments of the business that were prepared in
accordance with generally accepted account-
ing principles and fairly represent the financial
condition of the issuer.
Sometimes the buyers of shares will also make
certain representations and warranties, including
that the buyer is a company or private individual in
good standing and that the buyer has the authority
to enter into the agreement and perform its obliga-
tions under the agreement. If the shares are not
being purchased with cash but are being paid for
with a promissory note, or the shares are being
issued against a future promise to pay, additional
warranties may be required from the buyer regard-
ing its financial position.
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Annex 8A Sample Checklist of Legal
and Regulatory Issues
Questions to Address When Considering
Transformation
Legal form
• Applicable laws and regulations
• Corporate status
• Tax-status implications, if any
Powers
• Types of services and products MFI can provide
to customers
• Types of investments MFI can make and transac-
tions it can enter into
• Types of financing MFI can access
Regulatory process
• Licensing criteria
• Ownership criteria or limitations (impact on
investors for entry and exit)
• Governance and management requirements
(including foreign ownership restrictions, resi-
dence requirements, level of skills required of
senior management, and so forth)
• Staffing requirements (management criteria and
required positions)
• Minimum capital requirements (amount, form,
and authorized use of funds)
• Initial reserve requirements
Applicable supervisory regime
• Capacity to supervise (expertise, human resources,
ongoing training)
• Reputation
• Respect for rule of law and transparent
rulemaking 
• Legal authority (source of authority, accounta-
bility)
• Extent of level playing field among likely com-
petitors targeting same or similar customer base
(including nonprudential as well as prudential
regulatory regimes)
Supervision
• Risk-based or rule-based (or in between), extent
of on-site and off-site supervision
• Reporting requirements (how much, how often,
with what level of detail)
• Loan loss provisioning requirements (and inter-
action with applicable tax laws)
• Capital adequacy requirements
• Unsecured lending limits
• Loan documentation requirements
• Physical security requirements
• Branching limitations (and requirements)
• Cost of regulatory compliance (as paid by regu-
lated institution)
• Corrective action powers (triggers, enforcement
procedures)
• Involuntary and voluntary liquidation proce-
dures (interaction with bankruptcy regime)
Questions for a Borrowing MFI to Address
When Entering into a Loan Agreement 
before Transformation
Prepayment provisions
• Is the borrowing MFI permitted to prepay all or
a portion of its loan? If so, how are costs of pre-
payment allocated between borrower and
lender?
• If the borrowing MFI is to be assessed a prepay-
ment penalty, would conversion of the outstand-
ing loan into equity or assumption of the loan by
the new regulated MFI trigger a prepayment
penalty?
Affirmative covenants
• Is the borrowing MFI required to maintain
existing ownership or governance structures? 
• Is the borrowing MFI required to report on
significant changes in business?
Financial covenants
• Is the borrowing MFI required to maintain
financial ratios that are likely to change (even if
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only for an interim period) as the result of trans-
ferring assets from the borrowing MFI to the
new regulated MFI?
• Is the borrowing MFI required to maintain any
debt ratios that will be difficult to achieve once
the regulated MFI starts taking deposits?
• Are there any debt ratios in the financial
covenants? How broadly are these drafted?
What do terms debt and indebtedness mean?
Would they include deposits? 
Negative covenants
• Is the borrowing MFI permitted to sell or trans-
fer substantially all of its assets? If not, how do
these restrictions affect asset transfer plans of the
borrower?
• Is the borrowing MFI allowed to establish a sub-
sidiary, change its management, change its legal
form, and so forth?
Events of default
• Is it an event of default if the borrowing MFI
changes its legal form, transfers a substantial
amount of its assets, liquidates, or other?
• Is there a cure period (if any) for covenant
defaults (as opposed to payment defaults)?
• Is there a cross-default or cross-acceleration
clause? If so, what are the triggers of such a clause?
Assignment rights
• Can the borrowing MFI assign its rights or obli-
gations under the loan agreement to another
party (for example, the successor, regulated
MFI)?
Credit enhancements
• Is the loan secured by a pledge of the borrowing
MFI’s assets, or a third-party guarantee, or other
credit enhancement? If so, how will such credit
enhancement be affected by the contemplated
legal transformation, be it a reorganization or
asset transfer?
Syndicated loans
• Is the loan syndicated? If so, how do the amend-
ment and waiver provisions work? (How are
consents to amendments or waivers of syndi-
cated loan agreement achieved—number of
votes, process for meeting of syndicate members,
other?)
Issues to be Discussed with Local Counsel
before Commencing Negotiations 
with Potential Investors
The following is not a comprehensive list. Addi-
tional issues may arise that will also need to be
addressed under host country law.
Documentation
• Which constituent documents of the transform-
ing MFI need to be amended to reflect the
transformation and possible involvement of new
equity investors?
• What new constituent documents will need to be
drafted to reflect the transformation and possible
involvement of new equity investors?
• What other documents need to be drafted or
amended to reflect the transformation and possi-
ble involvement of new equity investors?
• What resolutions, registrations, or other corpo-
rate actions will need to be obtained in connec-
tion with the contemplated transformation and
involvement of new equity investors? 
• Are there any terms of the contemplated trans-
formation and involvement of equity investors
that should be set forth in a particular document
for such terms to be enforceable by means of
specific performance? If so, do local courts
enforce provisions of shareholder agreements by
means of specific performance?
• What is the likely consequence of setting forth
the social mission of the investee company in its
constituent documents or other agreements? Is
there any ultra vires risk in doing so? Are there
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any legal obligations that would influence the
matters addressed in the statement of the investee
company’s purpose (such as requirements by
bank regulators to define target customers, maxi-
mum size of microcredits, and so forth)?
Corporate
• Are there any local legal issues that may be trig-
gered by the due diligence process? For example,
are there any legal restrictions that the trans-
forming MFI must comply with when giving
information or access to third parties (such as
bank secrecy rules)?
• What is the legal framework for issuing shares to
investors against cash contributions?
– What agreements need to be entered into for
shares to be issued? Are there any board reso-
lutions or shareholder resolutions that need
to be obtained before shares can be issued? 
– What existing agreements need to be amend-
ed? Are there any requirements to file regis-
trations with host country authorities (for
example, with a companies or commercial
register)?
– What, if any, approvals or notifications must
be registered with host country supervisory
authorities?
• Does host country law give any statutory rights
to minority shareholders? If so, what are the
applicable thresholds for such rights to apply
(how much of an interest must a minority share-
holder hold to benefit from such statutory
rights)?
– Do minority shareholders have preemptive or
veto and control rights? Are any other rights
accorded to minority shareholders by host
country law? In each case, what, if any, exclu-
sions are permitted? 
– Are there any decisions that host country law
would require all or a supermajority of share-
holders to agree to before giving effect to
such decisions? 
– Are there any other duties of majority share-
holders with respect to treatment of minority
shareholders or the investee company?
• What is the legal framework for shareholder
voting rights?
• What legal rights, if any, do shareholders have to
accessing information of the investee company
and to what extent may shareholders request
management reports from the investee com-
pany? Can any such rights, access, or informa-
tion be validly excluded or limited? Under what
circumstances?
• Can different classes of shares be issued under
host country law? What is the legal framework
for doing so?
• What is the legal framework applicable to share-
holder meetings? What matters are reserved for
approval by shareholders’ meetings (as opposed
to board of director meetings)? What are the
statutory voting requirements with respect to
such matters? 
• What are host country requirements for the size,
composition, and powers of the board of direc-
tors? What are the rules for appointing directors?
For holding meetings? What matters require
supermajority or unanimous approval of board
of directors? 
• What are the rules for appointing officers of the
investee company?
• What is the legal framework applicable to dis-
tributing profits of the investee company? Are
there mandatory reserve requirements? Any
other restrictions regarding the distribution or
retention of profits?
• What restrictions or other legal issues might
arise, if any, in connection with payment of
dividends in local currency to foreign share-
holders?
• What are the rules for financial reporting by
investee company?
• To what extent do investee company and share-
holders need to structure their dealings and
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arrangements on an arm’s-length basis? Are
there any prohibited transactions between the
investee company and its shareholders?
• What requirements should be included in share-
holder noncompete clauses or documents to be
enforceable under host country law?
• Are share transfer restrictions enforceable? Are
there rules applicable to how such restrictions are
structured that would limit or otherwise impact
the enforceability of such restrictions?
• Are there any rules that are likely to affect the
validity and enforceability of exit mechanisms?
Are first refusal and rights of first offer permissi-
ble? Are put and call rights enforceable? How
must these rights be structured to ensure their
enforceability? 
Foreign ownership
• Are there any restrictions under host country law
that would affect the ownership of equity
interests in the investee company by foreign enti-
ties or persons?
• Are there any residency requirements or nation-
ality requirements applicable to directors?
• Are there any notification or registration
requirements that would be triggered by an
investment by a foreign entity or person in the
investee company?
• What, if any, tax law or other law benefits are
there if certain requirements regarding local
ownership or management are met? (For exam-
ple, are more onerous taxes imposed on foreign-
owned companies?)
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Annex 8B Sample Terms of
Reference: Hiring Local Counsel
to Support Legal Transformation
The following are suggestions only and may need to
be revised substantially to reflect host country legal
issues or issues of particular concern to the trans-
forming MFI.
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and so forth.
Objective
The objective of this engagement is to provide legal
counsel to MFI A during the process of its transfor-
mation into a regulated shareholding company
thataccepts and on-lends deposits from the public.
Tasks
1. Develop a timetable outlining the necessary doc-
uments, approval processes, and likely length of
time for incorporating MFI A as a joint stock
company (from the time all necessary documen-
tation is filed with host country authorities to the
time registration and all approvals are likely to be
obtained).
2. Prepare written memorandum analyzing rights,
obligations, liabilities, and corporate governance
requirements of joint stock companies in host
country, including
• Appointment, removal, number of required
directors, number of board meetings, and so
forth; and 
• Liabilities and responsibilities of MFI A’s
directors and officers (under host country’s
corporate law and microfinance or banking
law [as appropriate] and offer recommenda-
tions to address such liabilities, such as acqui-
sition of director and officer insurance and
the like). 
Where deemed advisable or required by
host country law, draft conflict of interest
policy for board members of MFI A to
execute. 
3. Conduct legal due diligence of all existing con-
tractual obligations of MFI A—loan agreements
(if currently borrowing), grant agreements (past
and present), personnel contracts, lease arrange-
ments, vendor and other service agreements,
forms of loan and other agreements with cus-
tomers, and so forth. Identify which contracts
will need to be revised to reflect MFI A’s change
in legal form. Where necessary, draft amend-
ments, consents, and waivers.
4. Draft all constituent documents (such as Articles
of Incorporation or Charter), relevant approvals
(including any MFI A board resolutions), share
certificates, and so forth necessary to incorporate
MFI A as a joint stock company and to author-
ize the issuance of share capital. 
5. Offer general preliminary advice on options
available for transferring assets (financial and
others) from old institution to new institution,
including, to extent applicable, the labor, tax,
and other laws that might be triggered by trans-
fer of financial assets, nonfinancial assets, and
personnel. Also advise on whether it is possible
under laws and regulations of host country to
reorganize existing company into new company,
and, if such a reorganization is possible, analyze
tax and other legal consequences of implement-
ing a reorganization. 
6. Develop a memorandum outlining a tax plan-
ning strategy for MFI A’s legal transformation,
which will include, among other things,
• Tax consequences of transferring assets (such
as an existing loan portfolio, investments,
cash, physical assets) from one form of corpo-
rate entity to another (a related issue to be
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analyzed is whether a one-time transfer or
staggered transfer of the loan portfolio is
optimal from tax management point of view),
and
• Tax consequences of issuing shares (and later
selling shares) to investors (including to initial
shareholders) including how to establish the
tax basis of MFI A’s newly issued shares for
purposes of later calculating capital gains or
losses on subsequent sales of such shares.
7. Develop a memorandum outlining MFI A’s
labor law responsibilities with respect to its
employees, which will include, among other
things,
• An analysis, with suggested recommenda-
tions, of how best to transfer personnel from
one institution to another;
• An analysis of how to handle termination of
personnel that are not being transferred to the
new institution (including description of lia-
bilities and obligations owed by MFI A to
such terminated employees); and
• Recommendations on how to structure future
employee contracts to be entered into by the
new institution, and development of a form of
employee contract that can be used by MFI A
after transformation.
8. File with appropriate local authorities
• All necessary constituent documents,
approvals, share certificates, and so forth nec-
essary to incorporate MFI A as a joint stock
company;
• All necessary documents for tax registration of
MFI A; and
• A completed application to operate as a
licensed financial institution (once application
is filed, MFI A may request local counsel to
monitor status of applications with bank reg-
ulatory authorities and provide status reports
to MFI A senior management). 
Deliverables
1. Timetable for incorporating MFI A as a joint
stock company
2. Written memorandum analyzing rights, obliga-
tions, liabilities, and corporate governance
requirements, and conflict of interest policy for
board members, if applicable
3. Legal due diligence report of existing contractu-
al obligations of MFI A
4. Draft constituent documents, relevant approvals,
share certificates, and so forth to incorporate and
issue share capital 
5. Advice on appropriate method to transfer assets
to new company
6. Written memorandum outlining a tax planning
strategy for transformation
7. Written memorandum outlining labor law
responsibilities with respect to MFI A’s em-
ployees
8. Confirmation of filing of various necessary docu-
ments as well as license application
Level of Effort. It is estimated that the legal trans-
formation process may take 6 months to 1 year or
more. Counsel fees will be negotiated up front
either at an hourly rate, fixed fee, retainer, or some
combination of these three.
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Annex 8C Sample Conflict
of Interest Policy
The material below is for illustrative purposes only
and is drawn from, with certain modifications, a
form of conflict of interest policy that is often used
by U.S. not-for-profit organizations. Any actual
conflict of interest policy should be reviewed and
modified by local counsel to reflect host country
law requirements.
Article I
Purpose
The purpose of the conflict of interest policy is to
protect this organization’s (Organization) interest
when it is contemplating entering into a transaction
or arrangement that might benefit the private inter-
est of an officer or director of the Organization or
might result in a possible excess benefit transaction.
This policy is intended to supplement but not
replace any applicable laws governing conflict of
interest applicable to organizations of this type.
1. Interested Person
Any director, principal officer, or member of a
committee with governing board delegated pow-
ers, who has a direct or indirect financial interest,
as defined below, is an interested person.
2. Financial Interest
A person has a financial interest if the person has,
directly or indirectly, through business, invest-
ment, or family
a. An ownership or investment interest in any
entity with which the Organization has a
transaction or arrangement,
b. A compensation arrangement with the Orga-
nization or with any entity or individual with
which the Organization has a transaction or
arrangement, or
c. A potential ownership or investment interest
in, or compensation arrangement with, any
entity or individual with which the Orga-
nization is negotiating a transaction or
arrangement.
Compensation includes direct and indirect
remuneration as well as gifts or favors that are not
insubstantial.
A financial interest is not necessarily a conflict of
interest. Under Article II, Section 2, a person who
has a financial interest may have a conflict of inter-
est only if the appropriate governing board or com-
mittee decides that a conflict of interest exists. 
[Note that host country law may have a very
different definition of what constitutes a “financial
interest” and who constitutes an “interested per-
son.” Accordingly local counsel should review and
revise this to meet host country requirements.]
Article II
Procedures
1. Duty to Disclose
In connection with any actual or possible conflict
of interest, an interested person must disclose the
existence of the financial interest and be given
the opportunity to disclose all material facts to
the directors and members of committees with
governing board delegated powers considering
the proposed transaction or arrangement.
2. Determining Whether a Conflict of Interest
Exists
After disclosure of the financial interest and all
material facts, and after any discussion with the
interested person, he or she shall leave the gov-
erning board or committee meeting while the
determination of a conflict of interest is discussed
and voted upon. The remaining board or com-
mittee members shall decide if a conflict of inter-
est exists.
3. Procedures for Addressing the Conflict of
Interest
a. An interested person may make a presentation
at the governing board or committee meet-
ing, but after the presentation, he or she
shall leave the meeting during the discus-
sion of, and the vote on, the transaction or
arrangement involving the possible conflict of
interest.
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b. The chairperson of the governing board or
committee shall, if appropriate, appoint a dis-
interested person or committee to investigate
alternatives to the proposed transaction or
arrangement.
c. After exercising due diligence, the governing
board or committee shall determine whether
the Organization can obtain with reasonable
efforts a more advantageous transaction or
arrangement from a person or entity that
would not give rise to a conflict of interest.
d. If a more advantageous transaction or
arrangement is not reasonably possible under
circumstances not producing a conflict of
interest, the governing board or committee
shall determine by a majority vote of the dis-
interested directors whether the transaction
or arrangement is in the Organization’s best
interest, for its own benefit, and whether it is
fair and reasonable. In conformity with the
above determination it shall make its decision
as to whether to enter into the transaction or
arrangement.
4. Violations of the Conflict of Interest Policy
a. If the governing board or committee has rea-
sonable cause to believe a member has failed
to disclose actual or possible conflicts of inter-
est, it shall inform the member of the basis
for such belief and afford the member an
opportunity to explain the alleged failure to
disclose.
b. If, after hearing the member’s response and
investigating further as warranted by the cir-
cumstances, the governing board or commit-
tee determines the member has failed to dis-
close an actual or possible conflict of interest,
it shall take appropriate disciplinary and cor-
rective action.
Article III
Records of Proceedings
The minutes of the governing board and all com-
mittees with board delegated powers shall contain
a. The names of the persons who disclosed or oth-
erwise were found to have a financial interest in
connection with an actual or possible conflict of
interest, the nature of the financial interest, any
action taken to determine whether a conflict of
interest was present, and the governing board’s
or committee’s decision as to whether a conflict
of interest in fact existed; and
b. The names of the persons who were present for
discussions and votes relating to the transaction
or arrangement, the content of the discussion,
including any alternatives to the proposed trans-
action or arrangement, and a record of any votes
taken in connection with the proceedings.
Article IV
Compensation
a. A voting member of the governing board who
receives compensation, directly or indirectly,
from the Organization for services is precluded
from voting on matters pertaining to that mem-
ber’s compensation.
b. A voting member of any committee whose juris-
diction includes compensation matters and who
receives compensation, directly or indirectly,
from the Organization for services is precluded
from voting on matters pertaining to that mem-
ber’s compensation.
c. No voting member of the governing board or
any committee whose jurisdiction includes
compensation matters and who receives com-
pensation, directly or indirectly, from the Orga-
nization, either individually or collectively, is
prohibited from providing information to any
committee regarding compensation.
Article V
Annual Statements
Each director, principal officer, and member of a
committee with governing board delegated powers
shall annually sign a statement that affirms such
person
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a. Has received a copy of the conflict of interest
policy,
b. Has read and understands the policy, and
c. Has agreed to comply with the policy.
Notes
1. Legal advisers who are expert in the laws and regula-
tions of the host country are called here “local coun-
sel”; legal advisers who are expert in the laws and
regulations of countries other than the host country
are called here “international counsel” or “foreign
counsel.”
2. Some transforming MFIs, particularly those in
Latin America, have hired a lawyer during the
transformation process to work within the MFI
(thus, “in-house”). This person often then heads up
the new legal function for the regulated organization
(if applicable). 
3. Ideally, it would be clear which laws and regulations
govern the process. However, the legal and regula-
tory environment that comes to bear on transforming
MFIs can be confusing, inconsistent, and even con-
tradictory, particularly for institutions transforming
into regulated institutions. In some jurisdictions, the
legal and regulatory environment is in an indefinite
state of flux as new laws are considered and new reg-
ulations drafted to address the unique risks posed by
deposit-taking microfinance activities.
4. See discussion in chapter 7, Ownership and Gover-
nance, regarding the need to clarify with donors, at
the time of grant-making, their expectations for how
grant funds will be applied and any restrictions that
will be imposed by donors on assets funded by such
grants.
5. Depending on the laws of the host country, some
forms of legal organization and incorporation are
more amenable to future legal transformations than
others. Increased recognition of this fact has caused
some MFIs to front-load their analyses of legal trans-
formation strategies. These MFIs begin their analysis
of possible legal transformation strategies at the time
that the MFI is first established—even when a legal
transformation is not likely to come for many years.
For example, some MFIs incorporate from the very
start in a legal form that would likely be acceptable to
bank regulatory authorities should the MFI eventu-
ally choose to apply for a deposit-taking license. This
avoids the future need to consider complex legal
transformation issues at the same time as just as com-
plex, if not more so, operational transformation issues
are being managed.
6. Investor or Shareholder Agreements are discussed
later in this chapter under “Negotiating Investor
Documents.”
7. Some jurisdictions will impose requirements or limi-
tations with respect to the words that can be used in
names. In the Kyrgyz Republic, for example, the
name must include words that designate the type of
MFI being operated—such as microfinance company
(MFC), microcredit company (MCC), and microcre-
dit agency (MCA). Also, MFIs operating in the
Kyrgyz Republic may not use the words “National,”
“State,” “Kyrgyz Republic,” or “Kyrgyzstan” in their
names. (See Article 3. Name of a microfinance organ-
ization, The Kyrgyz Republic Law on Micro-finance
Organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic (approved by
the Legislative Assembly of the Parliament of the
Kyrgyz Republic, July 11, 2002; approved by the
People’s Representative’s Chamber of the Parliament
of the Kyrgyz Republic, July 3, 2002.)
8. Ultra vires is Latin for “beyond powers.” It refers to
conduct by a corporation or its officers that exceeds
the powers granted by law.
9. The mission statement may also be included in the
Shareholder Agreement depending on whether
the MFI wants to ensure new investors are in agree-
ment with the transformed MFI’s mission.
10. For example, in some countries, majority voting
requirements and rights of minority investors must be
addressed in the company’s constituent documents to
be enforceable. Or certain formalities must be pro-
vided for in the constituent documents (and
observed) to grant preemptive rights to one investor
over others.
11. However, host country laws also may limit the scope
for competition by limiting the kinds of institutions
on which board members can sit, thereby at least
eliminating interlocking director positions. In
Uganda, for example, directors sitting on boards of
microfinance deposit-taking institutions (MDIs)
may not also sit on the boards or serve in any execu-
tive capacity with other Ugandan institutions. (See
Article 26 (3) of the MDI Act.)
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Human Resources Management
Amicrofinance institution’s (MFI’s) humanresource base is its greatest asset. Althoughthis statement is true for most organiza-
tions, it is particularly true in the case of MFIs. Like
all financial service provision, microfinance is built
on customer service. Relationships established
between client and loan officer or between client
and other branch staff lie at the heart of microfi-
nance technology. Loan officers are often described
as “walking encyclopedias.” Their in-depth under-
standing of the local market and the challenges
faced by their clients—both in their businesses and
homes—as well as their typically high community
standing, are a great asset, although difficult to
quantify. While valued for different reasons, all of an
MFI’s staff, from back-office data clerks to head
office managers, contribute to its success.
As outlined in chapter 3, Planning for Transfor-
mation, the process of transforming an unregulated,
nonprofit nongovernmental organization (NGO)
with a primary focus on credit services into a
regulated, for-profit share company with the
capacity to offer both credit and savings services
requires change at all levels of the organization.
Although numerous experts are contracted and sig-
nificant resources expended in attracting investors,
upgrading systems, and developing the capacity to
intermediate deposits, transforming MFIs have his-
torically not appreciated the importance of invest-
ing in the change management process itself. The
extent to which internal and external change agents
follow a transparent, clear, and open process for this
transition directly correlates with the success of the
transformation. In a wide range of industries,
the inability of change agents to manage the people
side of the business change process has resulted in
inefficient and unsuccessful change projects and
an inability to realize new business strategies and
objectives (Hiatt and Creasey n.d.). Transformation
of MFIs is no exception.
Change is difficult. Before transformation, rela-
tionships among staff members are defined and
expectations are more or less understood. Organi-
zational change disrupts the established dynamic,
leading to fear and uncertainty among staff
members about the future. When change is first
proposed, some people will “deny that it is neces-
sary, or try to minimize the scope of change, deflect
or delay the change, or simply ignore it” (Carlson
1992, p. 115). However, if the change process is
well-managed, these reactions can be addressed up
front and strategies developed to prevent them
Chapter 9
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from blocking the change process. If the process is
not well-managed, such resistance can either
significantly prolong or even overtly sabotage the
transformation.
This chapter presents a framework for thinking
about, planning for, and addressing the impact of
institutional transformation on an MFI’s human
capital. It examines three key elements that influ-
ence the human capital of an organization: the
structure, the staff, and the culture. To use a
metaphor, consider the MFI as a house. The blue-
print, outlining the framework of the house and
carefully designed by an architect, is the organiza-
tional structure—the organizational chart that
shows how each unit in the organization relates to
the others, and the job descriptions that specify staff
roles and responsibilities. The concrete building
blocks represent the staff—each member carefully
selected for both quality and the degree to which he
or she fits in with and supports the other building
blocks already in place. Finally, the mortar repre-
sents the intangible institutional culture—the sticky
substance that holds all those blocks together, with-
out which the house will be at risk of collapsing. It is
imperative for the transforming MFI to adapt the
organizational culture to meet its needs as a regu-
lated MFI, to ensure an appropriate organizational
structure is in place, and finally to ensure the right
staff are in the right positions and are well-trained.
It should be noted that the human capital issues
discussed in this chapter are relevant for a range of
different transformation models, whether the
transformation is structured as the creation of a
new company or as a reorganization of the old
company. It does not, however, address the future
human capital issues associated with the founding
NGO (if applicable). These issues will vary dramat-
ically depending on how the NGO redefines itself
after transformation. Thus, the decision about who
moves to the new company (if applicable) and
who remains with the NGO depends heavily on
the decisions made regarding the future role of the
NGO.
Adapting the Organizational Culture
A commonly expressed concern of institutions
considering transformation is the fear that transfor-
mation will significantly change the corporate cul-
ture of the organization. The following statements
articulate that apprehension:
• “Our staff is motivated by poverty alleviation.
Transformation to a for-profit company may force
a mission change.”
• “We do not want to lose the personal relation-
ship we have with our clients.”
• “If we have to hire formal bankers, we may lose
touch with the real needs of our target market.
They also may not relate well to current staff and
thus tension will be created in our organization.” 
• “Having to standardize our policies and proce-
dures will limit our ability to innovate and be
flexible to client needs.”
• “Creating all these new departments just adds
bureaucracy and hierarchy.”
Each of these statements represents valid concerns
and has direct implications for the institutional
culture of an organization. The development of a
new business strategy; incorporation of a range of
new stakeholders, including investors and superviso-
ry authorities; upgrading of policies, procedures, and
systems; changes in the organizational structure
and staffing patterns; and the introduction of a
range of new products and services—all affect the
way people carry out their work, how people interact
with each other in their work, and ultimately how
people feel about their work. These are all defining
aspects of an institution’s culture—the shared set of
beliefs and values that permeate an institution’s
workforce.
Institutional culture can be deliberately changed
or molded by dynamic leaders. It can also, however,
change inadvertently if the change process is not
well-managed. The experience of BancoSol, the first
institutional transformation from an NGO to a
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commercial bank, highlights the importance of
addressing these issues up front. The NGO’s social
welfare culture included an ingrained antibanking
ethos that for many staff proved too difficult to
reverse (Rhyne 2001). Despite investments in a
human resources specialist, tensions grew in
BancoSol as experienced bankers were hired for
many of the specialized functions, such as asset and
liability management and internal control. Tension
between the old guard and the new guard was also
evident in the ACP/Mibanco transformation, as
formal bankers were brought into senior manage-
ment positions with very different communication
and operating expectations.
Assuming some element of cultural change is
inevitable with transformation, what can leaders do
to manage this change process proactively? 
Defining a Culture
Culture is a composite of personal reactions and a
reflection of individual beliefs that have evolved
over time, becoming a set of shared values. All staff
members in an organization have their own sets of
personal values and beliefs about what they do and
how they feel about their work. These values and
beliefs influence the way in which they treat other
staff, communicate to both superiors and subordi-
nates, and view their overall contribution to the
organization. These factors together influence what
staff believe about the organization, and how they
interpret the organization’s mission and vision.
New staff coming into the organization will also
have their own sets of values and beliefs based on
prior work experience as well as initial impressions
of the new organization. Proactive steps taken by
the transforming MFI can mitigate a potential cul-
ture clash among staff: 
• Articulate institutional values: Regardless of
leadership changes, management changes, insti-
tutional restructuring, or technological changes,
an organization’s core values should endure.
Thus, all staff in the organization must be able to
clearly articulate these values. Working sessions
with staff to define institutional values can
advance this process. The resulting value state-
ments should be incorporated into all induction
sessions, made visible to both staff and clients in
the branches and at the head office, and be used
in all communication materials to ensure maxi-
mum buy-in.
• Recognize and encourage distinct roles of old staff
and new staff: Old guard versus new guard, old
timers versus new timers, NGO staff versus bank
staff. Transformation provides an opportunity to
renew and recreate organizational culture.
Although efforts do need to be made to mini-
mize culture clash, MFIs also need to recognize
the benefits of the process. As explained by
Bolman and Deal (1991, p. 249),
Newcomers are expected to bring new
ideas and perspectives. It is their destiny to
be agents of evaluation and reform. Old-
timers act as a force for cohesion, stability,
and the wisdom of the past. If the new-
comers fully succumb to the press of his-
torical tradition, the organization risks stul-
tification and decay. If the old-timers fail to
play their part, the organization risks chaos
and disarray.
• Incorporate core values into the recruitment
process: In recognition of the first two points
above, the recruitment process can be used to
reinforce an institution’s commitment to its
values. Although external recruits with formal
banking experience may bring significant techni-
cal expertise, those with strong personalities and
limited exposure to microfinance can easily upset
the communication patterns in the organization.
The interview process, therefore, must focus on
some of these issues, including the individual’s
level of commitment to the vision of the organi-
zation. This could be determined by incorporat-
ing a field visit into the review process, as well as
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making it mandatory that all new senior man-
agement spend their first week in the field, work-
ing at a branch and interacting with clients. 
• Build consensus on the target market: One of
the more common fears with transformation is
staff concern that converting into a for-profit
institution will force a shift in target market or
“mission drift.” As discussed in chapter 4,
Marketing and Competitive Positioning, target
markets will naturally expand with a growing
institution, but a transforming institution needs
to think strategically about the kind of market
image it seeks. The development of new prod-
ucts (particularly those that attract a higher-end
customer), the increased professionalization of
both staff and infrastructure, and the addition of
more formal operating procedures—all charac-
teristics of transformation—affect the MFI’s
market image and ultimately the kind of client
attracted to the institution. Consensus among
staff (both old and new) as to who the regulated
institution will serve needs to be built early on,
particularly with an MFI’s front-line staff (tellers,
loan officers, customer care officers, and others)
who serve as the primary relationship builders
with customers.
• Incorporate the double bottom line into perform-
ance evaluations: The structure of an institution’s
performance management system has a profound
impact on the values and goals of a workforce.
By incorporating social indicators, such as
increases in levels of food security, housing,
health care, or education of the MFI’s clients,
into employees’ performance evaluation frame-
works, an institution can help institutionalize the
“double bottom line” culture.1
• Select partners with shared values: The institu-
tion’s core values should also guide the selection
of technical assistance providers and, even
more important, the selection of investors (see
chapter 7, Ownership and Governance). The
influence of these outside stakeholders on the
corporate culture of an institution should not
be underestimated. Investors, particularly those
with board influence, can have a significant
impact on setting institutional priorities and
direction, two factors that critically affect the
culture of an organization.
The core values of an institution are reflected in
the institution’s overall strategic goals, its business
model, the type of staff hired, and the way staff
interact with each other and the institution’s clients.
Stated values lead to specific goals. Goals are oper-
ationalized through the development of a business
model with clear objectives and strategies for imple-
mentation. This in turn leads to hiring people who
commit to these objectives and share similar values.
Investments are then made in training and equip-
ping these individuals to achieve the institution’s
overall goals (figure 9.1).
Each MFI must determine the values appropri-
ate for the institution and constantly seek to have
those values internalized by every board member,
manager, and staff member.
Building Commitment to Change
The transformation process will undoubtedly
change the organization radically. Because customer
needs and expectations are constantly changing and
because market competitors are never far behind, an
MFI cannot afford not to change. This culture of
change is particularly evident in institutions com-
mitted to continuous improvement. As discussed
in chapter 3, Planning for Transformation, any 
far-reaching organizational change, including
institutional transformation, requires active leader-
ship. Top management and the board must act as
champions of change. They must be clear about
why transformation is being pursued and be able to
clearly articulate the anticipated benefits, as well as
challenges, to staff. 
The process of building commitment to change
can be facilitated through developing an ongo-
ing communications strategy. Organizations that
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encourage open communication channels between
senior managers and front-line staff, between back
office and front office, and between customers and
staff tend to be more open to change. Materials
about the transformation need to be written and
concepts need to be spoken such that staff under-
stand and can relate. Newsletters that address their
concerns head-on, workshops that encourage active
questioning and participation, and managers who
are committed to an “open-door” policy send sig-
nals that the opinions and views of staff matter and
will be listened to in building the new corporate
vision. Uganda Microfinance Union, for example,
encouraged staff to raise concerns, issues, or ques-
tions. A monthly newsletter, Transformation News,
was developed to provide updates on key activities
in the transformation process. Articles included
easy-to-understand explanations of the new regula-
tory framework, interviews with top management
on fundamental transformation issues, and overall
status updates on new product developments and
expansion plans. Other ways to help build a com-
mitment to the transformation process include the
following:
• Scheduling time in branch manager meetings to
specifically discuss the status of different trans-
formation initiatives
• Providing staff an opportunity to interact and
ask questions of potential investors 
• Periodically sending articles or news clippings on
transformation to branch staff
• Including feedback from and summaries of
external training courses for “banking” skills that
staff members have attended in newsletter to
branches.
Although not written specifically for microfi-
nance, the quote below highlights the importance
of using a proactive communication style to sell the
vision of transformation. This new vision needs to
be communicated in a simple way that motivates
1. Determine the
  Core Values
       of the institution.
2. Establish strategic goals
 consistent with values.
3. Develop business model and plan
  to operationalize strategic goals.
4. Hire staff who share the values.
5. Train and empower staff to implement change.
Figure 9.1 Model for Sustainable Change
Source: Author.
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staff but is also personal, making staff feel a part of
the transformation.
In more successful transformation efforts,
executives use all existing communication
channels to broadcast the vision. They turn
boring and unread company newsletters into
lively articles about the vision. They take
ritualistic and tedious quarterly management
meetings and turn them into exciting discus-
sions of the transformation. They throw out
much of the company’s generic management
education and replace it with courses that
focus on business problems and the new
vision. The guiding principle is simple: use
every possible channel . . . (Kotter 1998,
p. 12).
Some MFIs use the “balanced scorecard” to
ensure staff are committed to change, particularly
from a strategic perspective (box 9.1).
Adapting the Organizational
Structure
Early in the transformation planning process, the
MFI needs to evaluate whether it has the right orga-
nizational structure to support the new business
strategy. Organizational structure is more than just
the boxes and lines arranged hierarchically on an
organizational chart. It is “an outline of the desired
pattern of activities, expectations, and exchanges
among all levels of staff in the organization”
(Bolman and Deal 1991, p. 46). As such, it includes
how the MFI organizes its operations—the depart-
mental and branch operating units, as well as staff
roles and responsibilities. Within the context of
preparing for transformation, this section focuses on
building an organizational structure that responds
to the changing operating needs of the MFI, under-
standing the formal and informal reporting lines
that evolve from this structure, and developing
appropriate job descriptions for the staff within the
structure. Some MFIs may choose to hire external
consultants to look at human resources issues and
make recommendations about the appropriate orga-
nizational structure and staffing. Annex 9A, Sample
Terms of Reference: Human Resources Manage-
ment, provides Terms of Reference for a human
resources management consultancy.
Building the Right Organizational Structure
All organizations, regardless of transformation,
need to constantly look toward the future and
assess themselves, not only from the perspective of
how they respond to current client needs, but how
they might respond to future client needs. This
concept of managing the present from the future
(Goss, Pascale, and Athos 1998) should guide the
thinking about organizational structure. Managers
need to realize that this is an ongoing process.
Although transformation can lead to a funda-
mental restructuring of the MFI’s operations—
a process that could take anywhere from two to
Box 9.1 The Balanced Scorecard
Used by a number of transformed MFIs, including
BancoSol and Mibanco, the balanced scorecard is
a management system (not only a measurement
system) that enables organizations to clarify their
visions and strategies and translate them into
action. The scorecard views the organization
from four perspectives (financial, customer, inter-
nal business processes, and learning and growth),
and assigns metrics to each of these perspectives.
It provides feedback around both the internal
business processes and external outcomes to
continuously improve strategic performance and
results. “When fully deployed, the balanced
scorecard transforms strategic planning from an
academic exercise into the nerve center of an
enterprise” (Arveson 1998).
Source: Author.
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five years—building the right organizational struc-
ture is not a one-off activity.
As discussed in chapter 5, Strategic and Business
Planning, one of the first steps in the process of
transformation is to develop a long-term business
plan that takes into account the anticipated changes
that will come with transformation. Among other
things, this plan articulates the institution’s out-
reach goals, both geographic expansion and num-
ber of clients reached; the anticipated products and
services to be provided; and the human and physi-
cal resources needed to achieve these plans. This last
point, the necessary human resources required to
support the future business strategy, may not always
be fully appreciated by transforming MFIs. To
begin with, certain organizational constraints can
impede an MFI’s ability to realize its optimal orga-
nizational structure:
• Absence of several critical functions: With many
NGO MFIs, the organizational structure typi-
cally revolves around the provision of credit,
evidenced by senior management teams primarily
composed of a credit or operations manager
(in some organizations this position is referred
to as the commercial manager) whose primary
responsibility is managing the organization’s loan
portfolio; and a finance and administration man-
ager, whose primary responsibility is to monitor
and report on the financial performance and
administration of the MFI. With the addition of
deposit mobilization, a number of functions or
departments including asset and liability manage-
ment, treasury, human resources management,
internal controls, planning, marketing, and exter-
nal relations (investors, regulators) may be new
to the licensed organization or become more
complicated, usually requiring new staff positions
and responsibilities.
• Insufficient focus on staff development: Many
MFIs are beginning to reorient themselves
toward their external clients in an effort to more
proactively address customer service issues, but
insufficient attention is often paid to staff as the
internal client.
• Outdated or inappropriate authority levels: NGOs
often lack appropriate internal controls and may
not have efficient reporting structures. Staff at
the head office may be tasked with financial man-
agement or human resources management, but
in fact defer to the managing director for all deci-
sions. Conversely, relatively junior staff may be
tasked with making and approving large pur-
chases, without requisite checks and balances. 
• Underdeveloped managerial processes: MFIs often
start with many soldiers and few generals. Over
time, some of these soldiers are promoted to gen-
erals, yet many do not have the necessary skills
nor does the MFI always invest in the necessary
training. Promoting good loan officers to branch
managers makes sense from many perspectives—
they know the business, they know the market in
which they work, they are respected by their col-
leagues, and promotion from within improves
staff morale. However, additional training and
support are needed to ensure the promoted loan
officer can truly take on the role of branch man-
ager. In some cases, and for some positions, hir-
ing externally may be required.
• Inadequate management information systems:
NGOs are frequently hindered by poorly per-
forming management information systems (MIS).
Accurate and timely reporting from branches
to the head office may be impeded by communi-
cations or data-capturing constraints. Similar
problems exist in many MFI head offices as well.
• Absence of appropriate governance: NGO boards
are often made up of individuals who do not have
their own personal resources at stake. These indi-
viduals are generally well-respected leaders in
their communities, but this lack of financial own-
ership can limit effective governance. Further-
more, NGO boards may not have members who
possess all the skills necessary to manage a finan-
cial institution. (See chapter 7, Ownership and
Governance, for further discussion.)
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Although the prevalence of these characteristics
will differ across MFIs, the following section out-
lines two critical organizational structure issues that
transforming MFIs may need to address in the
transformation process—establishment of new head
office departments and positions, and the restruc-
turing of branch operations. 
Establishment of new departments and positions at
head office. The need to add or reevaluate head
office departments and positions will depend on the
complexity of the MFI before transformation. In
some cases, for example in fairly large and sophisti-
cated MFIs (even if unregulated), transformation
requires much less change than in other cases. Key
areas and functions that typically need to be reeval-
uated include the following (see annex 9B, Exam-
ples of Job Responsibilities for Senior Staff, for
detail on the responsibilities of senior positions dis-
cussed below):
• Chief Executive Officer: One of the more diffi-
cult decisions facing a transforming NGO is
whether the current head of the organization is
the right person to serve as head of the trans-
formed institution. The personality and skill set
of the founding director or current NGO direc-
tor may not be consistent with the type of per-
son needed to lead the new regulated institution.
Despite the many cases of consistent leadership
throughout the transformation process, there are
still a number of cases where the board of the
regulated institution has opted to recruit exter-
nally for a new director with more specific bank-
ing expertise. Whether the NGO director or a
new hire ultimately leads the regulated MFI,
training and external exposure visits will
undoubtedly be needed. As well, the CEO typi-
cally needs to be approved by the regulatory
authorities as a condition of granting the license.
• Chief Financial Officer: Most MFIs already have
a finance manager in place, but transformation to
a regulated, deposit-taking financial intermediary
may require the recruitment of a more senior
individual to be the Chief Financial Officer
(CFO). This individual will have responsibility
for creating the vision for and managing the long-
term financial strategy of the organization. New
responsibilities will include establishing guide-
lines for the regulated institution’s tolerance for
risk and expectations from investments; establish-
ing the process of financial statement reporting
in compliance with central bank requirements
and other new stakeholders, both internal and
external; and managing a more complex liquidity
position and other treasury functions.
In many regulatory environments, the CFO
needs to be vetted and approved by the regula-
tor as part of the application process. In some
cases, this individual must meet certain academic
qualifications or hold certain degrees, or qualifi-
cations such as Certified Public Accountant or
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants.
• Risk management or treasury function: Deposit
mobilization adds complexity to asset and liabil-
ity management. Managing the spread between
deposits and loans is not a skill the finance man-
ager of an NGO will have had much chance to
exercise. MFIs typically elect to hire this experi-
ence externally, and invest in additional training
for all branch staff. The CFO may initially be
able to handle this work load, but as deposits
grow, liquidity management becomes more
complex, justifying the hiring of an individual
exclusively dedicated to the treasury function. A
cross-departmental risk-management committee
(or Asset and Liability Committee, ALCO) is
also normally established to closely evaluate the
evolving structure of the MFI’s balance sheet
and the risks and returns inherent in this struc-
ture (box 9.2). (See chapter 10, Financial Man-
agement, for a detailed description of the treas-
ury function.)
• Human resources function: Although many
NGO MFIs have an individual responsible
for managing human resources, often with
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administrative duties as well, transformation and
the ensuing demands for upgraded staff skills,
increased training opportunities, and more
aggressive hiring practices call for a more senior
staff member to serve as Human Resources
Manager and for the human resources function
to be upgraded to a full department (box 9.3).
Key functional areas for this department typical-
ly include developing the human resources plan
for the organization, administration of salary and
benefits, recruitment, coordination of internal
and external training, establishment of staff per-
formance monitoring and evaluation systems,
publication of a staff newsletter, and identifica-
tion and documentation of human resources
policies and procedures.
• Internal audit function: The hiring of internal
auditors and the creation of an independent Inter-
nal Audit department is largely driven by organi-
zational size. As client numbers increase and
transaction volumes multiply, an MFI needs to
invest in a concrete system of controls. In
particular, MFIs that begin offering voluntary sav-
ings, an undertaking that significantly increases
both customer volume and security risk for
the institution, must develop internal audit
expertise. The Internal Audit department is one
critical component of the internal control func-
tion. The role of this department is to provide an
independent check on institutional compliance
with established policies and procedures. (See
chapter 12, Internal Controls and Audit, for fur-
ther discussion.)
The Chief Internal Auditor (CIA) is another
senior position that the regulators will want to
approve. As with the CFO, the CIA is often
required to have certain academic or professional
qualifications. With enough preparatory time, an
MFI can identify the necessary external training
courses and build this capacity within its current
team. Alternatively, external recruitment is a quick
way to bring in this expertise.
The CIA should be a professional accountant
familiar with a variety of audit techniques, stan-
dards, and systems. Given the nature of microfi-
nance business and the role of internal audit, this
individual must also possess a willingness to work
Box 9.2 Risk Management at XacBank
In recognition of the increasing sophistication
and size of operations, XacBank established a risk
management committee in 2001 to monitor the
institution’s current and forecasted positions in
key risk categories, including credit risk, asset-
liability management (liquidity risk, interest rate
risk, foreign exchange risk), and new product
risk. The committee meets on a bimonthly basis
and includes executive management and senior
management representatives from Operations,
Finance, and Marketing.
Source: Contributed by Lloyd Stevens, DFID Financial Sector
Deepening Programme, Uganda, November 2005.
Box 9.3 HR Management at Uganda
Microfinance Union
Before the transformation planning process,
Uganda Microfinance Union (UMU) relied on the
individual tasked with branch management to
oversee key aspects of human resources manage-
ment. These activities were largely limited to
managing leave time, ensuring payroll was
processed, and coordinating the overall perform-
ance review process. As the organization grew,
and in acknowledgement of the increased impor-
tance of the organization’s human capital, UMU
hired a full-time Human Resources Manager, ele-
vating what was a largely administrative task to a
full department position, reporting directly to
the CEO. In addition, UMU established a training
function within this department, tasked with all
new entry training and refresher training for
current staff.
Source: Author.
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with the poor and go into market areas where
clients work. This requirement may be unappeal-
ing to a formal sector bank auditor; thus, it is crit-
ical to vet candidates properly to ensure the nec-
essary commitment to the MFI’s target group. 
• Operations function: For MFIs that have histor-
ically relied on commercial banks to service their
clients’ disbursement and repayment transac-
tions, transformation and the institutional shift
to deposit mobilization can require the launch of
extensive front- and back-office operations at the
branches. The installation of in-house tellers, an
increase in the range of products and services
offered at the branch, and more sophisticated
funds management activities increase activity lev-
els at the branches. A number of MFIs put in
place an Operations or Supervision Department
to oversee branch operations. (See chapter 13,
Customer Service and Operations, for further
discussion.)
• Information technology function: The addition of
savings mobilization results in the MFI becoming
a true financial intermediary, multiplying the level
of scrutiny and supervision by government regu-
lators and others. The ability to produce timely
and accurate reports becomes a critical factor in
how the organization is viewed externally. Failure
to produce these reports can result in fines and
penalties, and also prompt shareholders and reg-
ulators to question the soundness of the organi-
zation’s operating ability. Upgrading the MIS
often equates with the creation of a full depart-
ment tasked with not only supporting the new
hardware, software, and communications infra-
structure, but also ensuring timely and accurate
reporting. (See chapter 11, Management Infor-
mation Systems, for further discussion.)
These system and department changes also
lead to upgrading the information technology
(IT) staff. The IT manager is responsible for
managing and influencing the MFI’s IT infra-
structure, including hardware and software pro-
curement and installation, staff training on hard-
ware and software, system documentation, and
development of MIS for both accounts and
operations. This individual should report directly
to the head of the organization. Preferably, the
IT Manager will have previous project manage-
ment experience, in addition, of course, to qual-
ifications and experience in IT. Knowledge of
accounting is also important.
• Marketing function: As the MFI begins to
expand its geographic presence, as products and
services grow, and as competition becomes a sig-
nificant force in the market, the need for strong
marketing capacity in an MFI grows. The need
for more sophisticated marketing initiatives with
a strong and consistent brand image, particularly
important for savings mobilization, is often
addressed through the creation of an inde-
pendent marketing department. (See chapter 4,
Marketing and Competitive Positioning.)
• Market research and product development
function: In addition to increased marketing
capacity, transformation typically requires
increased investment in an institution’s market
research function. With the opportunity and
need to expand product offerings, the research,
development, piloting, and expansion of new
products becomes a core function of the organ-
ization. While an NGO may have relied on
external technical support for many of these
activities in the past, building greater in-house
capacity in market research and product devel-
opment are important investments for future
competitiveness. 
• Investor relations function: Given the expan-
sion of stakeholders to include shareholders
and regulators, it is important for the trans-
formed MFI to develop an investor relations
function. This function develops specific external
communication such as the Annual Report,
communicates with external investors, and, in
some cases, ensures compliance with regulators.
The investor relations function may not require
a separate department—at least initially—but
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should be recognized as a role that requires an
individual or team to take responsibility and be
accountable for communicating to investors.
The creation of these new departments and staff
positions ultimately redefines the organizational
structural of the institution. The MFI’s organiza-
tional chart will change significantly after trans-
formation. See annex 9C, Sample Organizational
Charts, for examples of transformed MFI’s organi-
zational charts as well as a description of each of the
positions in Socremo MFB’s proposed organiza-
tional structure.
Restructuring of branch operations. The creation
of new head office departments is typically accom-
panied by the creation of parallel units or skills at
the regional or branch level. These changes often
lead to an increase in decentralization, as branches
begin to function more and more as discrete profit
centers.
Staff additions at the branch level needed to sup-
port these changes are dependent to a large extent
on the current operations of the transforming MFI,
but usually include the following:
• Tellers: For MFIs that have historically relied
on either commercial banks or group meetings
“under a tree” to process repayment and dis-
bursement transactions, transformation to a
deposit-taking institution results in the addition
of teller services at the branch level. 
• Accountants: As repayment and disbursement
transactions are brought in house, the complexity
of managing branch-level accounts increases.
Some MFIs have opted to continue to post trans-
actions at a head office level, and others have
found it more efficient to decentralize some of
the transaction posting to the branch level. This
decision ultimately depends on a range of factors,
including the structure of the MIS (centralized or
decentralized database), internal controls, local
accounting capacity, and the like. If an MFI elects
to pursue a more decentralized approach, branch-
level accountants may be required, as will be
capacity building of branch managers to oversee
and supervise these new accountants.
• Customer service officers: Market image and
competitive positioning become key challenges
during an institutional transformation. The addi-
tion of a customer service or information officer
to the branch’s core staff can help present a more
client-focused image to anyone walking into a
branch office. This individual is typically sta-
tioned at the front of the branch to answer any
questions and to advise clients on available prod-
ucts and services.
• Supervisors: Branch managers are often responsi-
ble for the overall supervision of the branch oper-
ations at MFI NGOs. With transformation and
the addition of banking halls, teller windows,
marketing or customer service officers, and oth-
ers, some MFIs develop the position of supervi-
sor within the branches. The supervisor focuses
on the front-office operations and ensures that
branch staff are performing their jobs well and
providing excellent customer service. The super-
visor typically has some level of authority to
approve transactions above what tellers or other
branch staff can approve. Ultimately, the supervi-
sor assists the branch manager in ensuring the
branch operations run smoothly.
• IT capacity: Upgrading an MFI’s IT, common
in a transformation, will undoubtedly lead to the
need to increase IT skills at the branch level.
Although not all systems will require the place-
ment of network administrators at the branch
level, the MFI will need to carefully plan
how system support will be provided to branch-
es in a timely and accurate way. As noted in
chapter 12, Internal Control and Audits, MFIs
that have historically relied on ledger keepers or
manual methods of tracking accounts will find
that computerization can reduce the number of
staff required, forcing MFIs to reassign or lay off
staff members.
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Revising Job Descriptions
Transformation provides a unique opportunity to
revisit existing job descriptions and develop new
ones. Technological innovations, the introduction of
new products and services, and other operational
changes may significantly change day-to-day respon-
sibilities for certain positions. Job descriptions will
need to be developed with these changes in mind.
A reasonable and comprehensive job description
should include the following:
• General statement of duties: brief statement that
broadly explains duties.
• Key responsibilities and performance measures:
identify key responsibility areas and detail specific
activities. Under each responsibility area, ensure
easily tracked performance measures.
• Core competences required: identify key technical
abilities and general skills considered to be pre-
requisites.
• Required qualifications: identify specific educa-
tional background or prior experience needed.
• Attributes desired: identify general personal
characteristics needed.
• Supervision received: identify who will supervise
this position.
• Supervision exercised: identify other positions
that this position is responsible for supervising.
• Customer and peer contact, internal and
external: identify with whom the incumbent
interacts on a day-to-day basis.
• Tools used: identify specific tools, such as com-
puters or vehicles, the employee is expected to
operate.
• Vertical and horizontal promotion opportunities:
identify career path opportunities for this posi-
tion, with clear explanation of experience and
training requirements needed for promotional
opportunities.
A key component of a comprehensive job
description is the section on performance measure-
ment and appraisal. The management style termed
“managing for results” is not linked to any one type
of institutional structure, but transformation into a
regulated, share company often encourages a more
results-oriented management style. The number of,
and level of engagement by, external stakeholders
including investors and regulatory authorities typi-
cally increases pressure on management to reach
targets and achieve results. Transformation provides
MFIs the opportunity to draft more detailed, per-
formance-based employment contracts to capture
some of these targets.
The drafting of new job descriptions can create
fear among staff if they feel their positions are being
restructured or their skill sets are no longer valued.
Thus, the process of developing job descriptions
should be conducted ensuring maximum inclusive-
ness and transparency. At the same time, however,
management needs to be honest about what skills
and positions will be needed in the transformed
institution. This issue is particularly relevant for
MFIs that are creating new companies with the
transformation process. Most of the NGO staff will
be transitioned to the new regulated institution, but
management should see the transformation exercise
as an opportunity to reassess staff capacity. The typ-
ical approach to transitioning staff from the NGO
to the new regulated institution is to terminate the
NGO staff contracts and, using new, clearly docu-
mented job descriptions, undertake a transparent
recruitment process for the new institution. Not all
NGO staff will find homes in the new institution,
and this reality should be communicated to staff in
a transparent manner. However, this communica-
tion process must be implemented with a great deal
of sensitivity and awareness of the potential for
fraud and underperformance of staff if employees
fear dismissal. MFIs need to exercise enormous cau-
tion in how they communicate this message to their
staff. The payment of termination benefits and
other financial liabilities (tax, pension, and so forth)
that could be triggered by the termination of posi-
tions, even for staff who are being reassigned to the
new entity, will also need to be closely evaluated.
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Because of sensitivities surrounding the drafting
of job descriptions, a number of transforming MFIs
have opted to hire externally for this exercise. An
external consultant can ask certain questions about
an individual’s day-to-day activities that someone
internally may not be comfortable asking. In addi-
tion, assuming the consultant has broader financial
system exposure, such an individual could provide
the MFI leadership (usually the board) with key
insights into the new roles and responsibilities to be
assumed by staff in the transformed institution and
the requisite skills. This certainly applies to senior
management positions, because the scope of their
areas of responsibility typically expands with trans-
formation, but is applicable, too, for front-line and
back-office staff.
Ensuring the Right Staff
Once the right organizational structure is estab-
lished, the responsibilities of the branches defined,
and job descriptions documented, these positions
need to be staffed by people who have the right
skills and attitudes for the job, or at a minimum,
have the capacity to learn the skills. Likewise, the
MFI will need to demonstrate that it has the com-
mitment and willingness to invest in developing and
nurturing these skills.
Managing a financial intermediary is a complex
process, particularly challenging for institutions that
have remained relatively centralized, relying on the
visionary founder or a few top leaders to set direc-
tion and make decisions (Ledgerwood 1999). With
the increase in external scrutiny by regulators and
others, MFIs often need to build significant mana-
gerial and technical expertise throughout the
organization. The shift to a regulated MFI is often
characterized by a significant professionalization of
operations. Staffing levels need to be examined not
only from the perspective of today’s requirements,
but also based on future needs. Staff capacity needs
to be built in critical managerial and technical areas,
calling for investments in training and capacity
building. New recruits might be needed to fill some
of the more senior technical positions. Managing
the balance between internal promotion and exter-
nal recruitment takes careful planning. Finally, insti-
tutionalizing an appropriate performance-based
management system to motivate and retain staff is
important.
Optimizing Staffing Levels
A quickly growing MFI often hires staff in a reac-
tive manner—staff are recruited in response to pleas
from branch managers or other head-office staff to
ameliorate what is perceived as staff overload.
Transformation planning allows an MFI to instead
shift to a more proactive hiring pattern. The goal
is to bring in the necessary staff today to achieve
the right balance and number of qualified staff for
tomorrow.
As highlighted above, staffing level issues for a
transforming MFI include both insufficient staffing
and overstaffing. This change in personnel requires
careful planning early in the transformation process.
Five steps can be taken to identify and meet this
changing demand for personnel:2
Select a planning horizon. The planning horizon is
directly related to the term of the institution’s
strategic plan. If an MFI has a five-year strategic
plan, a five-year human resources plan should be
feasible. Three to five years for personnel planning
is typically the most useful and practical.
Project the supply of personnel. Staff retention
rates indicate employee satisfaction and must be
monitored. If not communicated well, transforma-
tion planning can result in the perception of unpre-
dictability, encouraging some staff to actively seek
out other more stable opportunities. 
Forecast the demand for personnel. To determine
the institution’s optimal staffing level not only for
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today, but also well into the future, the MFI can use
a range of strategies. When managers know their
operations well, they should have a good sense of
the right number of people required for their
departments to function effectively. New managers
or managers of new departments may have a harder
time with this exercise, which underscores the
importance of exposure visits and forums for
management-level exchanges among MFIs. In addi-
tion, many MFIs already use financial projection
models that require the structuring of a “model
branch.” Because 80 to 90 percent of employees are
in the branch systems, optimizing staffing in the
branches should be a priority (Carlson 1992).
Identify emerging excesses and shortages and make
plans to resolve shortages and excesses. This step
simply requires a comparison of the projected sup-
ply of staff with the projected demand year by year,
often known as a gap analysis. Because of the sensi-
tivities involved in such an evaluation and the need
to ensure a long-term perspective, MFIs might find
it best to contract externally for this analysis. (See
annex 9A for sample terms of reference.) In addi-
tion, because such an assessment can generate anxi-
ety among staff who may see it as an assessment of
their performance, the analyst should emphasize
that the objective of the gap analysis is not to deter-
mine who should be fired, but instead to provide
the organization with an assessment of skill short-
ages to identify both priority recruitment areas and
required training programs. (Ultimately, however,
institutions will likely have to make some hard deci-
sions regarding staff capacity.) With gaps identified,
the MFI then needs to draft a concrete plan for
resolving the shortages and excesses, clearly the
most challenging step in the process.
Consider the costs. Significant costs will arise from
additional personnel salaries and benefits as well as
training costs, which need to be factored into the
projected financials.
Building the Right Skills Mix:
External Recruitment and Training
Using results of the gap analysis, the MFI needs to
make decisions about which positions to recruit for
externally and which to upgrade through addition-
al training and exposure. Hiring externally provides
the opportunity to upgrade the MFI’s level of
professionalism quickly. Internal training and devel-
opment will improve the skills and attitudes of
the existing work force, but it takes time. Transfor-
mations of NGO MFIs to regulated financial
institution have typically involved external hiring
for key technical positions, such as the Treasury
Manager, the IT Manager, and in some cases, the
Human Resources Manager. These external recruits
can contribute significantly to upgrading the skill
base of the MFI, but their additions to the institu-
tion’s capacity obviously need to be carefully
weighed against their impact on the payroll. In
most developing countries, people with senior
banking skills are usually scarce, allowing the few
that exist to command high market prices. 
Institutional commitment to training. Training
must be a core activity of the MFI focused on build-
ing the skills to enable the institution to meet its
goals. Training must be viewed as an investment,
not an expense. Resources need to be committed to
building internal training courses as well as identify-
ing appropriate external training opportunities. The
selection, management, and training of internal
trainers are crucial. Although a training coordinator
is often hired to help coordinate the delivery of
training, training is actually often conducted by
MFI staff with hands-on experience. This implies
that they have been trained as trainers and that their
supervisors are supportive of the training process.
Perhaps, even more important than the actual train-
ing is the development of a culture in which
individuals strive to learn and are motivated to
continue to pursue new challenges. Such a culture
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includes supportive managers who see the value in
training and are motivated to find ways to develop
their staff. Managers will generally support training
opportunities for their staff if they feel the training
adds value to staff members’ abilities to carry out
their duties.
Balancing in-house training and external training.
Building a solid training and development infra-
structure is critical to the professionalization
process of the MFI, particularly for institutions
committed to filling senior management positions
through internal promotion. Most NGO MFIs
have internal training programs heavy on introduc-
tory sessions for new staff and methodology train-
ing for loan officers. Training for specific technical
skills or more general management skills is often
outsourced. Because loan officers typically make
up a significant portion of the staff, this makes
economic sense. However, as an MFI begins to
expand its presence and decentralize its operations,
an over-reliance on external training can become
costly.
The appropriate balance between in-house
training and external training opportunities will
depend on a range of factors, including the quality
and relevance of external training, the relative
importance of the training to the MFI’s competi-
tive advantage in the marketplace, the number of
staff who need to be trained, and the frequency of
the training. These factors will differ between insti-
tutions, but a common thread among transforming
institutions has been their commitment to building
a strong in-house training function. Using external
training to fill gaps in the internal training program
can continue. However, the disadvantages of using
external training are the cost of the training per
person, the dependence on the external training
schedule, and the fact that usually no external
course is specifically tailored to the MFI’s method-
ology. With the continuous growth that comes
with transformation and the increasing importance
of products that require more sophisticated analy-
sis, it often makes sense to begin developing the
in-house training capacity of staff. Key in-house
training modules include new staff induction,
methodology training for products (including cash
flow analysis techniques for individual lending),
delinquency management, sales and marketing,
customer service, and basic budgeting for branch
managers. 
Balancing on-the-job training with classroom
training. Most learning in a financial institution
occurs on the job, as specific skills are internalized,
deepened, expanded, and supplemented through
day-to-day experience. Building and disseminating
solid on-the-job training is a key resource for insti-
tutions. Such training, however, also needs to be
balanced with more structured classroom training.
On-the-job training programs often do not provide
the theoretical knowledge that the employee needs
to properly execute his or her work, particularly for
field and loan officers. In addition, the quality of
the on-the job training can be irregular, depending
on who is tasked with orienting the staff member.
Supplementing on-the-job training with structured
classroom training can help address some of these
issues (box 9.4).
Box 9.4 Training of Loan Officers
As is the case with many quickly growing MFIs,
U-Trust initially relied heavily on on-the-job train-
ing to build capacity among its field staff. A well-
developed rotation program provided new staff
with broad exposure to various departments.
The significant increase in staff hiring combined
with the introduction of more sophisticated risk
assessment technologies, however, prompted the
development of supplementary standardized
classroom training.
Source: Author.
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Career path management. The possibility of mov-
ing up in an organization can be a significant moti-
vator for staff. Thus, MFIs should link training
programs to performance appraisal systems. Yearly
performance appraisals should identify additional
training needs for all employees, while the differ-
ent workshops attended should be valued in the
overall development of the employees. Career path
management balances the MFI’s need to have
qualified people in each position and the need
to use different positions to develop qualified
individuals.
Table 9.1 presents a summary of primary train-
ing needs for transforming MFIs by position. The
training needed to support transformation and to
provide an MFI with the necessary human
resources base is not limited to functional skill
development. Instead, a wide range of management
skill-building sessions and attitude development are
often just as important in this process. 
Priority Training Needs
All the training needs identified in table 9.1 are
important. The following summarizes some of the
more significant training priorities at the branch
level.
From branch supervisor to branch manager—With
the trend toward decentralization and the requisite
shift toward more branch-based transactions, trans-
formation has tended to also increase the roles and
responsibilities of branch managers. Within the
NGO structure, branch managers often play more
of a senior loan officer role, largely acting as a
supervisor for the loan officers in the branch. With
transformation, however, they take on a much more
significant management function as branch staffing
levels (including tellers, possibly for the first time),
internal control requirements, liquidity manage-
ment, reporting, security, and other needs expand.
Branch managers faced with these tasks for the
first time can be supported with specific manage-
ment skills training in leadership and decision
making, as well as more technical training in finan-
cial statement analysis, budgeting, and liquidity
management.
Prioritization of quality customer service—
Increasing competition in today’s markets is forcing
MFIs to adjust their strategies and restructure their
operations. The importance of building strong cus-
tomer relations is recognized as key to building a
competitive advantage in the marketplace, particu-
larly for organizations adding deposit services.
Because so many factors affect a customer’s experi-
ence, customer service needs to be incorporated as
an overall enterprise objective and philosophy.
Thus, transforming organizations are placing
greater priority on exposing their staff to customer
care or customer service training. Some form of
service quality training has become compulsory
in many of the leading MFIs. (See chapter 13,
Customer Service and Operations, for further
discussion.)
From loan officer to relationship officer—The shift
from credit only to a credit and savings institution
has a profound impact on the role of the MFI’s
primary client contact point—the loan officer.
Although loan officers by definition are tradition-
ally trained to market a relatively narrow set of
products (or one product), the shift to deposit tak-
ing requires a significant increase in both their
understanding of product offerings and the way in
which they interact with clients (box 9.5). Whereas
the key themes for marketing microloans are speed
of service, price, and perhaps flexibility, the themes
for microsavings are liquidity and security, the latter
of which requires building trust in the marketplace.
As mentioned in chapter 1, Mobilizing Savings
from the Public, regulated commercial MFIs must
mobilize savings from the broader public, not from
the poor alone. This requires a major effort to train
management and staff to deal with a broader target
market.
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Table 9.1 Training Needs for Transforming MFIs
Personnel Management skills Functional skills Attitudes
All staff
Senior
management
Branch
managers
Loan officers
Back-office
staff
• Leadership
• Goal setting
• Planning
• Monitoring and control 
• Productivity
management 
• Cost management 
• Problem identification,
analysis, and resolution 
• Quality control 
• Change management
• Managing relations with
external stakeholders:
supervisory authorities,
shareholders, and the like
• Managing for results
n.a.
n.a.
• Results orientation 
• Improvement orientation 
• Active, involved management 
• Staff development 
• Problem resolution 
• High standards 
• Receptiveness to change 
• Profit orientation 
• Customer focus 
• Open communications 
• Constructive critique 
• Objectivity 
• Initiative
• Assumption of responsibility
• Responsible to external board
and regulators
• Double bottom line
• Shift from role as senior loan
officer to true manager
• Money laundering 
• Shift from sellers to buyers:
credit only to credit and
savings
n.a.
• Customer service
• Marketing and brand image
awareness
• General banking practices
• Auditing 
• Computer technology
• Human resources development 
• Management accounting
• Asset liability management
• Risk management
• Treasury management
• More sophisticated human
resources management 
• Regulations (for example, money
laundering, and so forth)
• Governance (dealing with new
players and rules)
• Budgeting
• Financial accounting
• More advanced credit analysis and
cash flow analysis techniques
• More advanced delinquency
management
• Human resources development
• Customer service
• Security (especially if handling
cash)
• More advanced credit analysis and
cash flow analysis techniques
• More advanced delinquency
management
• Customer care 
• Sales
• More advanced IT capacity
• For accountants: cash to accrual
accounting, basic liquidity
management
Source: Adapted from Carlson (1992, box 5.4).
n.a.  Not applicable.
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Improved client risk assessment techniques—The
addition of individual loans (if not offered previ-
ously or at least not to clients with higher income
levels) requires investment in significant loan officer
training. Building the ability among loan officers to
calculate capacity to repay based on simplified cash-
flow analysis requires an investment in both class-
room training and on-the-job monitoring and
supervision (box 9.6). This shift may also lead to
changes in the profiling of loan officers, requiring
recruitment efforts to focus on applicants with
more developed financial analysis skills.
Motivating and Rewarding Performance
Identifying staffing levels and building the right
skills mix responds to a transforming MFI’s need to
identify and attract the right quantity and caliber of
employees. The next challenge is how to retain and
motivate these staff. Critical motivating influences
already mentioned include developing a compre-
hensive training and development program, ensur-
ing clear and transparent promotional opportunities
for staff, and empowering staff through greater
decentralization as improvements in systems and
internal controls allow branch-level staff to take
on more responsibility. This section considers a
fourth, perhaps more basic motivator—monetary
compensation.
Staff compensation. Institutional transformation
into a for-profit company has two important impli-
cations for staff compensation: (a) the fact that
the company is changing from a nonprofit to a for-
profit can create certain expectations among staff
that salaries and benefits will increase (in spite of the
continued commitment to social objectives), and
(b) transformation provides MFI managers a unique
opportunity to introduce or redesign the way in
which staff are motivated, monitored, and rewarded.
MFI staff members in positions similar in title and
job description to positions in traditional banking,
such as tellers, loan officers, data capturers, and the
like, may begin to compare their salaries with friends
or family members in similar positions at local banks.
This may lead to unrealistic expectations about
what transformation will mean for their own pay. By
proactively addressing these concerns, an MFI’s
human resources manager can help avoid deteriora-
tion in staff morale. In some cases, staff members are
simply misinformed. Investing in an external salary
survey is often useful for showing true averages and
for making transparent benefits, in-kind contribu-
tions, and bonuses. In other cases, staff may not be
Box 9.5 From Loan Officer to ARO
With the introduction of a wider range of prod-
uct offerings, including savings services, FINCA
Uganda recognized that the term loan officer no
longer reflected the true role of this position.
The organization coined a new term account
relationship officer or ARO, to reflect the
expanded role such staff are playing in servicing
the financial needs of their clients.
Source: Interview with Clare Wavamunno, and Millie Kasozi,
FINCA Uganda, March 2004.
Box 9.6 Expanding the Market
In an effort to reach further down market with
its individual loan product, UMU shifted its analy-
sis from a largely collateral-based assessment to
a more thorough assessment of the borrower’s
capacity and willingness to repay. With an
expanded focus on the cash flow of the client’s
business, the revised individual loan appraisal
format required a significant investment in the
training of loan officers, branch managers, and
senior management.
Source: Author.
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aware of the true financial picture of the organiza-
tion. Communication is critical. Conducting basic
information sessions with staff that focus on the
general financial performance of the institution is
very useful. This session could also include an
overview of the basic fiscal and regulatory changes
that will affect the organization as a regulated,
for-profit entity.
Assuming a scenario in which a new organization
is created and staff are shifted from the NGO to the
new regulated MFI, the NGO staff contracts would
be terminated and new contracts issued by the reg-
ulated MFI. This provides MFIs with the opportu-
nity to realign the salary scale, change titles and
positions as needed, and restructure the overall
compensation package. Incorporating staff input
and managing expectations regarding compensa-
Box 9.7 Ten Steps to Redesigning an Incentive Scheme to Accommodate an Institutional
Transformation
1. Redefine and clarify strategic goals of the new
transformed institution. These may not be the
same as the goals of the original MFI NGO.
2. Analyze new culture, clientele, products, and
processes. Introduction of savings products, new
technology advances, changes to branch-level
procedures, and the like will affect incentive
scheme design.
3. Redefine the objectives of the incentive scheme.
What is the MFI trying to achieve, and what
results does it expect? Also, what problems is it
trying to fix?
4. Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of such a
scheme. How much is the regulated institution
willing to spend?
5. Decide which staff members and positions will
be affected by the scheme.
6. Perform technical design work including for-
mula development and calibration, as well as
spreadsheet testing. It is useful (and should be
obligatory) to carry out sensitivity and scenario
analyses. It helps to use a participatory process.
7. Choose incentive mechanisms. Examples are
merit pay, incentive pay (bonus schemes),
perquisites, benefits, profit sharing, gain shar-
ing, ownership, or a combination of these mech-
anisms. Consider staff expectations, levels of risk
involved, and regulatory restrictions.
8. Field test in a controlled environment at one or
two branches.
9. Sell the scheme to the staff. Do not underesti-
mate the need to build buy-in to changes in an
incentive scheme. Changes in performance indi-
cators (either additions or deletions), weight-
ings, or actual bonus values need to be carefully
explained and promoted to staff.
10. Monitor the performance of the scheme. Make
adjustments based on regular reviews (for
example, semiannually).
Source: Adapted from Holtmann 2003.
tion are important components of the change man-
agement process.
Adapting incentive schemes. The transformation
process provides MFIs an opportunity to introduce,
or redesign, a staff incentive scheme as part of com-
pensation. Targets for the transformed institution
may be different from those for the NGO, products
and services may have expanded, and priority areas
for the institution’s growth plans may have
changed. All these factors can be incorporated into
an MFI’s incentive scheme design (see box 9.7).
Incentive schemes in the microfinance industry
range from monthly bonus payments based on a
variety of different variables to profit-sharing plans
and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).3
Staff incentive schemes need to be adapted and
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tailored to the specific situation prevailing in each
organization or MFI. 
Some of the key issues a transforming MFI
should consider in incentive scheme design are
highlighted below: 
• Balance between base and incentive: Trans-
formation provides MFIs the opportunity to
structure or restructure the relationship between
base pay and bonus pay. In finding the right
balance, an MFI needs to consider the appropri-
ate level of risk staff is able (that is, has control
over) or willing to assume. The higher the pro-
portion of incentive in the overall compensa-
tion package, the higher the risk for the staff
member. As suggested by Martin Holtmann in
MicroSave’s Staff Incentive Schemes Toolkit
(2003, p. 19),
For loan officers, the variable (performance-
related) portion might account for between
20 to 50% of total compensation. Levels
much below 20% will probably not have
much of an effect on behavior, while levels
above 50% may attract risk-seeking individ-
uals to the job. Other MFI staff members
such as those engaged in savings mobiliza-
tion and back-office work would probably
find variable pay accounting for 50% of total
compensation unduly harsh. For such occu-
pational categories it may be more appro-
priate to let the variable (incentive) part of
compensation vary between 15 and 30% of
total pay.
• Individual versus unit incentives: Incentive
schemes can be developed for individuals,
branches, or units, depending on the activities
and responsibilities of each individual and the
particular behavior the institution is trying to
encourage (box 9.8). An institution’s choice of
individual or unit (such as branch) based
schemes is ultimately affected by a range of fac-
tors, including capacity of the MIS, preference
for encouraging individual performance or fos-
tering teamwork and cohesiveness in the unit or
branch, operating structure of the MFI, risk of
free-rider behavior, and size of the unit.4
• Staff incentive schemes for savings: Performance-
based incentive schemes for loan officers are
relatively common. However, little is known
about effective incentive schemes for staff
who mobilize savings. The major difficulty 
in establishing individual performance-based
incentive schemes for savings is attribution—
mobilizing savings involves every member of a
branch. Furthermore, the volume of savings
depends as much on seasonal fluctuations that 
Box 9.8 Individual versus Branch
Incentives at UML
UMU (now UML) has always maintained that one
of the secrets to its success is its team approach to
service delivery, which is not only based on team-
work but also on team spirit. A flat operating
hierarchy and an open-door policy at all levels of
the organization contribute to a motivating
environment. When embarking on the process of
developing a monetary incentive scheme for
staff, UML wanted to ensure this team approach
would endure. Therefore, although UML recently
decided to begin tracking performance by loan
officer, and has thus shifted to a more individual-
based incentive scheme, branch performance is
still incorporated. Incentives for loan officers are
computed based on number of loans disbursed,
portfolio growth, and portfolio quality. Branch
manager incentives include these same parame-
ters, plus compliance with reporting require-
ments and operating policies, as well as branch
profitability. Back-office staff, including account-
ants, cashiers, support staff, and customer care
officers, receive incentives based on the prof-
itability of the branch.
Source: Authors.
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vary from branch to branch as it does on the
level of promotional activity. Nevertheless, fail-
ing to recognize the vital contribution of branch
staff to raising deposits and serving clients effec-
tively and efficiently does little to encourage
individual and thereby collective excellence
(Holtmann 2003).
Incentives can be provided for good per-
formance for savings mobilization through
branch-based awards given on the basis of most
improved or best performing branch. Individual
awards can be provided to tellers meeting
peak targets. In most cases, it may be sufficient
to construct a simple formula-based scheme
that takes into account outreach (that is, the
development of the number of accounts) and
deposit volume. When deposits are mobilized
through branches, the incentive awards (such as
monthly bonuses) should be based on group
performance and should be shared equally
among the staff members (or prorated for part-
time staff). As with any incentive scheme,
savings-based incentive schemes need to be care-
fully designed and tested. See Holtmann and
Grammling 2005.
Annex 9D, Checklist for Managing Human
Resources, provides a summary checklist of the
major transformation-related human resources
issues discussed in this chapter. 
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Annex 9A Sample Terms of
Reference: Human Resources
Management
Background
Background on the organization including its
mission, target market, client outreach, portfolio
size, and so forth.
Strategic Objective
By transforming its operations, MFI A seeks to
meet the following key objectives:
1. To provide a variety of financial services, includ-
ing savings, credit, and money transmission, to
low-income people
2. To enhance access to more commercial funding
including savings, debt, and equity capital
3. To portray credibility in the eyes of potential
customers and the public
4. To promote professionalism and best practice in
service delivery
5. To increase efficiency, sound financial manage-
ment, profitability, and institutional sustainability
To this end, MFI A has identified the need to
strengthen its human resources (HR) management
function. This will entail reviewing and, where need-
ed, establishing policies, systems, and job descrip-
tions in all areas of human resources management
including the following:
• Organization and management development
• Recruitment and human resources planning
• Performance management
• Compensation and incentives
• Employee relations and services
MFI A requires assistance in defining the appro-
priate structure for its HR function as well as devel-
oping and increasing the competencies of its HR
staff.
MFI A also requires assistance to develop an
appropriate organizational structure for the trans-
formed MFI including draft job descriptions and
training needs. 
To meet these objectives, the following two
phases will be undertaken:
Phase I 
Tasks
1. Interview senior management and, if possible,
board members to determine the business driv-
ers and organizational context of MFI A.
2. Assess the current HR policies and systems.
3. Assess the current capabilities of line managers
and supervisors through focus group discussions,
interviews, and assessment tools.
4. Conduct a survey of employees to identify
concerns with and requirements of the HR
department.
5. Facilitate a management retreat where the leaders
will define the philosophy, values, and policies
that will guide the institution in developing, for-
mulating, and reviewing its HR programs and
processes, as well as define and agree on their role
and the behaviors they will model as leaders.
6. Identify the areas to be developed to achieve a
strong HR function.
7. Develop an implementation strategy for carry-
ing out the HR function and identify the roles
required to ensure HR has the capability to
achieve its strategies and programs, specifically:
• Determine the appropriate HR department
structure.
• Define the department’s goals and vision and
clarify each position in the unit.
• Prepare job descriptions and competencies
required for the HR positions.
• Train HR key staff and associates.
Deliverables
1. Prepare assessment report of current HR poli-
cies, systems, and capabilities of management.
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2. Draft HR philosophy, values, and policies.
3. Draft HR plan including programs and processes
to be put in place to support business strategies
and address gaps.
4. Draft HR implementation strategy, department
structure, and required HR positions including
job descriptions.
Level of Effort. It is estimated phase I will take 20
to 25 days to complete.
Phase II
Tasks
1. Working jointly with management and the HR
department, develop an organizational structure
to meet the needs of the regulated MFI.
2. Develop draft job descriptions for the positions
identified.
3. Assess the current competency levels of the
managers and selected staff to determine current
capabilities and identify training needs.
Deliverables
1. Draft organizational chart.
2. Draft job descriptions.
3. Prepare assessment report of key managers and
selected staff.
4. Prepare training recommendations for employ-
ees based on assessment results.
Level of Effort. It is estimated phase II will take 25
to 30 days to complete.
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Annex 9B Examples of Job
Responsibilities for Senior Staff
Chief Financial Officer 
The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is the most sen-
ior financial advisor to the Chief Executive Officer
and reports directly to him or her. The CFO creates
the vision for and manages the long-term financial
strategy of the organization. Key responsibilities
include the following:
• Oversee the finance department; as required,
hire accountants and finance staff, and develop
and ensure adherence to appropriate policies and
procedures.
• Produce financial and other reports for manage-
ment, directors, auditors, regulators, tax agencies.
• Manage balance between risk and return by
maintaining a positive spread between the inter-
est rates on earning assets and the interest cost of
funds (asset liability management).
• Manage cash and funds transfers.
• Develop annual budgets and contribute to
annual projections.
• Oversee interbranch transfers.
• Prepare documentation for external funders,
regulatory and governmental authorities, exter-
nal auditors, and financial consultants as needed.
• Ensure reliability and integrity of financial and
operating information systems.
• Manage capital expenditures and all procure-
ment for the institution.
• Establish and enforce internal controls.
• Maintain the general ledger.
• Oversee funding requirements and liquidity
management.
• Oversee tax filings.
• Manage the staffing and training of financial per-
sonnel to ensure maximum efficiency and high
quality performance.
Treasury Manager
The function of the Treasury Manager is to manage
the institution’s overall liquidity position. This
includes ensuring adequate liquidity levels at
branches and head office, adhering to reserve
requirements and other liquidity ratios mandated by
the central bank, minimizing the cost of foregone
earnings on idle funds and avoiding the cost of emer-
gency borrowing, maximizing the return on invest-
ments outside the loan portfolio, and managing the
interest rate spread between loans and deposits. Key
responsibilities include the following:
• Review cash holdings at branches on a consistent
basis and facilitate transfer and pricing of excess
to branches with cash shortfalls.
• Monitor balances on bank accounts to evaluate
availability of idle cash for investment.
• Monitor interest rate risk, liquidity risk, foreign
exchange risk (if applicable).
• Prepare liquidity reports required in normal
operations, for treasury management meetings,
for ALCO meetings, or to meet compliance
reporting requirements.
Human Resources Manager 
The responsibilities of this position include manag-
ing and influencing the strategic design and delivery
of human resources services in the areas of com-
pensation, staffing, and training. Key responsibili-
ties include the following:
• Develop annual HR plan for the organization in
consultation with top management; ensure qual-
ity implementation of plan.
• Direct internal and external recruitment activities.
• Develop individual professional development
plans; identify and coordinate staff development
and training opportunities.
• Ensure all HR policies are in place and well doc-
umented in Human Resources Manual.
• Develop or update incentive scheme as part of
overall staff compensation.
• Implement performance management systems,
coach managers on performance issues, assess
management training needs.
• Administer benefits and salaries.
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Internal Auditor 
The function of the Internal Auditor is to verify that
the internal controls set by management effectively
mitigate risk throughout the MFI. Although
approaches differ between Francophone and Anglo-
phone systems, the Internal Auditor should report
directly to the board of directors. Key responsibili-
ties include the following:
• Oversee the internal audit department: hire
internal audit clerks, develop and ensure adher-
ence to appropriate policies and procedures,
establish standards for executing internal audits.
• Oversee scheduling and execution of internal
audits, including these:
– Compliance audits to ensure compliance with
all applicable laws and regulations;
– Financial audits to ensure accuracy of
accounts and reports;
– Management audits to check the degree to
which employees follow policies and proce-
dures correctly (includes methodology audits
to ensure credit evaluation, disbursement,
repayment procedures being appropriately
applied);
– Special investigations (as needed) to check for
fraud or gross misconduct.
• Ensure audit work is properly planned and con-
ducted, that reports meet audit standards, and
that audit evidence adequately supports the
conclusions.
• Coordinate and support external audit process.
• Assist with general information requests from
external and internal sources.
Information Technology Officer 
The IT officer is responsible for managing and
influencing the MFI’s information technology
infrastructure, including hardware and software
procurement and installation, staff training on
hardware and software, system documentation, and
development and implementation of MIS for both
accounts and operations. The IT Manager should
report directly to the head of the organization. The
IT Manager has primary responsibility for oversee-
ing the day-to-day running of the MFI’s informa-
tion systems. Key responsibilities include these:
• Project management: If and when the MFI
implements a new system, the IT manager is
responsible for overall project management of
installation and rollout of the new system. This
role will require 
– Development and management of project plan
– Coordination of project communications
– Facilitation of project committee
– Management of customization requests
(working closely with the software vendor),
management of staff training on new system
– Serving as the primary point person for the
software and hardware vendors. 
• Ongoing system maintenance, support, and
development will include these:
– Coordinating branch hardware and software
setup
– Creating new system users
– Establishing and maintaining user security
controls
– Overseeing the daily rollover
– Ensuring a timely month-end consolidation
– Overseeing the data transfer process from
branches to head office
– Coordinating future system development
requests. 
• Management information systems: The IT
Manager has primary responsibility for ensuring
appropriate MIS are in place and able to meet
management needs.
• Training: The IT Manager is responsible for
developing and carrying out (along with other
IT department staff and the HR department) a
comprehensive training plan for all staff in both
hardware and software. With a new system, this
will require the implementation of an initial
assessment of staff computer skills, followed by
the development of an appropriate training
schedule, materials, and courses.
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When designing Socremo MFB’s future organi-
zation chart, the following goals and principles
were emphasized:
• Clear distribution and assignment of tasks,
responsibilities, and competencies;
• Separation of operative functions and control
functions up to Management Board level;
• Strong target-group orientation and high degree
of flexibility with regard to clients’ needs;
• Even distribution of workload between members
of the Management Board.
Duties and Responsibilities 
of the Management Board 
The general manager (GM) heads the management
board (MB) and carries the overall responsibility for
the institution’s business, including business areas
delegated to other members of the MB. In addi-
tion, the GM carries exclusive MB level res-
ponsibility for the human resource, financial control
and legal advice departments.
The manager banking operations (MBO) reports
to the GM. The MBO carries MB level responsibil-
ity for all credit and noncredit operations. As such,
the MBO is the line superior to all staff in the cred-
it, operations, and IT departments in all branches of
the bank. With respect to credit, the MBO leads the
headquarter credit committee and is responsible for
all loan contracts exceeding department level or
branch level limits.
The manager supervision and administration
(MSA) is responsible for branch supervision (with
respect to all credit and noncredit operations),
General Manager
Manager Supervision
and Administration
Manager Banking
Operations 
Credit 
Operations 
IT
Human
Resources 
Financial Control
Legal Advice 
Branch
Supervision
Administration
Treasury
Supervisory Board
Internal Audit
General Assembly
Management Board
Fiscal Council
Source: Contributed by Christoph Diehl, Socremo, and LFS. 
Socremo—Banco de Microfinanças de Moçambique 
Proposed Organizational Structure after Transformation (please see description of each position below) 
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internal administration as well as for treasury. As
with the MBO, the MSA reports to the GM.
Duties and Functions of Departments
and Units
Portfolio of the GM. The human resources depart-
ment is in charge of developing a human resources
policy, guidelines and procedures for recruitment,
elaboration of staff development plans, and creation
of in-house training facilities. The HR department
is headed by the GM and its proper establishment is
one of her or his key responsibilities.
The financial control department is headed by
the chief accountant who is responsible for all activ-
ities of the department, in particular accounting,
liquidity management, and external and internal
reporting of the bank. The department works
closely with the credit and other departments to
ensure proper flow of information and reporting.
Primary tasks include liquidity management and
budget monitoring. The financial control depart-
ment is also responsible for proper reporting to the
central bank and the tax authorities. It reports
directly to the GM.
The legal advice unit is in charge of all legal ques-
tions concerning the bank (in connection with its
clients as well as other legal issues) and assumes a
support function in this respect. In addition, the
legal adviser may be directly charged with enforce-
ment of persistently delinquent clients. While the
legal advice unit bears a service function for all
operative departments in the bank, its assignment
carries a clear focus on support to the credit
department. 
Portfolio of the MBO. The credit department is
responsible for credit risk management and growth
of the loan portfolio. It is exclusively in charge of all
loan generation and follow-up tasks for all credit
products offered (microloans, small and medium
enterprise loans, consumer loans, housing loans,
agricultural loans, and so forth). This includes
direct marketing tasks, client relationship manage-
ment, loan analysis, and loan decision making, as
well as loan enforcement. Furthermore, the credit
department is responsible for the continuous
improvement of existing credit products and the
development and implementation of new credit
products. The head of the credit department reports
to the MBO.
The banking operations department is in charge
of all tasks related to payment transactions, account
management, and savings. At an advanced stage of
institutional development, it is envisaged to estab-
lish subdivisions for each of these tasks. The head
of the banking operations department reports to
the MBO.
The IT department has a service function and
supports all units of the bank in terms of procure-
ment, usage, and maintenance of information and
communication technology (hardware and soft-
ware). It is in charge of developing and modifying
the bank’s IT systems in accordance with changing
informational needs. Requirements for IT system
adjustment are defined on a continuous basis. The
IT department further ensures adequate data secu-
rity and the fulfillment of requirements of the
supervisory authority for an IT system. The head of
the IT department reports to the MBO.
Portfolio of the MSA. The branch supervision
department supervises all branch credit- and non-
credit-related activities. It ensures maintenance of
high quality standards and compliance with all
internal rules, guidelines, and procedures. It also
seeks to improve standards and procedures and
make related proposals. The head of the branch
supervision department reports to the MSA. 
The bank’s branches are organized as independ-
ent profit centers. In specific cases, a branch may
consist of several outlets. While branches enjoy
decentralized decision-making procedures, control
functions are centralized at the head office. Each
branch is headed by a branch manager who is
responsible for all decisions related to the branch
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(human resources, administration, operations, cred-
it, and accounting). Branch managers report to the
MSA. In addition, branches have credit as well as
operations units to cover all credit- and noncredit-
related activities. All staff in these units come under
the MBO.
The administration department is in charge of
administration and maintenance of the bank’s fixed
assets as well as the storage of confiscated securities.
The administration department is responsible for
procurement, car pool, security, housekeeping, and
so forth. The administration department is headed
by the MSA.
The treasury department ensures adequate refi-
nancing of the bank. In this function it not only
supports the Asset and Liability Committee
(ALCO) in raising appropriate financial resources
but also monitors the bank’s financial and opera-
tive margins and proposes interest rate policies.
The head of the treasury department reports to the
MSA. In addition, she or he reports directly to
the ALCO and participates in ALCO meetings.
Internal Audit Unit. The objective of the internal
audit unit is to provide independent judgment and
consulting to continually improve the bank’s oper-
ations with respect to adequacy and efficiency. The
Internal Audit Unit reports to the Supervisory
Board, which also appoints the personnel of the
Internal Audit Unit. The unit has direct reporting
lines to the Supervisory Board as well as to the
Fiscal Council. The Internal Auditors evaluate
internal control systems and risk exposures associat-
ed with the bank’s governance structure, its credit
and noncredit operations and its information
systems. The goal of the Internal Audit Unit is to
ensure compliance with laws, regulations, and
contracts; maintain and increase efficiency of
operations; and safeguard the bank’s assets. The
Internal Audit Unit regularly makes proposals for
improvements based on shortcomings identified in
any area of the bank’s operations.
Asset and Liability Committee. The Asset and Lia-
bility Committee manages the bank’s exposure to
market risks. The Committee consists of all mem-
bers of the MB. Responsibilities of the ALCO
include (a) decisions with regard to the bank’s
exposure to market risks and supervision of their
implementation, (b) development and adoption of
medium and long-term financial and liquidity plans,
(c) identification of funding needs and development
of business strategies on the mobilization of funds,
and (d) continuous review of market conditions and
adaptation of business operations accordingly.
The organization structure above reflects the
planned future organization of Socremo MFB.
Although formal prudential requirements are
already met by Socremo MFB’s organizational struc-
ture, local management capacities must still be built
to (a) fill more of senior management positions
described and (b) support envisaged growth of the
institution. This implies a need for training of cur-
rent staff to fully assume senior management func-
tions as much as it implies recruiting new staff for
new business areas.
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Annex 9D Checklist for Managing
Human Resources
Culture
• Have you clearly articulated your institutional
values? And are these values understood and
appreciated by all levels of staff?
• Do you have a plan for limiting the potential for
culture clash between current staff and new
recruits?
• Have you identified a leader for the transforma-
tion process?
• Do you have a strategy to ensure staff buy-in to
the need for an institutional transformation?
• Do you have a plan to communicate the trans-
formation process to your staff? 
• Do you prioritize your own staff as internal
customers?
Organizational Structure
• Does your organizational chart currently reflect
the business units needed to support your future
business strategy? If not, do you have a plan for
incorporating these new departments into the
organizational chart?
• Does your current human resources function
have the capacity to support the upgrading of
staff skills, increased training opportunities, and
more aggressive hiring practices needed to pre-
pare the institution for transformation?
• Are staff job descriptions updated? 
• Do these job descriptions identify key responsi-
bilities and provide key performance measures?
Staff
• Do you have a detailed financial projection
model that enables you to project number of
staff needed in the future?
• Do you have the appropriate number of staff to
support anticipated growth?
• Do you prioritize training and development in
your institution evidenced by a culture in which
individuals strive to learn and are motivated to
continue to pursue new challenges?
• Do you have a strong in-house training pro-
gram, complemented by external training
opportunities?
• Have staff been adequately trained?
• Do you have the capacity to develop new train-
ing modules in house?
• Does your current senior management staff meet
the academic and professional requirements of
the regulator? If not, can you source this expert-
ise locally?
• Have you analyzed your staff compensation in
light of competition with both other MFIs and
commercial banks?
• Have you implemented a performance-based
incentive scheme? And have you a plan to incor-
porate changes to product offerings, priority
areas, and other criteria anticipated with trans-
formation?
Notes
1. For further information see Thys, Tulchin, and Ohri
(2005). 
2. This section draws heavily from Carlson 1992.
3. Although ESOPs can be useful for enhancing general
motivation, the direct impact of an ESOP on actual
staff performance tends to be much more limited.
Shareholdings are usually very diluted and there is a
marked lack of direct relationship between individual
performance and the (potential) annual dividend pay-
out. Likewise, it is doubtful whether the expected
long-term appreciation of the share price would actu-
ally serve as a sufficient long-term incentive device
capable of “binding” important staff members such as
middle managers and preventing them from leaving
the organization.
4. Although the introduction of individual loans is
not driven by institutional structure, the transforma-
tion process from a credit-only NGO to a deposit-
mobilizing regulated intermediary often pushes MFIs
to offer individual loans, if they are not offered
already. In general, the underwriting of individual
loans requires more in-depth cash flow analysis, and
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often results in a more personal client–loan officer
relationship. For institutions with primarily village
bank or group loan portfolios, or for institutions that
have historically not held individual loan officers
responsible for their own individual portfolios, this
shift to individual lending does have implications for
the institution’s incentive scheme.
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Financial Management
Transformation from an NGO to a regulateddeposit-taking financial institution introducesa range of new internal and external pres-
sures, many of which are magnified by technologi-
cal advances, financial innovations, and general
developments in the country’s overall financial sys-
tem. These new pressures have significant conse-
quences for the financial, operational, and strategic
risks faced by the institution, increasing demands
on the responsibilities, structure, and staffing of the
microfinance institution’s (MFI’s) financial man-
agement function. 
Financial risk incorporates liquidity, interest
rate, foreign exchange, capital adequacy, and other
market risks. Operational risk arises from day-to-day
product and service delivery errors and includes
human resources risks, information and technology
risk, and fraud risk. Strategic risk encompasses inter-
nal risks associated with poor business decisions and
external risks associated with changes in the busi-
ness or competitive environment. Generally the
most serious for newly transformed institutions,
strategic risks include governance, management,
and reputation risk. Effective financial management
enfolds the range of strategies, policies, and proce-
dures used by financial institutions to minimize
these risks while optimizing financial performance.
As with any comprehensive risk-management
strategy, effective financial management for a regu-
lated financial institution is a continual process of
systematically assessing, measuring, monitoring,
and managing the key risks in the organization.
Effective financial management is defined by a wide
scope of activities that extend far beyond tradition-
al accounts management and financial reporting,
and involves a range of actors beyond those who
staff the finance department.
MFIs transforming into regulated financial insti-
tutions need to convince prospective investors and
regulators before receiving their licenses that they
have the internal capacity to manage these addi-
tional demands. Building this capacity calls for plan-
ning and requires restructuring and fundamental
changes to staff roles and responsibilities in the
finance department. 
Starting with an initial overview of the functions
of financial management in a regulated MFI, this
chapter examines four core components of financial
management that will change or be redefined with
transformation. These include financial planning
and budgeting; financial control including account-
ing, financial reporting, and financial analysis; treas-
ury management; and investor relations. The chap-
ter highlights the changes transforming MFIs
Chapter 10
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should expect in each of these areas and provides
guidance on developing capacity in anticipation of
these changes.
Financial Management Functions
Financial management of a regulated financial
institution typically includes the following
functions: 
• Planning—business planning, budgeting, fore-
casting, and capital budgeting
• Controller—accounting, financial and compli-
ance reporting, procurement and general finan-
cial administration such as payroll and others
(although this is sometimes considered adminis-
tration and not finance), and usually some finan-
cial analysis
• Treasury—asset liability management, capital
adequacy management, and funding and invest-
ment activities
• Investor relations—communication with share-
holders and other stakeholders, such as the
annual report and annual meeting
Some of these functions will be new to the trans-
forming institution and others will be familiar but
require improvement. Because of the nature of their
capital bases and typically limited funding sources,
microfinance NGOs may not have dedicated staff
for treasury operations. Similarly, transformation to
a regulated for-profit company often triggers a
change in tax planning. Likewise, while onerous
reporting is certainly not new to donor-funded
NGOs, the addition of investors and regulators as
stakeholders alters the institution’s reporting
requirements. As a regulated institution, the impor-
tance of each of these functions will vary depending
on how the MFI is financed (debt-equity mix), how
it chooses to invest these funds (variety and risk
level of asset base), and to whom it is ultimately
responsible (shareholders and regulators).
Key Players
The institution’s board, management, and staff all
play a role in financial management—the board lays
out the broad strategy for achieving profitability
goals and sets limits on the level of acceptable risk;
management determines how to operationalize
these goals and remain within acceptable risk
parameters; and staff in all departments, not only
finance and administration, play the critical role of
implementing the operational steps to achieve the
goals. In addition, support partners such as interna-
tional NGOs and donors often influence decisions
relating to the institution’s chart of accounts, finan-
cial management policies and procedures, and over-
all reporting structures and requirements. With
transformation, this group expands to include two
additional stakeholders—investors and regulators—
both of whom have clear expectations for the insti-
tution’s approach to the risk-return trade-off.
While shareholders’ investment goals (some
combination of profit maximization and social
return) will vary, regulators are quite clear about the
level of risk they are willing to permit. Specifications
about what should be included in a financial insti-
tution’s policies and procedures, or specific guide-
lines for operating ratios and on-site inspection
capability, are examples of regulator tools that are
used to influence and monitor risk-return behavior.
Box 10.1 demonstrates how one MFI in South
Africa creates accountability for risk management.
Organization of the Finance Department 
The expanded scope of financial management will
typically require the reorganization of the finance
department. As demonstrated in figure 10.1, tradi-
tional NGO finance and administration depart-
ments usually include a finance manager, a few
accountants or bookkeepers, and an individual or
two tasked with administrative duties, such as
overall office management or procurement. The
finance manager is often a skilled accountant with
some management experience and generally takes
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Box 10.1 Risk Management at Teba Bank, South Africa
Risk governance structure. Teba Bank has estab-
lished a risk-management structure that includes a
General Manager for Risk, who reports to the Gen-
eral Manager. At the board level, risk addressed in
the Audit Committee, a dedicated Risk Committee,
and a Directors’ Affairs/Strategy Committee. The
asset and liability committee and the credit man-
agement committee report to the Risk Committee.
Risk governance process. Teba Bank’s board is
ultimately responsible for the risk-management
process; the Risk Committee is appointed to assist
the board to fulfill this responsibility. The board
reviews and approves risk strategies and policies
developed and recommended by management. The
board Risk Committee approves the Enterprise Risk
Management Framework; through this framework
ownership of key risks is allocated to the most
appropriate senior official. Members of senior
management sign off on the Risk Management
Framework as the risk owners. Risk management is
a continuous and evolving process, involving
monthly risk assessments. 
Risk appetite. Teba Bank’s board sets the risk
appetite of the institution, similarly to setting major
risk thresholds. The risk appetite is the degree of
uncertainty that Teba Bank is willing to accept to
reach its goals. It covers products, markets, treasury
limits, lending, and the like. 
Risk reporting. The board receives quarterly
reports covering the top 10 risks, the risk register,
and the risk watch report. Management receives
these reports monthly. 
Source: Pikholz and others 2005.
Finance and administration
manager
Managing director
Accounting
Financial statement preparation
Donor reporting
Fixed asset management
General services
Procurement
Office management
Figure 10.1 Financial Management Functions of an
NGO MFI
Source: Author.
on the role of an expanded controller including
preparation of financial statements, funds manage-
ment, budgeting, and procurement activities.
As mentioned in chapter 9, Human Resources
Management, with transformation, the NGO
finance manager role is typically upgraded to Chief
Financial Officer (CFO). As the complexity of the
institution’s financial operations expands, the key
activities of the finance manager expand and the
required skills extend beyond accounting and
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budgeting to include leadership, strategic manage-
ment, financial policy development and implemen-
tation, and investor relations. 
Additional positions are also required within the
finance department, some of which require specific
skills and expertise and thus may need to be sourced
through external recruitment or built internally
through investment in training and exposure visits
(or a combination of both). Figure 10.2 presents an
example of the various functional areas of a finance
department of a regulated MFI: planning and budg-
eting, controller, treasury, and investor relations.
These functional areas—planning, control, treas-
ury, and investor relations—are not necessarily sep-
arate departments and depending on the size of the
financial institution, these areas may not be staffed
with full-time individuals. Instead, various units
within the finance department may be tasked to
carry out the different functions. For example, the
chief accountant or controller may be responsible
for financial reporting, while all the finance depart-
ment staff may be involved in planning. In addition,
some transformed institutions set up a risk depart-
ment specifically to address and mitigate the
numerous risks a financial intermediary faces. While
this book addresses various types of risk in different
chapters, risk is not specifically considered an area
within the finance function because of the large part
credit risk plays in risk management, and credit risk
is not specific to the finance area (nor specific to
transformation).
Financial Planning and Budgeting
Planning commits the MFI’s strategic vision to con-
crete goals and objectives. Planning is generally
done for a multiyear period and at the head office
level with input from the different departments.
Budgeting supports planning by ensuring that the
resources needed to achieve the plan are available
and used efficiently. Budgeting is generally com-
pleted on an annual basis (or more frequently) and
by all operating units of the MFI.
Chief Executive
Officer
Chief Financial
Officer
Planning and
budgeting
Business planning
Budgeting
Capital budgeting
Controller
Accounting
Reporting
Financial
Administration
Profitability analysis
Treasury
Asset Liability
Management
Capital adequacy
Investing
Funding activities
Investor relations
Shareholder
communications
Annual report
Annual meeting
Figure 10.2 Financial Management Functions in a Regulated Financial
Institution
Source: Adapted from Falletti 1992.
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Planning
Planning encompasses multiple levels of analysis.
Strategic planning sets broad objectives and goals,
that is, the overall plan to achieve the vision for the
institution. Business planning defines actions and
tasks to accomplish the strategic plan. Financial
planning translates the goals, strategies, and activi-
ties developed at the strategic and business planning
levels into financial operating targets.1 The finance
department provides input to both the strategic and
business planning processes. It is typically tasked
with translating the defined goals, strategies, and
activities into measurable financial targets to be
included in or to accompany the business plan. The
complexity and stakes of this latter role increase
notably when the MFI transforms to a regulated
intermediary. Taking on investor capital, using this
capital to leverage commercial borrowings, devel-
oping new savings products for clients, and invest-
ing these resources in a wide variety of investment
instruments with varying terms and rates—all bring
new levels of risk, further complicating the plan-
ning process. At the same time, the need to pro-
duce realistic and achievable financial targets
increases with the need to satisfy both investors and
regulators. 
Translating defined goals into measurable finan-
cial targets requires developing financial projec-
tions. This task involves creating the format and
structure of the projections model, overseeing the
assumptions incorporated into the model, manag-
ing the input of other operating departments into
the modeling process, and finally, developing a wide
range of scenario analyses based on preliminary
results. These financial projections ordinarily cover a
three-to-five-year period. (See chapter 5, Strategic
and Business Planning, for a detailed discussion of
business planning.)
Budgeting
A second key function of the finance department is
to coordinate development of the annual operating
budget, which, depending on the MFI, may also
include development of monthly or quarterly budg-
ets. As part of the licensing process, regulators will
review the adequacy of the institution’s budgeting
systems, particularly important for bank examiners
employing a risk-based approach to supervision.
(See chapter 2, Regulation and Supervision: The
Policy Framework, for a discussion of risk-based
supervision.) Although most NGOs will have some
form of annual budget, transformation generally
requires improvements in this process. Budgeting
includes the following:
• Defining the process
• Establishing formats and a schedule for develop-
ing the budget
• Providing training and guidance to the relevant
units to ensure a systematic approach
• Providing data on actual income and expendi-
tures to the relevant units
• Providing overall feedback on budget drafts
• Preparing the final budget for senior manage-
ment and board approval. 
Most of these tasks are carried out by the finance
department, which also develops and implements a
monthly or quarterly reporting process for compar-
ing actual results to budget. This process should
include an analysis of any notable variances, both
for the overall institution and individual branches or
units.
Capital Budgeting
In addition to operating budgets, the MFI also
needs to prepare an annual “capital” budget for
those items that require capital expenditures and
are capitalized on the balance sheet. Compared
with operating budgets, capital budgets are gener-
ally much larger and can critically affect the finan-
cial structure of the MFI. Furthermore, the benefits
of a capital expenditure are often ongoing and
spread over a period of years. 
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While the ultimate decision on capital expendi-
tures is made by the board or senior management,
planning and analysis for capital budgeting deci-
sions are generally led by the finance department.
With the addition of shareholders expecting a finan-
cial return on their investments, capital budgeting
becomes more complex than when, as an NGO, the
MFI periodically received donor funds to build a
new branch or improve its infrastructure. As a reg-
ulated institution with owners, the MFI needs to
assess each potential capital expenditure according
to its ability to enable growth of the institution as
well as provide financial returns. Thus, capital
budgeting becomes a complicated and difficult task
involving analysis of various options before submis-
sion to the board for approval.
Capital budgeting is a complex undertaking2 and
generally involves the following:
• Establishing long-, medium-, and short-term
operating and financial objectives
• Identifying, measuring, and ranking the various
capital expenditure projects on the basis of the
following:
– Degree to which they meet the MFI’s
objectives
– Operational impact
– Yield on the investment
• Exploring alternate sources of capital (internally
generated funds or debt or equity)
• Determining the “hurdle rate” and identifying
those projects that offer the most attractive
returns (comparing the break-even point
between the yield on the capital expenditure and
the weighted cost of capital for the MFI)
• Selecting the most viable projects for capital
expenditure and seeking board approval
Two areas in particular are critical for sound cap-
ital budgeting—appropriate corporate policies and
capable budgeting techniques. Policies need to be
clearly established that reflect and support the
following:
• The ideal capital structure, that is, amount of
debt to equity relative to assets
• The ideal mix between long-, medium- and
short-term debt
• The best mix between leased and purchased assets
• The process for determining the hurdle rate
• The need for earnings to be retained in the MFI
to fund growth
• The MFI’s appetite for risk (both management
and board)
While the ultimate decision for capital expendi-
tures lies with senior management and the board,
the finance department and the various operating
areas of the MFI must prepare estimates for capital
expenditure options. Without accurate and sound
estimates and projections, senior management and
the board will not have the appropriate information
to make decisions. When making decisions involv-
ing the use of capital (whether borrowed or inter-
nally generated), the MFI needs to be confident
in its ability to accurately project the cash inflows
and outflows, and ultimately the returns on such
expenditures.
In addition to planning and budgeting revenue
and operational expenses, the transforming MFI
also needs to be aware of any tax liabilities that may
arise as a for-profit regulated MFI. As explained in
chapter 5, Strategic and Business Planning, trans-
formation from a nonprofit entity to a for-profit
corporate structure will most likely result in a tax
liability for the institution. Corporate tax liability
can be sizeable (30 to 40 percent of net earnings),
highlighting the need for comprehensive tax plan-
ning far in advance of the actual transformation.
Financial Control
The control function of a financial institution
generally includes accounting, reporting, financial
administration, and possibly financial analysis. The
accounting function compiles and consolidates
financial information for the MFI. The reporting
function ensures adherence to appropriate account-
ing and regulatory standards and develops financial
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statements and reports for management and for
external use, including compliance reporting.
General financial administration activities include
procurement, payroll, fixed asset management, and
other services—however, because these generally
do not change much with transformation they are
not discussed here. Finally, various types of financial
analysis, such as periodic profitability analysis, may
be carried out within the controller’s unit (often in
conjunction with the product development or mar-
keting units of the MFI).3
Accounting
An MFI must ensure its accounting system is trans-
parent and flexible in capacity, yet rigid in controls
and standards. Controls and standards become
especially important with transformation; for
example, the account nomenclature, or system of
accounts, must be consistent with international
accounting standards as well as with those required
by regulators. 
An adequate accounting system includes the fol-
lowing (Branch and Klaehn 2002):
• A detailed chart of accounts with clear definitions
• Definitions of reserving and provisioning
accounts for loan or investment losses
• A definition of depreciation and methods of
depreciation
• A definition of how assets are revaluated
• Levels of accounts to facilitate more in-depth
analysis
• The ability to limit time period of accruals (see
discussion of cash and accrual below)
Complying with regulatory accounting stan-
dards and reporting requirements often demands a
range of changes in account preparation. Given the
amount and quality of material already available on
accounting, this section is limited to highlighting
key changes that may be required with transforma-
tion. (For further information on this topic, see the
reference section at the end of this chapter.)
Chart of accounts. The chart of accounts is the core
of an institution’s accounting system. The structure
and design of the chart of accounts will ultimately
determine the type of financial information that can
be accessed and therefore analyzed by management
or reported to external parties. In most regulatory
frameworks, the central bank or other regulators
provide specific expectations for the institution’s
chart of accounts. Before the regulator’s prelicens-
ing inspection visit, an MFI will need to ensure its
chart of accounts conforms to central bank require-
ments. For MFIs that began as projects of interna-
tional organizations, or those with more home-
grown accounting processes, this transition can be
profound.
Cash to accrual. While some differences exist
between countries, most regulatory accounting
requirements stipulate some level of accrual-based
accounting. Most MFIs use standard cash account-
ing, which means income and expenses are record-
ed when cash is actually received or expended.
Under an accrual-based accounting system, when a
business performs a service, makes a sale, or incurs
an expense, the accounting entries are booked,
regardless of whether cash has changed hands.
Thus, revenues are recorded as they are earned and
expenses as they are incurred, not necessarily when
cash is received or disbursed. The shift to accrual-
based accounting may involve upgrades in manage-
ment information systems and adjustments to
accounting practices, and in some cases may affect
the financial position of the MFI. As with the
recording of interest revenue, the way in which
financial expenses are recorded can affect the insti-
tution’s bottom line.
• Adjusting for accrued interest revenue: It is
standard practice in the banking industry to
reflect interest revenue earned regardless of
whether it has been received.4 When loan pay-
ments are received, the interest income is
recorded as revenue and as cash. Under accrual-
based accounting, when loans are not paid, the
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interest is treated as earned and the interest
income is typically recorded as revenue and as
accrued interest or interest receivable on the asset
side. Based on the assumption that the interest
will be received later, this transaction has the
potential to overstate interest income if it con-
tinues on loans that are unlikely to be repaid. 
The decision whether to accrue interest rev-
enue on delinquent loans and the amount of
time interest revenue is accrued and through
what accounting transactions, differs according
to regulatory requirements and accounting stan-
dards in the country. Banks commonly stop
accruing interest once a loan is past due more
than 90 days. However, central banks differ in
their treatment of accrued interest. For example,
in Uganda, the regulations state that any loan
that has interest or principal unpaid for 30 days
or more is considered nonperforming and placed
on a nonaccrual basis. Thus, interest due but
uncollected on these loans is not accrued to
income but is instead shown as “interest in sus-
pense.” Any interest on loans previously accrued
as income but uncollected must be reversed and
credited to the interest in suspense account until
payment is received. In Russia, where accounting
standards are designed to maximize taxable
income (and hence tax proceeds to the govern-
ment), the opposite is true. Institutions must
continue to accrue interest income—and pay tax
on this income—on nonperforming loans for
five years.
• Adjusting for accrued interest expense: When
MFIs borrow from external sources, they
incur liabilities that carry financing costs that
need to be paid periodically, such as quarterly
or semi-annually. As such, these liabilities accrue
interest expense. Financial statements need to
be adjusted to capture this cost. If interest owed
is not accrued, the MFI’s financial costs are
understated, thus overstating profitability.5
Provisioning and loan losses. Accounting for loan
losses and adequately provisioning for potential
loan losses are two more areas in which adjust-
ments to financial statements are often needed
when an MFI transforms. With the shift away from
donor funds toward client savings and other com-
mercial borrowings, the importance of adequate
provisioning cannot be overstated from a risk-
management perspective. While stronger MFIs
often already have relatively conservative provision-
ing policies, transformation to a regulated financial
institution can result in more aggressive provision-
ing and write-off requirements. Alternatively, in
some regulatory environments, the provisioning
policy requirements for the relevant institutional
category still reflect more traditional bank credit
risk, and thus actually represent less conservative
policies for MFIs that typically have shorter loan
terms. In either case, the MFI will need to ensure
that its provisioning and write-off policies follow
regulatory requirements, while at the same time
ensuring, from a management perspective, the risk
in the portfolio is adequately provisioned. Changes
to provisioning policy can have significant implica-
tions for an MFI’s bottom line. Furthermore,
in some cases “over-provisioning” (in excess of
what the regulator mandates) might have fiscal
implications—the tax authorities may require that
the MFI reverse any negative impact on earnings at
the time of calculating taxes.
Table 10.1 presents the provisioning require-
ments embodied in the Ugandan Microfinance
Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDI) Asset Quality
Regulations as an example. For MDIs in Uganda,
this level of provisioning is probably adequate for
management purposes, but each institution needs
to determine if it should provision more conserva-
tively for management purposes while still adhering
to regulatory requirements. 
Reporting 
With transformation, an MFI’s internal and exter-
nal reporting requirements undergo comprehen-
sive changes. Financial statements, including the
balance sheet, income statement, and cash flow
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statement, need to be produced on a monthly basis
and should incorporate budget to actual compar-
isons. Internal management reports also need to
reflect the key risk areas of the transformed institu-
tion, including capital adequacy, asset quality,
liquidity, and interest rate and foreign exchange risk
(if applicable), many of which will be new to man-
agement and thus require investment in training to
ensure managers understand the essential relation-
ships and trends. 
The controller will ordinarily also be responsible
for producing financial reports for compliance with
regulatory requirements and for producing reports
for external stakeholders including investors. Regu-
lators have specific reporting requirements for super-
vising deposit-taking institutions and transforming
MFIs may not appreciate the significant amount of
time and resources required to comply with report-
ing requirements. Off-site supervision is character-
ized by frequent report submission and generally
covers the perceived risk areas highlighted in
table 10.2. Depending on the capacity of the
Table 10.1 MDI Reserve Requirements
MDI reserve calculation (%)
Days Rescheduled 
outstanding Normal loans
Current 1 1
8–30 1 5
31–60 25 50
61–90 50 75
91–180 100 100
180 100 100 
(and write off) (and write off)
Source: Bank of Uganda, Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institutions 
(Asset Quality) Regulations 2004.
Note: At the end of each month (or other period), the MFI calculates
its required loan loss reserve (balance sheet account) by applying the
relevant percentage allocations to the outstanding balances of its loans
in the various aging categories. It then compares this total value (the
required loan loss reserve) to what it currently has in this account. If the
required reserve is higher than the current reserve, the MFI will need to
provision (a debit to expenses) the amount of the gap. If the required
reserve is less than the current reserve, the MFI can either reverse the
necessary provision (a credit to expenses) or maintain the higher level
(preferred).
Table 10.2 Examples of Central Bank Reports
Topic Frequency Description
Liquidity requirements Weekly Requires various data from balance sheet and computation 
of liquidity ratios.
Minimum capital requirements Monthly Report of core capital, supplementary capital, and computation 
of capital requirements.
Portfolio quality Monthly Reports client population, deposits, portfolio statistics, and aging
information.
Schedule of provisions Quarterly Details of specific and general provisions. Also requires sector 
information on nonperforming loans.
Insider lending Monthly Details of loans extended to shareholders, directors, and staff.
Loan sizes as percentage Monthly Often included in portfolio quality report. Captures regulatory 
of capital limitation on lending more than certain percentage of capital to
one individual or firm.
Sector analysis Monthly Often included in portfolio quality report. Requires segregation 
of portfolio by retail, manufacturing, and service sectors.
Deposit breakdown Monthly Analysis of deposit holders by size and number of accounts.
Financial statements: Monthly Financial statements presented in standard format.
balance sheet, income 
statement, cash flow
Source: Adapted from MDI Act 2003.
314 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
institution’s management information system,
some of the required reports may be automatically
generated while others have to be developed using
basic spreadsheets. Working in close coordination
with the MFI’s information technology department,
the finance department needs to manage and
ensure data transfer protocol, data security, and data
reliability.
As mentioned in chapter 11, Management
Information Systems, inaccurate or late reporting
generally triggers fines or penalties for the licensed
institution, or in some cases prohibition from
declaring and paying dividends, the suspension of
opening branches, or at the extreme, the suspen-
sion of lending operations. This underscores the
need for reliable systems and timely processing. In
addition, on-site inspections (usually conducted
annually) require a formidable amount of report
preparation and can consume substantial amounts
of the controller’s resources and time. 
Profitability Analysis
With the increase in competition that typically
accompanies transformation, earnings and cost
analysis (the analysis of institutional profitability
from a variety of angles) becomes a critical tool for
transforming MFIs to ensure they will be able to
compete as licensed institutions and provide opti-
mal returns to their shareholders. Identifying the
sources of profits and losses provides a financial
institution important input into strategic decisions
related to branch operations, product design, and
customer targeting, while understanding revenue
and cost structures guides management on where
and how to expand the delivery of services, and
how to refine existing delivery channels so they are
more efficient. 
A comprehensive management accounting sys-
tem analyzes the profitability of the institution from
several perspectives: 
• Branch profitability analysis considers the value
and efficiency of the distribution network.
• Product profitability analysis looks at the contri-
bution of each service or product relative to net
operating income.
• Customer profitability analysis examines the con-
tribution of individual customers to the earnings
of the institution.
Each of these reporting elements emphasizes a
different aspect of profitability and reflects different
income streams, expense allocations, and tech-
niques for pricing internal funds transfers. 
Branch profitability analysis. Most mature MFIs
organize their branches as profit centers; operating
costs, provision for loan losses, depreciation, and
all other branch costs are accounted for at the
branch level and measured against revenue gener-
ated by the branch. Setting up branches as profit
centers can help to improve efficiencies and pro-
ductivity of line staff because they can directly
analyze the financial status of their own business
unit.6 Accounting systems, therefore, need to be
flexible enough to create branch-level financial
statements.
When treating branches as profit centers, a
transfer pricing system needs to be set up to enable
excess liquidity to be transferred between branches.
Because some branches are net borrowers of funds
and some are net suppliers of funds, profit center
financial management calls for the development of
an internal funds transfer pricing mechanism. This
mechanism establishes a cost of funds for funds
transferred to and from the head office or between
branches. A branch that disburses a larger volume
of loans than the deposits it collects needs to receive
funding from head office (or another branch) to
fund those loans. A branch that has excess deposits
can “sell” funds to the head office or to another
branch. With transfer pricing, the branch that has
excess deposits receives payment (interest revenue)
for those funds, while the branch receiving funds
pays a fee (interest expense). 
Some MFIs allow branches to transfer funds
directly between one another and others set up a
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central financing facility at the head office. In either
case, if the head office determines that no excess
funding is available within the system, it accesses
external funding and then “on-lends” to its
branches. Whether funds are accessed from within
the branch network or externally (or both), an
internal funds transfer price needs to be established
Three approaches can be taken to selecting this
price or rate, generally determined by senior man-
agement or the board and changed periodically
(Cracknell and Sempagni 2002): 
• The marginal rate at which an institution can
borrow funds: This approach argues that the full
opportunity cost of capital should be charged,
that is, the rate at which an institution would
have to borrow funds to finance its loan portfo-
lio were deposits not available. This provides an
incentive for branches to mobilize savings local-
ly rather than relying on the excess liquidity of
other branches within the network.
• The long-term investment rate: This approach
argues that the long-term interest forgone on
investing deposits should be charged.
• Behavior-management rate: The rate is set
depending on the type of behavior management
wants to encourage in the branches—either
increased deposit mobilization or increased
lending. If the MFI is encouraging savings mobi-
lization, the rate used should be lower than the
interest rate on loans to borrowers, but higher
than the rate paid on voluntary savings. (The
relevant rate on savings should include the true
cost of mobilizing the savings, not just the inter-
est rate paid to savers.) Alternatively, funds sold
to the head office or other branches should be
priced at a rate lower than that paid by bor-
rowers on loans to encourage branches to lend
out excess funds. 
If the MFI wants to, it can set the “buy” and
“sell” transfer prices at slightly different rates to
allow for a small spread for the treasury department
in head office to cover the costs of mobilizing and
transferring these funds (whether through consoli-
dating excess savings or borrowing commercially). 
From an accounting perspective, each branch
maintains incoming and outgoing registers to
record all interbranch transfers. At the end of every
month, the branch prepares a statement listing all
transfers to and from head office and each branch
with which it has transferred money. A copy of the
statement is sent to the relevant branches and the
head office. The head office then prepares reconcil-
iations for each branch and compares them with
those forwarded by individual branches. This
enables the head office to monitor interbranch
transfers and effect the transfer pricing credits or
debits. The interest revenue earned and interest
expense incurred with transfer pricing does not
result in cash being paid or received (excluding the
actual amount of excess funds being transferred).
The transfer pricing itself is for accounting purposes
only to reflect the profit-unit concept at the branch
level. That is, the revenue branches receive for sell-
ing excess funds and the interest expense branches
incur for borrowing funds are simply accounting
entries. Unless the MFI has set different transfer
prices for selling and buying funds, the final effect
of transfer pricing on the MFI on a consolidated
basis is zero.
Product profitability analysis. Product profitability
analysis requires all (or most) revenue and costs to
be attributed to the products of an institution,
rather than to profit centers. Products can include
loans, deposits, and other services, and should
include all products offered by the branch (or
MFI). A variety of mechanisms can be used to allo-
cate costs and revenue to provide an understanding
of product profitability and, in turn, determine the
efficiency of various business processes.
“The purpose of all cost allocation methods is
to assign shared, or ‘indirect,’ costs to indi-
vidual products, customers, branches, or
other cost objects (sometimes called cost cen-
ters) as defined by an organization. Many if
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not most, nonfinancial costs in a financial
services institution are indirect, requiring
some sort of allocation system if management
wants to analyze product costs” (Helms and
Grace 2004, p. 1).
This section identifies two of the more common
mechanisms used in the financial sector: traditional
cost allocation and activity-based costing. While it is
beyond the scope of this chapter to describe these
approaches in detail, the following provides a brief
summary:
• Traditional cost allocation: Traditional cost allo-
cation methods use allocation bases to distribute
income and costs among products. The process
involves allocating income and costs line by line
from the profit and loss account to products,
deciding on what basis each line or “allocation
unit” should be allocated, such as to direct labor
hours or total account balances of a specific
financial product. Next, a notional charge or
transfer price is levied on loans and applied to
savings products, reflecting the fact that capital
for lending is mobilized from savings. Finally,
marginal cost analysis is used to assist manage-
ment in making decisions related to loss-making
products.7
• Activity-based costing: Activity-based costing
(ABC) assigns income and costs based on
resources (such as staff time or infrastructure
usage) consumed. The focus of ABC is on spe-
cific product delivery activities, such as loan
application processing, loan disbursement, loan
monitoring, and loan recovery. ABC allows
managers to more fully understand the true costs
of each product, identify excess capacity in their
operations, and make informed decisions to
improve efficiency (box 10.2).8
See annex 10A, Sample Terms of Reference:
Activity-Based Costing, for sample terms of refer-
ence to hire a consultant to carry out an activity-
based costing exercise.
Customer profitability analysis. Institutional under-
standing of customer profitability tends to be lim-
ited in microfinance. Profitable customers are often
lost through overpricing, and unprofitable cus-
tomers are won by underpricing or are subsidized
by more profitable customers (Richebacher 2003).
Very few MFIs have a clear understanding of the
connection between customer types or particular
market segments, and costs. Methods to further
this understanding range in complexity from simple
analysis, such as using percentages of sales, to devel-
oping complicated allocation methods based on
actual activities that incur costs. In general, these
approaches are derived from the product profitabil-
ity analysis discussed above—the unit profitability
of each product is multiplied by the number of
units sold to a particular customer (Falletti 2002). 
Implementing customer profitability models
requires an MFI to allocate costs by customers. Such
an allocation needs to be coupled with a move away
from the more traditional product management
focus to a customer management focus. In the prod-
uct management model, for example, one manager
handles mortgages, another term deposits, and
another working capital loans. The managers do not
necessarily know how any one customer interacts
with the entire MFI. For any one product, a cus-
tomer may be a low-value customer, but she or he
may be very valuable if considered across the organ-
ization. Yet, because the product managers cannot
know this, they may underinvest in the customer. If
the MFI followed a customer management model,
the customer’s true value would be apparent and
could be managed accordingly. As mentioned in
chapter 9, Human Resources Management, some
MFIs using this customer-based approach no longer
refer to their line staff as credit officers or account
officers but rather as “relationship managers.”
A combination of all three models—branch,
product, and customer—can also be used to analyze
profitability. In addition, information gathered can
support planning efforts, measure performance for
compensation and incentive programs, and help to
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accurately price products. Ultimately, the likelihood
of conducting in-depth profitability analysis will
depend on the MFI’s level of technological sophis-
tication and available resources. MFIs should first
undertake a realistic cost-benefit analysis of the dif-
ferent options before investing too much time and
resources in any one approach. 
Treasury Management
The evolution of an MFI from a donor-funded
NGO to a commercially financed and regulated
institution is typically characterized by an increase
in the variety and market base of liabilities. At the
start-up phase, the donor-funded NGO usually has
access to relatively low cost funds and relatively
limited funding sources. Management is generally
most concerned with how these resources are
invested, that is, in the loan portfolio or other
investments. As the MFI’s funding needs grow
beyond what is available from donors, attention
often shifts to mobilizing sources of commercially
based funds. In many countries, the MFI’s limited
bargaining power combined with relatively unso-
phisticated capital markets limits the financing
Box 10.2 Activity-Based Costing
Costing is a powerful tool that helps managers dis-
cover the true costs of products. Better manage-
ment information on products helps managers
make critical decisions about product design, deliv-
ery mechanisms, and pricing. The costing exercise
also raises awareness of the cost components of
different products, reveals hidden costs, instills cost
consciousness in staff, and uncovers excess capacity
and other operational problems. 
Traditional cost allocation distributes administra-
tive costs directly to products. ABC traces adminis-
trative costs first through activities and then to
products. By first assigning costs to activities, ABC
allows managers to more fully understand the costs
of each product, identify excess capacity, and make
informed decisions to improve efficiency. 
ABC also facilitates customer segment analysis
within particular product groups. For instance, man-
agers can compare the costs of new loans and repeat
loans, current loans and delinquent loans, savings
accounts of varying balance sizes and transaction
frequencies, and other useful customer segments. 
An MFI can also cost branches (and branch activ-
ities) using ABC. Head-office costs can be appor-
tioned to branches based on the number of cost
drivers each branch “absorbs.” This bypasses the
need for arbitrary head-office allocation ratios and
percentages. 
Furthermore, using ABC allows managers to
measure unit costs for many operating activities at
the overall and branch levels. Unit costing is the cost
every time a particular activity is performed. For
example, an MFI may find that every time it opens
a deposit account it costs $1.42 to perform the ac-
tivity “open deposit account.” This unit cost can vary
depending on the time allocated to that activity
overall, the number of times that activity is per-
formed in the period, and any overall cost changes
during that period. 
Measuring unit costs at the branch level allow
MFIs to set interbranch benchmarks in terms of unit
costs for each activity. The assumption is that what
goes into a branch’s processes and activities should
be relatively standard across the branch system. Set-
ting unit cost benchmarks for certain activities will
help the branches standardize their processes and
target inefficient or subproductive activities and will
allow measurement of branch performance com-
pared with peers. Finally, measuring (and compar-
ing) unit costs at the branch level can also assist
branches to track and address periods of excess or
under capacity, allowing for changing staff levels at
key times of the year.
Source: Contributed by Lorna Grace, USAID Rural Economic Diversifi-
cation, Honduras, August 2005.
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options available. However, as the institution
evolves, the funding options generally expand,
although often at a higher cost than the conces-
sionary funds previously available. At the same
time, competition between MFIs operating in
the same markets may force a reduction in the
MFIs’ lending rates. Thus, maintaining an adequate
spread between the rates charged on loans and the
rates paid for financing (spread management)
becomes critical to the sustainability and profitabil-
ity of the MFI (Christen 1997). Once regulated,
managing the spread between lending and deposit
services, specifically, also becomes critical.
Different institutions use different terminology
for the treasury function. For the purposes of this
book, the term treasury management is used to
encompass all functions related to managing the
institution’s balance sheet (and, if applicable, off-
balance sheet items). Treasury management is
divided here into three areas, each of which are dis-
cussed below:
• Asset liability management (ALM)
• Capital adequacy management
• Investing and funding activities
Some transforming MFIs may wish to engage an
external consultant to assist them in establishing
an adequate treasury management function. See
annex 10B, Sample Terms of Reference: Treasury
Management, for sample terms of reference for
advisory services in treasury management. 
Asset Liability Management
ALM seeks to manage the balance between risk
and return by maintaining a positive spread
between the interest rates on earning assets and the
interest cost of funds. It involves understanding
the risk and return trade-offs in the institution’s
business strategy and making these trade-offs clear
so that the board of directors and senior manage-
ment can make informed business decisions for the
institution (Ledgerwood 1999). ALM analyzes the
structure of an MFI’s balance sheet and the risks
and returns inherent in this structure. ALM encom-
passes liquidity management, interest rate and for-
eign exchange gap management, and liabilities
management.
The target results of ALM (Falletti 1992) are to
achieve the following:
• Protect the shareholders and depositors.
• Maintain sufficient liquidity to cover cash flow
requirements, and invest idle liquidity profitably.
• Manage the interest rate gap to maximize earn-
ings within risk limits.
• Generate attractive foreign exchange earnings
within risk limits.
• Price products to support asset and liability man-
agement and maximize the MFI’s earnings.
Because ALM affects so many aspects of the
organization, it is normally carried out by a com-
mittee rather than a single person or department,
though an individual in the finance department may
be tasked with supporting the committee. This
committee is called the Asset and Liability Commit-
tee, or ALCO. Generally, financial institutions have
two ALCOs—a board ALCO and a management
ALCO. The board ALCO sets the policies that the
management ALCO implements. The management
ALCO typically includes the CFO and other senior
managers who meet at least monthly (preferably
weekly) to make decisions about balance sheet
structure and off–balance sheet positions based on
an evaluation of the interest rate environment. A
large part of the committee’s task is to forecast and
adjust the MFI’s interest rate position (discussed
below) for the coming months to maximize the net
interest margin, while also protecting depositors’
funds (Christen 1997). Therefore, the committee
examines the operating environment (including the
macroeconomic environment and findings from
marketing intelligence, such as competitor rates,
central bank reports, and newsworthy financial
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sector initiatives), the risks and opportunities it faces
within this environment (such as the need to make
any product or pricing adjustments or reevaluate
market expansion plans), and trends in key financial
ratios. A “feedback loop” will ensure policies and
strategies are appropriate and the risk levels are
within the risk parameters set by the institution
(Campion 2000). All of the decisions made by the
management ALCO must be in keeping with the
policies set by the board ALCO. See box 10.3.
Liquidity risk. Deposit-mobilizing MFIs must main-
tain minimum liquidity levels at their branches. Liq-
uidity is measured by comparing the shortest-term
assets to total assets or deposits. The treasury man-
ager must ensure the operating units have an ade-
quate level of liquidity at all times, and must man-
age the institution’s overall investment strategy. At
the same time, must minimize the cost of forgone
earnings on idle cash and avoid the costs of emer-
gency borrowing, forced liquidation of assets, or
reduced loan disbursement. In addition, trans-
formed MFIs must comply with the regulator’s
stipulated minimum reserve requirements.
Liquidity risk arises from either a shortage
of funds to cover obligations or from excess 
funds sitting idle and not earning revenue. While
most NGO MFIs are familiar with cash flow
management— ensuring that cash coming in is
equal to or greater than cash going out—liquidity
management incorporates not only cash obliga-
tions, but also other short-term assets and short-
term liabilities. With transformation, the variety of
these other short-term assets and liabilities tends to
expand, adding complexity to the liquidity manage-
ment process.
Box 10.3 Risk Management at Equity Bank
Risk governance structure—A management Asset
and Liability Committee (ALCO) oversees risk man-
agement at Equity Bank in Kenya. Members of the
management ALCO include the Chief Executive
Officer and key functional heads (Operations,
Finance, Credit, and Treasury). The management
ALCO reports to the full board, as does the board’s
own ALCO and risk-management committees. These
committees comprise the Chief Executive Officer
and two board members with a key functional head
as its secretary. 
The members in the board’s ALCO and risk-
management committees have the technical skills to
guide both the board and management. They
enable the board of directors to discharge its
responsibilities for risk management oversight. The
board’s Audit Committee assesses the effectiveness
of all risk-management initiatives.
Risk governance process—The management
ALCO committee is responsible for risk management
on a day-to-day basis. Key risks mitigated include
credit, operational, and compliance risks. Financial
and market risks are managed by optimizing the
balance sheet’s funding mix, maturity profile, capi-
tal adequacy, and exposure to foreign exchange and
interest rate fluctuations. The management ALCO
consults regularly with the board’s ALCO and risk-
management members to implement the policy set
by the board. 
Risk appetite—Equity’s board sets the risk thresh-
olds for all aspects of the bank’s operations and
exposures. The board ensures that these meet or
surpass applicable and explicit statutory prudential
requirements set by the government, central bank,
and the Ministry of Finance. 
Risk reporting—The management ALCO meets
weekly to assign and review individual responsi-
bilities of members along their functional duties.
The ALCO submits monthly reports to the board’s
ALCO and risk-management committee and pro-
duces a quarterly report for deliberation by the full
board. 
Source: Pikholz and others 2005.
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The goals of liquidity management include the
following:
• Honoring all cash commitments on a daily and
ongoing basis: Liquidity management requires
cash flow forecasts to be prepared for the head
office, each branch, and the institution as a
whole. These forecasts should be prepared every
week, with each day’s activity forecasted. Once
per month, to help management anticipate near-
term transactions, cash flow forecasts for the
remaining weeks in the month should also be
prepared. Likewise, given the often time-con-
suming nature of lining up external funds, MFIs
should prepare three- to six-month forecasts. 
As a regulated institution, the MFI begins to
broaden its asset base with more sophisticated
investment activities and diversify its liabilities
with the introduction of voluntary savings.
Therefore, the components to be included in the
cash flow forecast expand. Without historical
data, estimating the trend in these new net
inflows or outflows will be difficult. For deposit
flows, for example, MFIs will need to make some
assumptions about how customer behavior
might vary according to season. Market research
on savings and loan patterns could help validate
these assumptions. For an MFI planning to
offer both demand deposits and time deposits,
the distinction between the two is generally
not relevant in terms of their trend and season-
al behavior when making liquidity projec-
tions (Bald 2000). However, the MFI must be
prepared for exceptional circumstances, such as
political instability, that may result in larger than
planned withdrawals. Deposit-taking MFIs need
to have contingency plans in place, such as con-
tingent lines of credit.
Other potential new components related to
cash flow management include the cash effects
from long-term investing and financing (such as
share capital increases or dividend payments).
Although new to the MFI, these cash flows tend
to be relatively easy to predict because they are
largely under the control of MFI management
and are generally known well in advance. Unlike
the small but frequent cash transactions resulting
from the majority of deposits and loans, cash
flows in this category do not have to be approx-
imated. Instead, the MFI can capture each one
with its expected amount and the probable time
that it will occur. 
• Complying with central bank minimum reserve
requirements: As regulated financial institu-
tions, MFIs need to comply with minimum
reserve requirements imposed by the regulator.
These requirements state that a certain amount
of cash needs to be held on deposit with the cen-
tral bank “in reserve.” These holdings earn little
or no interest, cannot be used for lending or
other investments, and are netted against
deposits for purposes of calculating available
liquidity. Reserves need to be closely monitored
both for compliance with regulations and for
impact on liquidity management and cash
planning.
Minimum reserve requirements differ by
country and also vary between different institu-
tional types and their particular supervising
authorities. In general, however, all short-term
liabilities are reservable while long-term obliga-
tions and equity capital are exempt from mini-
mum reserves. In particular, reserves apply to all
customer deposits (transaction balances, demand
deposits, savings accounts, time deposits), and
short-term liabilities (such as money market
deposits, commercial paper, and interbank loans
offered to investors). Each day the MFI needs
to aggregate its liabilities in the reservable
categories, multiply the balance by the applicable
percentage rate, and calculate the reserve
requirements over all categories (Bald 2000).
This total reserve requirement is the minimum
that the MFI must have on deposit with the
central bank. Reserve requirements are nor-
mally expressed as ratios, which may differ by
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regulatory authority. In Uganda, for example,
the MDI regulations require that institutions
maintain a reserve ratio equal to or exceeding 15
percent. This ratio is defined as the total of liq-
uid assets including cash, balances with the cen-
tral bank or other financial institutions, treasury
bills of up to three months, and other govern-
ment securities, divided by total deposits (savings
and time deposits).
Another liquidity ratio typically examined by
regulators is the current ratio. This ratio com-
pares current assets to current liabilities. It
reveals the ability of the MFI to meet short-term
debt service payments and calculates the degree
of coverage provided by short-term assets.
• Avoiding the cost of unplanned and expensive
borrowing: In addition to projecting future
cash flow needs, liquidity management involves
developing contingency plans for unplanned
funding shortfalls. Most MFIs achieve this by
negotiating lines of credit from local banks—the
institution is only charged for the amount of the
line of credit used, often with a commitment fee
on the unused portion of the line. The ALCO
will typically set operating parameters that reflect
the level of liquidity risk the institution is pre-
pared to accept. These parameters include a fixed
percentage of the available credit lines that the
individual tasked with liquidity management is
allowed to utilize in the normal course of busi-
ness. Some unused borrowing capacity should
always be maintained to allow for emergencies or
unexpected situations. Depending on the MFI’s
market credibility, the depth of the financial mar-
kets in the country, and regulatory restrictions,
the MFI could also address liquidity needs by
borrowing from private individuals by offering
higher rates of interest to large certificate of
deposit (CD) holders (Christen 1997). 
• Minimizing the cost of forgone earnings on idle
cash: While having too little liquidity can lead
to unplanned and excessive interest payments,
having too much liquidity is a lost opportunity
for additional investment income. Clear proce-
dures and guidelines for both monitoring and
investing any idle cash should be in place.
• Maintaining cash balances at the branches that
neither exceed the maximum insured limit nor
result in excess “idle” cash: As part of their daily
control activities, branch managers must closely
monitor their branch cash position to ensure
cash levels remain below the maximum value for
which the branch is insured and above minimum
operating needs. If the cash level in the vault falls
below a certain minimum limit, a cash delivery
needs to be ordered; if it reaches a certain maxi-
mum limit, cash needs to be placed in a nearby
commercial bank or wherever management has
designated excess cash to go, for example, a
regional office or head office. Policies for these
occurrences need to be clearly documented and
enforced throughout the branch network.
Internal controls and limits as well as procedures
and guidelines for managing and monitoring
liquidity need to be developed and followed regu-
larly.9 A liquidity policy that is developed by the
board and implemented by management, should do
the following:10
• Specify who is responsible for liquidity manage-
ment in the MFI. Often this will be the treasury
manager, the finance director, or another high
level executive.
• Clarify the scope of authority and signatory
powers assigned to the liquidity manager.
• Define acceptable liquidity instruments as well
as the size of transactions and signature require-
ments. On the asset side, this will typically
include vault cash, balances with other banks,
and relatively liquid investment instruments. The
policy will need to specify limits for maximum
exposure to any one bank, as well as clearly spec-
ify acceptable types of investment instruments.
On the liability side, the board will need to
define allowable funding instruments. Generally,
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a liquidity manager will only have authority to
borrow short term.
• Describe the general methodology for liquidity
planning.
• Include a set of operating parameters that
reflect the level of liquidity risk the MFI is pre-
pared to accept. These operating parameters may
include the following:
– Minimum and maximum limits for holdings
of cash assets at head office and branches,
– Minimum and maximum levels of vault cash,
and
– Maximum percentage of available credit lines
that the liquidity manager is allowed to
borrow.
Interest rate risk. Interest rate risk arises when inter-
est rates on assets and interest rates on liabilities
are mismatched, both in rates and terms. Interest
rate risk occurs after assets and liabilities have been
priced and loans have been booked. For most NGO
MFIs, the majority of assets are short term and the
majority of liabilities are long term, limiting the risk
that increases in the MFI’s funding costs may not
be matched by increased lending rates. For institu-
tions that transform and begin mobilizing and
intermediating deposits, however, interest rate sen-
sitivity analysis becomes more important. Parame-
ters of interest rate risk need to be defined and
related policies established reflecting the appropri-
ate technique for analyzing such risk, and for devel-
oping and evaluating strategies to control it. 
Gap management is one method used to ana-
lyze interest rate exposure to changes in market
rates. It measures the difference between the
volume of assets and the volume of liabilities that
will be repriced during a week, month, quarter,
or year. 
Financial institutions usually analyze their gap
position in the following time buckets: 1–30 days,
31–90 days, 91–180 days, 181–365 days, and more
than one year. Each asset and liability category is
classified according to the time that it will be
repriced (as opposed to when it will mature), and is
then placed in the appropriate time bucket. For
example, if a loan matures in three years, but every
six months the interest rate is set in reference to an
external indicator, this loan would fall in the period
labeled 91–180 days. The gap for each time bucket
is then calculated by subtracting the liabilities from
the assets. The cumulative gap position is calcu-
lated by adding up the period’s respective gaps. See
table 10.3 for an example. 
A funding gap (assets less liabilities, the “Dif-
ference” row in table 10.3) of greater than 0 is
referred to as a positive gap, and represents an asset-
sensitive position: interest rate–sensitive assets for a
particular time period outweigh liabilities. Because
there are fewer repriced liabilities to fund the
repriced assets, a decline in interest rates would lead
to increased risk. A funding gap of less than 0 is
referred to as a negative gap, and represents a
liability-sensitive position. If interest rates decline,
risk is reduced because lower-priced liabilities will
Table 10.3 Gap Analysis
0–30 days 31–90 days 91–180 days 181–365 days Over 365 days Total
Assets 80 100 60 40 20 300
Liabilities 100 80 60 50 30 320
Difference (assets 20 20 0 10 10 20
less liabilities)
Gap ratio (assets 0.80 1.25 1.00 0.80 0.67 0.94
to liabilities)
Source: Author.
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be funding more assets that are still priced at the
higher rate.11 For most NGO MFIs, assets are nor-
mally short term while liabilities are longer term,
resulting in a positive funding gap. This will likely
change with transformation. 
Gap management theory assumes that declining
interest rates will be beneficial to a liability-sensitive
institution (that is, one in which repricing liabilities
exceed repricing assets in the time period) and that
rising interest rates will benefit an asset-sensitive
institution (Falletti 1992). See table 10.4. Gap
management, however, relies on a number of
assumptions that may not always be true. It
assumes, for example, that all assets and liabilities in
a given period will reprice in the direction of the
movement of market interest rates and that the
rates in a given period will change by the same mag-
nitude. Neither of these assumptions holds true on
a consistent basis. As a result, more sophisticated
financial institutions have increasingly begun to use
duration analysis to assess their current and pro-
jected asset-liability positions. Duration analysis
measures the mismatch between the aggregate
durations of assets and liabilities. It is a complex
computation and generally involves scheduling the
periodic cash flow (both principal and interest) of
asset and liability portfolios and then measuring the
size of the relative market value change given a cer-
tain relative change in interest rate. (For a more
detailed explanation of duration analysis, see Bald
2002 or Falletti 1992.)
Foreign exchange risk. Foreign exchange risk
occurs when an MFI holds cash or other invest-
ments (assets) or debt (liabilities) in foreign cur-
rency. It is the risk of loss due to changes in the
value of foreign currencies relative to the MFI’s
domestic currency. Whether the MFI incurs a gain
or loss depends on both the direction of the
exchange rate change and the level of foreign cur-
rency assets in relation to foreign currency liabili-
ties. As with interest rate risk, gap analysis can be
used to assess the impact of a devaluation or reval-
uation of the currency. If foreign currency assets
exceed foreign currency liabilities, revaluation will
produce a gain if the value of the foreign currency
increases and a loss if the value of the currency
decreases; if foreign currency assets are less than for-
eign currency liabilities, the opposite is true. The
effect of these gains and losses on an MFI’s finan-
cial position as well as the frequency and the way in
which they are recorded for accounting purposes
are dependent on the accounting rules in the coun-
try in which the MFI is operating.
Capital Adequacy Management
An MFI’s capital plan is usually developed within its
business plan. The appropriate level of capital is
determined by three interconnected factors: regula-
tory requirements, growth projections, and investor
return expectations. While regulators are eager to
see high capital levels, shareholders want to main-
tain the lowest level of capital necessary to ensure
higher returns on their investments without incur-
ring undue risk—maintaining this balancing act
while ensuring that growth targets are achieved is
at the core of capital adequacy management. Trea-
sury is responsible for monitoring regulatory capi-
tal requirements, comparing the projected capital
level to both strategic and regulatory standards,
developing plans for raising the necessary capital,
and executing approved capital financing plans
(Falletti 1992). Carrying out these activities in an
appropriate and profitable manner requires a solid
Table 10.4 Interaction between Funding Gap
and Interest Rates 
Funding Change in Value 
gap interest rates Risk of the MFI
Positive Up Down Up
Positive Down Up Down
Negative Up Down Up
Negative Down Up Down
Source: Adapted from Falletti (1992).
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understanding of regulatory reporting require-
ments, effective investor relations, as well as robust
systems.
Each country has rules prescribing the minimum
amount of capital required for various institutional
forms—banks, development banks, nonbank finan-
cial institutions, and the like—as well as the mini-
mum capital adequacy requirements, reflecting
capital as a percentage of risk-based assets. For
example, in Uganda, the minimum paid-in capital
requirement for MDIs is 500 million Uganda
shillings (approximately U.S.$270,000) in cash.
Meeting the statutory minimum capital, however, is
often immaterial because MFIs that have the capac-
ity and the size to transform frequently have capital
in excess of the statutory minimum capital require-
ments. Capital adequacy requirements, however,
require close monitoring. Capital adequacy is calcu-
lated as follows:
Risk-asset ratio  (10.1)
Known as the Basle Capital Accord,12 this widely
accepted methodology for calculating capital ade-
quacy is used globally by central banks to set
requirements for capital in relation to the size of
business. Qualified capital is expressed either as
tier I or core capital divided by risk-weighted assets,
or as the larger total capital that comprises tier I
and tier II capital, divided by risk-weighted assets.
Table 10.5 summarizes the differences between
tier I and tier II capital. 
The denominator of the ratio in equation 10.1
reflects a calculated value for the MFI’s assets, based
on risk weighting. While the actual percentage
weightings may differ by country, the process of
adjusting assets for risk entails multiplying each
asset value by a percentage weighting. Assets with
the greatest risk are “risk adjusted” by 100 percent;
those with little or no risk (such as cash reserves in
the central bank) are risk adjusted by 0 percent. In
most countries, an MFI’s microfinance portfolio
Qualified capital

Weighted risk-based assets
will be risk weighted by 100 percent because it
is typically viewed to consist of unsecured loans.
Table 10.6 summarizes the various risk weightings
by asset category.
The target values for the risk-asset ratio set forth
by the Basle Capital Accord is 8 percent (of which
the core capital element must be at least 4 percent).
As mentioned in chapter 6, The Funding Structure,
for MFIs, experience suggests a higher ratio may be
more appropriate because of various characteristics
of the microfinance sector, including higher volatil-
ity of loan delinquency, high operating expenses in
relation to loan or portfolio size, and potentially
restricted access to additional funding from share-
holders or donors if necessary to recapitalize the
institution in times of crisis. The Ugandan Microfi-
nance Deposit-Taking Institutions Act (clause 16,
p. 20), for example, stipulates that licensed MDIs
must have a core capital adequacy ratio of less than
15 percent of risk-weighted assets, and a total
capital adequacy ratio of less than 20 percent of
risk-weighted assets. If they fail to adhere to capital
adequacy requirements, the central bank may sus-
pend or restrict operations.
In most countries, subordinated convertible
debt13 can be included in the capital adequacy cal-
culation, depending on the term and remaining life
of the debt. However, because subordinated con-
vertible debt is not normally available to cover losses
of a financial institution, it is limited to a maximum
Table 10.5 Definition of Capital
Tier I a. Paid-up share capital and common shares
b. Disclosed reserves
c. Perpetual noncumulative preferred shares
Tier II a. Undisclosed reserves
b. Asset revaluation reserves
c. General provisions and general loan-loss reserves
d. Hybrid (debt and equity) capital instruments
e. Subordinated debt
Source: Adapted from Bald (2002).
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Table 10.6 Risk Weights by Category of On–Balance Sheet Asset
Risk weighting
(percent) Asset category
a. Cash
b. Claims on central governments and central banks denominated in national currency and funded
in that currency
c. Other claims on OECD central governments and central banks
d. Claims collateralized by cash of OECD central government securities or guaranteed by OECD
central governments
a. Claims on domestic public sector entities, excluding central government, and loans guaranteed
by such entities
a. Claims on multilateral development banks (IBRD, IADB, ADB, AfDB, EIB) and claims guaranteed
by, or collateralized by, securities issued by such banks
b. Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and loans guaranteed by OECD-incorporated banks
c. Claims on banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD with a residual maturity of up
to one year and loans with a residual maturity of up to one year guaranteed by banks
incorporated in countries outside the OECD
d. Claims on nondomestic OECD public sector entities, excluding central government, and loans
guaranteed by such entities
e. Cash items in process of collection
a. Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or will be occupied by the
borrower or that is rented
a. Claims on the private sector
b. Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual maturity of over one year
c. Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless denominated in national currency,
and funded in that currency)
d. Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector
e. Premises, plant and equipment, and other fixed assets
f. Real estate and other investments (including nonconsolidated investment participations in other
companies)
g. Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted from capital)
h. all other assets
Source: Bald 2002, p. 92. 
Note: ADB  Asian Development Bank; AfDB  African Development Bank; EIB  European Investment Bank; IADB  Interamerican Development
Bank; IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
0
0, 10, 20, or
50 (at national
discretion)
20
50
100
of 50 percent of tier I. In Banque Centrale des Etats
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) countries, for
example, subordinated convertible debt that has at
least five years remaining until conversion can be
included at 100 percent in the calculation of total
capital (assuming it is less than 50 percent of
the core capital). Once the convertible date is less
than five years, the portion of debt that can be
included in the capital calculation falls by 20 per-
cent per year. (See chapter 6, The Funding Struc-
ture, for more discussion on capital adequacy and
capital planning.)
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Investment and Funding Activities 
In close coordination with the CFO, the treasury
function is also normally tasked with negotiating
the MFI’s various funding relationships as well as
investment of excess funds. This effort involves
managing the relationships and negotiations with
commercial lenders and other funders. It also
includes the responsibility for managing invest-
ments such as treasury bills, term deposits, bonds,
and others. Although neither of these activities may
be new to the transforming MFI, their complexity
and the amount of funds may be significantly
greater than when operating as an NGO or project.
The MFI must establish investment guidelines and
policies for the CFO and treasury manager to be
able to adequately manage investment and funding
activities. (See chapter 9, Human Resources Man-
agement, for a discussion on the responsibilities of
the CFO and treasury manager.) In addition, the
structure of the department should adhere to the
common banking principal of segregation of duties;
those responsible for transacting actual investments
should be different than those recording or recon-
ciling them. 
Dividend payout policies will also affect the
investment strategy of the transformed MFI. These
policies should include the required processes and
procedures that need to be undertaken for both
investments and for dividend payouts and should be
agreed to by the board or its ALCO.
Investor Relations
In addition to regulators, transformed MFIs also
need to satisfy shareholders who come with their
own demands for timely and accurate information.
The shareholder reporting process must synthesize
key elements of information needed for a compre-
hensive understanding of the financial condition
and performance of the institution, as well as its
overall direction.
The investor relations function is tasked with
supporting all shareholder communication. For a
privately held MFI with only a few investors, this
function may be handled by the CFO or treasury
manager. For institutions listed on a public
exchange or with a large number of independent
investors, a dedicated investor relations unit may be
required. The relevant tasks include providing
financial and other company information to its
shareholders, the financial community, and the
public at large as requested. The investor relations
function must ensure that all information is accu-
rate, informative, of the highest quality, and meets
regulatory requirements. The investor relations
function also plans and organizes the annual share-
holders meeting, writes and disseminates the annual
report, and organizes and facilitates other investor
meetings. 
Annex 10C, Checklist for Financial Manage-
ment, provides a summary checklist.
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Annex 10A Sample Terms of
Reference: Activity-Based Costing 
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and so forth.
Objective
The primary objective is to use activity-based cost-
ing to analyze the cost structure of MFI A’s credit
and savings products and to develop an under-
standing of why and how costs are incurred and the
overall implications for MFI A’s product offerings.
Tasks
The consultant will perform the following tasks:
1. Identify the appropriate credit and savings prod-
ucts for focus in the analysis.
2. Create an activities dictionary that delineates the
core operational processes and activities associ-
ated with different products.
3. Determine allocation bases and quantify them.
4. Conduct interviews with all relevant product
and administrative staff members to identify staff
time estimates per activity.
5. Assign cost drivers, and determine unit activity
costs.
6. Apply activity unit costs to products.
7. Allocate costs, including capital costs, and con-
duct a final costing analysis, as well as a marginal
cost analysis.
8. Write recommendations to improve design and
delivery, as well as the price structure of MFI A’s
products, and to integrate activity-based costing
into MFI A’s operations.
Deliverables
The following deliverables are required:
1. Activities dictionary that delineates the core
operational processes and activities associated
with MFI A’s products 
2. Consolidated results from interviews with rele-
vant staff members 
3. Final costing analysis and marginal cost analysis
4. Recommendations for adjustments to products
to increase efficiency and to align pricing with
results of costing analysis 
5. A brief completion report summarizing the find-
ings and recommendations enumerating tasks
going forward and ways to integrate activity-
based costing into MFI A’s operations
Level of Effort
It is expected that approximately 20 to 25 days will
be required to complete this assignment.
328 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
Annex 10B Sample Terms of
Reference: Treasury Management
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and so forth.
Objectives
Transformation into a regulated financial interme-
diary requires a high level of professional treasury
management to ensure that such areas as liquidity
management, asset liability matching, capital ade-
quacy, and investment policies are managed in a
way that balances risk and return to the institution
while protecting depositors, shareholders, and
other stakeholders. In addition to being required
for the sound and prudent management of the
organization, such policies are a requirement of the
law and the regulations. In preparing to become a
licensed financial intermediary, MFI A plans to
engage a treasury management consultant. 
The specific objectives of this consultancy are to
• Assess the treasury management capacity of
MFI A.
• Develop treasury management guidelines and
policies that consider the appropriate risk man-
agement framework.
• Develop models and tools for effective treasury
management, establish the treasury department,
and assist or mentor the treasury manager to
assume responsibility for the treasury function.
Tasks
To meet the objectives, the consultant will perform
the tasks listed below, working closely with the
treasury manager:
1. Review the legislation and its implementing reg-
ulations, specifically those related to liquidity and
funds management.
2. Review MFI A’s treasury management policies
and systems as a component of an ideal risk man-
agement framework.
3. Assess the treasury management capabilities of
MFI A’s software platform.
4. Review and assist MFI A in finalizing an Asset
Liability Management framework to balance risk
and return. This framework must comply with
the regulations provided under the law.
a. Develop a process for the day-to-day mana-
gement of liquidity and cash forecasting,
considering MFI A’s headquarters location
and its branches; and draft a user guide for
liquidity management.
b. Develop guidelines and implement tools to
mitigate foreign exchange risk and interest
rate risk.
c. Recommend the proper constitution of an
Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO) for
management and for the board, including res-
ponsibilities, policies, goals, and operations
(membership, frequency of meetings).
5. Develop capital adequacy policies, including
weighted assets and types of capital available and
potential implications. These policies must com-
ply with regulatory requirements.
6. Recommend guidelines to help MFI A’s man-
agement develop the necessary policies to invest
various funds under management.
Deliverables
The following deliverables are required:
1. An assessment of the treasury management capa-
bilities of MFI A’s software platform and recom-
mended modifications
2. An Asset Liability Management framework to
balance risk and return, including:
3. Recommended policies to ensure capital
adequacy
a. Draft of documented processes for liquidity
management both for day-to-day and for
longer term
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b. Draft of user guide for liquidity and cash
management
c. Recommendations on the proper constitution
of an ALCO
4. Recommended investment portfolio guidelines
5. A brief completion report summarizing the find-
ings and recommendations enumerating tasks
and benchmarks for the treasury manager going
forward
Qualifications
• Degree in business or related field such as
accounting or economics
• At least five years of experience as a treasury
manager for a commercial bank or microfinance
institution
• International consulting experience in treasury
management
Level of Effort
It is expected that approximately 35 to 40 days will
be required to complete this assignment. 
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Annex 10C Checklist for Financial
Management
Structure of Finance Department
• Have the scope and objectives of the finance
department been clearly identified and docu-
mented?
• Is the organizational structure appropriate to sup-
port the expanded scope of the finance functions? 
• Does the MFI have the human resources skills
needed to accommodate the expanded scope of
the finance department after transformation?
• Does the CFO or finance manager have the skills
and credentials necessary to lead the finance
department of a regulated financial institution? If
not, have appropriate candidates been identified? 
Planning and Budgeting
• Does the MFI have a long-term financial projec-
tion model?
• Is the model flexible enough to accommodate and
reflect new products, new funding sources, and
the like, expected after transformation?
• Does the MFI have a detailed annual budget and
is it reviewed by management on a regular basis? 
• Does the finance department lead the annual
budgeting process?
• Is the budget process participative?
• Does the MFI analyze actual to budget on a
consistent and meaningful basis?
• Has the finance department investigated all rele-
vant tax implications for after transformation?
• Has a capital budget been prepared?
Accounting
• Does the institution’s chart of accounts comply
with regulator guidelines? 
• Are the MFI’s accounting procedures in line
with regulatory standards and requirements? 
• Are the MFI’s provisioning and write-off policies
in line with regulator requirements? Does the
MFI consistently follow these?
• Does the MFI’s treatment of interest income and
expense adhere to regulatory requirements? 
• Has the MFI conducted a needs assessment of all
stakeholders’ reporting requirements, including
the regulator and investors?
• Has the current management information system
been assessed for capacity to respond to such
reporting requirements?
• Have the relevant compliance reports been
approved by the regulator?
• Has Internal Audit reviewed the integrity of
these reports?
Treasury
• Has the MFI reviewed the relevant laws and reg-
ulations on liquidity and funds management?
• Has the board established clear guidance on the
MFI’s level of acceptable liquidity risk?
• Have ALCOs been established at both the board
and management levels?
• Have asset-liability management procedures
been established?
• Have staff been trained in producing relevant
management information for asset-liability man-
agement risk monitoring?
• Has the treasury management capacity of the
software been assessed?
• Have policies and procedures for capital ade-
quacy management been established?
• Have investment guidelines and policies been
drafted and agreed on?
• Have dividend payout policies been drafted and
agreed on?
• Have forecasting tools been developed to esti-
mate liquidity needs?
• Have process flows and procedures been 
drafted for investment and dividend payout
policies?
Investor Relations
• Has a person or unit been tasked with the in-
vestor relations function? 
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• Have policies and guidelines been put in place to
guide all external communications?
• Has a process been established to produce annual
reports and other shareholder information?
Notes
1. Planning framework drawn from Falletti (1992).
2. Because capital budgeting is relatively complicated, it
is not covered in this chapter in detail. Further infor-
mation on capital budgeting can be found in Helfert
(1982) or Bergeron (1977), as well as many other
sources.
3. While not always included directly in the control or
accounting function, profitability analysis is discussed
here because the financial data required and the
transfer pricing mechanism that may follow are man-
aged here.
4. Some MFIs capitalize (record as an asset on the bal-
ance sheet) the interest revenue expected when the
loan is disbursed (this is often the case for MFIs oper-
ating with British accounting standards). Under this
system, when a loan is disbursed, the MFI’s loan
account is typically debited by the principal plus the
full amount of expected interest; the client’s account
is credited by the principal portion; and an “unearned
interest revenue” account is credited by the interest
portion, and netted against the loan account. On the
installment due date, regardless of whether the client
pays, the “unearned interest revenue” is debited, and
“interest revenue” is credited. When the client pays,
“cash” is debited for the full payment, and the loans
account is credited.
5. For one to accrue interest expense, the amount of
interest owed as of the date of the balance sheet is
debited on the income statement as a financing cost,
and is credited as a liability on the balance sheet in the
accrued interest expense account.
6. The MFI can expand the profit center approach to
include the head office as well by pricing the services
the head office provides to the branches. When branch
managers are assessed on the overall profitability of
their branches, they, in effect, determine the value
added by the head office through deciding whether to
“buy” head-office services. This helps to ensure effi-
ciency and relevance of head-office activities. 
7. See Cracknell and Sempangi (2002) for more in-
depth discussion of this topic.
8. See Helms and Grace (2004) for more in-depth
discussion of this topic.
9. For specific tools for monitoring and projecting
liquidity, see Biety (2005). 
10. Drawn from Bald (2002, p. 106).
11. Another measurement, the gap ratio (see table 10.3),
compares the rate-sensitive assets to the rate-sensitive
liabilities. A gap ratio of more than 1 is a positive gap,
and a gap ratio of less than 1 is a negative gap.
12. See Imboden and Stevens (2005) for a succinct sum-
mary of Basle II and its application to microfinance.
13. Subordinated term debt typically includes conven-
tional unsecured subordinated debt capital instru-
ments with a minimum original fixed term to maturity
of over five years and limited life redeemable prefer-
ence shares. 
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Management Information Systems
Changes inherent in transforming to aregulated financial intermediary have signifi-cant implications for a microfinance institu-
tion’s (MFI’s) management information systems
(MIS). The people, policies, and processes that gov-
ern the way data are collected, processed into infor-
mation, stored, analyzed, and accessed, all undergo
change. The introduction of new products, compli-
ance with regulatory reporting requirements and
accounting standards, support for teller services,
and greater demands for portfolio analysis, all pose
new information requirements on the transforming
MFI. These new requirements must be supported
without jeopardizing ongoing information needs.
In addition, systems must possess the flexibility to
accommodate the growth of the MFI going for-
ward. Although the size of the gap between a trans-
forming MFI’s current MIS and the systems it will
need as a regulated, deposit-taking institution will
vary by institution and by country, in general, the
MIS upgrade process tends to be one of the more
expensive and time-consuming aspects of the trans-
formation process. 
To transform successfully, MFIs will need to
ensure that their systems and use of IT are closely
aligned with their business strategies, both in the
short and longer term. In particular, the MIS will
need to provide the transformed MFI with levels
of flexibility and reliability that accommodate the
changes associated with regulation. Ideally, it must
also become a stable platform from which IT initia-
tives, such as automated teller machines (ATMs),
point-of-sale transactions, or cell phone banking,
can be launched. To achieve this goal, MFIs must
dedicate sufficient time and resources to the MIS
upgrade, employ structured project management
methodologies, and incorporate change manage-
ment activities.
This chapter provides an overview of the changes
required to an MFI’s information systems as part of
the transformation process. It first considers the
planning that needs to take place before an MIS
upgrade, then addresses the actual MIS upgrade
process, leading to the requirements for software
and infrastructure, and finally, implications for MIS
security needs and the MFI’s human resources.1
The bulk of the chapter is focused on the software
requirements for loan portfolio management, sav-
ings management, accounting, and reporting,
because many aspects of these functions will either
be new or require revisions for the MFI to operate
as a regulated deposit-taking entity.
Chapter 11
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Planning for an MIS Upgrade 
MIS involve much more than just computers—they
include the “policies, procedures, and practices that
direct an organization’s operations and the staff
that interact with the information, combined with
the software and hardware.”2 Thus, change man-
agement is a vital part of the MIS upgrade process.
(See chapter 3, Planning for Transformation, for
more information on change management.) 
MIS upgrades can include the implementation of
new banking software, a reengineering of basic
information processing procedures, investments in
information technology (IT) training for staff, and
the revamping of an institution’s reporting frame-
work. In planning for an MIS upgrade, MFIs
should consider the following key components:
• Project management
• Strategic thinking
• Process assessment
Project Management
To identify the proper new system and successfully
implement it within the time frame of the trans-
formation process, MFIs will find it imperative to
manage the upgrade process formally as a project
and adhere to good project management practices.
Managing any project presents numerous chal-
lenges, but technology projects add an extra layer of
complexity because of the high expectations of
technology, the breadth of stakeholders that are
affected by systems, and the linked time frames
within the overall transformation strategy.
To help ensure proper leadership and institu-
tional acceptance of the results, the MFI should
create an IT task force to upgrade process. The IT
task force should be aligned with the organiza-
tional culture and structure, properly identifying
who is responsible for critical IT decisions. This
ensures that IT-related decisions embody uniform
principles and are properly placed within the busi-
ness strategy and resources of the organization.
The task force should include a senior level man-
ager responsible for the team, representative
managers from each of the key business units, the
IT manager, and a representative sample of general
users. This task force oversees and is directly
involved in the MIS upgrade process. This com-
mittee could be a subset of the transformation
committee discussed in chapter 3, Planning for
Transformation. 
Project analysis and planning is by far the most
critical phase in the MIS upgrade process because
failure to identify an activity or requirement may
ultimately delay or even prevent transformation.
Although MFIs may find this approach somewhat
time consuming, clearly establishing the needed
MIS changes as a project will save significant
amounts of time, money, and effort in the longer
term.
Certain challenges are unique to IT initia-
tives. Technology is often seen as a panacea for
all problems—when it fails to deliver as promised
or on time it can cause morale issues. Aligning
and managing expectations is therefore impor-
tant throughout the entire process. IT project
management and analytical experience are also
difficult to come by for MFIs. Rare is the MFI
that has the full range of staff expertise in house.
Leveraging outside experts will be necessary
along the way, so it is important to plan and allo-
cate resources accordingly. Because technology
affects everyone in an MFI, including customers,
regulators, and the board of directors, there is a
complex web of stakeholders to manage—both
their participation and their expectations must be
guided. Furthermore, this type of IT project is
likely to follow tight time frames and budgets;
therefore, activities and resources must be man-
aged very closely.
See box 11.1 for a summary of factors leading to
the success of IT projects.
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Strategic Thinking
With transformation, regulatory oversight opens
the door to delivery of more and different financial
products, which leads to the ability to grow the cus-
tomer base. In turn, transformation also provides
access to additional sources of capital to fund the
growth. Hence, when identifying the requirements
for the new information system, the MFI must con-
sider more than just compliance with regulatory
reporting to determine the best application. The
MFI should clearly articulate its business goals, tak-
ing into consideration client demands and available
technology innovations. To prepare for this, oppor-
tunities and challenges of accessing and using tech-
nologies locally need to be assessed. At this point,
the MFI should articulate the vision in terms of the
“what” (branchless banking, for example) and not
the “how” (smart cards, connectivity, or a point-of-
sale network). The how will be determined later in
the process based on priorities, availability of tech-
nology, viability, and resources. 
The next key output of a strategic thinking exer-
cise is a criteria set for evaluating the technology
options. This will vary in length, characteristics, and
priority by institution, but generally includes some
of the following attributes—customer driven,
extendable, usable, reliable, secure, and affordable.
It is imperative that the IT task force and the trans-
formation committee come to agreement on these
priorities before beginning the due diligence of the
different options, to prevent the evaluators from
becoming enchanted with the bells and whistles of
Box 11.1 Critical Success Factors for IT Project Management
• Technology choices should always further busi-
ness objectives; the MFI must have explicitly clear
business goals everyone understands and to
which everyone is committed.
• Management must establish clear standards for
success with specific targets to measure results
and quantify return on investment; otherwise,
employees may feel no sense of accomplishment
and investors may not be satisfied with results.
• The project must have a project champion,
generally a well-respected, high-level senior
manager with the ability to sell the new vision.
This person might be the general manager or the
operations manager.
• The project must have an internal MIS project
manager responsible for keeping the project
moving forward on schedule, following up with
others to ensure work is completed.
• The project must have a task team to do the
work comprising fair representation of the stake-
holders across the organization; the project man-
ager is responsible for leading this team.
• Management must clearly define the require-
ments for solution in the beginning. 
• The project must have senior management lead-
ership, buy-in, and accountability for outcomes,
including from business unit managers.
• The rationale for change must be clearly stated
and communicated to all stakeholders.
• The project must have adequate resources for
not only the new software but for internal staff
time, specialized technical assistance, training,
hardware, and other capital investments.
• Planning, planning, planning, and even more
contingency planning should be done to ensure
the process meets designated milestones and
remains in synch with the overall transformation
process.
• Corners must not be cut on training or change
management activities; this will inevitably inter-
fere with a smooth process and result in project
cost overruns. Investing in people is just as impor-
tant as, if not more than, investing in technology.
Source: O’Keeffe and Frederick (2004, pp. 6–7).
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new technology. Because this is a critical step in the
process and requires a special set of skills, the MFI
should consider engaging a third party to lead the
strategic thinking session. If the chosen facilitator is
not an expert in technology, the IT manager should
prepare a summary of the technology landscape for
the given country or region, to be used during the
session.
Ultimately, significant capital investment in
equipment, hardware, and technical assistance will
be required to employ the new applications success-
fully and prepare the MFI to manage the expected
growth. The MFI is strongly advised to choose a
solution that will bring them the greatest return in
the long-term (five to seven years).
Process Assessment
Process assessment refers to assessing the various
business processes that take place within the MFI
to effect its operations. (See Chapter 12, Internal
Control and Audit, for a brief discussion on process
mapping.) Although a full-scale reengineering effort
of the core processes of the MFI is not mandatory
for transformation, it is important to at least identify
the core processes that will be most directly affected
by the upgrade of the information system. Adopting
a new MIS provides an excellent opportunity to
address inefficient or outdated processes and proce-
dures that may have been developed and passed
down over time. Rather than simply automating
what is in place, the processes should be assessed,
redesigned, streamlined, or eliminated as appropriate
with the new technology. Technology’s greatest
value added is not when it is laid over existing
processes but when business processes and practices
are examined and revised to both take advantage of
the technology and improve overall efficiency and
client service (although care should be taken not to
let the technology drive the business processes).
Becoming a regulated deposit-taking institution
should lead the choice of technology, which, in turn,
should enable new and better operations.
Once the core processes are identified, they
should be classified as either priority proces-
ses, background processes, or mandated processes.
Each process should then be evaluated for its
salience and value to the institution to determine
whether improving each process is worth the
investment as part of the MIS upgrade. Precious
IT resources and transformation money should
focus directly on the processes with the most
potential for improvement that will generate eco-
nomic value (directly or indirectly) for the
organization. 
MIS Upgrade Process 
Following a standard approach to managing the
MIS upgrade process is critical to overall success.
The four core phases include the following:
• Needs assessment
• Design
• Research and selection
• Implementation
In general, from start to finish the MIS upgrade
process will usually take a full 12 to 18 months. It
is vitally important that the MFI document the
MIS upgrade process, most particularly the
research and selection process if seeking donor
funding (box 11.2).
Needs Assessment
As a first step, the IT task force needs to analyze the
existing systems and compare these to what will be
required to operate as a regulated deposit-taking
institution. From this analysis, the task force can
identify the primary activities required for the MIS
upgrade and estimate the resources needed. This
assessment of current and future information needs
results in a requirements document. See annex 11A
for a sample requirements document.
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In the assessment, the MFI must clearly identify
the input, processing, output, and communications
requirements for the MIS after transformation.
Involving external stakeholders, many of whom will
be new to the MFI, such as the regulatory body and
investors, as well as internal users—including all
departments affected by transformation, senior
management, and operational users of the current
MIS—in the requirements definition is critical to
ensure a complete set of specifications early on as
well as buy-in from the various stakeholder groups.
Unclear requirements are the number one reason
IT projects go over budget and miss deadlines.
Changes late in the process will affect all levels—
technology, processes, budgeting, training, and
rollout.
Consultations with each of the stakeholders
should allow the MFI to determine the scope of the
project including both an overview of issues and the
specific detailed requirements of the information
system for the newly transformed organization. A
sample set of requirements and the common source
are shown in table 11.1.
Based on the high-level requirements, a set of
MIS project tasks should then be determined. For
example, the requirement to provide compliance
reporting calls for a series of activities regarding
communications alternatives to ensure the required
information is available. It is important to prioritize
Box 11.2 Documenting the Process
The four core phases of the MIS upgrade process
should be carefully documented at each stage,
particularly if the MFI hopes to access donor
funding for part or all of the cost of acquiring a
new MIS. Given the high price, the procurement
of an MIS typically falls in the most complex and
closely scrutinized level for donors (for example,
requiring international competitive bidding, in
the case of the World Bank). Although each
donor’s procurement rules will differ, generally
they seek to ensure high standards of trans-
parency and value for money. If a particular
donor has already been identified before the
start of the process, the MFI should ensure that
the donors requirements are met at every stage.
If the donor is not yet known, the MFI will have
to go even farther, and attempt to anticipate
every possible requirement.
In anticipation of receiving donor funding, a
transforming MFI in Uganda moved forward
with the needs assessment, design, research, and
selection phases (but not contracting). When a
willing donor was found, the process (and in par-
ticular, its documentation) did not meet the
donor’s requirements and the MFI ultimately had
to fund the full MIS purchase with its own
resources. 
Source: Contributed by Lloyd Stevens, DFID Financial Sector
Deepening Programme, Uganda, November 2005. 
Table 11.1 Sources and Requirements
Source Requirement identified
• Minimum regulatory require-
ments for licensing, as docu-
mented in central bank policies
and procedures
• Ongoing regulatory reporting
requirements
• Accounting and loan process-
ing regulations
• Time frame for transformation
• Estimates of business growth,
including both transaction
processing and geographic
expansion plans
• Details of new products and
changes to existing products
• Anticipated future business
model
• IT vision and strategy
• Resources available for MIS
transformation
• User requirements for upgrade
or new system
Source: O’Keeffe and Frederick (2004, p. 4).
Central bank 
regulations
Transformation 
committee, 
transformation 
plan, business plan
Senior management,
transformation,
business plan
System users
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requirements. The output of this exercise should
be a project plan, complete with task breakdown,
resource budgeting, external technical assistance
needs, and allocation of responsibilities. Project
dependencies, risks, and responsibilities should
also be analyzed and included in the project plan,
which ultimately should be submitted via the IT
task force to the transformation committee for
approval and allocation of resources. 
Furthermore, a process to identify requested
system changes or upgrades should also include a
defined method for communicating the change to
the MIS department or external MIS supplier (or
both) and a subsequent method for recording, vet-
ting, prioritizing, and authorizing the changes. A
change request database, possibly related to a sup-
port call database, can help manage change requests
through to implementation.
The skills required to carry out this analysis may
be beyond those available in a purely technical IT
department and in some cases could be well suited
to an external consultant who has both an under-
standing of the regulations and business environ-
ments as well as of information systems as a whole.
See annex 11B for sample terms of reference for a
consultant to carry out the needs assessment.
Regardless of who carries out the assessment, the
findings should be verified with the IT task force
and the transformation committee to ensure the
requirements have been correctly interpreted and
the objectives of the project are clear.
Design
In the design phase, the IT task team envisions the
“what” of the solution and assigns priorities to
the requirements. Once a change has been given
initial approval, further analysis may be necessary
to understand the details of system changes
required to fulfill the request. These details should
be documented as proof that the effects of the
change have been thoroughly considered. The out-
put of this phase is a specifications document that is
used in the next phase to research technology
options.
Research and Selection
The next phase, research and selection, is usually
completed in two iterations. First, a high-level scan
is done of all available options with some basic
research to narrow the options down to a short list
of three because the amount of due diligence done
after this stage is significant. Once the short list has
been identified, each vendor is requested to make
an on-site visit and demonstration. A Request for
Proposal outlining the necessary system require-
ments should then be developed and given to each
vendor. Once the proposals are received from the
vendor, they are evaluated and rated according to
the priorities and resource criteria set outlined by
the IT task force. Leveraging an external consultant
for this phase can be valuable if in-house expertise
does not exist. See annex 11B for sample terms of
reference to engage a consultant to assist in the
selection of software. Donor funding may be avail-
able for this type of exercise, such as through the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Information
Systems Fund.3 The final goal of the research and
selection phase is to select the software application
for implementation and to negotiate a contract with
the chosen vendor.4
Implementation
The final phase of the upgrade process is imple-
mentation. A detailed implementation plan should
be created to outline the specific activities, includ-
ing the resources and time frames for delivery.
The activities in this phase may include hardware
installation, network upgrade, software installation,
data migration, testing, training, and process
realignment. 
If implementation involves a significant upgrade,
or complete replacement of a system, data migra-
tion or conversion will be required. This involves
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either transferring data from a previous system to a
new database, or capturing data electronically if the
current MIS is manual. This process will directly
affect the data quality of the final system so it is crit-
ical that it is carried out correctly. Some guidelines
for data migration are suggested in box 11.3.
Following data conversion, and equally impor-
tant, is testing. Delivery of a system change, either
as a patch or a full version upgrade, must be suffi-
ciently tested before implementation. Testing has
two main objectives—to ensure the change works
as specified and to ensure it has not had any adverse
effects on the rest of the system. Standard test rou-
tines should be followed to ensure that all processes
are carried out with the new version of the software
(for example, new loan creation, disbursement,
end-of-period processing). These tests should be
made on a replica of the live system with all test
results documented and issues reported back to
development. 
Once systems and user acceptance testing have
been completed, a pilot run of the software or soft-
ware upgrade should be carried out to identify any
additional issues that arise through the use of the
software on a daily basis. During the definition
phase for the pilot test, criteria should be estab-
lished to judge when and whether the pilot is
successful. 
Training of users and technical staff must also
take place during the implementation phase. Train-
ing programs need to be designed, taking into
account the existing skills of users and any changes
to business processes that will accompany the new
system. Training methods should include hands-on
training sessions, with accompanying training man-
uals. An assessment of technical training require-
ments for systems personnel should also be carried
out to ensure that the skills are available, either in
house or through an outsourcing arrangement, to
support the new technology. 
This phase culminates with a system evaluation
to ensure optimization of the technology. Despite
testing, issues may still be identified after imple-
mentation. A postimplementation review will help
to identify these outstanding issues, and will pro-
vide a valuable learning exercise that should assist
with future MIS or technology projects. 
The implementation phase can take anywhere
from 2 to 12 months depending on the size of the
institution and the approach taken for the conver-
sion to the new system. (See box 11.4 for a sum-
mary of conditions that could make it take longer.)
Again, it may be useful to hire an external consult-
ant to assist in the implementation process. (See
annex 11C for sample terms of reference.)
Box 11.3 Dos and Don’ts of 
Data Migration
Do:
• Confirm exact data requirements with the
new supplier.
• Use trained data entry clerks who understand
the importance of data accuracy.
• Design tools for data entry to validate data as
it is entered.
• Schedule time for data cleaning before actu-
ally converting—expect exceptions.
• Do a trial run to understand how the
data will be converted into the new system;
understand how each piece of data will be
used.
• Work with previous software suppliers to map
the old database structure to the new one.
Don’t:
• Skimp on time or resources when confirming
data requirements—it will be much harder to
fix data errors once the data is actually in the
system.
• Expect branches or users to do data entry
without supervision and training.
• Presume the new software supplier will imme-
diately understand the old database.
Source: Contributed by Geraldine O’Keeffe, December 2005.
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Given the length of time required for an MIS
upgrade, the transformation committee will find it
imperative to work closely with the IT task force to
properly align and sequence activities so as not to
put the transformation process and regulatory
approval at risk. 
Software Requirements
When transforming to a deposit-taking financial
intermediary, many MFIs need to consider pur-
chasing new software. Credit-only institutions often
operate with software designed primarily for loan
tracking. Upon becoming a deposit-taking institu-
tion, the software must be upgraded to manage and
monitor client savings as well. 
Although not all transforming MFIs will need to
purchase new software, for those that do, evaluation
tools such as that provided by Mainhart (1999)
should be used to assess potential software applica-
tions. This framework breaks down the assessment
of an MIS application into the following compo-
nents: functionality and expandability, usability,
reporting, standards and compliance, administra-
tion and support, technical specifications and
correctness, and costs. Criteria are listed for each
component and a system can be assessed according
to how well it meets this general criteria set and the
specific priorities of the institution.5
Although all criteria listed within this framework
should be considered in terms of relative priority,
certain topics are of particular importance for
transforming MFIs: 
• Deposit account management: functionality and
flexibility to support different savings and
deposit products 
• Finance and accounting: functionality to per-
form a full range of accounting activities and
to meet required compliance standards, as
well as improved asset, liquidity, and deposit
management
• Loan tracking: capability to monitor and man-
age the loan portfolio, particularly portfolio
aging, in addition to greater flexibility with indi-
vidual loan products and the decision-making
processes
• Scalability of the system to support institutional
growth: ability to support diverse new products
as well as an increased volume of users necessary
for scaling the institution as it grows through
transformation
• Flexibility to incorporate new requirements:
because transformation can open many new
doors, the MIS must be flexible enough to
Box 11.4 Rollout of Bankers’ 
Realm at UMU
Before initiating its preparations for transforma-
tion, Uganda Microfinance Union (UMU) relied
on a manual account management system, built
primarily off ledger cards (yellow for loans and
pink for savings) and a separate centrally based
automated accounting package (Solomon IV).
This system faced limitations in efficiency, consol-
idating data, and trend analysis, underscoring
the need for a new system to respond to the
reporting and tracking requirements of a regu-
lated microfinance deposit-taking institution
(MDI). The resulting conversion from a totally
manual system—characterized by ledger cards,
ledger keepers, waste sheets, and tedious
month-end balancing—to Bankers Realm, a
holistic banking software, was not an easy one.
The first branch to go live was UMU’s newest
urban branch, opened in August 2002 and com-
puterized in October 2002. The computerization
of the rest of UMU’s branches took over two
years to complete and was challenged by many
issues. Strong project management proved criti-
cal throughout the transition process.
Source: Author’s findings.
Management Information Systems | 341
enable the organization to pursue new opportu-
nities easily as they emerge
• Report generation: greater control and ease for
adjusting and generating reports, especially those
required to comply with regulatory requirements
• Governmental and supervisory adherence: proper
audit capacities and security measures as well as
full control of the chart of accounts to ensure
institutional compliance
In addition, transformation often increases the
number of accounts per customer, as additional
loans and savings products are cross-marketed. As
discussed in chapter 10, Financial Management, the
MFI will most likely want to analyze customer
behavior and performance across all products;
therefore, access to an interface that shows the
client portfolio with summary information about
the client’s performance in each product becomes
important. Although this information may be avail-
able through detailed analysis of each account, it is
much easier and more valuable to analyze client
behavior collectively. Multiple products accessed by
the same client make a strong case for systems that
are integrated and customer focused, because such
systems provide the ability to associate several
accounts to one customer and thus more efficiently
manage the customer relationship. The alternative
is an account-centric system whereby each account
is considered separately from all other accounts or
even completely separate systems—however, these
generally make it difficult for summary behavior to
be extracted. 
MFIs must clearly identify their requirements
in these areas, and all other requirements, before
they select an MIS solution. Pressure to transform
should not compromise the time allocated to the
process of software selection, contract negotiation,
and implementation. A major project such as this
will benefit from laying down foundations to
support the new system and ensuring that both
business and technical needs are addressed by the
chosen solution. 
Whether current systems will be retained after
transformation or a new MIS selected, certain issues
important to the software requirements must be
addressed, including system design, loan portfolio
management, savings and deposit management,
accounting, reporting, systems integration, and
security. Given different regulatory environments
from one country to the next, this is not an exhaus-
tive list of issues relevant to all systems but rather
should be used to stimulate ideas and help MFIs
identify potential weaknesses in their MIS. See
box 11.5 for an example of one variable an MFI
might consider when choosing an MIS. 
Box 11.5 Availability of Local Skills
One often overlooked factor in selecting an MIS
is the availability of skills in the local market. The
presence of a few local standard MIS packages
offers an institution a much deeper talent pool
on which to draw, be it IT specialists or tellers
trained in a certain package. In Uganda, for
example, Equinox, a banking solution sold by
Neptune Software plc, has been adopted by four
of the largest providers of microfinance (one
bank, one credit institution, and two MFIs). Over
time, this will create a broad pool of staff well-
versed in this system’s functionality. Because it is
an open secret that MFIs often recruit from their
competitors, this offers a resource from which to
draw, and reduces reliability on a few key staff
members. If an institution selects an obscure MIS
that no other company in its market is using, all
new staff will have to be trained from scratch. Of
course, the institution may look at this the oppo-
site way (“if no one else uses this package, my IT
staff will be less likely to be recruited by a com-
petitor”). On balance, however, the benefits of
recruiting and replacing staff from a deep local
talent pool outweigh any benefits of “trapping”
staff by giving them nontransferable skills.
Source: Contributed by Lloyd Stevens, DFID Financial Sector
Deepening Programme, Uganda, November 2005.
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System Design 
The design of the overall information system must
balance system security and privacy with access and
flexibility. This trade-off can be outlined by the IT
manager or consultant, but ultimately senior man-
agement and the board have the responsibility to
determine the levels of risk the institution is willing
to assume to provide greater customer service and
ease of access. 
Furthermore, natural tension arises between cus-
tomization at the department or branch level and
the need for institutionwide information standards
to ensure continuity and efficiency of services to
customers as well as compliance reporting. Too
much or too little flexibility between these levels
generally results in poor communications, and a
variable quality of responses. For example, varia-
tions in loan application requirements between
branches raise challenges for information consis-
tency. However, a loan officer may need to be able
to offer different terms (within reason) for a loan
product to respond to customer needs and general
market demands. Technology can help create the
necessary consistency and control across the organ-
ization but also provide significant flexibility. Set-
ting some loan product parameters at the global or
product level, but allowing others to be defined at
the individual account level by the loan officer is
one example of how system design can meet the
needs of the MFI. Another is setting the security
features of an MIS to restrict changes to the chart
of accounts at the branch level. Although the IT
manager or consultant can lay out all the data
standards and business policies that need to be
considered, ultimately senior management must
decide which elements are institutional standards
and which are defined at the department or branch
level. 
Finally, business needs must drive the techn-
ology choices. These generally include software
capabilities first, then hardware requirements that
support the software requirements and business
decisions. However, there are exceptions to this
order of thinking, hence the importance of having
clear business objectives agreed to at the onset of
transformation so that a clear vision of the
necessary IT design can be created to support
those objectives in a comprehensive and holistic
approach.
Loan Portfolio Management 
As discussed in chapter 10, Financial Management,
regulations affect the way in which a licensed MFI
needs to process and monitor its loans including
treatment of interest in arrears, tracking of restruc-
tured loans, loan loss provisioning, and aging of
loans in arrears. 
Interest treatment. Although the regulator may
not specify explicitly the way in which an MFI
should account for interest, it will most likely stipu-
late acceptable treatment for interest revenue on
loans in arrears. If one is to meet these require-
ments, the way in which the MIS handles overdue
interest beyond a certain period of time, say 30 days
overdue, needs to be considered. Given that this
time period may vary, a degree of flexibility to spec-
ify interest treatment at the product definition,
account, and global level is a useful feature in a soft-
ware application. Without this ability it is likely that
some programming would be required to make
changes to interest treatment. This latter option
may be entirely appropriate given that interest treat-
ment is unlikely to change on a frequent basis, and
may be a one-off customization change for a soft-
ware supplier or programmer. 
Loan loss provisioning. A well-designed system to
support loan loss provisioning can help improve the
efficiency and accuracy of this critical process. An
integrated loan portfolio and accounting system
should reduce the effort required to calculate and
post provisions. At the same time, however, this
must occur in a transparent way to allow checks on
accuracy. 
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Ideally, provisioning is fully automated as part of
the end-of-month processes. However, use of a
spreadsheet can also provide the necessary func-
tionality. The major concern with a spreadsheet
system is potential errors that may arise due to man-
ual inputs. Controls should be in place to ensure
that provisions are calculated using correct data
from the MIS and that calculated provisions recon-
cile with accounting entries. With an off-the-shelf
application using a relational database, static (or
preferably dynamic) links to a spreadsheet should be
possible to eliminate data entry errors. Dynamic
links to the necessary calculation template will
ensure correct data extraction. Static links that
require manual manipulation to complete process-
ing are prone to errors; this susceptibility, however,
can be offset by using tiered spreadsheets, limiting
manipulation, and locking formulas for accuracy.
Whichever method the MFI chooses should be
tested with the software vendor to ensure sufficient
usability.
Aging of arrears. Provisioning also introduces
the issue of aging brackets used for reporting
arrears. Typical options for these brackets are
weekly or monthly, with the ideal system allowing
the MFI to input its own. Consideration must be
given to the length and number of aging brackets
that the regulators require for provisioning pur-
poses. For example, the regulator may require
provisions on a monthly basis up to 180 days,
whereupon loans are written off. An issue would
arise in this case if the system only allowed a maxi-
mum of up to 120 days. Applications should be
flexible enough to allow the institution to define
the aging brackets. 
Exiting clients and dormant accounts. A mechanism
for monitoring and reporting clients who leave the
MFI may be required by regulators or simply
desired by management. If so, the first step is to
establish the criteria that define an exiting client,
possibly using a period within which a client does
not renew a loan or ceases to hold any savings. A
report to identify such clients or alternatively, an
automated system that makes these accounts inac-
tive, can help identify, and ultimately report on,
these clients.
Dormant accounts may also be an issue. Many
regulators set a definition of a dormant account,
establishing a period for inactivity after which the
account is considered dormant. Often, savings bal-
ances in dormant accounts must be set aside, or
even turned over to the central bank for safekeeping
until the client or an heir comes forward to claim
them, a process known as “escheatment.” 
Rescheduled loans. If the MFI has a policy of
rescheduling loans, such loans will probably need to
be tracked and reported separately because of their
higher risk. The regulator may also require higher
provisioning on these loans. A unique identifier
should be associated with restructured loans so they
can be easily identified and separated from the rest
of the portfolio. This could be achieved by intro-
ducing restructured loans as a new product type in
the MIS so that when a loan is restructured it is
transferred to this product type with different pro-
visioning levels. The functionality within an MIS for
such transfers and regeneration of payment sched-
ules needs to be investigated to ensure that the
application can adequately handle the defined
requirements (separate tracking of rescheduled
loans, for example). 
Additional client data. Transformation may place
greater demands on customer information require-
ments of the MIS, possibly including information
by client or loan such as sector of employment, gen-
der, age, and so on, as well as the ability to capture
more detailed household financial information
needed for some individual loan analyses. If this
information is not already being collected, manage-
ment will need to decide the most efficient and
effective way to collect, store, report, and analyze it.
New forms may need to be designed, input screens
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altered, or certain fields made mandatory. Alterna-
tively, the MFI may need to build a separate data-
base to capture this information, which, over time,
may become a key source of trend data useful for
more sophisticated risk analysis. The collection of
this information will have front-office implications
that may well increase workload and slow down
processing time. A way must also be found to
gather this information from existing clients. 
Even if the required customer information is
already being collected, transformation may require
mapping of existing categories to those set out by
the regulator. A good example of this is “sector of
employment.” The regulator may only want a high
level categorization whereas the MFI may require
more detailed information about the nature of their
clients’ work. A method to map, tier, or move exist-
ing data categories needs to be designed and imple-
mented, ensuring that the MFI does not lose any
required detail. Transformation may also provide an
opportunity to carry out data cleaning activities on
existing information, possibly through validation of
information with clients and purging of data not
being used. 
Savings and Deposit Management 
Before transformation, the savings and deposit
module of the MIS may either not exist or be
underutilized because of a lack of or limited savings
products offered by the MFI. Thus, the savings
module may represent the most significant invest-
ment of resources resulting from MIS transforma-
tion. Identifying the requirements for this module
may be complicated by the fact that new savings
products may not yet be designed or they may be in
a pilot stage. However, one advantage of using a
proven off-the-shelf application is that it should
already have a robust deposit management module
with flexible parameters, so the MFI does not nec-
essarily need to know the precise characteristics of
the deposit products before progressing with the
application selection.
New savings products. With regulation, MFIs can
introduce a variety of new savings services, usually
ranging from open access savings accounts to fixed
deposits. As with all new products, the MIS will be
affected and careful consideration needs to be given
to how the MIS will support the provision of these
products and how the MIS will make available the
necessary information to track development and
performance. 
Good communication between the MIS team
and the product development team will help build
an understanding of the limitations of the system
and how these may affect the design of new prod-
ucts. This should not mean that system limitations
should determine product design but rather, system
issues should be considered while planning new
products to allow for programming efforts if
required. If a savings module is currently in place,
the MIS department could provide the existing
product definition criteria available in the system to
the product development team so they are aware of
what is immediately available as opposed to what
features would require customization. Additionally,
communication will help ensure the MIS depart-
ment incorporates testing and rollout of new
products as part of its schedule, rather than being
informed at the last stage of product rollout, thus
limiting the ability to perform adequate testing.
Introducing new savings products will likely
require new reports. Certain features of savings
products (perhaps number of free transactions) may
result in a requirement to report on an element of
customer behavior previously not collected (per-
haps number of transactions per month). An MIS
application that includes a report generation tool
(for example, Crystal Reports) that allows end users
to create and format their own reports is extremely
beneficial for this purpose. However, the tool will
only be useful if the required data exists in the data-
base. If a report is needed on data that is not cur-
rently contained in the system, both a change to
the database structure and to the software code will
be needed, which most likely will mean supplier
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intervention for an off-the-shelf package. Depend-
ing on how frequently this report is needed, a
spreadsheet report might provide an adequate
alternative.
Savings product criteria. Just as the MIS depart-
ment can provide information to the product devel-
opment team, the product development depart-
ment should be able to detail the information
requirements for savings products—both those
available immediately and those to be offered in the
future—and provide this information to the MIS
department (or IT task force). It may be impossible
to predict specific details of future products, but it
should be possible to identify the criteria that will
be used to define a savings product as well as the
common options for each criteria. For example, one
criterion is “interest procedure,” with the options
of flat, tiered, minimum balance, and average bal-
ance. Once these requirements have been gathered
and analyzed, the MIS department can assess the
level to which current, or proposed systems, meet
them. 
A review of the top dozen banking software
applications shows a finite set of parameters neces-
sary to handle savings product—mainly minimum
and maximum opening balance limits, interest
amounts, interest calculations and accrual posting,
and withdrawal restrictions and fees. As long as the
software has the ability to set these business rules at
the global, product, and account levels, and enables
some user-defined options for each, an MFI should
be relatively assured that any future savings prod-
ucts can be accommodated.
To give an indication of what these common cri-
teria are and to help identify any issues that should
be addressed in the definition process, the criteria
used with the MIS software Bankers Realm6 is pro-
vided as an example in table 11.2. (The criteria have
been modified slightly to show only the key criteria
and should not be interpreted as a replica of the
product definition interface available within this
application.)
Some additional issues may need to be defined
for savings products, such as “who will act as the
account beneficiary,” and “how will joint accounts
be treated.” Whether defined at the account or cus-
tomer level, this functionality should be available as
part of the MIS.
System distinction between compulsory and volun-
tary savings. Many MIS applications recognize the
use of compulsory or forced savings accounts that
are linked to loan accounts. The introduction of
voluntary savings, which by definition should be
independent from loan accounts, may require that
the MIS apply different conditions to these
accounts and, therefore, classify them differently.
For example, forced savings accounts may contain
system controls to ensure that the client is saving
according to schedule or retains a minimum balance
relative to the client’s loan amount. In contrast, vol-
untary savings accounts will have neither of these
requirements but will have different conditions,
such as a number of free withdrawals per month.
How the application associates one savings account
with a loan account but considers another as inde-
pendent may need to be addressed if the trans-
formed MFI continues to require forced savings on
its loan products. To deal with this requirement, the
MIS application may need to have two different
product types so that forced savings has a different
product definition interface than voluntary savings.
This implies that the system must apply different
logic to compulsory and voluntary products, and
may also require an additional data entry step for
tellers.
A separate classification for voluntary and
compulsory savings is particularly important in sit-
uations in which forced savings accounts are drawn
on to make loan repayments in arrears. Unless such
transfers are authorized by the customer with doc-
umentation, voluntary accounts should never be
used for loan repayments. Ideally this policy should
be enforced by the system so that transfers between
these accounts are not possible. If system control is
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Table 11.2 Savings Product Definition
Criteria Options Key questions
Product type
Product ID
Account prefix
Minimum 
balance
Interest rate
Interest frequency
Interest calcula-
tion method
Interest start date
Interest rounding
GL account
interest payable
Charge type and
amount
Free transactions
Transaction costs
Minimum or
maximum fee
GL account fee
income
Dormancy criteria
Checkbook
Tax rate
Debit balance
allowed
Savings, fixed deposit
User definable 
User definable 
Free text field (enter numeric
values)
Percentage
Daily, monthly, weekly, yearly
Flat, tiered, minimum
balance, average balance
Immediately, first of month,
and the like
For example, nearest
thousand, round down
Select from available GL
accounts
Fixed, per transaction, none
Free text field (enter numeric
values)
Enter cost per transaction
Limits on charges
Select from available GL
accounts
Various—dormancy on zero
balance followed by closure
after certain time, dormancy
on no account activity for
specified period, below a
certain balance
Yes or no
Enter rate of tax
Yes or no
What different types of savings products are offered?
What unique identifier will be used for each product?
How will an account numbering system identify the type of
product? For example, all account numbers beginning with 
2 may be savings, and 203 might be open-access savings.
What is the minimum balance?
Is there a penalty for falling below this balance? If so, how is it
applied?
Are reports available to show accounts that are below 
minimum balance?
Monthly or yearly?
How often will interest be paid and is this part of a system
procedure (end of month, for example)?
What procedure will be used to calculate interest?
Will interest be paid in the first month the account is opened?
How should interest calculations be rounded?
If integrated, which account will be used to capture interest
payable?
Will a flat fee be payable or will it be based on account 
usage?
How many free transactions are allowed? Within what time 
period?
None
Is there a minimum or maximum set charge?
If integrated, which account will be used to capture fees 
received?
When will accounts be made dormant?
When will dormant accounts be closed?
How will dormant accounts be reactivated?
Criteria and cost for reactivation?
What will happen to balances in a dormant account?
Is a checkbook available for this product?
Is tax applicable on interest paid?
What rounding is used for these calculations?
What GL account is used for tax received?
Will this account be allowed to go in debit?
Source: Modified from O’Keeffe (2003).
Note: GL  General ledger. 
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not possible, a manual system should be designed
to ensure that transfers from voluntary savings
accounts to loan accounts have the necessary cus-
tomer authorization and paper trail.
There may be no requirement for the system to
differentiate between compulsory and voluntary
savings products if compulsory savings are aban-
doned with transformation. In this instance, exist-
ing products need to be reclassified within the sys-
tem or migrated to the new system, which may
require a back-end change in the database (unless a
feature exists within the MIS to change the product
type). Some systems require the loan account to be
associated with a savings account or minimum
account balance as a mandatory field. Obviously,
this condition will need to be removed or turned
off if forced savings are no longer part of the loan
product. 
Access to account information. The success of
voluntary savings mobilization depends heavily on
clients’ trust in the MFI and their belief that their
money is safe and accessible during banking hours.
Many new savers take some time to develop this
trust and require constant proof that their money is
credited to their account and available for with-
drawal should they require it. This proof has MIS
implications because customers may frequently
request account balances and statements of transac-
tions. The way in which the MIS supports this need
must be considered, along with the pros and cons
of available options in light of the organizational
environment.
Table 11.3 considers some possible alternatives
for meeting client needs for information.
In addition, MFIs should consider electronic
customer inquiries by phone, by internet, or at
kiosks. Although this may be beyond the capacity of
the MFI in the first or second year after transfor-
mation, institutions most likely must go in this
direction if they are to be competitive, responsive,
and cost effective as they grow. Including these
requirements into the overall requirement set at this
stage is, therefore, important.
Fraud prevention and detection. The introduction
of, or increase in, savings products can pose new
opportunities for internal and external fraud and
hence raises the importance of the internal control
capabilities of the MIS. (See chapter 12, Internal
Control and Audits, for more discussion on fraud
prevention.) 
One way to reduce the opportunity for fraud is
through client identification. MFIs will have
addressed the issue of client identification as part of
credit operations but the move to savings and the
commensurate withdrawals may put more pressure
on identification processes, possibly exposing weak-
nesses in the system. An MIS that can support an
electronic identification method, such as a scanned
signature and photo card, a smart card, or even bio-
metrics, will help to minimize the risk of unautho-
rized transactions resulting from forged identifica-
tion. In choosing the identification system, the MFI
will need to consider the literacy level of clients,
availability of technology and infrastructure to sup-
port the technology, the level of security required,
and the cost. In some cases, the identification
method can have multiple functionalities. For
example, smart cards enable client identification,
branchless banking, and off-line transaction capabil-
ities as well as passbook functionality.
Increased worldwide concern about money
laundering and financing of terrorism may result
in MFIs being held to new regulations requiring
implementation of Know Your Customer policies
and procedures, as well as being responsible for
reporting suspicious transactions to the central
bank. The extent to which these regulations are in
place and enforced varies from country to coun-
try but MFIs can realistically assume that at some
stage in the future, as regulated MFIs, their MIS
will need to support such measures. New require-
ments may include record-keeping obligations
and verification of identification, both of which
could entail changes to the MIS. Criteria for
suspicious transactions (for example, an extended
period with no transactions followed by a large
deposit or withdrawal) need to be defined and
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Table 11.3 Client Information Sources
Option Description Pros Cons
Manual 
passbooks
Computer-
updated 
passbooks
Account 
statement
Smart cards
Manual book that becomes
the client’s property;
shows all transactions
and balances; updated 
by a member of the MFI
staff either after each
transaction or at the 
client’s request
Manual book that is
updated using specially
designed printers; held by
client and updated after
each transaction or on
client request
Single statement printed
periodically or on client
request
Embedded computer chip
in a plastic card that 
stores client and account
information
Time consuming
Costly
Loss of passbook could present 
security concern for client
Human errors in transcribing 
Fraudulent creation of books
Possibly requires dedicated staff
to update
Difficult when customer has multiple
accounts
Expensive printers
Availability of printers
Expense of passbooks that must be
compatible with printers
Loss of passbook could present 
security concern for client
Possibly requires dedicated staff
Difficult when customer has multiple
accounts
Some customers may not interpret as
easily as a passbook
Multiple statements for multiple
accounts
Frequent requests 
Potentially mandated by the central
bank at least annually
May not eliminate the need for 
printouts
Relatively expensive technology to 
produce cards (although decreasing)
Requires client education to build up
trust in the technology
Requires accessible device for clients to
read or check account balances
No expensive equipment
required
Easy for customers to 
understand
Easy for staff to update
Faster updating
Accurate
Difficult to duplicate for
fraudulent purposes
Cheaper than passbooks
Only print for customers
who require
Use same printers as used
for receipts
Fast and accurate
Clients can move from one
branch to another
All client information held in
same place
Opens up options for remote
transactions
Very difficult to duplicate,
reducing likelihood of fraud
Source: O’Keeffe and Frederick (2004, p. 16).
reports made available to identify such transac-
tions. These criteria may change over time so flex-
ibility needs to be incorporated into any system of
identification. 
Current accounts and overdraft facilities. Transfor-
mation to a deposit-taking institution may entitle
MFIs to offer current accounts—demand accounts
that allow the user to transact with checks and pos-
sibly access an approved overdraft. If so, the MIS
needs to include functionality to support these
products. The minimum requirements will include
the posting of check-based transactions, clearing of
funds, checkbook administration, and processes for
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approving and monitoring overdrafts. At the trans-
action level, personal checks must be validated
against a register that shows the check series allo-
cated to each account. Checkbook administration
processes will need to update this register as well as
ensure that all appropriate charges are applied each
time a new checkbook is issued. The ability to stop
payment of a specified check number is also
required, along with the possible levying of a charge
for this service. 
The MIS should contain processes that automat-
ically clear effects on a daily basis, updating account
balances with the cleared funds. A register of all pre-
senting banks, along with the required days for
clearing of each, must be maintained if the system is
to automatically determine the value date for a
check-based transaction. While provisions for pre-
mature clearing of effects may be necessary, the
security surrounding this, and indeed all clearing
processes, must be flawless. Finally, the MIS should
facilitate the reconciliation of clearing accounts,
either electronically if transaction data can be
imported from the clearing bank, or manually using
reports designed for this purpose. 
If an overdraft facility is available to current
account holders, the system and supporting busi-
ness processes must be available to administer and
monitor these products. The approval of overdraft
limits should pass through the necessary authoriza-
tion steps, both on and off the system, to ensure
that these credit lines are well controlled. 
Interbranch transactions and branchless banking.
Allowing access to a savings account from any
branch will be an attractive benefit for many cus-
tomers. This functionality may, however, be
restricted by the extent to which branches have
access to a centralized database of customer
information as well as by communication technolo-
gies that allow branch staff access to verify client
details at the client’s home branch. Account access
devices based on magnetic stripe or smart cards may
eliminate or reduce the burden on branches and be
an attractive alternative for providing interbranch or
branchless banking through, automated teller
machine (ATM), point-of-sale (POS) devices or
mobile telephone banking access technologies. Fax,
chat, or text messaging could be less expensive
alternatives, but may not be viable in the long term
given the large number of potential transactions. 
Teller services. MFIs that have not historically pro-
vided teller services will need to consider how they
will provide clients with convenient access to their
now increased range of services. Form and location
of customer access points are important strategic
business decisions with an array of implementation
issues, including several issues that influence the
MIS. First, the physical location of tellers needs to
be suitable to the hardware, taking into account
appearance as well as functionality, security, and
access to electricity. The supervisor also needs to
have visual access to the tellers as they carry out
transactions. Second, the software needs to allow
tellers to input transactions securely as they occur,
obtain the necessary vouchers, and update pass-
books (if used). Third, tellers need reports to rec-
oncile their cash with the system posting at the end
of day (such as a cashier summary sheet). Other
functions include the general navigation of the
interface, its drill-down capability (ability to click on
an item to see a greater level of detail), teller and
system performance, the array of available transac-
tions, secure log in, voiding capabilities, multi-
transaction and summary views, and others. Careful
planning for the user interface with the MIS to
accommodate ease of use and availability of
required information from a limited number of
screens makes the teller’s job easier and ultimately
contributes to higher levels of customer service. 
Accounting
The accounting module may be the module least
affected by the transformation process although this
will depend on the extent to which the accounting
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function is already computerized and how consis-
tent it is with regulatory requirements. Regulatory
requirements and growth may still affect the chart
of accounts and other accounting functions. (See
chapter 10, Financial Management, for more dis-
cussion on accounting for transformed MFIs.)
Integration with the general ledger. A key issue
during transformation is the determination of how
the general ledger (GL) will be updated in a timely
and reliable manner with a sufficient level of inter-
nal control. Whether updating is completed in real
time, with changes in the savings and loans modules
immediately reflected in the relevant accounts, or
on a periodic basis, usually as part of the end-of-day
processing, needs to be decided. The end result
should be the same—a GL account balance that
reconciles with individual ledger accounts. Trans-
formation will not change this basic requirement,
but it may result in higher transaction volumes that
ultimately strain the interface between nonintegrat-
ed modules and the underlying processing power of
the MIS. Depending on how the current MIS is
designed, this may result in an increase in the time
required to update the accounts module, possibly
making it unrealistic to obtain a balance sheet
and income statement by the end of each day, a
condition many regulators require. Therefore,
preparation for transformation should assess the
scalability of a transfer process between modules,
ensuring that the system has the capability to meet
current and future demands. If this capability is
absent, an alternative should be designed and
implemented, such as moving from end-of-day pro-
cessing to twice or three times a day, or to real-time
posting. 
Although an integrated application may not
present issues regarding processes to update the
accounting module, any assumption that an inte-
grated MIS will automatically ensure all ledgers are
balanced may be inaccurate. Depending on the
system, MIS posting directly to the GL control
account could result in the ledgers not balancing.
To identify such errors and mismatches, a system
must provide functionality to identify when ledgers
do not reconcile, perhaps through warning mes-
sages that appear during the end-of-day processing.
When conducting due diligence on a new informa-
tion system, this capability should be verified.
Balancing ledgers, while always a crucial task for
MFIs, becomes even more critical when reporting
to regulatory agencies. This is due, in part, to
penalties for misreporting as well as the responsibil-
ity for overall compliance. 
Chart of accounts. If an MIS is not centralized and
each branch has its own account installation
module, a standardized chart of accounts must be
implemented. For enforcement purposes, a system
to administer and control the chart of accounts
from a central point is required. This system must
ensure that all branches remain synchronized when
new accounts are added or changes are made to
existing accounts. Spreadsheets can be useful tools
to assist in this task, acting as a central record of all
accounts, showing which branches use which
accounts, and providing a detailed description of
their usage. Reporting regulations will also affect
the administration of the chart of accounts. Secu-
rity features of an MIS that restrict changes to
the chart of accounts at the branch level may be
implemented—however, security needs to be care-
fully balanced with efficiency. 
A system needs to be established to ensure that
the MFI’s chart of accounts is aligned with central
bank formats to meet regulatory requirements. This
involves ensuring that any internal change to the
chart of accounts does not adversely affect the detail
required on compliance reports. Thus, the system
for administration and control of the accounts must
also track which accounts are required by regulators
to ensure they are not affected by any internal
changes.
Other accounting functions. The way an MFI
records its fixed assets and depreciation must
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comply with regulatory requirements. In certain
cases, the regulatory body may stipulate the life
of each asset type or the acceptable rate of depre-
ciation, or both. The MIS should be able to pro-
duce a fixed asset register at any time showing
the net book value of each asset and, if necessary,
additional information including the purchase
price, supplier name and location, date of pur-
chase, and depreciation rate and term. Ideally,
the MIS will automatically apply the depreciation
expense as part of the end-of-month process.
Otherwise this can be tracked in a spreadsheet
and manually posted to the accounting module
monthly.
Regulations may differ on the issue of cash-
based accounting versus an accrual system but it is
important to ensure that the MFI is in compliance.
A shift of accounting treatment from cash-based to
accrual (or the reverse) can pose a challenge and
should be carefully analyzed. For example, a shift
to accrual-based accounting may introduce issues
about reversals after a certain period on a nonper-
forming loan. Before shifting accounting proce-
dures, the MFI must ensure the MIS is capable of
either identifying such reversals or preferably
automating them. 
Tax implications may arise if interest income is
accounted for on a cash basis. As part of the end-of-
year process, the MFI may be required to accrue
interest income for a certain period before calculat-
ing taxes due. This requires the ability to identify
the interest portion of payments due for a specified
period, which may not be straightforward depend-
ing on the way the system tracks payments (as
principle only or principle plus interest).
Value added taxes (VAT) may also be applicable
in some countries. If so, the system must be capable
of automatically tracking VAT due from customers
based on interest income or other fees. In instances
in which interest is accrued, VAT may need to be
accrued as well because VAT is what is payable to
the authorities, rather than the actual amounts
received from the customer. 
Reporting
Regulatory reporting requirements generally affect
all elements of the MIS. Reporting content and
frequency may vary but generally comprise
liquidity, capital adequacy, portfolio quality, finan-
cial position (balance sheet, income statement,
cash flow statement), loans extended to insiders,
and loan loss provisions. Frequency ranges from
daily or weekly to quarterly. Late submission of
reports may carry financial penalties for the MFI as
would inaccurate reporting. Therefore, establish-
ing the necessary business processes and maximiz-
ing alignment of the MIS with these processes 
is critical. See chapter 10, Financial Management,
for more discussion on regulatory reporting
requirements. 
The ability of an MFI to meet regulatory report-
ing requirements is likely to be assessed as part of
the application for an operating license, adding fur-
ther importance to this area. Therefore, the MFI
must identify all the data fields and reporting for-
mats up front to ensure the application selected can
meet the requirements or, alternatively, that the
vendor (as a condition of the contract) can provide
the reports or the capability to develop the reports
going forward.
In identifying the reporting requirements, the
MFI should confirm that it clearly understands
the regulatory requirements and, of critical
importance, that guidelines have been finalized
by the regulatory body before commencing MIS
changes. Once clarified, each required data ele-
ment needs to be compared with those currently
available in the system. If the required data is not
currently collected, a format for collection will
need to be designed and a decision made about
what should be manual or automated. The vol-
umes of data and the cost of collection will assist
with this decision-making process, as will a dis-
cussion of the way in which information will be
used. For example, reporting on clients’ eco-
nomic activity for sector-based risk analysis will
require a high volume of data and therefore may
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justify automation. In contrast, loans extended to
insiders will generally be low volume and can be
tracked using a simple spreadsheet. 
Once mechanisms of data collection have been
identified, the way in which the information will be
processed and with what frequency must be deter-
mined. This includes consolidation of data from
branches and any required calculations such as com-
putation of capital adequacy. Clear responsibility for
these processes needs to be established and may
require cooperation from multiple departments
including IT, branch staff, and head office. Despite
these multiple responsibilities, one person should
be responsible for overseeing the processes and for
ensuring that reports are complete, accurate, and
submitted on time. Table 11.4 outlines the process
necessary to design reports to meet regulatory
requirements.
Reports submitted to the regulator will generally
need to be signed by the chief executive officer or
the most senior accountant (or both), which implies
that availability of these key people will need to be
confirmed in advance of each submission. The
method of submission may also have implications.
If electronic submission is permitted, security meas-
ures such as electronic signatures may need to be
established. 
Submission of reports can give rise to ad hoc
data requests from regulators, who may wish to
investigate some element of a report in more detail.
The nature and frequency of these requests cannot
be predicted, so the MFI must have reliable access
to reporting and database skills that can be
promptly applied to these requests. 
Efficient systems to collect, collate, process, and
submit reporting information will reduce the risk of
Table 11.4 Design Process for Reporting
Task Steps
Study the reporting requirements as set out in the law and its implementing regulations;
review loan agreements, memoranda of understanding, and contracts with stakeholders to
determine reporting requirements.
Conduct staff interviews and site visits to assess what reports are currently generated,
when they are generated, and how they are used.
Draw up an external reporting compliance policy detailing a framework specifying who
must produce what reports and when. Present the framework to the key staff responsible
for its implementation.
Draw up an internal reporting compliance policy, which should include recommended
changes to internal reporting, its policies, and its procedures to clarify who must produce
what reports and when. Establish a framework for action and monitoring once reports are
produced and distributed. Present the policy to the key staff responsible.
Draw up a matrix of
• mandatory external reports that the organization must produce once it is licensed; and
• currently produced internal reports, who receives them, and when, and the value that
they add or do not add.
Meet with the central bank to review the proposed reporting framework and ensure that the
system, once modified as proposed, will meet all the requirements.
Work with IT department to ensure that the information systems are in place to generate
the mandatory reports and the reports are being produced and provided to the appropriate
personnel. Identify gaps where the appropriate reports do not exist or where the necessary
data are not collected and recommend solutions to fill gaps and implement.
Train staff involved in implementation of the internal reporting policy and framework.
Source: Adapted from Enlaiten Ltd., from O’Keeffe and Frederick (2004).
Information gathering
External reporting policies 
Internal reporting policies
Reporting matrices
Meet with regulators
MIS gap analysis
Implementation
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missing deadlines or submitting inaccurate reports.
All processes should be formally tested to identify
any issues and, where applicable, backup procedures
should be designed to ensure that loss of commu-
nication links, for example, does not jeopardize
the ability of the MFI to comply. In addition, new
reporting requirements may emerge over time and
systems development will have to incorporate
these changes. If a development effort must be
launched each time new reports are required, or
changes to existing reports evolve, how best to
carry out these changes, either in house or through
requests to the software supplier, must be deter-
mined. The latter option requires a responsive sup-
plier that can rapidly turn around such requests.
Ideally, with an integrated MIS, the MFI should
have the capability to generate new reports through
a user-friendly interface and the necessary in-house
skills.
Operations requirements and regulatory require-
ments. Operational and management reporting
requirements must be carefully balanced with those
of the regulatory body. Information key to the
organization, including operations, management
and the board, must remain available even while
changes are implemented to effect transformation.
Identification of critical management reports and
analysis of the data that make up these reports
will help to ensure the availability of information.
Table 11.5 outlines the process for meeting report-
ing requirements.
Expanding Outreach Services and Delivery
Channel Technology
Transforming MFIs are often keen to examine and
revise delivery channels to improve their outreach.
Numerous initiatives emerging in the microfinance
sector demonstrate how technology can help MFIs
expand outreach and improve their services. Such
upfront delivery channel options include ATMs or
point-of-sale networks (for transactions), handheld
computers (for remote data capture), smart cards
(for off-line transactions and identification), bio-
metrics (for authentication), and interactive voice
response (for client access to account information)
to name just a few. Each of these technologies has
effects on the MIS. 
Four main issues need to be considered with any
delivery channel initiative: MIS stability, level of
integration, information processing and security,
and technology standards of the targeted delivery
channel. In addition, MFIs must consider not only
the increased outreach and additional convenience
afforded to clients but also the timing and
sequencing, and the capital and effort required to
launch these initiatives successfully. Taking on too
many large-scale changes simultaneously, particu-
larly during the transformation process, is risky,
overwhelming, and challenging for staff to man-
age. The IT task force is responsible for prioritizing
such initiatives and allocating funding and human
resources to ensure success and business value
added for each initiative.
First, and perhaps most important, the stability
of the MIS should be prioritized over new initia-
tives. If weaknesses are present in the existing sys-
tem, the introduction of new services with asso-
ciated new technologies and processes will probably
add further instability to the system, jeopardizing
both the MIS and the success of the new services.
The stability of the system should be assessed from
the perspective of both management and users, and
from a technological standpoint. Only if all stake-
holders can verify that the system is meeting their
information requirements and can vouch for the
capacity of the system and organization to absorb
the change associated with a new initiative, should
new projects be considered feasible. 
The second consideration involves determining
exactly how a new technology will interface with
the existing or revised MIS. Such an interface typi-
cally involves a mechanism to transfer data from one
application to another, for example, from devices
such as handheld computers or ATMs to the main
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system, and possibly both ways. In designing an
interface, or analyzing an MIS system that possesses
an interface, alternatives for communications, secu-
rity, and efficiency of the transfer process must be
explored. If the internal MIS application requires
development of a connector or interface, responsi-
bility for this development must be clearly estab-
lished. It cannot be assumed that the MIS software
Table 11.5 Process for Meeting Reporting Requirements
Management information Regulatory reporting and other 
Task requirements stakeholder information requirements
Needs assessment
and agreement
Analysis
Implementation
process flow and
procedures
Review and 
evaluation
Periodic audits
Reports
Documentation of all management information
needs including the required frequency of 
production of reports
Agreement internally on the meaning of
common terms
Agreement of departments responsible for 
producing particular information
Agreement of a policy on data integrity and
completeness
Confirm that all data required can be captured
in an appropriate and affordable manner
Define and agree on report layouts for
programmer to implement
Define access rights for the various reports
Determine the skill level required of the staff
who produce the reports
Capture test data for input into the system
Review reports produced from the test data
Agree and make amendments needed for
customization of system
Test system-produced reports after 
customization
Write guidelines for production of the system-
produced reports
Coordinate meetings to review and accept
system-produced reports and their accompany-
ing guidelines
Internal Audit department to review the 
integrity of reports on a periodic basis
Produce matrix of internal reports with due
dates and officers responsible
Calendar prompting for reports to be produced
and submitted 
Information on late submissions
Documentation of reports required, including
their formats and due dates
Definition of terms
Guidelines on completion of reports
Agreement of departments responsible for 
producing particular information
Confirm that all data required can be captured in
an appropriate and efficient manner; if not,
determine the process to be used to obtain the
information at a future date.
Determine the skill level required of the staff 
producing reports.
Work with a programmer to ensure defined
reports are produced by the system.
Capture test data for input into the system.
Review reports produced from the test data.
Agree and make amendments to report layouts.
Define any system gaps and need for
customization of system.
Test system-produced reports after customization.
Coordinate meetings to review and accept
system-produced reports and their accompanying
guidelines.
Have internal audit department review the
integrity of reports on a periodic basis.
Produce matrix of regulatory reports with due
dates and officers responsible.
Produce matrix of external reports with due dates
and officers responsible.
Have calendar prompting for reports to be
produced and submitted.
Supply information on late submissions.
Source: Adapted from Enlaiten Ltd., from O’Keeffe and Frederick (2004).
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provider will be willing, or able, to build the inter-
operability between the two technologies. At the
same time, limitations on access to source code may
prevent other programmers from building the
interface. At a minimum, MFIs should look to use
applications that follow standard protocols for data
transfer, or off-the-shelf commercial applications
should be given priority over proprietary options.
Third, MIS’s ability to process and track transac-
tions captured through new delivery channels needs
to be considered. New services present manage-
ment with an opportunity to better understand
clients through a new source of information. Thus,
delivery channel technology will affect not just the
input requirements of the MIS but also the pro-
cessing and output as well as security requirements.
Ideally, the MIS not only interfaces with e-banking
solutions but also incorporates the information
from these sources as part of the overall information
available to management to support its decisions.
Finally, the technology standards of the new
delivery channel should be considered. For exam-
ple, many countries have existing arrangements
to share delivery channel infrastructure amongst
member institutions—commonly called switching
networks. The networks allow members’ clients to
transact via all devices (ATMs or POSs) on the net-
work, regardless of which member owns the device.
The device owner collects a small fee (called the
interchange fee) for each transaction performed by
another institution’s client. Typically these delivery
channels require clients to use a bank card (mag-
netic stripe or smart card) to gain access. By joining
the network and adopting the same card specifica-
tions as the other switched network members an
MFI can instantly give its members broad access to
a delivery channel that it would not normally be
able to afford on its own. Even in countries where
no switching network exists, MFIs can still con-
sider “white label” bank card arrangements, where-
by an institution with an existing investment in
infrastructure agrees to, for a fee, issue cards and
process transactions on their access points (ATMs
or POS devices) for the benefit of the MFI’s clients.
The bank cards can be labelled on the front with
the MFI’s logo. These type of shared infrastructure
arrangements are only possible if compatible tech-
nology standards are selected for the delivery
channel.
Infrastructure
Transforming MFIs recognize the importance of
a solid infrastructure platform designed to sup-
port both growth and change. Systems already
under strain cannot be expected to cope with
increasing numbers of transactions, more com-
plex data, and increasing communications
requirements arising from regulatory reporting.
An institution needs to have confidence in both
the application software used as well as the hard-
ware, communications, and other infrastructure
required to run the MIS application. This confi-
dence is characterized by system accuracy, trust by
users in that accuracy, user-friendliness of the sys-
tem, and ease of information retrieval to support
daily operations.
Hardware
If new software has been selected to support trans-
formation to a deposit-taking institution, generally
hardware requirements then need to be identified
and new hardware procured and installed, prefer-
ably acting on recommendations of the software
supplier. Alternatively, if the existing software is to
be retained, the hardware will need to be assessed
for its capacity to support future levels of activity
(within the context of new architecture design,
initial use, and replacement plan). Analysis of the
existing system should identify any hardware issues
currently limiting the system and if feasible, systems
load testing should be carried out to observe the
way in which systems cope with increasing demands
and to identify maximum capacity. 
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Information Communications Technology 
Transformation places new demands on the MIS’s
ability to centralize information from different
operating locations. Regulatory reporting require-
ments and liquidity management compel the head
office to be aware of the position and performance
of the MFI’s branches with greater frequency and
reliability. The current frequency of physical trans-
fer of data may no longer be sufficient, prompting
MFIs to establish a wide area network (WAN) that
permits the electronic transfer of data between two
or more locations. Various communication alterna-
tives can support setting up a WAN. Determining
which is most suitable for the MFI requires balanc-
ing factors such as cost, transmission speed, and
reliability. Other factors beyond regulatory require-
ments drive decisions (and justify the cost of a
WAN) to centralize control of data—increased data
integrity, better risk management (increased secu-
rity, decreased fraud), branchless banking, version
control, and easier customer information access.
WANs leverage IT resources and facilitate easier
analysis of data for new product development, mar-
keting, and strategic planning. A WAN also enables
better communications across a geographically
dispersed staff, easier coordination scheduling, eas-
ier information dissemination, alternative training
options, better virtual project management, and
generally better staff monitoring and institutional
oversight. Each of these drivers must be considered
when designing the new technology infrastructure. 
Availability of telecommunications alternatives
will vary considerably from one country to the next
and are constantly changing as new technologies
emerge and regulations governing their use change.
Some of the typical alternatives include dial-up,
leased line (copper or fiber optics), wireless, and
satellite. Each MFI will need to investigate which
alternatives are available to them and then rate
them according to reliability, speed, and cost. Addi-
tional considerations include interoperability with
existing and planned hardware and software appli-
cations, availability of support (in-house versus
external), supplier reputation and general customer
service, and the cost of backup strategies. A short
list of vendors should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate their services so that they can be
tested, especially where the technology or service is
relatively new. 
Communications requirements need to keep in
mind both current and future operations and serv-
ices to ensure the communications infrastructure is
flexible enough to cope with both change and
growth. Given the importance of communications
and the costs of alternatives, the selection of a com-
munications supplier or telecommunications alter-
native should follow the same structured decision-
making process as the software selection process.
Requirements must be analyzed and alternatives
identified. The decision should be based on an
established set of criteria including strengths, weak-
nesses, and implementation requirements, to ensure
that the connection will operate as intended. Senior
management, with input from technical experts and
the IT task force, should be heavily involved in the
decision-making process. 
Power
When upgrading systems during transformation,
the availability and quality of power supplies must
be considered. Protection against power surges can
be achieved either through use of a universal power
supply (UPS) or a stabilizer attached to the main
power supply. Although both protect against unsta-
ble power supply, only the UPS will provide backup
power in the event of full failure. Generators or bat-
tery-powered inverters could also supply backup
power. Of all these options, only the inverter will
ensure that low levels of power will be supple-
mented. Each of the options has associated costs
that need to be weighed against the possibility of
losing data or losing access to real-time data if there
are power outages.
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MIS Security
Security consists of measures taken to protect the
MIS, both physically and logically, from any event
that may compromise the integrity of the informa-
tion produced by the system, or may contribute to
the unavailability of the system. This includes pro-
tection against unauthorized access, system misuse,
and physical or software related failures. Protecting
the technological and information assets that make
up the MIS is an ongoing concern for those respon-
sible for IT. Transformation, however, may high-
light security issues from the perspective of both
regulators and potential investors. 
MIS Security Policy
A transforming MFI should develop a comprehen-
sive IT security policy outlining its policies and
procedures. The IT security policy should identify
risks to the systems and provide an analysis of the
likelihood of occurrence and impact on systems.
Risks include active threats that arise from inten-
tional misuse of the system, and passive threats such
as system faults or natural disasters. Policies and
procedures should demonstrate the controls to mit-
igate the likelihood or impact of these risks. Finally,
a security log should be kept to show how the secu-
rity policy has been implemented and updated over
time to address changes to the security environ-
ment. Any new policies should be reflected in the
document.
Control Environment
An MIS can be controlled by a combination of appli-
cation controls and general controls, both of which
seek to limit the likelihood or impact of breaches in
security. 
Application-based controls are set by and depend
on the features and programming of the MIS.
Because application controls are software-specific
they may be beyond the MFI’s ability to design but
should be analyzed when assessing the security fea-
tures of an MIS. Ideally, application controls should
cover data input, processing, and output, and
include procedures such as error handling, input
validation, and control totals. Standard feature
requirements for any MIS application include track-
ing every user on the system with a user-defined
profile, transaction type, date and time stamps, as
well as restrictions. Profiles should be easily estab-
lished by role (loan officer, teller, branch manager)
as well as by feature (loan disbursements, new appli-
cations, savings account look-up). The application
should also include basic utilities and restrictions to
ensure proper administration of and access to the
application and the corresponding database. Only
users with high-level clearance should be author-
ized to access these capabilities.
General controls consist of hardware, software,
and manual procedures that create a control envi-
ronment. Table 11.6 lists some common general
controls used by MFIs.
Human Resources Implications 
Many of the issues discussed in this chapter require
an MFI to have sufficient access to the appropriate
IT resources. The MFI must ensure that the cor-
rect mix of technical, management, business, and
interpersonal skills are held by those charged with
responsibility for the MIS. Supporting hardware,
software, and MIS users can be a time-consuming
task requiring a mix of skills. Increasing the use of
technology throughout the MFI will have a con-
current effect on the levels of support required.
Whether support is provided by an in-house IT
department, or contracted to a third party, an effi-
cient ratio of support personnel to users should be
maintained. This ratio will be influenced by the
extent of the users’ technical experience but gener-
ally can be determined through analysis of support
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calls received. A database of support calls can assist
with the support function, enabling prompt resolu-
tion of calls through identification of common fixes
and known issues. 
Additionally, transformation puts pressure on
those in leadership roles in IT, because of demands
to take advantage of technological alternatives to
help the MFI achieve its goals. MFIs that have
experienced gradual adoption of IT may need to
take stock of available resources to ensure that the
capacity of the MIS to support and grow with the
organization is not jeopardized by a lack of appro-
priate skills. Leveraging consultants for discrete
tasks, using available local support services when
required, and using application support services are
alternatives to building internal capacity. Still, pro-
viding professional development opportunities for
technical staff will be critical for keeping pace with
the rapid changes in technology and staff desire to
keep skills up to date. 
IT Staff Issues
The ability of an MFI to attract IT staff will depend
on the market availability of IT professionals as well
as competition for these skills from other employ-
ers. Competing with private sector salaries may be
beyond the means of many MFIs but some effort to
recognize the competing salary scale may help both
attract and retain staff. In many instances, IT
departments suffer from high staff turnover.
Although the loss of any experienced staff can be
detrimental to an MFI, loss of an experienced IT
staff member can leave the organization at serious
risk, particularly if systems are not formally docu-
mented. Ensuring that MIS responsibility and
knowledge is managed to avoid over-dependency
on a limited number of staff members, as well as
ensuring systems are well documented, can help to
protect against such risk. 
Providing technical training to employees of
the MFI is a major responsibility for the MIS
department, particularly as the MFI goes through
transformation. In addition, however, senior man-
agement and business unit managers should fully
understand the system and ensure that its ability
to manage is not compromised by a lack of tech-
nical comprehension. Management training will
help ensure that ownership of the MIS lies with
those that depend on its information, namely
Table 11.6 Typical General Controls
Type of control Description Sample controls
Physical
Logical
Human
Implementation
Operational
Source: O’Keeffe and Frederick (2004, p. 29).
Protects against physical hazards and
unauthorized physical access to systems
Protects against unauthorized access 
to systems
Protects against unintentional damage
resulting from user actions
Protects against exposing the system to
additional risk as a result of systems
development
Protects against failure of systems and
security measures
Restricted access to key hardware and to
storage locations; protection from 
hazards; fire extinguishers, and power 
surge protection
Network and database security including
passwords and access controls, encryption
during data transfer, and audit trail
Training, organizational culture fostering
security
Formal change control procedures, testing,
documentation to support changes
Routine systems maintenance and monitor-
ing, data backups, disaster recovery
planning, and IT Internal Audit
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management. Perhaps the most important goal of
investing in management technical training is to
ensure that technology becomes firmly inte-
grated in the organization recognizing the ways
in which IT can help accomplish existing busi-
ness goals and objectives as well as identify new
opportunities. 
Technical training needs are likely to be continu-
ally in demand and constantly evolving, and there-
fore should be addressed as part of the human
resources (HR) training function. Depending on
the extent and frequency of training courses, train-
ers may be outsourced or identified from existing
IT staff. If internal staff is used, care must be taken
to ensure that those with technical understanding
also have the necessary skills for imparting this
knowledge to others. It should not be assumed that
all IT workers make effective trainers. 
HR Information Systems
In light of expanding staff numbers, transformation
may be an opportunity to equip HR departments
with a system for personnel records, if such systems
do not already exist. Whether an off-the-shelf appli-
cation or developed in house, a personnel records
system should provide the necessary functionality to
track and manage personnel, and include compe-
tency profiles, performance history, training, salary,
benefits, and personal information. Additionally,
payroll functionality should be available either as
part of the HR information system or through the
MIS itself.
Box 11.6 presents some of the lessons learned
from MIS upgrade projects during MFI transfor-
mations in Uganda.
Annex 11D provides a summary checklist of MIS
considerations for use by transforming MFIs.
Box 11.6 Lessons Learned in Uganda
Key lessons learned through the process of trans-
formation related to MIS in Uganda include the
following:
• Ensure all senior management own and lead the
decision-making process for the MIS upgrade ini-
tiative. The organization as a whole must buy
into the vision for the MIS and not view it as an
IT project. All costs must be sufficiently priori-
tized and evaluated to determine the economic
value added for the investment.
• Clearly and thoroughly document all phases in
the MIS upgrade process, for both internal and
external purposes.
• Establish clear requirements for the MIS before
and after transformation. This should be
achieved through consultation with all stake-
holders and consider both short- and long-term
impacts of transformation.
• Ensure central bank guidelines are finalized
before starting any software modifications.
Definitions of terms used within regulations
should be clarified with the regulators to avoid
any errors during interpretation.
• Map out and plan the activities required for an
MIS upgrade project to help ensure that the
transformation process is not held up by any
“forgotten” requirements and that management
is aware of the extent of work required to trans-
form the MIS. 
• Do not underestimate the time and resources
required to prepare IT and MIS documentation.
Multiple inputs and revisions may be required if
documentation raises policy issues that must be
addressed at the organizational level. 
• Do not underestimate the timing necessary for
arranging suitable housing for hardware, partic-
ularly when teller services are being established.
Renovations, stabilizing electrical sources, and
networking involve reliance on external sup-
pliers that may adversely affect the MIS trans-
formation plan; therefore, it is critical to have
(Continues on the following page.)
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Box 11.6 Lessons Learned in Uganda (Continued)
contingency plans and to initiate these steps as
soon as possible. 
• Consider trends in telecommunications evolu-
tion and affordability when designing systems so
that even if not currently feasible, systems imple-
mented will not limit the flexibility to incorporate
additional connectivity as it becomes affordable. 
• Ensure that access to a range of IT skills is avail-
able either in house or through a reliable out-
sourcing arrangement. Skills should include a mix
of technical specialists, business analysts, tech-
nical trainers, and management with an overall
vision for the role of technology in the MFI.
• Dependence on software suppliers to make con-
tinual customization changes can slow down the
MIS transformation process considerably. Avail-
ability of programming capacity in house can
help MFIs reduce such dependencies and is espe-
cially recommended for the report development
function. 
• Formalization of systems to support IT capabili-
ties and services should be included as part
of MIS transformation. This includes hardware
deployment, user support, systems security, IT
audit, and systems change control.
• Flexibility and scalability of the MIS software are
two of the most important features to address
transformation needs. 
Source: O’Keeffe and Frederick (2004, p. 35).
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Annex 11A Sample Requirements
Document 
This sample requirements document was con-
tributed by Samuel Richard Mutebi, FRIENDS’
Consultant, May 2006.
To transform into a regulated deposit-taking
institution, MFI A needs to upgrade its MIS to
efficiently meet the needs of its growing client
base and to comply with regulatory requirements.
This document contains an assessment of the exist-
ing management information system (MIS) and
provides specifications for a new system to meet
MFI A’s information processing, monitoring, and
regulatory requirements. 
Current Management Information System
MFI A currently operates with an ad hoc comput-
erized system. Loan tracking is performed manu-
ally. Reports are manually compiled using MS
Excel at the head office. MFI A has off-the-shelf
accounting software for accounting operations,
which is run in parallel with the manual system. All
branches are connected to cellular telephones for
communications.
Accounting system. The system handles all account-
ing functions by tracking financial and nonfinancial
transactions, handles budgeting, and generates
scheduled and ad hoc reports as well as other doc-
uments. The system is designed in modules with the
general ledger as the central accounting module for
summarizing and posting accounting transactions.
Modules can be purchased separately. 
Modules include the following:
• General ledger
• Accounts payable
• Purchasing
• Order processing
• Project controller
• Account receivable
• Inventory
• Cash manager
• Payroll
Security management and control. The computer
is in the accounts department and the accounting
software has the following security features:
• Access to the system is controlled by user defin-
able password.
• Categories of users are assigned by specific job
description, which enhances internal controls.
• A password protection feature allows division of
responsibility.
• An audit trail shows transaction details and the
user who completed the posting.
Database management system. MFI A’s system is
hosted on a Microsoft SQL server database man-
agement system.
Hardware. The system is running on a stand-alone
personal computer (PC) with 128 MB RAM, 2 G
HDD, and CD drive. Backups are stored on 650 MB
CD. There is one universal power supply (UPS) and
a LaserJet 2100 printer.
Procedures and documentation. Easy and detailed
user and operations manuals are available for refer-
ence. However, they are not updated to incorporate
site modifications and enhancements.
MIS to Be Implemented
MFI A will purchase an appropriate banking system
to handle loans, savings deposits, and other financial
products. Improving the system will involve migrat-
ing the accounting system to a local area network
(LAN) and abandoning the manual system.
Software. The banking system to be purchased will
be installed in branches and other units responsible
for providing financial services to clients. A database
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program and report writing tool will be installed at
head office to host and analyze data from all the
branches and units. It will generate consolidated
reports for management, regulators, and other
authorized stakeholders.
The system to be procured should meet the
specifications outlined below in addition to other
functional features.
Loans
• Process both individual and group loans.
• Keep track of repeated loans.
• Handle up to 100,000 accounts.
• Define loan code to identify loans with same
characteristics (for example, interest rate, term)
within a particular loan product.
• Allow amortizations on weekly, monthly, quar-
terly, and annual basis.
• Control minimum and maximum loan
disbursement.
• Allow variable grace periods.
• Allow flexible interest days in a year.
• Calculate fees, charges, and penalties.
• Allow flexibility in defining minimum and maxi-
mum terms.
• Allow both cash and accrual treatment of income.
• Allow both fixed and floating rates and flat and
declining-balance interest calculation methods.
• Allow flexibility in accruing interest with respect
to date.
• Allow flexibility in posting interest with respect
to date.
• Provide ability to fix interest rate at both product
and account level.
• Allow biometric verification.
Savings and Term Deposits
• Handle both voluntary and compulsory savings.
• Have account opening minimum amount.
• Have a possibility of authorized overriding of the
above minimum amount.
• Allow joint accounts.
• Observe processing of fees and other charges.
• Have a number of transactions permitted in a
given period.
• Prepare standing orders and instructions.
• Have a minimum and maximum interest-earning
balance.
• Use tiered interest.
• Have variable interest days in a year.
• Have flexibility accrued in interest.
• Provide early withdrawal penalty.
• Allow flexibility on interest posting date.
• Use photo and signature verification.
• Have biometric verification.
Customer Information
• Individual, individuals in a group, and group 
• Nonperson entities
• Personal, home, and business information
• Memo field to capture complementary informa-
tion not handled in standard fields
• Client status (normal, delinquent)
• Group information
• Modification of client information
• Ability to delete client information with
authorization
Collateral
• Allow both physical and financial assets.
• Record value of security, valuation date, and
expiry date.
• Provide description of the security.
Input and processing
• Real-time transaction processing
• Both single and batch data entry
• Front- and back-office facilities
• Cash and check deposits
• Accept other bills
• Interaccount transfer
• Event-triggered transactions (penalties)
• Periodic computer-generated transactions
(interest)
Inquiries
• Loan balance (principal, interest, and charges)
• Overdue payments (principal, interest, and
charges)
• Loan statement
• Loan repayments
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• Loans financial data
• Loans nonfinancial data
• Collateral
• Savings balance
• Client information
• Credit history
Reports
• Listing of loans
• Collection report 
• Delinquency report
• Portfolio at risk report
• Performance report by credit officer
• Client’s status report 
• Portfolio at risk by aging analysis and business
activity
• Loans profile by gender
• Ad hoc report facility
Security management and control
• Access to the system controlled by definable
password
• User groups that access only those menus rele-
vant to their functions and responsibilities
• Dual control on key transactions
• Change of password at any time
• Detailed audit trail
• Built-in backup procedures
Infrastructure and hardware
Database
Database should be a relational open database man-
agement system. Servers and client PCs together
with the necessary computer accessories and electri-
cal equipment will be procured to support the new
software. 
Architecture
The branches will have LANs of about five PCs
depending on the size of business and volume of
work. The banking system will be installed on those
LANs in a decentralized environment. The integra-
tion between the new banking system and the
accounting system residing on the head office LAN
will be through a flat file. Both systems will be
uploaded to the database at head office periodically. 
Communication
The intention is to use wires access point at head
office. Cellular data units will be used periodically
to transfer data from branches to the head office via
an Internet service provider (ISP). Transfer of data
and reports from branches to head office will be
through e-mail, file transfer protocol, and in excep-
tional cases, diskettes and hard copies.
Electrical Installation
The electrical system will be reinstalled to match
computer network requirements. Appropriate uni-
versal power supply (UPS) will be used to ensure
clean power supply. Generators will be installed in
branches and head office to avoid disruption in
operations from power failure.
Budget
The estimated total budget is approximately
U.S.$600,000. 
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Annex 11B Sample Terms of
Reference: MIS Assessment and
Software Selection
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and so forth.
Objectives
MFI A understands that its current management
information systems (MIS) are inadequate to meet
regulatory requirements and to support operations
as a deposit-taking financial intermediary. It believes
that improving its MIS is key to receiving its license
to operate as a deposit-taking intermediary.
Phase I: Needs Analysis
The objective of this assessment is to review MFI
A’s institutional needs for an information system
and use information elicited from the institution
to prioritize its information technology (IT)
requirements. Members of staff from the IT and
operations departments will be available to work as
members of the Needs Analysis team and assist in
conducting an inventory of the institution’s current
information systems.
Tasks
• Assess information flows: using a mix of inter-
views, observation, and review of documenta-
tion, assess the information flows within the
institution and the workflows that result in the
capture and use of information. 
• Compare institutional documents with observed
practice: Determine and document any gaps
between actual observed processes and the insti-
tutional policies and procedures manual cur-
rently in place. 
• Investigate technical and budgetary constraints:
Work closely with MFI A’s IT and finance
managers to gain a deep understanding of the
institution’s current and future technology envi-
ronment as a licensed institution, as well as the
budgetary implications for the implementation
of the recommendations. 
• Prioritize initial requirements and features:
Using a workshop format, work with staff repre-
sentatives to categorize the list of initial require-
ments and define a list of essential, useful, and
optional features for an ideal information system. 
Deliverables. A Needs Analysis report outlining
institutional needs is the main deliverable, and it
should include the following:
• Summary of current processes with descriptions 
• Summary of reports used or required 
• Proposed improvements and future needs,
including meeting regulatory reporting
requirements
• System requirements and technical environment 
• Draft budget including hardware, software, im-
plementation costs, and recurring annual costs 
Phase II: Software Evaluation 
The objective of this evaluation is to assess the qual-
ity and suitability of the current software application
for MFI A’s operations and reporting requirements.
Tasks
• Review application’s functionality: Thoroughly
investigate the significant features of the software
and investigate any deficiencies in its operations.
Drawing on knowledge of the functionality avail-
able in commercial microfinance packages tar-
geted for institutions similar to MFI A, develop a
comparative matrix of functionality. This matrix
should indicate commonly available features that
are either missing or poorly implemented in the
current software, and highlight any functionality
that is well-designed and implemented.
• Assess application design: Assess the applica-
tion design and determine whether the soft-
ware design, the technological platform, and
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development tools conform to current and
emerging standards. 
• Conduct user satisfaction interviews: Conduct a
series of interviews with current users to deter-
mine their levels of satisfaction with the applica-
tion, in particular the user interface and reports
produced. 
• Review the technical support process: Investigate
existing procedures for the resolution of software
bugs, the procedures for incorporating new
functionality, and the skills of the teams respon-
sible for both tasks. 
• Review documentation: Obtain copies of all doc-
umentation available for different categories of
users (such as user manuals, system administra-
tion manuals, and online help) and assess their
quality and suitability. 
• Assess future direction: Evaluate various options
for the future direction of the software, including
continued internal development and support of
the current application, or shift to an off-the-shelf
package.
Deliverables. A Software Evaluation report will
be the main deliverable, and should include the
following: 
• A list of the main features of the software appli-
cation, indicating which work well and which are
inadequate for the institution’s needs as a regu-
lated MFI 
• A list of key features that are missing 
• A summary of user interviews, indicating overall
level of satisfaction 
• An assessment of the quality of the software
design and technical support process 
• Recommendation for future direction for the
application 
Phase III: Software Selection 
The objective of phase III is to enable MFI A to
evaluate and select software that will best suit its
needs and requirements. 
Tasks
• Ensure needs analysis is complete: Assist MFI A in
evaluating and thoroughly understanding pres-
ent and future needs ensuring that a needs analy-
sis report with the appropriate level of detail
exists.
• Construct a short list of possible vendors: Using
the list of available vendors from the CGAP Web
site or other sources, identify three vendors who
are able to meet MFI A’s requirements. Create a
detailed questionnaire and contact selected ven-
dors to obtain information about the capabilities
of their products. 
• Review vendor information: Review informa-
tion received from vendors and assess the fit
of the software functionality against MFI A’s
institutional requirements, using a framework
structure such as that available on CGAP’s Web
site.
• Recommend one supplier: Conduct further due
diligence to assist MFI A in narrowing the choice
down to one vendor; thoroughly review the cost
elements of the implementation proposal, high-
light any areas of hidden costs, and determine a
realistic budget for the implementation. Ensure
the services offered under the implementation
are comprehensive and appropriate. This may
require further in-depth research on the prod-
ucts and vendors, reviewing a demonstration
version, and contacting current clients of each
product. 
Deliverables. There are three deliverables required
for phase III:
• Request for Information: a detailed question-
naire for short-listed vendors to complete
• Software comparison matrix document with
summary of product functionality presented in a
format that allows for easy comparison 
• A recommendation for one selected vendor’s
proposal, listing proposed services to be pro-
vided, with the associated costs 
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Optional deliverable: If time permits, assist MFI A in
preparing a proposal for donor or investor funding
to cover the costs of implementation of consultant
recommendations, further consulting services, or
procurement of software and hardware. 
Qualifications
• Degree in information technology or related
field
• At least five years of experience as an information
technology manager for a commercial bank or
microfinance institution
• International consulting experience in manage-
ment information systems
Level of Effort
It is estimated this assignment will take up to
50 days to complete.
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Annex 11C Sample Terms of
Reference: Advisory Services on
Implementation of MIS Upgrade 
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and so forth.
Objectives
To achieve and maintain a license as a deposit-
taking financial intermediary, MFI A must demon-
strate that it prepares and maintains adequate books
of accounts, records, computer systems, and other
nonfinancial records that show a true state of affairs,
and that comply with international accounting stan-
dards. The adequacy of this MIS will need to be
approved by MFI A’s External Auditor, and veri-
fied by the regulator through on-site and off-site
inspections.
MFI A has determined it needs to upgrade its MIS
to meet the requirements as a regulated deposit-
taking institution. The objective of this consultancy is
to assist and advise MFI A in the upgrade process. 
Tasks
The consultant will work with the in-house MIS
department headed by the MIS manager. The tasks
outlined below will be implemented in two parts.
The first part is estimated to take 20 days and will
consist of the following tasks:
• Develop a transition plan from the current work-
ing environment to the new environment with
due consideration for MFI A’s resources, tech-
nology, and caliber of staff. 
• Work with the vendor to develop an implemen-
tation plan for installing, testing, and rolling out
the new software systemwide.
• According to the new system’s requirements,
ensure that the data in the old systems are able to
transfer to the new system. Provide MFI A’s MIS
manager the necessary data transfer risk informa-
tion so the latter is able to see inconsistencies or
gaps in the data, as well as oversee the correction
of the data so that a complete, “clean” dataset is
available for migration.
• Assess readiness of test sites (hardware, commu-
nications, electricity, and the like).
• Review the vendor’s training plan to ensure that
staff receive the appropriate training.
• Ensure that the MIS department has the full
capacity to oversee the migration of data to the
new system so that the test site becomes fully
operational. The old systems should continue to
operate in parallel to provide a foundation for
evaluating the output of the new system and for
fall-back purposes.
• Provide the MIS department the technical capac-
ity to test user acceptance at the pilot site(s). 
• Assess vendor’s user manual for completeness
and understandability.
• Provide the MIS department information on
proper rollout of the system to all branches.
The second part, to be done four months after
the commencement of system installation, is esti-
mated to take 10 days and will consist of the fol-
lowing tasks:
• Compare the output from the new system to
that of the old system. Evaluate the new system.
If acceptable, recommend to MFI A that it cease
processing on the old system.
• Conduct system audit to determine full compli-
ance of the new MIS with law and regulations. If
there are gaps, work with the vendor and MFI
A’s MIS department to resolve the gaps. Where
appropriate, request modifications of the system.
Deliverables
• Transition plan
• Implementation plan for installing, testing, and
rolling out the new software systemwide
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• Technical guideline for the MIS department to
oversee data migration and data transfer risk
information
• Preparation of the test sites
• Appraisal of vendor’s training plan on system 
use
• Technical guideline to ensure that the MIS man-
ager has full capacity to test user acceptance at
the pilot site(s); suggest additional training as
necessary or, where appropriate, request modifi-
cations of the system
• Assessment of user’s manual
• Rollout plan for the entire branch network
• Facilitate the process of addressing user com-
ments and requests for modification in a timely
manner
• Comparison of output of new against old system 
• System audit to determine full compliance of
new system to law and regulations
Qualifications
• Degree in information technology or related field
• At least five years of experience as an information
technology manager for a commercial bank or
microfinance institution
• International consulting experience in manage-
ment information systems
Level of Effort
It is expected that approximately 30 days will be
required to complete this assignment. 
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Annex 11D Management
Information Systems Checklist
General
• Have the central bank licensing requirements
been confirmed as they relate to the MIS? 
• Have the central bank licensing requirements
been fulfilled as they relate to the MIS?
• Does the MIS comply with the accounting treat-
ment specified within the regulations?
• Can the MIS produce all regulatory reports in a
time frame that is acceptable to management?
• Are there are any issues with the accuracy of
information contained within any of the regula-
tory reports produced by the MIS?
• Have backup processes been identified and test-
ed to ensure that loss or failure of any part of the
MIS does not jeopardize the ability of the MFI
to meet reporting requirements?
• Have disaster recovery procedures been imple-
mented and tested to ensure that loss or failure
of the MIS would have an acceptable impact on
operations? 
• Are the necessary operational reports, as identi-
fied by management, available and reliable?
• Have all new savings products been fully tested
in the MIS, including reporting requirements,
and are any MIS-related issues preventing their
availability?
• Is the capacity of the IT department sufficient to
support and maintain the MIS in a controlled
manner? 
• Has MIS security been deemed sufficient, with
appropriately designed controls, as verified by
Internal Audit and management? 
• Have procedures been established and tested for
system change control? Is there confidence that
system updates and changes will not jeopardize
the availability of the MIS? 
• Has the MIS taken into consideration predicted
rates of growth and does it have the scalability
and flexibility to support the MFI for at least the
next five to seven years?
• Have users of the MIS received sufficient train-
ing and are they fully aware of how the system
should be used or have a clear path for becoming
properly versed? 
• Has an IT governance structure been established
with clear means for vetting technology choices?
• Have communication procedures been estab-
lished between the IT department and manage-
ment to facilitate a regular exchange of informa-
tion to ultimately ensure that IT and business
strategy are well aligned? 
• Have any e-banking or delivery channel initia-
tives either in place or being considered been
properly sequenced so as not to adversely affect
the availability and reliability of the MIS during
the transformation period?
System Design
• What MIS strategy will strike a balance between
security and customer service? 
• How can technology further the strategy via
processes and policies? 
• What data should be centralized and
standardized? 
• What features and capabilities should be central-
ized and standardized institutionwide? 
• What features and data should be defined at the
department, branch, and account levels?
Handling of Interest in the Loan Portfolio
Portion of the MIS
• How does the regulator require overdue interest
to be accounted for? How does this compare
with the MFI’s existing treatment? Does the
system have the functionality to treat interest
income in this way? 
• If overdue interest is placed in an “interest in sus-
pense” account, how will the system process
recovered payments? Is it possible to age interest
in this suspense account? 
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• If the regulator changes its requirements for the
treatment of interest on any loans, how flexible is
the system for handling variations to the current
treatment? Can the user make required system
changes or is programming by the vendor
required? 
• Are there tax regulations that require a different
treatment of interest other than that stated by
regulator? If yes, how will these tax regulations
be dealt with? 
Loan-Loss Provisioning 
• What is the regulator’s policy on provisioning?
How does it define terms used (risk amount, for
example)? What aging categories are required? 
• How do regulatory requirements differ from
current provisioning policies? 
• Can the current system be configured to auto-
mate the provisioning process? If yes, how can
the accuracy of the provisions be checked? If no,
what manual system will be developed to sup-
port the provisioning process? 
• Are additional reports required to assemble the
necessary information for loan provisioning? If
provisioning will require manual input to
another system how will this be reconciled with
the loan portfolio system and the general ledger?
Aging of Arrears 
• What age brackets does the regulator require and
how do these compare with those in the current
or future system?
Exiting Clients and Dormant Accounts 
• Do regulations require reporting on exiting
clients? Is there a system in place to monitor
these clients? If yes, is it adequate to meet regu-
latory needs? If not, what are the requirements
and how could they be reported by the system? 
• What are the regulations on dormant, unclaimed,
and abandoned accounts? How are these defined,
and how must they be tracked? At what point, if
any, must balances in these accounts be turned
over to the central bank?
Restructured Loans 
• Are loans restructured? If yes, how does the sys-
tem deal with restructured loans? Are they
tracked and aged separately from normal loans? 
• How can the application be used to ensure
enforcement of restructuring policies and proper
tracking for aging and provisioning? 
• Is the system capable of provisioning on restruc-
tured loans?
Additional Client Data 
• What customer information does the regulator
require? 
• Does the MIS have the ability to store the data? 
• If it is not currently collected, what processes will
be used to collect this information from both
new and existing clients? Will clients need to be
contacted individually to collect this information? 
• If it is collected, how accurate is the existing data
and does it fit in the required categories? 
• What additional customer information might the
MFI need to collect to ensure sufficient market
intelligence for product development and risk
management in the new transformed operating
environment? 
• What priority has been assigned to collecting this
data if there are resource limits? 
New Savings Products
• Are procedures in place to involve the MIS
department in the development of new products? 
• Can new products be introduced without pro-
gramming efforts? 
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• How extensive is the product definition
interface?
• Are the criteria and options identified as current
and future requirements available within the
system? If not, which are missing and how criti-
cal are these? 
• Have all aspects of the product been fully tested
on the system—interest calculations and fees, for
example? 
• Are the necessary reports available to track
progress and operations of these products? If
not, can reports be designed in house or will
they require programming effort? 
• If an in-house report generation tool is available,
is the necessary data held in the database?
Savings Product Criteria
• What criteria are required to define savings prod-
ucts in the MIS? Are these criteria currently avail-
able in the MIS? 
• Are all required options available for each criteria? 
• If additional criteria exist in the system that
have yet to be defined in the policy for the
product, how will these criteria be established?
(How should dormant accounts be treated, for
example?)
Compulsory and Voluntary Savings
• Do voluntary savings accounts and compulsory
savings accounts require different defining crite-
ria within the MIS (that is, different product def-
inition interfaces)? If yes, how will the MIS
application support the different criteria of each
product? 
• What controls are available to prevent unautho-
rized transfers from voluntary savings accounts
to service loans?
• Will forced savings accounts be retained after
transformation? If not, what will happen to the
existing accounts?
Customer Access to Account Information 
• What information do customers want? When?
With what frequency? 
• What is possible for the MFI to produce, taking
into account available resources, client satisfac-
tion, and security? 
• What method will be used for customers to
track their account transactions? What implica-
tions does this method have on cashiers and
front-office IT, processes, and policies? Are all
the necessary resources for this method readily
available—for example, printers, paper, cards?
Fraud Prevention and Detection 
• What mechanism will be used for client identifi-
cation at the time of withdrawals and how does
the system support this? 
• What is the state of Know Your Customer regu-
lations in the country of operation? 
• What are the implications of these requirements
on the MIS?
Current Accounts and Overdraft Facilities
• Will checking accounts be offered? 
• How will checks be administered? 
• How will the MIS handle check-based transac-
tions, for example, capturing check details on the
system at the time they are received? 
• What are the central bank regulations regarding
current accounts? How will these regulations,
and the market in general, influence product
design and processes? 
• Have all processes to support these products
been carefully designed and tested (checkbook
administration, check returns, stop payments,
movements to and from clearinghouse, clearing,
reconciliation with clearinghouse, reporting, and
the like)? How will the system support charges
associated with these accounts (cost of check-
books, counter checks sold, stamp duty, and
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charges associated with stopping payments on
lost or spoiled checks)?
• Are overdrafts allowed on these accounts? What
will be the process for approving new overdrafts?
How will the quality of overdrafts be monitored
(frequency of credits, proximity of balance to
limit, or other)?
Interbranch Banking
• Are interbranch transactions required? 
• What is the current customer and market
demand for easy, convenient access to savings
accounts? 
• What systems, manual or electronic, are in place,
or could be installed, to handle these transactions? 
• Are there opportunities to develop branchless
banking?
Teller Services
• Are teller services currently available? If yes, will
they need to be changed to accommodate
increased transaction volume arising from addi-
tional products and growth? If not available,
how will they be accommodated? 
• Is the physical location suitable for the hardware
required? 
• Have cashier procedures and supervision tasks,
and the way in which the system will support
these, been defined?
Hardware 
• What are the software supplier’s recommended
specifications for client machines? 
• What server is required? 
• What is the projected size of the MIS database in
one, two, and three years? What size hard disk
and what processing capacity are required to
support this database size? 
• Does the size of the network warrant a dual
processor? 
• Will a redundant array of independent (or inex-
pensive) disks (RAID) be used to protect data
against hard disk failure? 
• What will be the limiting factor in the speed of
the system—the network or the hardware? (If
network is slow, there is no point in investing in
a top-of-the-line server, for example.) 
Information Communications Technology 
• How frequently will communications be
required—periodically or continuous (real-time
connection versus batch uploads)? 
• What will be the typical size of the data being
transferred? 
• How many locations need to be connected? 
• What information communications technology
infrastructure is available? 
• What level of reliability is required? How will the
business be affected if the communications link
becomes unavailable for different lengths of time? 
• What information needs to be sent—entire data-
base or just partial records? How might these
requirements change over time? 
• What specifications of the new system, other
than data transfer, rely on or could leverage con-
nectivity? What are the specific requirements?
What is the priority ranking of these additional
connectivity requirements?
Power Supply 
• What is the quality, strength, and reliability of
the power supply at each location? 
• What are alternative sources of power? 
• What additional power hardware is required to
ensure a stable and reliable source of power? 
• What MIS hardware options have the lowest
power requirements? 
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• What power hardware options are the most
durable for the price? 
• Which power hardware options have the longest
life or lowest replacement?
Notes
This chapter is based on a paper written by Geraldine
O’Keeffe and Laura Frederick titled “Transforming
MFIs: Management Information Systems.” The writing
of that paper was supported by the USAID-funded Sup-
port for Private Enterprise Expansion and Development
(SPEED) Project in Uganda, and Chemonics Interna-
tional, the implementing agency for the SPEED Project.
Thank you to Geraldine O’Keeffe for her review and
valuable additions to the chapter.
1. Although not discussed directly in this chapter, there
is a growing trend to try to “outsource” and share as
much as possible certain services, particularly MIS.
Buying MIS services and processing, thus avoiding the
need for substantial investments and constant
upgrades, or “sharing” MIS and back-office tasks
among several MFIs, is now being done by some
transformed MFIs.
2. CGAP IS website: http://www.microfinancegateway
.org/resource_centers/technology.
3. See CGAP IS Fund http://www.isfund.org/.
4. See CGAP IS Site http://www.microfinancegateway.
org/resource_centers/technology/iss_software/ for
tips on negotiating a software license.
5. The CGAP Technology Resource Center maintains
information on over 60 MIS options for microfinance
institutions. See http://www.microfinancegateway.
org/resource_centers/technology/iss_software/. 
6. Bankers Realm is a banking software product devel-
oped and marketed by Craft Silicon and installed in
various MFIs and smaller banks throughout East
Africa and other locations (http://www.craftsilicon.
com).
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Internal Control and Audits
Expanding funding sources to include clientsavings; adding cash handling through on-sitetellers; and committing to consistently report
timely and accurate financial, portfolio, and out-
reach information to regulators and other stake-
holders are just a few of the changes inherent in
most microfinance institution (MFI) transforma-
tions. Each of these changes significantly effects
the level and nature of risks faced by the MFI,
requiring commensurate changes in its internal
control system. 
Risk management should be proactive and antic-
ipate risks before they are experienced. Internal
controls manage risks before they happen (preven-
tive control) and measure to what extent the risks
have occurred (detective control). Internal audits
assess the adequacy of internal controls and how
well risks are being managed.
Internal control is a process, effected by an
entity’s board of directors, management and
other personnel, designed to provide reason-
able assurance regarding the achievement of
objectives in the following categories: effec-
tiveness and efficiency of operations; reliabi-
lity of financial reporting; and compliance
with applicable laws and regulations (COSO
http://www.coso.org/key.htm).
Internal controls form an integral part of the
overall risk-management framework in a financial
intermediary. Although various risks MFIs face
have already been discussed in this book—primarily
in chapter 2, Regulation and Supervision: The
Policy Framework, and chapter 10, Financial
Management—this chapter specifically addresses
risk management through internal control systems.
To assist transforming MFIs in implementing the
appropriate level of internal controls, this chapter
begins by presenting the critical components of an
effective internal control system. It then focuses on
one of the primary risks of weak internal controls—
fraud. The chapter then highlights the particular
preventive controls (designed to avoid an unin-
tended event or result) that MFIs can put in place
to maintain reasonable levels of risk, as well as the
detective controls (designed to discover an unin-
tended event or result) that provide a warning sys-
tem for existing problems requiring closer investi-
gation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
the role of the supervisory agency in evaluating
these internal controls. 
Chapter 12
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Components of Effective 
Internal Controls
The internal control system adopted by an MFI
needs to ensure, as far as is practical, the orderly and
efficient conduct of business. Internal controls are
most effective when they are directly incorporated
in the processes that support operations and enable
a quick response to changing conditions. For a sys-
tem of internal controls to be effective, the follow-
ing elements must be present:
• Honest and capable employees
• Clear delegation and separation of duties
• Proper procedures for processing transactions
• Suitable documents and accounting records
• Adequate physical control over assets and
records
• Independent verification of performance
These key elements work together to achieve a
foundation for sound internal control through
directed leadership, shared values, and a culture that
emphasizes accountability for control. Most non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) operating as
credit-only institutions have some of these elements
in place—in fact, it would be difficult to operate
successfully and sustainably without some degree
of controls. However, with the addition of savings
services and the requisite handling of cash (which
some credit-only NGOs avoid at the field level), as
well as the requirement to comply with regulations,
these elements become imperative to the success of
the transformed intermediary. 
Because of their importance in risk mitigation,
specific internal control requirements are typically
included by regulatory authorities in the licensing
and ongoing operational requirements of the trans-
formed MFI (Campion 2000). The Basle Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision1 in its paper “Frame-
work for Internal Control Systems in Banking
Organisations” (1998) identifies five main cate-
gories of common internal control breakdowns,
most of which can be directly correlated with the
lack of one of the above effective internal control
elements, and all of which are relevant for deposit-
taking MFIs:
• Lack of adequate management oversight and
accountability, and failure to develop a strong
control culture within the bank 
• Inadequate recognition and assessment of the
risk of certain banking activities, whether on- or
off-balance sheet 
• The absence or failure of key control structures
and activities, such as segregation of duties, ap-
provals, verifications, reconciliations, and reviews
of operating performance 
• Inadequate communication of information
between levels of management within the bank,
especially in the upward communication of
problems 
• Inadequate or ineffective audit programs and
monitoring activities 
A useful starting exercise for the board of direc-
tors and senior management in preparing for insti-
tutional transformation is to assess the adequacy of
the current internal control system by looking at
the common areas of internal control breakdowns
highlighted above.
Management Oversight and the 
Control Environment
The control environment refers to the overall atti-
tude, awareness, and actions of the board of direc-
tors and managers regarding the internal control
system and its importance. The control environ-
ment is the foundation for all other components of
internal control, providing discipline and structure. 
The board, along with senior management,
sets the tone of the organization and establishes a
culture within the organization that emphasizes
and demonstrates to all levels of personnel the
importance of internal controls. As discussed in
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chapter 7, Ownership and Governance, transfor-
mation most often results in new owners, which
generally implies increased governance responsibili-
ties and the need for requisite skills. Commensurate
with changes in the governance structure is the need
to examine the overall risk-management structure
of the transformed, or transforming, institution.
Under many jurisdictions, the board is required—
often through a board audit committee—to
review any and all communications from the audi-
tors and act on them. Each director of the board
may be held personally responsible and failure to
comply may in some cases be punishable by law.
Senior management is responsible for imple-
menting internal control strategies and policies
approved by the board and for developing process-
es to manage and mitigate risks. Roles and respon-
sibilities of the board, management, and staff
should be clearly delineated and adherence should
be enforced. Senior and line management should
demonstrate that they accept control responsibility
and not just delegate that responsibility to financial
and audit staff.
Improving internal controls requires constant
follow-up by management. Transforming MFIs
should implement tools and procedures that help
determine causes for noncompliance, redesigning
poorly defined or poorly communicated proce-
dures, and taking disciplinary action against those
who do not follow procedures or commit fraud.
Disciplinary action in response to fraud should be
consistent and serious, with the message of zero tol-
erance clearly communicated throughout the MFI. 
The following questions provide a guideline for
an MFI to evaluate its quality of management over-
sight and its control environment (COSO 1994):
• Do board members and senior management set
a day-in, day-out example of high integrity and
ethical behavior? 
• Is there a written code of conduct for employees,
and is it reinforced by training, top-down
communications, and requirements for periodic
written statements of compliance from key
employees? 
• Are performance and incentive compensation
targets reasonable and realistic, or do they create
undue pressure to achieve short-term results? 
• Is it clear that fraudulent financial reporting at
any level and in any form will not be tolerated? 
• Are ethics woven into criteria that are used to eval-
uate individual and business unit performance?
• Does management react appropriately when
receiving bad news from subordinates and busi-
ness units? 
• Is a process in place to resolve close ethical calls? 
• Are business risks identified and candidly dis-
cussed with the board of directors? 
Risk Recognition and Assessment
Every MFI faces a variety of risks from external
and internal sources that must be assessed. (See
box 12.1.) Because economic, industry, regulatory,
and operating conditions will continue to change,
mechanisms are needed to identify and deal with
the special risks associated with change.
Risk areas that become more prominent as MFIs
transform into regulated deposit-taking institutions
are liquidity risk or the prospect of income or equi-
ty losses stemming from inadequate access to cash;
interest rate risk, that is, the prospect of volatility in
net income and the economic value of equity in
response to interest rate changes; legal and compli-
ance risk, including compliance with regulations,
reporting, and capital adequacy requirements; and
operational risk, or the vulnerabilities an MFI faces
in its daily operations, including portfolio quality,
fraud, and theft. Each of these risks increases with
the addition of new products and savings interme-
diation as well as new information systems.
Creating a risk-management framework and cul-
ture within a transforming MFI requires the devel-
opment of a comprehensive system of management
controls, accounting and internal controls, security
procedures, and other risk controls. 
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Control Activities
Control activities are policies and procedures (in
addition to the control environment) established by
management to achieve specific objectives. Control
activities occur at all levels in the MFI and form an
integral part of daily activities. They help ensure
that policies and procedures address risks. Periodi-
cally the controls must be tested and evaluated for
effectiveness, and revised as necessary. Table 12.1
shows the range of control activities.
Information, Communication, and Monitoring
Pertinent information must be documented and
communicated in an effective and timely manner
that enables staff, management, and the board to
carry out their responsibilities. An effective internal
control system requires comprehensive and accu-
rate internal financial, operational, and compliance
data as well as external market information about
events and conditions relevant to decision making
(Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 1998).
Management information systems (MIS) must be
secure and supported by adequate contingency
arrangements.
Virtually all employees produce information
used in the internal control system or take actions
needed to effect control. Everyone in the organiza-
tion is responsible for communicating upward
problems in operations, noncompliance with the
code of conduct, or other policy violations or illegal
actions. In addition, management must demon-
strate open communication within all levels of the
organization and set up effective mechanisms for
Bank examiners in the U.S. Federal Reserve System
focus on the following risks:
• Credit risk—The risk of financial loss resulting
from a borrower’s late or nonpayment of a loan
obligation or that a guarantor will fail to meet
the obligation. Credit risk applies to lending and
investing activities.
• Liquidity risk—The risk of loss arising from the
possibility that the MFI may not have sufficient
funds to meet its obligations or be unable to
access adequate funding.
• Market risk—The risk that an institution’s finan-
cial condition will be adversely affected by
changes in market prices or rates (including
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, or equity
prices). 
• Operational risk—In the simplest definition, this
is risk of loss that arises directly from service
or product delivery, resulting from human or
system error. It is a risk that arises on a daily basis
as transactions are processed. Operational risk
transcends all divisions and products of a financial
institution. This includes the potential that inade-
quate information systems, operational problems,
unforeseen external events, or breaches of con-
tracts (including fraud) will result in unexpected
losses. Risks associated with human resources,
governance, and information technology are
included in this category.
• Legal and compliance risk—Losses arising from
failure to follow relevant legal and regulatory
requirements.
• Reputation risk—The risk to earnings or capital
arising from negative public opinion, which may
affect the institution’s ability to sell products and
services or to access other funding.
• Strategic risk—The risk to earnings or capital aris-
ing from adverse business decisions or improper
implementation of those decisions. This risk is a
function of the compatibility of the organization’s
strategic goals, the business strategies developed
to achieve those goals, the resources deployed
against these goals, and the quality of manage-
ment capacities and capabilities.
Source: Comptroller of the Currency, United States Department of the
Treasury, cited in Pikholz and others 2005.
Box 12.1 Categories of Risks
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monitoring to see that its directives are understood
and carried out, and if not, determine why not.
Internal control systems need ongoing monitor-
ing including periodic evaluations that assess the
quality of the system’s performance over time and
report deficiencies. Monitoring of key risks should
be built into the daily activities of the MFI. Further-
more, an effective and comprehensive internal audit
of the internal control system should occur period-
ically. 
The following questions provide a guideline for
the transforming MFI to evaluate its communica-
tion and monitoring controls:
• Are policies and procedures clearly documented
and communicated to all necessary staff members?
• Are appropriate controls built in as new systems
are designed and brought on stream? 
• Is the MIS secure?
• Are communication lines in the MFI open?
• Does management have effective mechanisms to
monitor the quality of the control systems on a
daily basis?
• Is an effective internal audit function in place?
Most transforming MFIs will find it useful to
hire an expert to assess their existing internal
controls relative to what is needed as a regulated
deposit-taking institution and then determine
how to build effective internal controls into all
systems. See annex 12A for sample terms of
reference.
Table 12.1 Control Activities
Process steps Role Responsibilities
1. Identify and prioritize
key risk exposures.
2. Develop strategies to
measure risks.
3. Design polices to
mitigate risks.
4. Implement controls and
assign responsibility.
5. Test effectiveness and
evaluate results.
6. Revise policies and
procedures as necessary.
Senior management
Board
Senior management
Board
Senior management
Board
Senior management
Branch management
Operating staff
Board and management
Internal audit staff
Identify and prioritize risks.
Review and approve.
Develop key risk measurement indicators.
Set acceptable range for risk.
Approve indicators and range.
Monitor results.
Design operational policies, systems, and guidelines to
reduce risk.
Provide clear instructions for procedures to implement
policies.
Approve operational policies.
Assign responsibility for implementation.
Implement control procedures.
Monitor compliance.
Provide input on appropriateness of policies and
procedures.
Offer suggestions for policies needed.
Comply with established policies.
Review results of operations.
Monitor compliance with policies.
Repeat the steps above for new 
policies and procedures.
Source: Lehman 2003.
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Risk of Poor Controls: Overview
of Fraud in MFIs
Fraud is a deception deliberately practiced to secure
unfair or unlawful gain. The most common types of
fraud in MFIs are falsified or altered documents,
fictitious loans, kickbacks, embezzlement of funds,
collusion in issuance of loans, and manipulation of
financial data through omitting the effects of trans-
actions or incorrectly using accounting policies and
procedures. Weak internal controls not only allow
errors and unintentional mistakes to go undetected
but also allow for fraud. Generally fraud can be
detected through an unexplained increase in delin-
quency, the discovery of accounting irregularities,
or irregular staff behavior.
Although certainly not unique to transforming
or transformed MFIs, fraud in any financial inter-
mediary can manifest itself in different forms and
have significantly different implications than in a
credit-focused NGO. For financial intermediaries
using depositors’ funds to finance their portfolios,
fraud can lead to low-income depositors losing their
savings and borrowers losing access to credit. It can
also lead to a deterioration of clients’ willingness
to repay loans or a run on the MFI’s deposits (or
both). The discovery of fraud by the regulator can
lead to the application of stop-lending measures,
which can destroy a hard-won culture of repayment
as clients lose faith in future loan renewals. 
Furthermore, during the process of transforma-
tion MFIs are more vulnerable to fraud because of
the significant changes taking place, while at the
same time, MFIs may become more able to detect
fraud. Changing systems, introducing new prod-
ucts, and standardizing policies and procedures can
lead to the discovery of fraud when weak informa-
tion and accounting systems and a lack of standard-
ization of products and services are revealed. With
transformation, MFIs often install new MIS and are
shocked to discover fraud has occurred but has
gone undetected because of an insecure system. In
addition, fraud can increase during a period of tran-
sition in which all systems are being revised and
communication may not be clear or time lags exist
between when the controls are established (or
revised) and communicated to staff or documented
in policy manuals. Furthermore, as the MFI trans-
forms, it must develop an awareness of new and
complex types of fraud as new products are devel-
oped and new clients are pursued (box 12.2).
As MFIs transform and refine their internal
control systems, they will find it important to
balance the effectiveness of fraud control with the
cost and burden of cumbersome procedures. As
discussed in previous chapters, during transforma-
tion the MFI must manage the changes taking
place and work to maintain staff morale and a cul-
ture of ethics. 
If fraud is identified, the MFI needs to move
quickly to control current and potential damage.
Consequences should be severe, and they should
be written, conveyed verbally, and strictly fol-
lowed. Policies should be in place to outline the
consequences of fraud and actions to be taken by
the MFI.
Box 12.2 Compartamos Savings
Mobilization Project
Gonzalo Ramírez Reyes, Manager of the Compar-
tamos Mobilization Project states, “Right now,
Compartamos staff is not allowed to physically
touch clients’ money. And we make sure clients
know that at every meeting, for example, by
asking them questions like ‘When a Compartamos
staff member asks you for your loan service fee,
what do you do?’ The answer is that there is no
loan service fee and that the clients should
report the staff member to management.
When we start mobilizing savings, we will have
to come up with new antifraud mechanisms
and ways of maintaining customer trust in the
institution.”
Source: CGAP n.d.
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Preventive Controls: Policies 
and Procedures
The single most important factor in the prevention
of fraud within an organization is a well-motivated
staff. The most important factor in the prevention
of unintentional errors are policies and procedures
that are well-understood by employees who are
motivated to follow them (Lehman 2002).
MFIs that transform to become licensed institu-
tions often need to formalize the many policies and
procedures that are “known to everyone” but not
documented in a consistent and complete format.
Formally documenting everything becomes a
necessity with transformation, both to satisfy licens-
ing requirements as well as to demonstrate greater
accountability to the MFI’s new stakeholders,
including shareholders, regulators, and depositors.
Policies and procedures inform all employees
what is expected of them, how they should perform
their duties, and what the consequences are if they
do not perform as required. Policies and proce-
dures should be clearly documented in a regularly
updated operations manual that is appropriately
disseminated. Operations manuals should clearly
define the steps required for each transaction,
explain how to handle exceptions, and delineate
lines of authority. Staff responsibilities are thus
more easily understood with staff knowing how
to perform tasks and in what sequence, and ulti-
mately how their tasks originate and who uses their
output. MFIs should establish a standard format for
operations manuals that allows for insertion of
updates and removal of outdated procedures. Con-
trols such as revision dates, a flexible page number-
ing system, central control of number of copies
issued of each manual and to whom, and number-
ing of each copy, will improve communication and
the ability to maintain standards. Furthermore, if
the MFI operates on a WAN, manuals should be
online providing a cost-effective means of commu-
nication and enhancing staff accountability for
compliance (Champagne 2004).
Internal control policies and procedures should
either be documented in a separate Internal Con-
trols manual or should be an integral part of opera-
tional manuals. In addition, regulated MFIs require
a clearly written Internal Audit manual. (The Inter-
nal Audit manual is discussed under Internal Audit
in the next section.)
Internal controls must be considered in all
processes in the MFI, including those newly
planned as a regulated institution—that is, savings
mobilization. “Process mapping,” which links spe-
cific risks to specific controls, is a useful tool to help
ensure that controls are built into all systems and
that they effectively address risks (box 12.3).
Process mapping also helps to ensure that controls
are cost-effective and processes are efficient.2
Human Resources Policies
Human resources policies that address hiring, train-
ing, remuneration, and staff termination serve as
potential controls for preventing misappropriation
of assets and unintentional errors. The transforma-
tion process offers MFIs the opportunity to rewrite
and change these policies to incorporate a more
proactive approach to fraud prevention. (See chap-
ter 9, Human Resources Management.)
Hiring. Staff in transforming MFIs must under-
stand and “own” the vision of the institution—
particularly as it changes with transformation. When
hiring new staff, an MFI must follow solid recruit-
ment practices including checking references, and be
willing to invest the time and resources to find the
right people. Hiring well becomes particularly im-
portant during transformation because the MFI will
likely need to hire people with skills that the institu-
tion has not previously had to seek, such as treasury
managers or internal auditors. All positions should
have a written description defining duties, responsi-
bilities, and performance standards. When first hired
and then annually thereafter, all employees should
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competent manner. Those who do not feel suffi-
ciently compensated will be much less likely to
carry out their jobs with thoroughness and atten-
tion to detail. Likewise, they are much more
tempted to commit fraud, especially in economies in
which the sums that they handle daily represent
months or possibly years of salary. Transforming
MFIs are often shocked at the remuneration
required by new staff who bring skills and experi-
ence from the formal financial sector. However, a
competitive salary, including a performance-based
incentive system that rewards high productivity, is a
strong preventive control in deterring sloppy or
fraudulent employee behavior. Transformation
allows MFIs the opportunity to realign salary struc-
tures and incentive schemes, as well as other forms
of compensation, to encourage good performance. 
Rotation of personnel and mandatory leave. Peri-
odically, employee job functions should be rotated
Process mapping is an exercise that MFIs undertake
to describe a particular process (opening a savings
account, for example) including the inherent risks
and the procedures that control those risks. Process
mapping allows the MFI to identify missing controls
as well as redundant controls that suboptimize cus-
tomer service and operational efficiency goals. 
Process mapping is not a quick exercise—it re-
quires time, thoroughness, and thoughtfulness. One
of the most difficult aspects of process mapping is not
the mapping exercise itself, but the analysis of the
map, looking for what is not there but should be there.
As a new process is being developed, the risk
analysis should be conducted in conjunction with
the process map. When a procedure is developed,
from a risk perspective it is helpful to brainstorm all
the types of risks inherent in that process at all levels,
including determining the identify of the intended
“risk owner.” To develop procedures for a new sav-
ings product, for example, not only should the risks
be identified, but so should what is to be done
to mitigate them. The intended actions to control
the risks become steps within the process. In this
manner, controls are built into the process, rather
than tacked on later.
Building controls into a process ensures the con-
trols are integrated and has proven to be far more
effective and efficient than adding controls onto an
existing process. When controls are added later, they
are often susceptible to erosion, or are “peeled” off,
when a process becomes subjected to performance
pressures, such as customer waiting time. The con-
trol activities, then, should be commensurate with
risk tolerance, and answer the question “What do
we do about this risk?” The steps in the process can
be viewed to examine why each step is being per-
formed and then evaluated from a risk perspective
and compared with the value of that step for cus-
tomer service, efficiency, and economy.
Source: Pikholz and others 2005.
be required to sign a “code of ethics” developed and
approved by the board. 
Training and development. A good training and
development program is a critical aspect of internal
control. As an MFI transforms, new staff skills are
required. This presents an ideal opportunity to
promote the transformed organization’s core values
of honesty and integrity and communicate the zero
tolerance policy against fraud. Training should in-
clude a session to explain the reasons behind internal
controls and emphasize how fraud and errors hurt
the institution and its clients. In addition, the insti-
tution will find it imperative to have its policies and
procedures well-documented and standardized,
enabling the training of new and existing employees
to be clear and consistent.
Remuneration. Employees should have strong
incentives to perform their jobs in a responsible and
Box 12.3 Process Mapping
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unannounced and the rotation should be long
enough to discover fraud, if any. Job rotation also
helps train staff to perform other jobs, allowing
them to fill in when other employees take vacation
or are sick. Leave policies should require all employ-
ees to take off at least five consecutive working days.
Termination. Employee awareness of the potential
negative consequences for inadequate job perform-
ance or fraudulent activity can also be a preventive
control. If a policy is not already in place, transfor-
mation allows the MFI to send a clear message that
staff members will be immediately terminated and
taken to court (if possible) if they perpetrate fraud. 
See box 12.4 for an example of how K-Rep Bank
in Kenya employed human resources policies to
reduce fraud.
Administrative Controls
Administrative controls establish lines of authority
and responsibility (with ultimate responsibility rest-
ing with management), and segregate the operating
and recording functions.3 Although certainly
important for unregulated MFIs, these controls
become even more critical for regulated financial
intermediaries, considering the responsibilities the
MFI has taken on to protect client savings and
investors’ equity. 
Segregation of duties. An effective internal control
system relies on an appropriate segregation of
duties. The participation of two or more persons in
a transaction creates a system of checks and balances
and reduces the opportunity for fraud. For exam-
ple, a person handling cash should not post to the
accounting records, or loan officers should not dis-
burse loan proceeds for loans that they approve, and
those with authority to sign checks should not rec-
oncile bank accounts. If segregation of duties is not
always possible, the supervisor should perform
additional procedures to offset the lack of adequate
internal control (WOCCU 2002). 
Dual control. At least two keys or combinations
under the control of at least two different people
should be required to access vaults, files, or other
storage devices. Dual controls should be established
for counting or transferring cash, negotiable collat-
eral, investment securities, reserve supply of checks,
night depository, mail receipts, automated teller
machine (ATM) cash, dormant savings accounts,
and spare keys to cashier drawers.
Box 12.4 K-Rep’s Controls to Reduce
Fraud in Kenya
To reduce its exposure to fraud risk, K-Rep
employed the following mechanisms: 
1. Introduced an education campaign to encour-
age clients to speak out against corrupt staff
and group leaders
2. Standardized all loan policies and procedures
so staff cannot make any decision outside the
regulations
3. Emphasized management training to increase
managers’ capacity and to introduce strict
supervision processes
4. Established an inspection unit that performs
random operational checks
5. Enforced the following human resources
policies: 
• Immediately fired staff involved in fraud 
• Maintained a profile of fraudulent staff
and use it to refine recruitment 
• Refrained from posting staff to home areas
to reduce the opportunity and temptation
to collude
• Made loan products available to staff 
• Paid staff well relative to other available
job opportunities in the area
• Rotated staff regularly within a branch
• Transfered staff periodically to other
branches
Source: Campion (2000, p.19).
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Savings management. Once an MFI begins collect-
ing voluntary savings, specific internal controls for
savings management must be implemented. Gener-
ally, controls for savings management are achieved
by setting rules for common transactions. Examples
of such rules include the following (Branch and
Klaehn 2002):
• Document all teller transactions with receipts.
• Include teller identification on all passbook
entries or receipts.
• Prohibit tellers from keeping client passbooks at
the institution.
• Ensure the internal auditor or supervisory com-
mittee reviews employee and official savings ac-
counts, including family member accounts, on a
quarterly basis for unusual or abnormal activity.
• Notify clients immediately in person, telephone,
or writing if a deposit error occurs.
• Ensure all change of address requests are in writ-
ing and signed by the client.
• Effect account closures only if the client advises
the MFI in writing and presents the proper
identification.
• Ensure the signature card is promptly pulled
from the active account file and placed in a
closed account file once an account is closed.
• Maintain a list of closed accounts including
account number, client name, and reason for
closure for review by the manager.
Cash control. Cash management is discussed in
detail in chapter 13, Customer Service and Opera-
tions; however, because it is a critical area for new
financial intermediaries given the addition of teller
services and savings mobilization, it is addressed
briefly here. 
The primary sources of cash received on an
ongoing basis by a licensed MFI are loan repay-
ments and savings deposits. With transformation,
most licensed MFIs will set up (if not already in
existence) banking halls with teller windows to
accept loan payments and savings. Ideally, both a
paper trail and computer entries should document
the collection of cash. 
Controls to prevent the conversion of cash by
officials or employees for their own personal use
should be established, including the following:
• Require all cash receipts from any source to be
recorded in a cashbook and reconciled to the
daily cash deposit.
• Establish cash limits for the total amount that
can be kept on the premises, in the vault, and in
each cashier’s drawer.
• Conduct periodic unannounced cash counts.
• Balance cashiers’ cash drawers with the general
ledger daily, with no cashier leaving the premises
until balance has been confirmed.
• Limit access to the vault and cashier drawers to
those individually responsible for the funds in
the vault or drawer.
• Immediately verify under dual control cash upon
receipt.
• Count cash under dual control if tellers buy or
sell funds to the vault or another teller.
• Document all transactions made by and between
cashiers with a receipt.
• Equip vault and cashier drawers with adequate,
functioning locking devices.
• Prohibit cashiers and employees from transact-
ing business on their own accounts or those of
related persons.
Security measures. With the addition of savings
mobilization from the public, transforming MFIs
need to ensure that banking halls are secure. Teller
stations should have locked drawers and there
should be grill or glass partitions between teller sta-
tions and the public. Doors and windows should be
equipped with grills, bars, and alarm systems.
Guards should be present at the banking halls and
trained in what to do in the event of a robbery. All
staff members should be trained in how to act in a
robbery and what steps to take after the thief has
left the branch. 
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As regulated institutions, all MFI branches will
require a vault that should be maintained in a
strong room. The vault will be used to keep legal
documentation backing up loans and investments,
the cash box, blank sequentially numbered forms
such as checks and receipts, expense vouchers and
documentation, and cash. 
Protection of assets. Access to assets should be by
authorized personnel only. Supervisors and senior
management should conduct periodic physical
inventories of assets, protect assets by purchasing
adequate insurance, require the use of passwords to
access the computer system, and change passwords
on a quarterly basis.
Accounting Controls
The need for accurate, timely, and secure accounting
systems becomes even more crucial for the MFI as a
financial intermediary because depositors’ savings are
at risk. Internal controls must be designed to ensure
the integrity of all financial transactions and the
bookkeeping system. They should provide reason-
able assurance that transactions are performed ac-
cording to management’s direction and by the right
people. In addition, transactions should be recorded
and financial statements prepared according to
accepted accounting principles. In some countries,
regulators will check to ensure this is the case.
Controls are implemented through financial
policies, specific procedures, job responsibilities,
and regular follow-up routines. The following poli-
cies are designed to ensure such integrity. Transac-
tions should be (Lehman 2002):
• Valid: The system should not permit the inclu-
sion of fictitious or nonexistent transactions in
journals or other accounting records.
• Properly authorized: The appropriate people
should authorize transactions.
• Complete: Controls should be in place to prevent
the omission of transactions from the records.
• Properly valued: An adequate system includes
procedures to avoid errors in calculating and
recording transactions at various stages in the
accounting process.
• Properly classified: Transactions must be classi-
fied according to type.
• Recorded: Transactions must be recorded at the
proper time (timeliness).
• Properly included: Transactions must appear in
subsidiary records and be correctly summarized
(posting and summarization).
• Supported: All transactions must be supported
with proper and valid documentation.
Controls for validity, completeness, and valua-
tion are best maintained by independent checks and
segregation of duties within the accounting func-
tion. Each person performs only certain functions
within the system and each person’s work is
checked by at least one other.
Specific internal controls in the accounting
system a transforming MFI should ensure it has in
place are described in the following sections.4
Daily posting and monthly reconciliations. Posting
records daily makes it much easier to locate errors
and make corrections. On a monthly basis, staff
members must individually balance each general
ledger account with its supporting subsidiary
ledgers (loan ledgers, bank and investment state-
ments, individual cashier records) and with the
respective general ledger control accounts. Some-
one other than the person who prepared the sub-
sidiary and reconciliations between the subsidiaries
and general ledger accounts should conduct a
review of the reconciliations.
Internal reports. Accounting systems should be
designed to facilitate the preparation of the internal
reports (such as nonperforming loans, dormant
savings accounts, and the like) necessary to review
key operational areas. Regular reviews should be
undertaken by a staff member not involved in
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the transactions and irregularities discussed imme-
diately with a supervisor.
Sequential numbering. Sequentially numbered
instruments used for checks, cash receipt vouchers,
and journal vouchers assist in reconciling and con-
trolling used and unused items. All unissued,
prenumbered items should be retained under dual
control.
Audit trail. Records and systems should provide an
audit trail that allows each transaction to be traced
from its inception to completion. Sufficient detail
must be included in all documentation of transac-
tions. For example, each time a transaction occurs,
it must be documented through preparation of a
voucher. Vouchers result in a paper trail for each
transaction. Such paper trails allow the MFI to
have adequate internal control over its record
keeping and ensures that its assets are safeguarded.
Vouchers are supported by invoices and check
stubs or cash requests and generally include the
following:
• Number and nature of voucher
• Name of department
• Date prepared and name of person who prepared
the voucher
• Account name and number
• Amount of money
• Source and description of the transaction
• Authorized signature(s)
• Attachment of original invoices and cash
requests
• Proof of delivery or completion of services ren-
dered
Reconciling loan and savings information. The
accounting system tracks information on loan
account transactions and savings account transac-
tions and aggregates the information to create
financial statements. At the same time, the loan
tracking system tracks information on loans, while
the savings module tracks information on savings
accounts. Some data, such as disbursements and
payments or withdrawals, is captured by both the
accounting and the loan or savings systems.
Many transforming MFIs choose to use integrated
software—meaning the various modules are inte-
grated so information entered in one is also
captured in others if appropriate. However, if the
MFI is not operating with an integrated system,
the two systems may capture the data at different
times and from different sources, resulting in dis-
crepancies. These discrepancies need to be recon-
ciled frequently.
Bank accounts. Once an MFI is licensed it will still
need a relationship bank for external transactions.
MFIs should adhere to the following practices
(Lehman 2002):
• Use only prenumbered checks for disbursements.
• Have proper documentation support for checks.
• Cancel supporting documents when paid.
• Have dual signatures and authority limits.
• Keep voided checks, but ensure signatures are
obliterated.
• Post or deliver checks directly to payee (if hand
delivered, obtain a receipt).
• Record all checks in numerical order in the cash
disbursements journal, and allocate each check to
the proper operating expense account number.
Bank reconciliations. Accurate and timely bank rec-
onciliation is critical to maintaining internal con-
trol over cash. Reconciliations must be prepared at
least monthly for each bank account to reconcile
the bank balances on the bank statements to the
general ledger or cash book balance. A supervisor
must review all bank reconciliations. Bank recon-
ciliations can also be considered a detective control
(as well as a preventive control) because errors,
such as improper accounting for or transferring of
funds, can be detected through the reconciliation
process.
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Detective Control: The Internal Audit 
The Institute of Internal Auditors defines internal
audit as follows: 
Internal auditing is an independent, objective
assurance and consulting activity designed to
add value and improve an organization’s
operations. It helps an organization accom-
plish its objectives by bringing a systematic,
disciplined approach to evaluate and improve
the effectiveness of risk management control,
and governance processes.5
Internal audit is carried out by determining if
financial and operating information is accurate, and
internal policies and procedures are being followed.
Internal audits differ from external audits in that they
are for the purpose of the MFI itself, not for third par-
ties. Internal audits focus on evaluating controls and
detecting fraud, whereas external audits focus on
whether financial statements reflect historical events
clearly and accurately. Internal audits are carried out
continuously throughout the year, while external
audits are done annually at the end of the fiscal year.
Regulators will want to ensure that before an
MFI is licensed, it has an effective and thorough
internal audit department. Once the MFI is
licensed, the supervisory body will periodically
examine the internal audit function to ensure its
continued effectiveness. 
All MFIs, particularly when licensed, must have
an Internal Audit manual that outlines the role of the
internal audit, the qualifications of the internal audi-
tors, the structure and functions of the internal audit
department, and the methodologies and tools to
conduct internal audits. See annex 12B for a sample
outline of contents for an Internal Audit manual.
The Internal Audit Department
In general, an NGO MFI will typically have two or
three relatively junior staff—often reassigned loan
officers—in the audit function reporting directly to
the managing director and focusing primarily on
branch audits. With transformation, the MFI needs
to rethink the scope of the department, its manage-
ment, and the skills needed by auditors.
The audit department is responsible to do the
following:
• Work with the board and management to
devise and maintain a system that ensures all
major risks of the MFI are identified and
analyzed.
• Plan, organize, and carry out the internal audit
function, including the preparation of an audit
plan, scheduling and assigning work, and esti-
mating resource needs.
• Report to both the audit committee and man-
agement on policies, programs, and activities of
the department.
• Coordinate coverage with the external auditors,
and ensure that each party is not only aware of
the other’s work but also well briefed on areas
of concern.
• Make recommendations on the systems and pro-
cedures being reviewed, report on the findings
and recommendations, and monitor manage-
ment’s response and implementation.
• Review and report on the accuracy, timeliness,
and relevance of the financial and other informa-
tion that is provided for management.
• Conduct any reviews or tasks requested by the
board, the audit committee, the chief executive
officer, or the finance director, provided such
reviews and tasks do not compromise the inde-
pendence or objectivity of the internal audit
function.
• Provide both management and the audit com-
mittee with an opinion on the internal controls
in the MFI.
Specifically, a regulated MFI needs to have an
internal audit manager or chief internal auditor,
internal auditors, and an audit committee.
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Chief Internal Auditor. While most NGO MFIs will
have an internal auditor in place, central bank
expectations for professionalism and independence
and the commensurate level of maturity needed for
this position may require the MFI to recruit exter-
nally for a chief internal auditor (CIA). The CIA
reports directly to the board of directors or the
audit committee of the board (see below), which
permits the auditor to report findings on an objec-
tive and independent basis without risk of unwar-
ranted dismissal. Regulators look for specific skills in
a CIA. It is recommended that this individual be a
professional accountant with familiarity with a vari-
ety of audit techniques, standards, and systems. In
Uganda, the MDI Act of 2003 states that the inter-
nal auditor must be approved by the central bank
and must carry out the following duties:6
• Evaluate the reliability of the information pro-
duced by accounting and computer systems.
• Provide an independent appraisal function.
• Evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency, and eco-
nomy of the institution’s operations; evaluate
compliance with laws, policies, and operating
instructions.
• Provide investigative services to line manage-
ment; certify returns submitted to the central
bank by the institution; and establish appropriate
accounting procedures and accounting controls
in respect of the institution’s business, and
ensure compliance with same.
• Require management of the institution to im-
plement and maintain appropriate internal con-
trol procedures and management information
systems.
• Review operations and transactions of the insti-
tution that could adversely affect the well-being
of the institution.
• Ascertain the nature of the external audit, coor-
dinate the internal and external audits, and con-
sider rectification and implementation of issues
raised by the external auditor.
• Perform an audit of the financial statements
of the institution to detect irregularities and
illegal acts in the conduct of the institution’s
business.
Internal auditors. The specific requirements for
internal auditors, including their qualifications,
profiles, and other criteria, will be dependent on the
needs and the size of the MFI after transformation.
Generally, additional internal auditors will be
needed with transformation because of the addition
of savings products and the numerous issues that
accompany accepting cash at the branch level. Fur-
thermore, with transformation come many more
complex transactions, making it important to
ensure that audit staff have the necessary skills
to audit a much broader scope of operations. For
example, internal auditors will no longer only audit
credit and other transactions at the branch, but
will also need to audit various back-office activities
that are new to the transformed institution. In
addition, various new head-office functions such as
treasury, supervision, and control will also need to
be audited. Internal auditors of regulated deposit-
taking MFIs should generally possess much more
comprehensive skills than those of credit-only MFIs: 
• A thorough knowledge of the principles, proce-
dures, and practices of accounting and financial
records and transactions
• A knowledge of audit procedures, including
planning, techniques, test, and sampling meth-
ods involved in conducting audits
• A knowledge of computerized accounting and
auditing record keeping systems
• An ability to gather, analyze, and evaluate facts
and to prepare and present concise oral and writ-
ten reports
• An ability to establish and retain effective work-
ing relationships with other MFI staff and to
communicate clearly and effectively, both orally
and in writing
• An ability to work unsupervised
Although many MFI NGOs may have appointed
internal auditors by simply reassigning loan officers,
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this method is unlikely to suffice once the institu-
tion transforms. Although credit officers under-
stand the business well, reassignment may create
difficulties in that they see themselves as peers of
the staff they are auditing.
Audit committee. If no distinct audit committee
exists on the board, the entire board assumes this
duty. Whether a separate audit committee is needed
is a function of the ability of the board to act as a
unit to perform these duties (or in some jurisdic-
tions, a board audit committee is required by the
regulators). When it becomes too cumbersome or
time consuming for the board to act effectively in
this capacity, the board should form an audit com-
mittee, which in turn formally reports back to the
board. Once it is determined that an audit commit-
tee should be created, the required qualifications
for committee members must be determined
(financial literacy, or experience in finance, audit, or
accounting); at least one member should be desig-
nated the “financial expert.” The financial expert is
someone who has a good understanding of gener-
ally accepted accounting principles and financial
statements and has the ability to assess the general
application of good principles in connection with
the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves,
and has experience in preparing, auditing, analyz-
ing, or evaluating financial statements (AICPA
2004).
Generally, audit committees have three to four
members each with three-year terms, ideally with
one member rotating each year. The committee
should meet at least four times a year and before the
annual meeting for the full financial year. The audit
committee should have a charter setting forth its
purpose, authority, composition, quorum, terms,
meetings, reporting, and responsibilities. This char-
ter should be ratified by the full board. See annex
12C for a sample charter of an audit committee.
The audit committee is responsible for reviewing
external audit reports (those performed by the
external audit firm, regulators, and tax authorities)
and ensuring any required corrective action is taken
by management. It also oversees and reviews the
activities of the CIA and assesses progress in meet-
ing the audit plan. During the last meeting each
year, the audit committee establishes dates of meet-
ings for the upcoming year, plans audit coverage for
the year with external and internal auditors, and
approves the internal audit plan including the
budget for staff time and the financial budget. 
The following questions provide a guideline for
an MFI to evaluate the effectiveness of the audit
committee(COSO 1994):
• Has the board recently reviewed the adequacy of
the audit committee’s written charter? 
• Is the audit committee functioning and, in fact,
independent of management? 
• Do audit committee members possess an appro-
priate mix of operating and financial control
expertise? 
• Does the audit committee understand and
monitor the broad organizational control
environment? 
• Does the audit committee oversee appropriate-
ness, relevance, and reliability of operational and
financial reporting to the board, as well as to
investors and other external users? 
• Does the audit committee oversee existence of
and compliance with ethical standards? 
• Does the audit committee or full board have a
meaningful but challenging relationship with
independent auditors, internal auditors, senior
financial control executives, and key corporate
and business unit operating executives? 
Operations of the Internal Audit Department
The specific design and implementation of an
internal audit function will vary among institu-
tions depending on the size, number of branches,
lending methodology, and reporting systems. The
internal auditor has the responsibility to review all
policies established by the institution and then to
design a series of internal control questionnaires,
or checklists, to use in determining whether those
390 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
policies are followed. As policies are revised or
updated, the checklists need to be revised as well.
In addition, periodic “spot-check” audits of
selected financial transactions should be carried
out.
Developing an audit plan. One of the primary tasks
of an internal audit department is to develop an
audit plan for the coming year. The audit plan
establishes the audit frequency, the types of audits
performed (normal branch audits, follow-up audits,
snap or spot-checks, operational audits, and process
audits), and the staff resources required.7 The
board audit committee must approve the audit
plan. The audit plan should include the following
(Champagne 2004): 
• The master audit plan showing the priority units
to be audited, the frequency, the risk assessment,
and the date of the last audit
• Based on the frequency and date of the last
audit, audits scheduled for the coming year
• The total staff hours required to perform these
audits compared to available audit hours in the
upcoming year (if a deficiency in staff hours is
found, a decision needs to be made whether to
reduce the scope of the audit or the coverage, to
increase staff, or a combination)
• The financial resources required to perform the
plan, including both operational and capital
expenditures
Audit scopes to a large extent affect the staff
hours budgeted for each activity. This means that
the detailed audit scopes for branch and head office
audits need to be drafted to establish some basis for
whether the intended scope can be performed in a
quality manner in the time allotted. Audit objec-
tives need to be clearly stated to meet regulatory
requirements for the evaluation of the following:
• The reliability of the information produced by
accounting and computer systems
• The effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of the
institutions’ operations
• Compliance with laws, policies, and operating
instructions
• The adequacy of internal control procedures and
management information systems
• The potential for operations and transactions to
adversely affect the institution’s well-being.
To comply with regulations, the annual audit
plan should generally include a plan to certify or
sign off on reports provided to the regulator. Inter-
nal audit must perform whatever tests it feels are
required to assert to the central bank that the report
content is accurate. The actual certification is a
management responsibility and should be carried
out by the chief financial officer or the chief execu-
tive officer. Certain reports should also be signed
off by the board. The internal and external auditors
perform tests as required to confirm accuracy of
what management has certified. These reports may
be weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annually and must
be submitted within stipulated time frames. In addi-
tion, the audit plan should state how the MFI will
coordinate activities as required with the external
auditor, and how it will address recommendations
for corrective action on issues raised by the external
auditor.
Ideally, the annual audit plan includes a full
branch audit and a follow-up audit as deemed nec-
essary, depending on the nature of audit findings
and confidence in the effectiveness of corrective
action taken, and at least one surprise spot audit in
each branch once a year.
When branch audits are conducted, the audit
should be planned in advance and the planning—
to include audit objectives, audit resources, and
work programs to establish procedures for testing—
should be documented in the working papers. The
scope, duration, and any audit requirements with
respect to working space and documents should be
communicated to the branch manager at the begin-
ning of each audit. The branch manager’s concerns
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should be discussed and considered in the perform-
ance of the audit.
In the course of a branch audit, audit findings
often reveal process improvements that could ben-
efit the whole organization. Corrective action must
then be recommended at a higher management
level than the branch manager.
With transformation, auditing the head-office
departments becomes much more complex
because the focus no longer remains primarily
on operations, that is, what goes on in the
branches and is consolidated at the head office.
Rather, with a licensed deposit-taking
institution, auditors will be required to audit much
more complex activities at the head office, including
treasury, MIS, and others and thus, as mentioned
above, additional skills are required. At least two
internal auditors should be assigned to perform
head-office audits to ensure accuracy and checks
and balances.
Developing the audit report. Audit reports present
the significant findings first, showing the impact on
the MFI if the condition is allowed to persist, and
whether the corrective action indicated will fix the
problem. To assist the audit department in more
fully developing their audit findings to show the rel-
evance to the organization, a process should be
developed in which audit findings are analyzed to
show the criteria used to measure the condition
(what should be), the condition noted (the “as is”),
the cause of the deviation between what should be
and what is, the effect of the condition if allowed to
persist, and recommendations to resolve the prob-
lem. This process, geared toward properly identified
causes, is what will diminish, control, or eliminate
the unfavorable condition. 
The audit report should be layered to meet the
needs of multiple readers, including the audit
committee, senior management, and line manage-
ment, because each requires differing levels of
detail. A sample audit report structure is provided
in annex 12D.
Training the audit staff. Audit staff will benefit from
periodic training on some or all of the following
topics:
• Developing audit findings
• Writing reports and determining adequate cor-
rective action
• Developing and maintaining working paper
standards
• Conducting fraud investigations
• Using audit planning process and documentation
• Using process mapping techniques
• Learning general banking topics, treasury man-
agement, supervision
Periodic surveys could also be useful to deter-
mine if staff are satisfied with the internal audit
process and if they feel they are being repre-
sented fairly and accurately by the internal audit
department.
Rating system. Some MFIs develop a rating system
to reflect the success of various branches and other
business units in managing risk and maintaining
adequate systems of internal control. Publication of
the rating guidelines and proposed branch audit
scope serves to motivate branch managers to
improve their operations in anticipation of the next
audit. To further motivate compliance and correc-
tive action, the audit rating can be incorporated
into the MFI’s performance incentive program.
The following questions provide a guideline for
an MFI to evaluate its internal audit function
(COSO 1994):
• Does internal audit have the support of top
management, the audit committee, and the
board of directors as a whole? 
• Has the written scope of internal audit responsi-
bilities been reviewed by the audit committee for
adequacy? 
• Is the organizational relationship between inter-
nal audit and senior executives appropriate? 
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• Does internal audit have and use open lines of
communication and private access to all senior
officers and the audit committee? 
• Are audit reports covering the right subjects dis-
tributed to the right people and acted upon in a
timely manner? 
• Do key audit executives possess an appropriate
level of expertise? 
Detective Control: The External Audit
An external audit is a formal and independent review
of an MFI’s financial statements, records, transac-
tions, and operations. It is performed by profession-
al accountants to lend credibility to the financial
statements and other management reports, and
identify weaknesses in internal controls and systems.
In most countries, regulators must approve the
external auditor and once approved, the MFI may
not change the external auditor without approval
again from the central bank. Some regulators also
require external auditors to change every few years.
The scope of an external audit can vary signifi-
cantly depending on the objectives of the audit.
The financial statement audit is the most common,
but management letters, special purpose audits, and
additional agreed upon procedures to be audited
may also be undertaken (table 12.2). 
Commissioning the Audit
The external auditor is usually engaged by, and
ultimately responsible to, the board of directors
through its audit committee. The process of com-
missioning an external audit begins by determining
a scope of work that lists the MFI’s requirements
and upon which audit firms can base their propos-
als (box 12.5). The scope of work generally needs
to be approved by the full board.
Evaluating external audit proposals. The MFI must
seek a balance in selecting the audit firm. It wants
auditors who are rigorous and objective. At the
same time, it wants to work with audit staff that
have the ability and judgment to understand the
unique circumstances and challenges of microfi-
nance. The relationship must be constructive, such
that the MFI feels that the auditor’s recommenda-
tions are supportive and the auditor feels that the
Table 12.2 Common External Audit Services for an MFI
Service Purpose Activities Output
Annual financial statement
audit
Management letter
Special purpose audit
Agreed upon procedures
To confirm that the financial
statements are free from
material misstatement
To obtain constructive com-
ments that management
can use to improve opera-
tions or internal controls
Generally to audit compli-
ance with donor require-
ments, including use of
funds
To obtain detailed results of
specific testing procedures
for selected transactions
or account balances
Audit, on a test basis, key
account balances and
underlying evidence or
procedures
By-product of the annual
financial statement audit
Review of specific issues as
requested by the client,
usually on behalf of the
donor
Performance of agreed
upon procedures
Audit report, including
an opinion, financial
statements, and notes
Management letter
Special audit opinion and
report
Report of results of
procedures without 
opinion; users draw 
their own conclusions 
Source: Lehman 2002.
MFI is making a good faith effort to address valid
concerns. Answers to the following questions will
help an MFI select an appropriate external auditor:
• Does the audit firm demonstrate an understand-
ing of the MFI by identifying elements of con-
cern or focus?
• Which set of auditing standards will the audit
firm use to conduct the audit?
• Does the audit approach reflect a review of
industry’s guidelines? (See the CGAP [1998]
publication, External Audits of Microfinance
Institutions: A Handbook.)
• Does the audit team include personnel with ade-
quate experience and qualifications?
• How well did the prospective auditor respond to
questions during the oral presentation?
• Does the proposal include any added value (for
example, suggestions on how to conduct the
audit more efficiently)?
Negotiating the fee. The fee is generally a function of
the level of effort and the hourly rates charged by the
firm. The bidder with the lowest price is not always
the best choice for the engagement. However, the
most expensive well-known firms with international
affiliations do not necessarily come with a guarantee
of technical or ethical quality. The selection of an
external audit firm and amount of the fee should be
based on factors reviewed above and presented to
the board for approval. In some cases, regulators
may determine the remuneration to be paid by the
MFI to the auditor approved by the regulator.
Contract or engagement letter. A contract or
engagement letter is used to formalize the audit
appointment. Generally, the audit firm will issue the
letter. The MFI must ensure that the final agree-
ment for the audit work reflects the work outlined
in the terms of reference and the proposal, as well
as the agreed level of effort and cost. 
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1. Introduction—Describe institution to be audi-
ted, party engaging the audit, and a brief state-
ment of services requested.
2. Description of the MFI and its organizational
structure—Identify key financial managers, list
of branches, and the like.
3. Prior year audits—Provide, if applicable.
4. Objective—Clearly state the financial statements
and period to be audited.
5. Scope—Specify expected procedures (for exam-
ple, adherence to specific standards, client visits,
and so forth).
6. Audit report and financial statements—Describe
expected content and presentation of the
statements. 
7. Management letter—List general areas to be
addressed and specific areas of concern.
8. Agreed-upon procedures—List additional proce-
dures to be audited, such as review of portfolio
systems, MIS, or internal control.
9. Timing—Provide deadline for completion of
audit report.
10. Preproposal survey—Ask the bidding firms to
spend time at the MFI (at their expense) to
gain information and understanding of the
organization.
11. Proposal format—Outline in detail the items to
be included in the proposal:
a. Understanding of the work
b. Audit approach—timing, procedures, and so
forth
c. Audit team—roles, experience, qualifications
d. Firm information—relevant experience, state-
ment of independence, principal clients,
adherence to standards 
12. Cost proposal—Request separate submission.
13. Deadline for submission of written proposals.
14. Oral presentations to the board (if desired).
Source: Lehman 2002.
Box 12.5 Key Elements of the External Audit Scope of Work
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Other Detective Controls
In addition to the use of internal and external
audits, an MFI can ensure other detective controls
are in place. For example, timely and relevant data
from the MIS can provide significant information to
help detect errors or fraud. Inventory management
also can provide an effective means of detecting
fraud or a lack of adequate internal controls. Man-
agement should periodically check that the inven-
tory balances are correctly stated in financial and
other records.
Supervision: Evaluating Internal
Controls
Transforming MFIs must address internal control
and risk management issues specific to the laws or
regulations with which it must comply. Many of
these issues are geared toward risk management
because the supervisor’s role is to ensure that
depositors’ savings are not at undue risk. 
Supervisors need to ensure that the internal
control system in regulated MFIs supports the
appropriate management of assets as well as
deposits, thus protecting the institution from pos-
sible loss, fraud, or inefficient use. Furthermore,
the supervisor needs to examine the reports and
data generated by the MIS for accuracy, reliability,
integrity, and relevance to decision making at the
different levels within the MFI as well as for its
stakeholders. Finally, the supervisor must ensure
the MFI adheres to prevailing rules and regulations
applicable to the MFI’s internal control policies,
including procedures, practices, competence, and
independence.
Prelicensing 
Before licensing an MFI to intermediate public
deposits, a regulator will require the MFI to
demonstrate strong internal controls. As dis-
cussed in chapter 2, Regulation and Supervision:
The Policy Framework, internal controls are at
the core of risk-based supervision. Before licens-
ing, the transforming MFI must demonstrate the
following:
• Branch and head office premises have strong
rooms and safes that meet central bank require-
ments and banking halls that will adequately
contain customer flows.
• The MIS meets certain capabilities with respect to
functionality and expandability, usability, report-
ing, and administration and support.
• The internal control system ensures operational
efficiency and effectiveness, reliable and accurate
reports, and compliance with applicable laws and
regulations.
• A sufficient risk-management program is in place
to identify, measure, monitor, and control the
level and type of risks to be assumed.
• Well-documented and standardized manuals
have been produced for risk management, credit,
human resources, operations, liquidity and funds
management, accounting, and internal audit.
• The CIA’s responsibilities are clearly outlined
and a competent qualified CIA is in place.
• The central bank has approved the external audi-
tor’s duties, appointment, and tenure.
• Appropriate governance is in place (or soon to
be), including adherence to board member qual-
ifications and completion of specific duties and
responsibilities as outlined in the law or the
regulations.
Ongoing Supervision
Once regulated, supervisors require all MFIs to
have an effective system of internal controls consis-
tent with the nature, complexity, and risk inherent
in the MFI’s activities. This system also needs to
respond to changes in the MFI’s environment and
conditions. In those instances in which supervisors
determine that an MFI’s internal control system is
not adequate or effective for the specific risk profile,
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the supervisor will take appropriate action (Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision 1998). For
example, in Uganda, MDIs must do the following: 
• Provide a letter of assurance to external auditors
stating that all financial and other related trans-
actions on- and off-balance sheets including con-
tingent liabilities have been disclosed.
• Report to a credit bureau details of all nonper-
forming loans classified as doubtful or loss as well
as all customers involved in financial malpractices
including bouncing of checks due to lack of
funds or fraud.
• Maintain accurate books of accounts including
vouchers, securities, records, computer systems,
and other financial and nonfinancial records
that show the true state of affairs and that
explain its transactions and financial position to
the central bank; records must be in English
and in accordance with international accounting
standards.
• Publish audited financial statements in the news-
paper with the external audit report and manage-
ment letter four months after year-end.
• Disclose to the regulator the name of any person
or group of related persons who hold 10 percent
or more of total voting rights.
• Take reasonable precautions to prevent loss or
destruction of books, accounts, vouchers, securi-
ties, records, computer systems, and other
financial and nonfinancial records; must prevent
falsification of entries, facilitate detection and
correction of inaccuracies, and ensure that unau-
thorized persons do not have access to or use of
information; keep corporate records for 10 years.
• Allow the central bank to freeze monies in any
account that is believed to contain the proceeds
of a crime.
• Send written notice to customers of dormant
accounts and unclaimed balances and hold such
balances in dormant register at head office for
three years without assessing any service charges;
after five years, funds must be remitted to the
central bank.
Below are examples of possible findings by the
regulatory authorities that would warrant action to
be taken to enhance internal controls:
• Inadequate segregation of duties with limited
internal controls in place
• Inactive audit committee
• Unacceptable or lack of external audit
• Management reports and accounting records
destroyed or missing
• Employees or officials with financial problems or
overt high standards of living from no apparent
source
• Multiple family members or related parties con-
trolling operations
• Inadequate or no review of internal control
reports provided by the MIS
• Computer entries with no identification as to
who performed the transaction
• Employees sharing passwords with other
individuals
• An MIS lacking adequate controls and audit trail
with little or no security features
• High employee turnover
• Poorly trained staff
All transforming institutions must determine
what specific internal controls and risk management
policies they must adhere to or consider once
licensed. A key task in the internal control review
process for transforming MFIs is to study the rele-
vant laws and regulations and ensure compliance.
Annex 12E provides an extensive checklist for
deposit-taking MFIs to use in determining whether
adequate controls are in place.
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Annex 12A Sample Terms of
Reference: Internal Controls
Assessment
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and so forth.
Objectives
The purpose of this consultancy is to strengthen
MFI A’s internal control and audit policies and pro-
cedures to ensure that the institution is able to
mitigate risks properly and on time and is able to
satisfy the regulators that its internal audit function
is sound. The related tasks should consider many
areas of the institution including branch operations
(loans, cash, and accounting), MIS, and risk man-
agement.
The assignment seeks a thorough study of the
current internal controls and audit procedures of
the institution to assist MFI A to put in place sound
internal control and audit policies and procedures.
Tasks
The consultant is responsible for completing the
following tasks. Because one of the objectives is to
build institutional capacity, the internal audit
department should be closely involved in the execu-
tion of these tasks. 
1. Review the relevant laws and implementing
regulations; if applicable, review the findings
and recommendations of the prelicensing
inspection report on internal controls and audit
management.
2. Review the branch operations policies and proce-
dures covering loans, cash, and accounting as
stated in the Branch Operations manual (or, if
applicable, the Internal Controls manual) and
assess the adequacy and effectiveness of those
policies and procedures in ensuring that internal
controls and supervision are in place; if necessary,
recommend improvements.
3. Review the Internal Audit manual and recom-
mend changes to ensure that the internal audit
department is able to detect noncompliance and
fraud.
4. Review MFI A’s banking software and assess the
integrity of data and access controls.
5. Assess the capacity (expertise, skills, and avail-
ability) of the internal audit department and the
audit committee to implement, monitor, and
supervise; recommend changes and improve-
ments to the internal audit department, its poli-
cies, and its procedures to comply with best prac-
tices and regulations.
6. Recommend reporting formats for the internal
audit department to report effectively to the
audit committee of the board, and transmit find-
ings and recommendations to the management
and branches.
7. Recommend to the board sound risk-
management policies and guidelines to ensure
adequate internal controls relating to credit,
operations, and compliance.
Deliverables
1. A comprehensive report that contains the
following:
a. Recommendations on how to address the
findings of the regulators as stated in their
prelicensing inspection report (if applicable)
b. Enhancements to the control policies and
procedures stated in the Branch Operations
manual
c. Improvements to the Internal Audit manual;
recommended strategies to ensure that the
internal audit department is able to detect
noncompliance and fraud
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d. Assessment of MFI A’s MIS for data integrity
and access controls including suggestions on
how MFI A could best use the system for
ensuring controls
e. Assessment of the capacity of the internal
audit department and audit committee to
monitor and enforce internal controls; recom-
mend skills and training requirements as
necessary
f. Recommended reporting formats including,
but not limited to, internal audit report to the
board, the regulators, management, and to
concerned branches
2. Proposed risk-management policies and guide-
lines for internal controls relating to credit, oper-
ations, and compliance
3. Brief consultancy completion report that includes
recommended follow-up steps or action plan for
MFI A
Qualifications
The consultant should have the following qualifica-
tions and experience:
• Postgraduate degree in business administration,
banking, finance, or related field; formal audit
designation preferred 
• At least five years of experience in internal audit
or risk management or both, preferably within a
commercial banking and microfinance setting 
• Familiarity with international best practices on
internal control and audit
• Experience in reviewing controls within manage-
ment information systems
Level of Effort
It is estimated this consultancy will take 20 to
25 days to complete.
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Annex 12B Internal Audit Manual:
Sample Outline of Contents
This outline is from Joyce Lehman, Internal Audit
Consultancy conducted under the SPEED Project,
Uganda, October 2002.
1.0 Risk management overview
2.0 Internal control system overview
2.1 Definition
2.2 Elements
3.0 The role of internal audit 
3.1 Place in risk-management process
3.2 Reporting protocol
3.3 Oversight responsibilities 
3.4 Liaison with external audit
4.0 Qualifications of the internal auditors
4.1 Professional
4.1.1 Education or experience
4.1.2 Code of conduct for the profession
4.2 Personal characteristics
4.2.1 Integrity
4.2.2 Confidentiality
4.2.3 Courteous with staff
4.2.4 Independence 
5.0 Structure of the internal audit department
5.1 Chief Internal Auditor
5.1.1 Duties
5.1.2 Reporting
5.2 Staff
5.2.1 Duties
5.2.2 Reporting 
6.0 Function of the internal audit department
6.1 Check for compliance with established
policies
6.1.1 Credit 
6.1.2 Cash handling 
6.1.3 Accounting
6.1.4 Procurement
6.1.5 Payroll
6.1.6 Compliance reporting
6.1.7 Financial statements
6.1.8 Fixed assets
6.1.9 Inventory and stores
6.1.10 Petty cash
6.1.11 Other
6.2 Confirm accuracy of manual transactions
7.0 Internal audit methodology and tools
7.1 Audit planning—budgets, schedules, and
so forth
7.2 Audit documentation
7.3 Audit forms—design work plans or ques-
tionnaires for each area of established policy
7.4 Audit files
7.5 Audit reports
7.6 Security of work space
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Annex 12C Sample Audit
Committee Charter
This sample audit committee charter is adapted
from Champagne (2004). 
Purpose
The purpose of the audit committee is to assist the
board of directors in fulfilling its oversight respon-
sibilities for reducing the risk of unreliable financial
reporting, ensuring the operational effectiveness
and efficiency of the internal control system and the
audit process, protecting the company’s assets from
misappropriation, and ensuring effectiveness of the
company’s process for monitoring compliance with
laws and regulations and code of conduct. While
the committee has the responsibilities and powers
set forth in this charter, it is not the duty of the
committee to plan or conduct audits to determine
that the company’s financial statements are com-
plete and accurate and are in accordance with gen-
erally accepted accounting principles. This is the
responsibility of management and the independent
auditors. Nor is it the duty of the committee to
conduct investigations.
Authority
The audit committee has authority to conduct or
authorize investigations into any matters within its
scope of responsibility. It is empowered to do the
following:
• Appoint, compensate, and oversee the work of
any registered public accounting firm employed
by the company.
• Resolve any disagreements between management
and the auditor regarding financial reporting.
• Preapprove all auditing and nonaudit services
provided by either internal or external auditors.
• Retain independent counsel, accountants, or
others to advise the committee or assist in the
conduct of an investigation.
• Seek any information it requires from employees—
all of whom are directed to cooperate with the
committee’s requests—or external parties.
• Meet with company officers, external auditors,
or outside counsel, as necessary.
• Review and approve proposals to outsource any
internal audit activities.
Composition
The audit committee will consist of at least three
and no more than four members of the board of
directors. The board will appoint independent
directors as committee members and the committee
chair. Each committee member will be both inde-
pendent and financially literate. At least one mem-
ber shall be designated as the “financial expert,” as
defined by professional accounting standards.
Meetings
The committee will meet at least four times a year,
with authority to convene additional meetings as
circumstances require. All committee members are
expected to attend each meeting, in person. The
committee will invite members of management,
auditors, or others to attend meetings and provide
pertinent information, as necessary. It will hold pri-
vate meetings with auditors (see below) and execu-
tive sessions. Meeting agendas will be prepared by
the chief internal auditor and provided one week in
advance to members, along with appropriate brief-
ing materials. Minutes will be prepared by the chief
internal auditor.
Responsibilities
The committee will carry out the following respon-
sibilities:
Financial statements
• Review significant accounting and reporting
issues, including complex or unusual transac-
tions and highly judgmental areas, and recent
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professional and regulatory pronouncements,
and understand their impact on the financial
statements. 
• Review with management and the external audi-
tors the results of the audit, including any diffi-
culties encountered.
• Review the annual financial statements, and con-
sider whether they are complete, consistent with
information known to committee members, and
reflect appropriate accounting principles.
• Review other sections of the annual report and
related regulatory filings before release and
consider the accuracy and completeness of the
information.
• Review with management and the external audi-
tors all matters required to be communicated to
the committee under generally accepted auditing
standards.
• Understand how management develops interim
financial information, and the nature and extent
of internal and external auditor involvement.
• Review interim financial reports with manage-
ment and the external auditors before filing with
regulators, and consider whether the reports are
complete and consistent with the information
known to committee members.
• Review procedures for the confidential, anony-
mous submission by staff of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters.
Review any submissions that have been received,
the current status, and the resolution if one has
been reached.
Risk management and internal control
• Provide oversight on the company’s guidelines
and policies with respect to business risk man-
agement.
• Question management, the chief internal auditor,
and the independent auditors about significant
risks or exposures facing the company; assess the
steps management has taken or proposes to take
to minimize such risks to the company; and peri-
odically review compliance with such steps.
• Consider the effectiveness of the company’s
internal control system, including information
technology security and control. 
• Understand the scope of internal and external
auditors’ reviews of internal control over finan-
cial reporting, and obtain reports on significant
findings and recommendations, together with
management’s responses.
Internal audit
• Review with management and the chief internal
auditor the charter, plans, internal audit manual,
budget, activities, staffing, and organizational
structure of the internal audit function. 
• Ensure there are no unjustified restrictions or
limitations on internal audit scope.
• Review and concur in the appointment, replace-
ment, or dismissal of the chief internal auditor.
• Review the effectiveness of the internal audit
function, including compliance with The Insti-
tute of Internal Auditors’ Standards for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, or
similar document.
• On a regular basis, meet separately with the chief
internal auditor to discuss any matters that the
committee or internal audit believes should be
discussed privately.
External audit
• Review the external auditors’ proposed audit
scope and approach, including coordination of
audit effort with internal audit, estimated fees,
and timing of auditor visits. 
• Review the performance of the external auditors,
and exercise final approval on the appointment
or discharge of the auditors. 
• Review and confirm the independence of the
external auditors by obtaining statements from
the auditors on relationships between the audi-
tors and the company, including nonaudit ser-
vices (such as tax services), and discussing the
relationships with the auditors. 
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• On a regular basis, meet separately with the
external auditors to discuss any matters that the
committee or auditors believe should be dis-
cussed privately.
• Ascertain that the external auditor’s service does
not exceed a continuous period of three years.
Compliance
• Review the effectiveness of the system for moni-
toring compliance with laws and regulations and
the results of management’s investigation and
follow-up (including disciplinary action) of any
instances of noncompliance. 
• Review the company policies relating to compli-
ance with ethics, conflict of interest, and the
investigation of misconduct and fraud, and
review significant cases of staff conflict of inter-
est, misconduct, or fraud.
• Review the findings of any examinations by reg-
ulatory agencies, and any auditor observations. 
• Review the process for communicating the code
of conduct to staff, and for monitoring compli-
ance with the code of conduct. 
• Obtain regular updates from management and
legal counsel regarding compliance matters.
Reporting 
• Regularly report to the board of directors
about committee activities, issues, and related
recommendations. 
• Provide an open avenue of communication
between internal audit, the external auditors,
and the board of directors. 
• Report annually to the shareholders, describing
the committee’s composition, responsibilities
and how they were discharged, and any other
information required by bylaws or regulations,
including approval of nonaudit services. 
• Review any other reports or issues that relate to
committee responsibilities.
Other
• Perform other activities related to this charter as
requested by the board of directors. 
• Institute and oversee special investigations as
needed. 
• Review and assess the adequacy of the com-
mittee charter annually, requesting board
approval for proposed changes, and ensure
appropriate disclosure as may be required by
law or regulation. 
• Confirm annually that all responsibilities out-
lined in this charter have been carried out. 
• Evaluate the committee’s and individual mem-
bers’ performance on a regular basis.
• Review with management the policies and
procedures with respect to officers’ expense
accounts and perquisites, including their use of
corporate assets, and consider the results of any
review of these areas by the internal auditor or
the independent auditors.
Approved by the board of directors at its meeting
on ___________ of ______________, 20___.
Signed by: ____________________________ 
Chair of the board of directors.
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Annex 12D Sample Format for
Quarterly Audit and Inspection
Activity Report to the Audit
Committee of the Board 
of Directors
This sample format for a quarterly audit and inspec-
tion activity report is adapted from Champagne
(2004).
The chief internal auditor will prepare and de-
liver a quarterly activities report to the audit com-
mittee of the board of directors as of the last full
three months ended since the last meeting of the
audit committee. The report will include the follow-
ing, at minimum:
1. Status of previously reported issues (follow-up
on management actions to determine that cor-
rective action was taken and is achieving desired
results, or the management or board has
assumed the risk of not taking corrective action
on reported findings).
2. Report to audit committee any external audits
in progress.
3. Audit reports issued: audit date, date issued,
rating (if assigned).
4. Significant and material findings during quarter
and recommendations. Reportable audit find-
ings include irregularities, illegal acts, errors,
inefficiency, waste, ineffectiveness, conflicts of
interest, control weaknesses. (Material would
be 5–10 percent of net income; 0.5–1 percent
of total assets; 0.5–1 percent of total revenues;
1 percent of total equity)
5. Comparison of audit plan to actual 
a. Comparison of financial budget to actual for
internal audit department with explanations
for variances, and projections as of year-end
with implications for completing audit plan
for year
b. Comparison of labor hours expended to
date to labor hour budget in annual plan
with explanations for variances, and projec-
tions as of year-end with implications for
completing audit plan for year
c. Proposed amendments to audit plan to
cover any expected shortfalls in annual audit
coverage
d. Audits in progress: audits during quarter as
per annual audit plan, other audits con-
ducted during quarter not in plan, other
assignments by management (showing rea-
son and status)
e. Fraud investigations (showing status,
amount of loss, how perpetrated, revised
control recommendations)
f. Conclusion as to the sufficiency of resources
to complete annual audit plan
6. Training and professional development
a. Status of audit staff training in comparison
with annual training program
b. Recommendations for upcoming training
opportunities and requirements
7. Annually (normally last meeting of year) 
a. Summary of accomplishments of prior year’s
audit plan
b. Summary of achievement of internal audit’s
development and performance objectives
c. Audits planned and labor hour budget,
including a brief description of risk analysis or
other method used to schedule audit coverage
d. Evaluation of controls for each major area of
institution to assess the control strengths,
weaknesses, and exposure for each area,
highlighting areas requiring special audit and
management attention for the coming year
e. Capital and operating budget for department
f. Annual training plan, including a summary
of staff qualifications, experience, education,
and certification
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Annex 12E Checklist for Internal
Control and Audits
This checklist is drawn from Pikholz and others
(2005, pp. 112–23).
Cash
1. Is all cash kept in a locked vault or safe during
nonbanking hours?
2. Is the vault protected by an adequate burglary
and/or robbery alarm system?
3. Is the movement of vault reserve cash subject
to dual control and record keeping?
4. Is a record maintained showing denominations
and amounts of reserve cash?
5. Is each teller supplied with his or her own cash
fund and his or her own vault compartment
for overnight storage (of keys and stamps at
least if cash is sold to the reserve at each end
of day).
6. Does teller management prescribe and enforce
cash limits for each teller fund?
7. Is the cash total maintained at each branch kept
to prescribed levels, and are levels reasonable?
8. Are interteller transfers made by vouchers veri-
fied by both tellers?
9. Is each teller’s cash checked daily to a control
total developed by the accounting system?
10. Is each teller’s cash periodically verified on a
surprise basis by designated individuals, and is a
record of the count retained?
11. Do tellers provide receipts to customers for all
transactions?
12. Do tellers participate in a structured training
program that provides guidelines for handling
all types of transactions?
13. Are tellers closely supervised, assisted, and
trained on the job?
14. Is a two-week leave or absence rule enforced?
15. Are tellers prevented from having access to
accounting records, once processed?
16. Are teller differences cleared daily?
ATMS and PINs [Automated Teller Machines
and Personal Identification Numbers]
1. Is daily access to the ATM under dual control?
2. Do the location, lighting, and construction of
the ATM provide adequate security for cus-
tomers and servicing personnel?
3. Are customers’ PINs mailed or delivered sepa-
rately from ATM cards?
Interoffice and Interbranch Transactions
1. Are the suspense accounts for interoffice and
interbranch transactions reviewed daily by a
designated person?
2. Are transactions recorded on two-part forms
that identify the sending and receiving offices
and the party initiating the transfer entry?
3. Is the reconcilement activity performed at a
central location by a person or group with no
authority to originate interoffice or interbranch
transactions or handle cash?
Due from Bank Accounts 
1. Are only designated officers allowed to draw on
due from bank accounts?
2. Are limited balances kept in accounts that may
be drawn upon by drafts?
3. Are due from bank advices, paid drafts, and
statements sent directly to an independent rec-
onciling unit within the MFI?
4. Are all due from bank accounts reconciled reg-
ularly in accordance with an established fre-
quency schedule?
5. Is a separate general ledger account or individ-
ual subsidiary account established for each due
from bank account?
6. Are bank statements satisfactorily reconciled on
a timely basis with individual difference items,
identified by date and amount?
7. Are approved depositories designated?
8. Are guidelines established for average balances
to be maintained at each depository?
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9. Are guidelines established for the write-off of
old reconciling items?
Credit Products
1. Is the MFI’s loan policy formalized and
approved by the board of directors?
2. Does the loan policy specify lending limits for
various ranks of officers and loan committees?
3. Are there procedures for periodic reporting of
concentrations of credit?
4. Is there an adequate audit trail of loan proceeds
disbursed, such as disbursement by check or
deposited to the borrower’s account?
5. Is there a signed application on file for each
loan?
6. Are credit files set up for each borrower?
7. Are loan records posted and reconciled with
the general ledger control accounts daily?
8. Are paid notes and loan agreements and relat-
ed documents returned promptly to borrow-
ers and cancelled or marked “paid” where
appropriate?
9. Are past due account reports prepared by
someone other than a teller or cash handler?
10. Are data processing personnel prohibited from
making or adjusting entries to borrower’s
accounts?
11. Does the board regularly receive statistical
reports describing the overall performance of
the loan portfolio?
Collateral and Securities
1. Is all collateral (securities) receipted with multi-
copy, prenumbered forms that provide a cus-
tomer receipt, credit file receipt, and vault
receipt?
2. Is all collateral or security held under joint cus-
tody, and do the collateral forms provide for
the initials of the joint custodians on all collat-
eral movements?
3. Are adequate procedures in effect to monitor
the value and condition of all collateral?
Interest and Fees
1. Has the MFI established definite loan rate and
fee policy guidelines for various credit products?
2. Are the exact terms (basis of interest and fee
computations, rate, and amount of fees) stated
in every loan agreement?
3. Do changes in terms require the formal
approval of the person or group authorized to
grant the loan?
4. Are customers provided formal receipts for
their loan payments that are dated and identify
the persons receiving the payments?
5. Are the rates and amounts of loan income
expected for the year and for each month set
down in a formal budget, and are variances ana-
lyzed and corrective action taken?
Loan Losses
1. Has a formal policy been adopted for writing
off assets?
2. Does that policy specify write-off criteria, pro-
cedures for periodic review, and collection
efforts to be undertaken?
3. Does management evaluate the adequacy of the
general reserve at least quarterly? 
4. Are notes and loan agreements repre-
senting written-off loans placed in joint cus-
tody and is supporting collateral adequately
protected?
5. Are collection efforts reasonable and effective?
Fixed Assets
1. Does the MFI’s inventory control system pro-
vide controls over access to movable property?
2. Are signed receipts required for the removal of
equipment?
3. Are purchasing and sales activities segregated
from the bill paying function?
4. Do the MFI’s policies and procedures preclude
conflict of interest or self-dealing in the selec-
tion of vendors, suppliers, and insurers?
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Savings Deposits
1. Are the rules and regulations governing savings
deposits established, approved by the board of
directors, and published?
2. Are new accounts personnel prohibited from
performing teller and accounting duties?
3. Are signature cards and other appropriate
account opening identification obtained and
filed when accounts are opened?
4. Are account numbers assigned in an orderly
and controllable fashion?
5. Are original passbooks prenumbered?
6. Do tellers issue receipts for all deposits, includ-
ing date, amount of deposit, and teller
identification?
7. Do tellers stamp the date and a teller identifica-
tion number on all transactions accepted?
8. Are subsidiary controls reconciled to the gen-
eral ledger daily, and are reconciling items
investigated by persons who do not handle cash
or post savings transactions?
9. Are customer differences and complaints han-
dled by someone who does not receive,
process, or post savings transactions?
10. Does the control system provide for placing
holds on accounts requiring special attention
(for example, dormant accounts, deceased
owner accounts, lost passbook accounts,
accounts pledged as loan collateral, accounts
requiring further data, and so on)?
11. Do withdrawals over a certain amount require
supervisory approval?
12. Is a closed account report generated and circu-
lated to designated officers?
13. Are accounts with no activity for a specified
period transferred to dormant status and placed
under dual control?
14. Is interest calculated and credited to customer
accounts independently? Is this done by per-
sons free from teller, account opening and gen-
eral accounting duties?
15. Are employee account transactions specially
classified, reported, and reviewed?
16. Are interest journals reviewed by independent
personnel and are large amounts reviewed and
recalculated?
17. Are exception reports reviewed by a control
person who does not receive, process, or post
savings transactions?
Fixed Deposits
1. Has the MFI established a formal policy,
approved by the board of directors, governing
the fixed deposit function?
2. Is each depositor required to complete and sign
an application in which penalty provisions for
premature redemption are disclosed?
3. Are all fixed deposit contracts countersigned by
an independent MFI official?
4. Is special approval required for premature
redemption?
5. Are certificates transferred to a noninterest
bearing demand deposit general ledger classifi-
cation at maturity?
Security
1. Do the windows permit a clear view of the
MFI’s or bank’s interior and are they kept rea-
sonably unobstructed?
2. Have exterior lights been installed to illuminate
all darkened or shadowed areas around the
MFI?
3. Is the vault area illuminated at night?
4. Is there an emergency lighting source?
5. Are the locks on exterior doors and windows
tamper-resistant?
6. Are doors and windows equipped with steel
bars or other burglar-resistant materials?
7. Are all unusual entrances (air conditioner
intakes, manholes, skylights, and the like) pro-
tected by an alarm, steel bars, or other?
8. Is there a regular procedure for securing side
and back doors while the MFI is open for
business?
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9. Are all entrances to the teller work area locked
while the MFI is open or while customers are in
the MFI?
10. Is there a documented procedure for opening
and closing the building and vaults that pro-
tects against attacks?
11. Are armed guards on duty in the lobby during
banking hours?
12. Are there alarm-activating devices at lobby
teller stations?
13. Is there an emergency power supply for use if
the regular supply fails?
14. Are vaults made of steel-reinforced concrete?
15. Are vaults equipped with a dial combination
lock, a time lock, and a substantial lockable day
gate?
16. Are safes too heavy for relatively easy removal,
and are they securely anchored to the premises?
17. Are safe doors equipped with a combination
lock?
18. Are the vault walls, floor, ceiling, and door pro-
tected by an alarm system?
19. Is the vault equipped with an alarm or tele-
phone so that an employee locked in the vault
can sound an alert?
20. Is opening of the vault under dual control?
21. Are there standard operating procedures for the
safe transit of cash not needed at each office?
22. Are precautions taken to prevent theft of all
unissued forms, checks, drafts, and the like?
23. Are tellers and other lobby personnel regu-
larly trained in robbery and postrobbery
procedures?
Emergency Preparedness
1. Does the MFI have a formal emergency pre-
paredness plan that has been reviewed and
approved by the board of directors?
2. Does the plan provide for alternate physical
facilities in the event that the MFI’s head office
or other vital facilities are destroyed?
3. Are vital records protected by duplication and
safe off-premises storage?
4. Is there a plan for continuity of management?
Insurance
1. Has the MFI’s policy with regard to insurance
been approved by the board of directors?
2. Does it call for formal analysis and considera-
tion of all insurable risks and types of coverage?
3. Does the MFI retain all insurance policies in an
orderly file, and are all riders and endorsements
attached to the policies?
4. Are policy expiration dates properly diarised to
assure prompt payment of renewal premiums?
Computer Processing
[Pikholz and others (2005) drew this section from
Gordon Morris & Associates (1991).]
1. Are computer operations performed where
they cannot be seen by the general public and
unauthorized visitors?
2. Does the server room have heat or smoke
detectors, temperature and humidity control
equipment, water sensors, and alternate power
supply (UPS system)?
3. Are emergency plans for computer processing
included in the MFI’s emergency preparedness
plans?
4. Do emergency plans include procedures for the
safe storage of data files and documents?
5. Do emergency procedures include power-off
procedures, restart, and recovery procedures
for equipment failure?
6. Does the contingency plan specify conditions
for off-site processing?
7. Is there a policy for retention of backup data
files to ensure that adequate recovery capability
exists?
8. Are there operating manuals for the system
and users, including error messages with appro-
priate responses, restart, and recovery proce-
dures?
9. Are programmers prohibited from running test
programs against live production files?
10. Have controls been established for each source
of data entering the automated system?
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11. Is output reconciled to input by persons not
responsible for the data entry?
12. Are parameter changes properly approved, doc-
umented, and tested?
13. Are parameter changes reported and reviewed
by an appropriate officer?
14. Is access controlled by user IDs and passwords
that are tracked by the system and reported?
15. Are changes to access levels reviewed by an
appropriate officer not responsible and without
ability to initiate such changes?
16. Are controls in place for vendor supplied
changes to ensure proper installation?
Notes
The authors would like to thank Pamela Champagne
of Shorebank Advisory Services and Joyce Lehman of
Mennonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA)
for the extensive use in this chapter of their excellent
materials developed under the USAID/SPEED Project
in Uganda during 2002 to 2004. 
1. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a
committee of banking supervisory authorities that
was established by the central bank governors of
the Group of Ten countries in 1975. It consists of sen-
ior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and
central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. It usually meets at the Bank for International
Settlements in Basle, Switzerland, where its permanent
Secretariat is located.
2. For a detailed explanation of process mapping, see
Champagne and others (2004).
3. Parts of this section are summarized from two World
Council of Credit Unions sources: Branch and Klaehn
(2002) and WOCCU (2002).
4. Some of this section is summarized from WOCCU
(2002). 
5. See http://www.theiia.org/index.cfm?doc_id=5402
#1__What_is_internal_auditing_.
6. The Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institutions Act,
2003, Part IV, Section 28, p. 30.
7. Some MFIs may want to also include client audits,
especially of client groups, in their audit programs.
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Customer Service and Operations
The transformation of a microfinance institu-tion (MFI) into a regulated deposit-takinginstitution requires a number of significant
operational changes. In the branch network, bank-
ing halls often need to be created or expanded
complete with teller windows, sales desks, customer
service points, and desks or offices for supervisors
and branch managers. Procedures for cash manage-
ment at the branches and deposit account man-
agement, both often new to the transforming insti-
tution, need to be developed and implemented.
Policies and procedures for both current and new
products need to be clearly documented in standard
format and distributed to branches and head-office
staff. Furthermore, the operations area (in some
cases referred to as “supervision”) will be thor-
oughly reviewed by regulators as part of the licens-
ing process. In fact, the licensing decision is likely
to be based, in part, on the efficiency and
professionalism of the overall operations of the MFI.
In sum, the operations of the transforming MFI
need to be examined, upgraded, standardized, well-
documented, and the appropriate personnel trained.
In addition, with transformation to a deposit-
taking institution, the customer’s experiences
and expectations with regard to products and
service levels change. Regulated MFIs have to
ensure they provide excellent customer service. For
many credit-only nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), clients principally interact with the MFI’s
loan officers. In many cases, clients may never enter
the MFI’s branches because all loan transactions
occur “under a tree” or in separate community cen-
ters. This generally changes with transformation
because the primary delivery channel for the insti-
tution’s products and services becomes the branch
and is thus the focal point for customer service
efforts. Conducting transactions in the branch will
define the way in which clients perceive the institu-
tion and dramatically influence their buying behavior.
With the addition of deposit mobilization,
transforming MFIs often need to spend significant
time and resources upgrading their branch net-
works and reexamining the way in which clients
are served and information is communicated. The
branch network is critical to communicating the
corporate brand and is a vital determinant of
the cost structure of the institution.
As mentioned in chapter 12, Internal Control
and Audits, credit-only NGOs often structure their
lending operations so that staff do not handle cash,
which helps reduce the temptation of fraud and
Chapter 13
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generally makes internal controls and accounting
easier for the MFI. In addition, the opening and
closing of savings accounts, deposits, withdrawals,
and other teller transactions are likely to be new to
the transforming MFI. Furthermore, while the MFI
may have general policies on managing documenta-
tion and inventory, those policies will need to be
reevaluated in light of regulatory expectations.
Operations becomes a critical component of a
transformed MFI’s strategy to meet compliance
requirements, strengthen its position in the
marketplace, and realize its commercial and social
goals.
This chapter begins with a general discussion of
the evolution of operations with transformation—
both function and structure. Given the close link
between customer service and operations in a trans-
formed MFI, the next section introduces key
aspects of customer service, providing concrete
suggestions on how to evaluate and improve it.
The bulk of the chapter then focuses on branch
operations concluding with a discussion on spe-
cific back-office operations—cash management,
deposit account management, and documentation
management—that transforming MFIs typically
need to further develop or in some cases address for
the first time as they plan to intermediate public
deposits. 
Transformation of Operations 
The operations of an MFI include planning, direct-
ing, delivering, and controlling the daily activities
related to the delivery of products and services. The
operations department supports the application of
operating policies and procedures and ensures over-
all reconciliation between the different functions of
the MFI, providing ongoing feedback to senior
management. In particular, the operations depart-
ment oversees the functioning of the branch net-
work from the operating perspective and frequently,
the marketing perspective as well.
Role of the Operations Department 
Operations activities for an MFI NGO tend to be
largely supportive—typically considered “back-
office” functions—supporting the more “front-
office” functions of the commercial activities that
provide direct service to the clients, such as mobi-
lizing clients, disbursing loans, receiving pay-
ments, and other daily activities. For a regulated
deposit-taking institution, however, the role of the
operations department expands beyond the back-
office functions, as teller and marketing functions
are added, both of which involve direct client inter-
action. At the same time, the efficiency of some of
the more traditional back-office functions, such as
transaction processing, become more important to
client satisfaction as clients become more discerning
in their choice of service provider. As discussed in
chapter 9, Human Resources Management, the
addition of supervisors at the branch level (and
sometimes at the head office as well) to assist with
the front-office functions helps branch managers
ensure that the overall operations of the branch run
smoothly. The role of the operations department
in a transformed MFI therefore extends beyond
simply providing back-office support and includes
the following:
• Ensuring adequacy and maintenance of
infrastructure: The operations department is
responsible for maintaining delivery channels.
It must ensure that the branch network, sub-
branches, agencies, automated teller machines
(ATMs), and tellers are sufficient for the volume
of business being generated. In transforming
MFIs, the operations department not only needs
to maintain delivery channels but may well
need to develop new delivery channels as part of
the transformation process. This can be a signif-
icant task, particularly for MFIs that have never
managed cash before and realize that the existing
infrastructure is unable to accommodate large
banking halls. For example, Compartamos in
Mexico considered partnering with other
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institutions and using third-party payment sys-
tems on an outsource basis to compensate for
their insufficient branch infrastructure. 
• Managing performance: The operations depart-
ment monitors all aspects of branch perform-
ance, comparing efficiency indicators across the
branch network and ensuring branches meet
their savings, portfolio, and profitability targets.
Operations staff members also work to motivate
front-line staff and to develop a team approach
to achieve greater productivity. An effective
operations manager, in conjunction with the
branch manager, closely monitors the activities
and accomplishments of branch staff and helps
staff reach performance targets, and helps the
MFI attain its profit targets on schedule. 
• Ensuring adherence to policies and procedures:
Clients expect branches to perform consistently,
and tend only to notice when things go wrong
or do not meet expectations. The operations
department, jointly with the internal audit
department, ensures that policies are followed
consistently in all branches. This not only helps
to reduce the possibility of fraud but also helps to
ensure standardization across branches. It may
also follow up with client complaints and, if nec-
essary, propose changes in policies or procedures.
• Identifying systems or applications problems or
weaknesses: The operations department is res-
ponsible for ensuring all systems in the branches
are working. For example, it is responsible for
monitoring all transaction systems and ensuring
tellers are able to use the systems effectively when
trying to post a transaction or carry out end-of-
day processing. Thus, the operations department
serves as a link between the information technol-
ogy department and the branches.
• Ensuring adequate and secure operating and
cash balances: The operations department,
jointly with the treasurer, is responsible for
ensuring the branches have enough cash. Opera-
tions must also ensure that any excess cash is
handled safely and securely, by establishing
comprehensive cash management procedures for
handling large sums of cash, use of safes in the
branches, teller approval limits, transporting cash
to and from the branch, and any other cash-
related issues.
• Identification of process bottlenecks: The opera-
tions department has a great advantage in
seeing how the day-to-day business flows occur
at the branch level. Coordinated attempts
are made to understand process bottlenecks
through process mapping (discussed briefly in
chapter 12, Internal Control and Audits) and
improving all procedures.
• Maintaining brand consistency: The operations
department works to ensure that every branch
looks and feels the same and ensures the MFI’s
brand is evident and consistent.1
• Maintaining high levels of client service: The
operations department works closely with the
marketing department (which is normally
responsible for conducting market research and
monitoring levels of client service), helping to
manage call centers, register complaints and
questions, and monitor suggestion boxes.2
• Maintaining high levels of product knowledge:
The operations department helps to ensure that
each staff member is fully aware of the client
benefits of each financial service provided by the
institution. Jointly with the marketing or the
human resources department, operations staff
perform product-based training and conduct
product knowledge tests.
• Optimizing branch marketing: In coordination
with the marketing department, the operations
department ensures that branches maintain a
consistent and coherent approach to marketing
products and services. The operations depart-
ment monitors the display of client communica-
tions, including posters, brochures, and other
materials.
• Optimizing customer service: Operations staff
members are also in a position to receive feed-
back from clients on a daily basis and ensure that
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client service goals are being met. Operations
staff members work closely with the human
resources department to ensure adequate train-
ing of front-office staff and to ensure that appro-
priate incentives are established for branch
personnel.
• Reporting to senior management: Operations or
supervision staff members provide an invaluable
service to senior management by reporting on
activities, accomplishments, problems, and plans
for the branches or units. They may also propose
new products or improvements to existing prod-
ucts or services and follow up on feedback or
findings made by internal audits, external audits,
and regulators. 
Structure of the Operations Department
The structure of the operations department
depends on the organizational structure and the
size of the transforming MFI. Operations staff may
be concentrated at head office and make frequent
visits to branches, or separate operations staff may
be based in the branches. In branches that are not
large enough to warrant their own operations man-
ager or supervisor, the branch manager may take on
this role. 
Job descriptions for operations staff vary among
institutions, but in general operations staff spend
significant time in the banking halls where they can
oversee tellers and customer service agents, and
provide approvals for transactions beyond the line
staff limits, as well as assist with customer queries or
complaints as they arise. Often operations man-
agers’ or supervisors’ desks are placed specifically
where they can see each of the tellers’ workstations
and can monitor client flow, addressing any
problems that may arise. By physically keeping all
the teller windows in sight, operations managers or
supervisors can ensure that tellers are following poli-
cies, especially those related to cash management.
Generally, the operations manager at the branch
reports to the branch manager and will have line
staff who report to him or her. However, this
reporting hierarchy depends in large part on the
branch manager’s duties and the reporting structure
of the credit officers. If the branch is large enough,
some MFIs have both a credit manager or supervi-
sor and a savings manager or supervisor, who over-
see the line staff and in turn report to the branch
manager. In smaller branches, there may be only
one manager or supervisor or even one manager or
supervisor overseeing two or more small branches.
Customer Service Framework
An MFI may have all the right products and guide-
lines in place, but if its branches are congested, its
personnel uninformed, and its procedures inconsis-
tently applied (all key elements of operations),
client satisfaction and loyalty will be low.3 Customer
service is the ability of an institution to constantly
and consistently satisfy clients’ wants and needs.
With transformation, MFIs need to significantly
increase their focus on customer service, particu-
larly given the competitive environment in which
the transformed MFI may find itself.
Although not necessarily intuitive, customer
service also includes areas of the MFI that do not
come in direct contact with the client. For example,
if back-office support staff are slow inputting loan
application information, the resulting delayed dis-
bursement will impact service quality as much as a
rude teller. For this reason, the entire institution is
involved in providing excellent customer service.
Customer service is one element of customer satis-
faction that, in turn, generates customer loyalty
(figure 13.1).4 Other aspects such as total product
and image are discussed in chapter 4, Marketing
and Competitive Positioning. 
The quality of customer service can be meas-
ured by the difference between the customer expe-
rience and his or her expectations. Excellent cus-
tomer service is achieved by exceeding customers’
expectations—even slightly—both consistently and
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creatively. Too often, however, the gap between
customers’ preferences and the perceived level of
service received breeds dissatisfaction. See fig-
ure 13.2. This gap can be caused by a variety of
factors discussed in chapter 4, Marketing and Com-
petitive Positioning. These negative factors include
the following:
• Inadequate market research: Does management
understand customer needs and preferences?
Has management correctly analyzed competitive
standards against which the client is measuring
the MFI?
• Flawed business model: Have the perceptions of
customer needs and preferences been successful-
ly translated into design of the product, policies,
and procedures? 
• Implementation problems: Is the service gap
related to a failure in the execution of the com-
pany’s business model, whether delivery chan-
nels, information technology, human resources,
or communication?
• Raised expectations: Is there consistency
between internal and external communications?
Have promotional campaigns falsely raised client
expectations? Has the social or political context
within which the MFI is working changed,
thereby affecting client needs and preferences?
Customer Service Strategy
Given the multifaceted nature of potential customer
service failures, strategies to improve the customer
experience are based on a variety of factors that
include standardization of policies and procedures,
delivery channels, human resources, technology,
and communications within the MFI. 
Policies and procedures. Systemizing procedures
and standardizing policies is a challenge for MFIs as
they transform but is vitally important to achieving
consistency and reliability—both crucial character-
istics of good customer service. Many MFIs pride
themselves on tailoring solutions to individual
clients and decentralizing authority to make deci-
sions. Nonetheless, MFIs will find it important that
the transformation process identify minimum stan-
dard levels and quality controls to ensure good
service is maintained as the MFIs’ services expand
in scale and scope. In addition, policy adjustments
are often necessary to meet customer expectations
for flexible, accessible, fast service. This issue is
particularly relevant for microfinance and other
service industries in which the distinctions between
“product” and “customer service” are blurred,
given that the former can be as intangible as the
latter. 
Loyalty
Customer
service
Image Personnel
Total
product
Figure 13.1 Elements of Customer Loyalty
Source: Churchill and Halpern 2001.
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Figure 13.2 Customer Service
Framework
Source: Marketing and Product Development
Unit, ACCION International.
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Delivery channels. Branches can become a source
of service problems in transformed MFIs, as they
try to manage higher traffic flows associated with
expanded services. Wait time is a consistent cus-
tomer complaint, along with disorganization, lack
of orientation or guidance, and insufficient seating.
In addition, convenience, including location of
the branch and its hours of operation, can con-
tribute to or hinder excellent customer service.
Many transformed MFIs explore channels com-
plementary to their branch network, such as
ATMs and remote transaction systems, to meet the
higher service levels customers expect from a
regulated financial institution (as opposed to an
NGO). With all delivery channels, the challenge is
to maintain consistency across all points at which
the customer interacts with the MFI, in terms of
service quality, available information, and other
“tangibles.”5 (See chapter 4, Marketing and
Competitive Positioning, for further discussion on
delivery channels.)
Technology. Technology becomes relevant for
customer service because it enhances informa-
tion quality, speed of service, and convenience.
Technology—point-of-sale devices, personal digital
assistants, credit scoring, biometrics, and other
innovations—has the potential to improve informa-
tion reliability and reduce processing time and
transactions costs. However, technology upgrades
during the transformation process can actually
create short-term service problems as bugs are
worked out, temporary patches are removed, and
staff become familiar with the new systems. Many
of the service strategies involve developing and
documenting contingency plans to deal with the
inevitable system crashes or freezes, power outages,
or data loss. The goal is to move the MFI from an
ad hoc approach to a more systematic approach to
dealing with these issues to maintain quality cus-
tomer service.
Human resources. The human resources area is
usually the primary focus of customer service
efforts—MFIs require staff to attend training that
emphasizes the MFI mission and the importance
of excellent customer service. Such training is a crit-
ical lever in improving service quality because it
is founded on an understanding that excellent cus-
tomer service begins internally. If the internal
clients are not satisfied, they will probably not pro-
vide good customer service to external clients. A
transforming MFI should conduct an assessment of
staff satisfaction, ideally through internal focus
groups, to identity the root causes of service prob-
lems for both the internal and external clients. The
most common human resources–related causes of
negative external customer service include
• Low employee moral caused by lack of a profes-
sional development path, perceived unrespon-
siveness to needs, meager pay in relation to
level of effort, lack of recognition, perceived
lack of transparency, low authority levels, and
micromanagement
• Poor or outdated training in policy and proce-
dures, skills development, or product details
• Weak organizational culture that is not centered
on the client or service (This issue is one of the
greatest challenges in developing and imple-
menting a customer service strategy.)
Addressing human resources issues requires
adjustments in recruitment, training, delegation of
authority, remuneration, and professional develop-
ment. See chapter 9, Human Resources Manage-
ment, for further discussion.
Communications. Both internal and external com-
munications are critical components in customer
service—external communications establish exter-
nal clients’ expectations and internal communica-
tions determine how the internal client satisfies
them. Most important, the promises communi-
cated in the promotional material must match what
the MFI delivers. Underpromising to keep cus-
tomer expectations low and then overdelivering
is the best outcome. Consistency is an important
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component of communications, which is why man-
uals or information sheets with frequently asked
questions can be helpful customer service tools.
Studies consistently show the value of soliciting
client feedback not only in improving delivery of
financial services but as an active ingredient in pro-
moting positive “word of mouth” among the target
group.6 Mechanisms to solicit client feedback
include the following:
• Client surveys: carefully worded and tested
surveys, easy to complete in a timely manner
designed to solicit client feedback on specific
issues or in general
• Focus group discussions: carefully moderated dis-
cussions with groups of clients designed to solic-
it client feedback on key issues
• Suggestion boxes: many suggestion boxes that sit
dusty and unused because clients feel their opin-
ions will have limited impact on the MFI (The
volume and quality of suggestions can be signif-
icantly increased through active promotion of
the suggestion box as a feedback mechanism.
Posters soliciting client feedback can be promi-
nently displayed, and a board showing institu-
tional responses to client suggestions can be
created and set up.)
A feedback system is also important for internal
clients—to deepen and update understanding of
their needs and communicate actions taken to meet
them. Feedback systems involve not only collect-
ing information (through suggestion boxes, staff
meetings, impromptu field visits, or other means)
but also tabulating and acting on the information
proactively to improve service. 
Improving Customer Service 
The business process of improving customer service
is based on a systematic, multidisciplinary, phased
approach outlined below. The MFI will likely find it
useful to appoint a customer service champion to
lead the process. 
Analysis and preparation. The process starts with
understanding the problems, their root causes,
and what the MFI hopes to achieve. This infor-
mation is gathered using a variety of marketing
intelligence—gathering techniques, including staff
interviews, labor climate surveys, focus groups,
mystery shoppers,7 time and motion studies,8 and
(if necessary) quantitative surveys with clients. The
goal of this phase is to elicit the following results:
• An understanding of the customer experience and
the key contact points: The results of the research
are analyzed to understand the key contact
points or “moments of truth” that affect client
perception of service quality. For example, if
good clients (large depositors, or those that
always pay loans on time) are not given prefer-
ential treatment when they visit the branch
(contact point), they may not feel the MFI
appreciates their business.
• Determination of root causes: Considering how
each of the various areas discussed above con-
tribute to customer service problems will help
uncover the root causes. For example, if cus-
tomers are complaining about the waiting time
in branches, it may be because of technology
problems, issues within human resources, a lack
of communication with clients, or improper
delivery channels (see figure 13.3).
• Definition of institutional vision for customer
service: Mystery shopping and time and motion
studies are performed on the MFI, as well as on
its competition to establish industry standards or
benchmarks against which the MFI can measure
its own performance and set goals for minimum
levels of service quality. In general, the MFI
must determine what it hopes to achieve in its
efforts to improve customer service and how
much it is willing to invest. Transformation is the
time when the institution can decide to establish
differential service levels—a baseline minimum
standard it wants to commit to uphold as part of
its brand promise and, potentially, an elite level
for preferred clients. 
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Strategy development. Once the analysis and
preparation phase is complete, findings are pre-
sented and brainstorming sessions are held by com-
ponent and by segment to compare those service
dimensions most highly valued by clients with the
cost and complexity of implementing various solu-
tions. Solutions that are easy and inexpensive to
implement and are prioritized by the client—such
as organizing transactions slips in the branches
or adding more seats for clients—are implemented
immediately. 
To solve more complex customer service prob-
lems, quantitative surveys, such as those that mea-
sure the relative importance of different service
dimensions and how well the MFI performs on
each one, may be helpful in prioritizing different
recommendations. As shown in figure 13.4, this fic-
titious MFI should focus on lowering minimum
required balances, raising interest rates paid on
deposits, and improving wait time—the dimensions
of service most important to clients and in which
the institution is performing relatively weakly. 
The timing to implement various solutions
depends on the cost, institutional capacity, and
strategic importance in the MFI’s overall position-
ing. In all cases, the MFI must define its goals and
establish target standards of quality by which it will
measure its progress in improving customer service.
The customer service champion is charged with
defining the areas that need to be improved and
with monitoring the progress. 
Pilot and implementation. Those recommenda-
tions that are more complex—such as developing a
new external communications plan or implement-
ing a qualitative incentive scheme that rewards
internal customer service—involve a variety of areas
within the organization and should be piloted
before rollout to ensure smooth functioning and
buy-in. The pilot plan should include the following:
• Parameters: Certain core components of the
strategy must be tested before institutionwide
rollout. Parameters should identify the number
of pilot test sites, the duration of the pilot,
and the frequency of the monitoring and
intervention.9
• Work plan: The work plan sets out the different
functional areas that will be involved in the pilot,
the responsibilities of distinct personnel, the time
line of activities to be tested, and interim and end
goals. 
• Training: Both front-line and back-office staff
are trained, that is, all branch staff including
guards and others join the training for team-
building purposes and to emphasize the point
that customer service is by its nature a multi-
disciplinary function. The training is typically
Branch
wait
timeNo information on waiting time
Limited reading materials
Communication
Technology
No contingency plans
System crashes
Limited automation
Human resources
Low staff motivation
Limited cashier authority
No line system
Limited branch hours
Insufficient client seating
Delivery channels
Figure 13.3 Possible Root Causes of Long Wait Time
Source: Marketing and Product Development Unit, ACCION International.
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interactive, to permit branch level staff to per-
sonalize the strategy (within limits).
As part of the piloting process, it is important to
also develop a monitoring plan. The goal of moni-
toring is to supervise the implementation of the rec-
ommendations, monitor outcomes, and revise the
strategy accordingly. The monitoring plan should
include a clear definition of how the service indica-
tors will be monitored, and how frequently. For
example, will the MIS generate certain indicators or
will they be observation-based? The customer serv-
ice team needs to determine how difficult it will be
to incorporate new variables into system reports
before deciding whether it makes sense to manage
the pilot manually instead. See table 13.1 for exam-
ples of possible solutions to improve customer serv-
ice and client satisfaction, as well as monitoring
indicators. 
Once a strategy for customer service is com-
pleted, it must be communicated to all staff. Com-
piling the different elements of the strategy into
a user-friendly customer service manual with the
following components will help solidify under-
standing within the MFI:
• Customer experience map with the key contact
points and how staff can add value at each one 
• Frequently asked questions with agreed upon
answers
• Customer handling procedures, including how
to process complaints and queries and escalation
policies that govern when to bring in managers
• Functional roles that outline the responsibility of
each staff member with respect to service and
sales support
• Feedback loops that define how client informa-
tion is collected, tabulated, and most important,
acted upon
• Contingency plans in case of system crashes,
power outages, or other unexpected events
Ultimately, excellent customer service is the
responsibility of the operations department work-
ing closely with the marketing department, if
applicable. As discussed below, the layout of the
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branch—including the presence of a customer ser-
vice representative, the location and availability of
transactional documents (deposit and withdrawal
slips, for example), rope lines, seats for clients—has
great impact on customer service. In addition, teller
management—including how tellers execute trans-
actions, how they are trained, and how they are
remunerated—is also a key operations function and
an important determinant of service quality. Many
transforming MFIs hire an outside consultant to
assist them in developing a strategy to improve cus-
tomer service. See annex 13A for a sample terms of
reference.
Branch Structure and Service
Like customer service, branch structure and serv-
ice is a function shared by both marketing (as part
of the delivery channel strategy) and operations.10
However, the operations department is normally
responsible for key components of branch man-
agement, including opening new outlets, layout
and configuration, teller and cash management,
and traffic flows.
Branch Location
Given the importance of the branch network as a
delivery mechanism, carefully locating and estab-
lishing each branch office is vital. Branches must be
located in areas that provide frequent, accessible,
and convenient service for existing and potential
clients. 
Branch location is particularly challenging for
transforming MFIs. Credit-only MFIs generally
select office locations according to a different set of
criteria than savings-based financial institutions. To
control costs, many credit-focused MFIs locate their
offices off the main road or in converted residential
spaces. This approach is fine for providing loans
because most clients are prepared to sacrifice con-
venience to obtain a loan. The same does not hold
true with clients wanting to access savings services.
Feasibility studies. Branches should be located
based on a macro-level feasibility study. Feasibility
studies determine high potential towns that match
the MFI’s mission, vision, and growth plans. The
study considers likely demand for financial services
and proximity to other branches and any competing
financial institutions. The feasibility study should be
Table 13.1 Improving Customer Service 
Recommended solution Indicators of success
Internal promotion Number of job postings
Employee of the month Improved morale
Regularly scheduled staff meetings Improved morale
Incorporate personal milestones Improved morale
in newsletter
Well-organized information board Compliance
Dress code Percentage of staff with colors
Customer service training Test
Objectives for tellers Number of transactions per day; percentage without error
Greeter or “orientation agent” Reduced wait time
Smart cards with identification Number of transactions per day; percentage without error
Feedback mechanisms (including Number of suggestions per number of active clients
suggestion boxes with posted actions) 
Source: Contributed by Monica Brand, ACCION International, September 2005. 
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conducted in conjunction with the marketing
department. 
Accessibility and expansion potential. Branches
should be located in areas that allow the MFI to
provide accessible, frequent, and convenient ser-
vices to its clients (see box 13.1). Careful research
conducted in conjunction with the marketing
department will help to determine where target
populations are located and underserved with finan-
cial services. Locations within those target commu-
nities can then be evaluated. The MFI should also
consider the expansion potential of the branch.
Providing rural services. An approach adopted by
many transforming MFIs is to operate through a
branch network supplemented by subbranches or
agencies. Subbranches are smaller than branches
but otherwise fully functional, though they may
operate on a local server during the day and update
information overnight. Agencies only operate one
or two days per week, generally in smaller towns
with opening times coinciding with market days.
Some MFIs pilot test subbranches in medium-size
towns with each subbranch location selected to pro-
vide sufficient space if the subbranch were to grad-
uate into a full branch as its client base grows.
Alternatively, licensed MFIs, if approved by the
regulator, can operate mobile banking units to
reach rural areas. In Kenya, for example, Equity
Bank operates mobile banking through vans
equipped with online access through very small
aperture terminal (VSAT) communications. The
vans can operate as independent branches with staff
serving clients from the van, or more often, used to
operate agencies for one afternoon a week in dif-
ferent locations around an Equity Bank branch
(Coetzee, Kabbucho, and Mnjama 2002).
Branches can also be supplemented, depending
on the institution and its target market, through
agency relationships, ATMs, point-of-sale devices,
or other technological advances. (See chapter 11,
Management Information Systems, for more
discussion.)
Proximity to other branches. To control manage-
ment and monitoring costs, some MFIs open
branches in relative proximity to other branches
within their networks. This allows the MFI to pro-
vide multiple access points for clients within a given
region and to expand into areas in which it is
already known, thereby reducing marketing and
promotional costs while also containing manage-
ment costs. 
Competition. High-potential locations often
already have a number of existing financial institu-
tions. The transforming MFI must determine if
there is sufficient unmet demand for another finan-
cial institution or if it has competitive advantages to
offer that might attract dissatisfied clients. A loca-
tion with limited competition may prove an ideal
opportunity, but then the MFI must question why
there is no competition and verify that enough
market demand exists. 
Location may also be a function of the maturity
of a financial institution. The initial branches of
many transforming MFIs may be situated in smaller
towns with limited local competition. However,
with transformation and expansion, MFIs have a
Box 13.1 Locating Branches 
of Transforming MFIs
Before transforming to a microfinance deposit-
taking Institution, FINCA Uganda located many
of its regional offices on the outskirts of regional
centers, because this provided good access to its
rural village banking clients for its field staff
(actual delivery of financial services occurred at
the village level in FINCA Uganda). However, to
compete for deposits, FINCA Uganda has relo-
cated many of its regional offices and has had to
rethink its delivery strategy. 
Source: Cracknell 2005.
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much greater ability to compete effectively with
larger commercial banks, and thus many open
branches in major metropolitan areas. 
Once a high potential location has been selected,
the institution needs to select where the branch
should be positioned. Sometimes the decision is
forced by the availability of suitable premises
(box 13.2). However, other factors such as foot
traffic, transport routes, potential for expansion,
facilities, and security should also be considered. 
Foot traffic. Foot traffic refers to the number of
people from the intended target group that pass by
the branch during a given period. Locations with
heavier foot traffic offer much higher potential for
savings mobilization and the provision of other
services than locations with low levels of foot traffic.
More remote areas with lower population density
may not be able to justify a full branch, but may jus-
tify opening an agency branch or implementing
mobile banking (if allowed by the regulator).
Transport network and security. A branch is likely
to draw clients from surrounding areas with good
transport links. Good transport links can make
cash-based transactions safer. However, generally
branches should not be located too close to bus ter-
minals because in many countries these are unsafe
locations, favored by pickpockets and other petty
thieves. Branches should be situated in relatively
secure areas.
Facilities. The branch should have access to utili-
ties, water, electricity, and ideally, mobile phone
network access and the Internet, and be accessible
to the management of the financial institution.
The importance of these attributes leads to an
almost inevitable bias toward locations serviced
by tarmac roads.
Branch Infrastructure
Branch-based banking is underpinned by the estab-
lishment, maintenance, and expansion of appropri-
ate infrastructure. Relatively standardized branches
with a banking hall, tellers, a back office, and space
for supervisors and credit officers will account for
most of a bank’s physical infrastructure. 
Branches must meet the requirements of the
MFI, its clients, and its regulators. Both the institu-
tion and its clients need an environment that
enables efficient transactions and effective commu-
nication. Regulators require secure premises appro-
priate to the business being undertaken within the
branch.
• Client focus: A client-focused banking environ-
ment requires careful consideration of the alloca-
tion of space, and the use of client service and
branch-based sales desks. The branch needs to
accommodate credit staff and branch manage-
ment while providing a sufficient number of
teller windows, queuing space for clients, and
customer service and sales desks. It also needs to
support effective communication with clients.
Box 13.2 Finding Quality Premises
“It can be difficult to obtain suitable premises
outside regional towns. This is because each
branch must be strategically located within a
town or trading centre. The branch should be
located in a secure area and should have a strong
perimeter wall at the back of the branch. The
physical strength of the building is important
due to low construction standards outside
Kampala. This often means when FINCA Uganda
moves to set up a branch in a town or trading
centre, there are a limited number of buildings,
which are well located and strong enough to
become a branch. In practice this means negoti-
ating with landlords and existing tenants. It can
also mean undertaking substantial infrastructure
improvements.”
Source: Interview with Shafi Nambobi, FINCA Uganda, from
Cracknell (2005).
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• Regulations: Most supervisory authorities stipu-
late minimum standards that must be met for
regulated institutions to mobilize savings. These
standards deal primarily with security, such as
requiring armed guards at the entrance, specify-
ing the dimensions and wall thickness of strong
rooms, safes, and dictating standards for the
teller windows and customer service areas. Many
MFIs do not meet these standards, either
because they outsourced these functions (such as
disbursements and payments) as NGOs or
because they were never mandated by a third
party to install these features. Thus, many MFIs
have to upgrade their existing branches to
properly handle cash functions as part of the
transformation process and comply with these
regulations.
Many financial institutions providing mass
market financial services operate predominantly
from rented premises for good reasons. The capital
outlay required to own premises is significant and
reduces cash available for lending. Also, in many
countries regulators prefer financial institutions
to maintain fixed assets at a lower level than core
capital—to ensure depositors’ savings are not being
used to finance long-term assets.
However, reliance on rented premises comes at a
price. In the absence of banking premises built
specifically for providing savings, it can be difficult
to create an ideal banking hall, especially outside
capital cities where the choice of suitable buildings
is limited. Extensive renovations are often required
and frequently internal walls and partitions need to
be removed to create a large enough area for a
banking hall. 
Older banking halls can be especially difficult to
render suitable, because they were designed at a
time when manual procedures predominated,
requiring considerable space for back-office opera-
tions. Today, the focus is on providing space for
clients and for staff interaction with clients. Over
time, regulated institutions commonly develop
“model branch” layouts to standardize the alloca-
tion of key functions (cashier, teller stations, waiting
area, customer service, staff meeting rooms, back
office, ATM), facilitate location of space, and
streamline purchase of equipment and furniture. 
Building the infrastructure of a branch can be
very expensive. On average, in Uganda, for example,
the transforming MFIs spent between U.S.$25,000
to U.S.$50,000 each for four or five teller branches
to meet central bank licensing requirements.
One of the most expensive requirements, often
making up half the cost of preparing a new branch,
is the construction of the strong room. Strong
rooms are normally constructed from reinforced
concrete. MFIs need to ensure that the strong
room does not connect with an outside wall, has
reinforced walls, ceiling, and floor and an appropri-
ately secure door. Given the cost of preparing a
branch, many transforming MFIs look where possi-
ble to rent premises formerly occupied by other
financial institutions, and ideally, with an existing
strong room. 
Security. Once the transformed MFI begins offer-
ing savings services, it must make sure that an
enhanced security system is in place. It must pur-
chase safes for all branches offering savings services
to keep cash for potential withdrawals. It must
ensure there is minimum risk of robbery by keeping
safes in the strong rooms. It must also introduce
dual custody of keys or combinations to the strong
rooms and safes to ensure there are checks and bal-
ances. (See chapter 12, Internal Control and Audits,
for more discussion). At a minimum, the following
are required:
• Doors and windows should be equipped with
steel bars or other burglar resistant material
• The strong room should be operated under dual
control
• Keys to the entrances of the premises should be
assigned to specific officers who should sign for
them
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• All branches should be equipped with security
alarm systems
• Teller stations should all have lockable cash
drawers
• Cash should be transferred under armed escort
at different times and hours of the day or week
(There should be no pattern formed of when
cash is transferred.)
See box 13.3 for more detail about making
premises suitable for a deposit-taking MFI.
Space allocation. Balancing space requirements
for the front and back office and savings and credit
functions is a perpetual challenge. The high trans-
action volumes that follow when mobilizing 
savings from the general public has a number of
implications:
• The banking hall must be sufficiently large to
accommodate peaks in transaction volume dur-
ing the day, month, and year. It should be large
enough to accommodate queue management
systems should these become necessary. The
number of tellers should be sufficient to manage
anticipated peak loads, and the banking hall
should have space to accommodate additional
teller stations to enable growth in business
volume.
• Space should be available to position client ser-
vice, inquiries, account opening, and sales desks.
These functions are frequently combined into a
single desk in physically smaller branches.
Increasingly, the branch or operations manager
or supervisor will occupy an office that connects to
the banking hall and to the back office to allow for
Box 13.3 Bank of Uganda Questionnaire on Premises
Ownership of premises. Are premises owned or
leased, and, if leased, is the lease sufficiently long
to produce economic returns and has landlord
approval been obtained for upgrades?
Approvals. Have approvals been provided from
local authorities, security companies, electrical
service?
Banking hall. Does the banking hall suit the type
of business to be undertaken in the premises?
Staff operating area. Is the space for each indi-
vidual adequate? Does the branch have appropriate
conveniences?
Lighting and ventilation. Are these appropriate
throughout the premises?
Outer doors, walls, windows. Are the outer
doors heavy duty, secured with two or more locks of
good quality? Are the windows and glass walls rein-
forced with metal grills or made of antiburglar or
bulletproof glass? 
Strong room. Is the strong room conveniently sit-
uated? Does it border with outside walls? Is there
space to accommodate the needs of the institution?
Are duplicate keys stored off the premises? Is there
dual control for entry?
Freestanding safe. Is it fireproof? Is access to the
safe and the room in which it is kept under the con-
trol of more than one person?
Cash loading area. Is it protected from public
view and access? Is cash in transit protected by
police or a security firm? Are there security guards
at the premises at all times?
Teller tills. Are they restricted to individual tellers
during working hours?
Alarm system. Is there an alarm system installed
in the premises? If yes, is it connected to the police
or a security firm? Are switches located in the strong
room, cashiers’ cubicles and teller stations, and man-
ager’s office?
Emergency plan. Is there an emergency plan? Is it
documented? Are there fire extinguishers located in
appropriate places? 
Source: Based on Cracknell (2005).
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easy access by both staff and clients. This position-
ing also allows for quick response if queues begin to
develop in the banking hall. 
Space requirements should be closely integrated
with the processes of the MFI. For example, super-
visors should sit close to tellers to ensure minimum
time delays if supervisor interventions are required.
Also, the supervisor’s desk should always be posi-
tioned so that he or she can see each of the tellers
as they carry out their day-to-day tasks. The space
required by back-office operations should be lim-
ited where possible through computerization of
many back-office functions. For example, super-
visor approvals can be provided online in most
modern banking systems. 
In many branches, the credit department sits off
the banking hall to provide easy access for clients.
Although credit officers sometimes sit directly in
the banking hall, a dedicated interview room is usu-
ally available to ensure privacy to clients seeking
loans. The challenge with operating a credit depart-
ment adjacent to the banking hall is that it can
quickly lead to the banking hall being crowded with
clients waiting for loans. 
Branch Communications
A client-focused MFI supports effective brand man-
agement and client communications and encour-
ages branch-based sales. The banking hall should be
used to communicate with clients through use of
signage, name tags, and posters. Two-way feedback
should be encouraged through well-promoted sug-
gestion boxes with responses to clients’ suggestions
clearly displayed nearby. 
Running an efficient and focused front office
requires that all staff in contact with clients be able
to answer basic inquiries. Most clients fail to distin-
guish between a teller and a loan officer when it
comes to the provision of basic information, yet in
many recently transformed MFIs, tellers have mini-
mal knowledge of loan products and loan officers
have poor knowledge of savings products. 
Given that clients and potential clients congre-
gate at the branch, it should be a key focal point for
sales. Sales should be driven by a branch-based mar-
keting focus, and, where possible, by branch-based
marketing staff. (See chapter 4, Marketing and
Competitive Positioning, for further information
on marketing and communications.)
Signage. Signage should use clear, concise lan-
guage that clients can easily understand. Signs must
be visible in a crowded banking hall, so clients
know they are in the right place for the services they
require. For this reason, signs hanging near the
entrance or waiting area should provide clear
instructions on basic functions. Smaller signs placed
on tellers’ windows and other “hot spots” should
be used for supplemental information (“Did you
know that . . . ?”) and promotions. All signage
should be consistent with the corporate brand to
help strengthen the image of the MFI. 
Name tags. It is surprisingly common for staff to
remain unidentified to their clients. In such cases
poor service is identified as an institutional fail-
ing rather than the fault of a specific individual.
Name tags identify staff as employees and give the
impression that the MFI is open and transparent
and accountable for its actions. Name tags also tend
to promote service excellence among staff and
encourage better communication. 
Client information. Client information includes
informative posters, price lists, brochures, and
notice boards. The target market must understand
the information provided and brochures and the
like should always be available to clients. Graphics
and photographs should be used to assist a semi-
literate market. If information is poorly presented,
communication with clients becomes much more
difficult. The transforming MFI needs to take
care that out-of-date posters and brochures are
changed when prices or product features change. In
some cases, clients are presented with too much
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information and are, therefore, unable to determine
what is important to read. In other cases, commu-
nication materials are presented casually in hand-
writing rather than in print and in a format that is
inconsistent with the corporate brand—thus lessen-
ing the impact potential of the brand. 
Customer service desk. Many MFIs offering savings
services operate customer service desks within the
banking hall. Customer service desks serve as a prin-
ciple point of contact with clients. Customer service
staff members are trained to have in-depth knowl-
edge of the MFI’s products and services and are
able to facilitate product sales even if other officers
are responsible for the closure of a particular sale. If
customer service staff members cannot answer an
inquiry, they should be able to channel questions to
an appropriate officer within the branch.
In addition to assisting clients, customer service
desks promote efficient services. They remove
clients with questions from queues, enabling
queues to flow faster. Customer service desks effec-
tively screen client contact, ensuring the client is
directed to the right officer and enable the officers
to be more effective and more efficient. In smaller
branches, customer service desks may commonly
also open new accounts, whereas in larger branches
and where demand justifies, this function is often
delegated to a specific account-opening desk. 
Branch-based sales. Sales desks placed directly in
banking halls have a number of distinct advan-
tages over more traditional counter-based sales.
Sales desks increase the visibility of highlighted
products to clients and increase the accessibility of
products to clients—those wanting to inquire about
new products and services do not have to queue to
ask a question. Thus, sales desks can significantly
increase sales of new or existing products. Further-
more, sales desks allow sales officers to explain
the products to clients comprehensively, which can
be especially important in illiterate and semiliterate
markets or for more complex financial services. See
box 13.4. 
A key role of the head-office marketing function
is to support branch-based sales. The marketing
department must ensure widespread product
knowledge throughout the institution. Its product-
related marketing materials must be carefully devel-
oped and tested to communicate product benefits
clearly. National sales campaigns should be carefully
coordinated and communicated clearly to every
branch to ensure that branches have the right mate-
rials and training to handle increased sales. 
Teller Management
Hiring and managing tellers may be new to regu-
lated MFIs if they did not accept cash at the bran-
ches prior to transformation. Proficient tellers and
effective teller management, combined with the
ability of the MFI to manage peak loads and
continually focus on improving processes and pro-
cedures, are key to efficient delivery of financial
services. Teller management ensures that tellers
operate efficiently. Efficiency comes from carefully
planning transactions so they can be performed
quickly and accurately again and again.
Teller screening. Tellers need to be proficient with
numbers as well as with computers. They must also
Box 13.4 Importance of Sales Desk 
for Complex Products
Shortly after becoming a bank, Equity Bank
launched its Jijenge contractual savings account
to encourage and reward regular savings. How-
ever, it was a more complex product to sell to
clients. Clients wanted to see the additional
return they would receive from disciplined sav-
ings. Equity decided to run a spreadsheet-based
simulation to explain the product. Initially sales
of Jijenge were strong, but when Equity decided
to remove the sales desk, sales of Jijenge
slumped. 
Source: Cracknell 2005.
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have an amiable nature and be able to speak with
clients in a knowledgeable and friendly manner.
Transforming MFIs (which are often also computer-
izing) may find their existing staff are not completely
comfortable with computers, which leads to inevita-
ble delays as tellers are trained how to use comput-
ers and perform basic keyboard skills. When hiring
tellers, MFIs will find it important to test applicants’
computer skills before employment. If possible, the
banking system should also be designed to ensure
minimal keyboard and mouse entry. 
Teller experience. Along with basic proficiency,
teller experience is a critical factor in processing
transactions quickly. The performance of experi-
enced and inexperienced tellers often differs signifi-
cantly. In a sample carried out by MicroSave of
tellers at Equity Bank, experienced tellers achieved
transaction volumes of 250 transactions per day.
Inexperienced tellers started with transaction vol-
umes of 100 transactions per day; after two weeks
on-the-job transaction volumes increased to 140 to
150 transactions per day. After the end of the first
month tellers had generally reached an acceptable
level of performance (Cracknell 2005). 
Teller withdrawal limits often vary depending on
the level of experience of the teller, so that inexpe-
rienced tellers are subject to greater levels of super-
vision. One solution employed by some MFIs is to
divert large cash transactions to an experienced
teller who is provided with note and coin-counting
machines.
Tellers are typically held responsible for cash
shortages and require time to gain confidence and
dexterity in counting money. Cash-counting
machines can significantly reduce the performance
difference, although machines are unlikely to
replace manual counting, in part because touch
helps tellers detect fake currency, which only the
more expensive counting machines can do. 
One step that can increase the productivity of all
tellers, but particularly inexperienced tellers who
require more supervision, is to enable online super-
vision. Considerable time is lost transporting phys-
ical vouchers between cashiers and managers or
supervisors. With online supervision, an alert
appears on the supervisor’s screen indicating that a
particular transaction requires supervision, enabling
the supervisor to authorize the transaction online. 
Teller performance monitoring. MFIs should mon-
itor the performance of tellers at an individual level
and at a branch level. Performance monitoring
must include both efficiency and effectiveness
measures. Efficiency implies measuring the number
of transactions of different types undertaken by dif-
ferent tellers in a typical period, with care taken to
ensure speed is matched with accuracy. 
Some managers feel that performance measure-
ment cannot be calculated purely on the basis of
branch averages, given that transaction types and
volumes differ in every branch depending on the
precise segmentation of the branch’s clients. Thus,
trends in performance over time, both of the
branch and individual tellers within the branch,
should be measured as well.
Teller stations. The physical attributes of teller win-
dows are critical to ensuring that tellers make fewer
errors. Teller stations should be large enough to
accommodate a computer (and printer, if necessary)
and still provide sufficient counter space for the
teller to efficiently count cash. Bulletproof glass,
obligatory in many countries for regulated institu-
tions, should not hamper communications between
the teller and clients. Tellers should be provided
with cash drawers carefully segmented to allow dif-
ferent denominations to be held separately. 
Personnel issues. As transaction volumes in a
branch increase, responding to the legitimate needs
of tellers to have breaks and vacations becomes
increasingly difficult. Rural branches with seasonal
fluctuations and branches with a large percentage
of salaried workers experience natural fluctuations
in the workflow that can be used to accommodate
staff leave. However, in urban branches with a large
percentage of microfinance clients, transaction
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volume can be relatively stable. In this case, when-
ever a teller takes vacation, long queues can develop.
Mitigation strategies include training staff in mul-
tiple skills so they can take over temporarily, or
larger institutions may employ “floating” cashiers
or tellers who move between branches in a particu-
lar region or city. 
Peak Load Management
A typical front-office environment, particularly in a
rural or semiurban branch, has fairly irregular levels
of activity—at some times of the day, week, or
month, banking halls can be filled to capacity, while
at other times they are empty. The situation can also
differ from branch to branch depending on location
and the local market.
Managing peak loads in the banking hall is par-
ticularly important in banking for low-income
clients, because transactions tend to be in smaller
amounts and of greater frequency. An MFI’s ability
to manage peak loads is a key determinant of its
customer service quality and the profitability of its
savings products. Peak loads affect both wait time
and the capacity of the physical infrastructure.
Manual procedures can further exacerbate peak
loads, while the MFI’s product range and banking
hours may also influence the peaks and valleys of
service provision.
Product range. An MFI’s product range can signif-
icantly influence transaction behavior within a
banking hall. For example, salary accounts create
monthly fluctuations around the month end; school
fee loans create periodic fluctuations around the
dates for payment of school fees; and agricultural
loans create seasonal peaks in activity around plant-
ing and harvest seasons.
Banking hours. Extended banking hours are
extremely beneficial for clients who would other-
wise have to take time from their business activities
to perform financial transactions. However, the
ability of a deposit-taking institution to extend its
business hours depends on how long end-of-day
processing takes, and in some countries, on central
bank regulations.
See box 13.5 for an example of how product
range and banking hours interweave to influence
customer service.
If extending branch hours becomes too costly an
option, a number of easily implemented solutions
can improve customer service using generally rec-
ognized principles of customer psychology and
common perceptions of waiting. (See box 13.6.)
Other possible solutions to manage peak loads
include the following:
• Remove inquiries from queues: Clients with ques-
tions slow down queues of clients wanting to
perform simple transactions. Removing clients
with questions from queues not only speeds up
service, but also ensures that the client’s problem
receives the fullest attention. Understanding
clients’ questions in detail often leads to appro-
priate solutions. For example, when Equity Bank
in Kenya found that many clients queued to
ask whether their salaries had been received, it
introduced boards that indicated for major
employers whether salaries had been received
and posted to client accounts. Other general
Box 13.5 Payment of School Fees 
at Centenary Bank
Centenary Rural Development Bank in Uganda
processes payments for school fees. Payments
are made three times a year, in January, May, and
September. At the time of year when payments
are received, Centenary is almost always over-
whelmed with clients. Typically, queues stretch
down the street before the bank opens. Cente-
nary has responded by opening for longer hours
during the season for payment of school fees. 
Source: Cracknell 2005.
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strategies to remove inquiries from queues
include directing questions as clearly as possible
through signage to customer service desks; pub-
lishing answers to frequently asked questions;
and assigning staff to the front office to manage
queues through providing direct assistance to
clients. For example, SogeSol in Haiti hired
“flow captains” to manage client inquiries while
they waited in line, thereby reducing branch
congestion and wait time. 
• Introduce single point queuing systems: In bank-
ing halls with sufficient space, single point queu-
ing systems should be introduced. In most cases
such queuing systems consist of a series of ropes
winding around the banking hall to ensure that
clients queue in a single line. The next available
teller serves the client at the front of the queue.
Single point queuing systems are popular with
clients because they are seen to be equitable—
they ensure service on a first-come, first-served
basis—and because they ensure that an individ-
ual client with a question causes minimal delay to
all clients equally. 
• Match staffing to expected activity levels: The
branch manager should ensure whenever possi-
ble that staffing levels are matched to expected
activity levels. During the busiest periods, all
teller windows should be staffed for the longest
possible time. This is no easy task, because a
branch cannot afford to maintain full-time staff
based on peak levels of activity. However, part-
time tellers can generally be employed or more
tellers than normally required can be hired, but
trained also to market products and services.
During slack periods in the month, tellers can
market to potential clients in marketplaces, at
schools, and at other likely venues. Another
strategy is to restrict staff leave to the middle of
the month if possible. 
• Specific extensions of banking hours: Specific
extensions of business hours are possible when
the MFI and its clients can predict peak periods
of activity, for example, for the payment of
school fees or for the payment of salaries. In such
a case, the MFI needs to communicate the
extension of business hours carefully to ensure
Box 13.6 Using Psychology to Improve Perceptions of Customer Service
Perceptions of waiting
• Unoccupied time feels longer than occupied
time.
• Anxiety makes waits seem longer.
• Uncertain waits seem longer than known,
finite waits.
• Unexplained waits are longer than explained.
• Unfair waits are longer than equitable waits.
• The more valuable the service, the longer the
customer will wait.
• Solo waits feel longer than group waits.
Solutions for improved customer service
• Have reading materials, videos, or other infor-
mation available.
• Allow clients to fill out inquiry forms or deposit
slips while waiting.
• Reduce stress by clarifying the process or creat-
ing a numbering system.
• Provide information on expected wait times or
post reason for delays (server crash or the like).
• Have an equitable system or clear rules for pref-
erential treatment.
• Compensate the client’s patience by providing
flexible products or a surprise soft drink.
• Never leave a client unattended without at least
asking if she or he can be helped.
Source: Contributed by Monica Brand, ACCION International, September 2005.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
428 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
that enough clients modify their transacting
behavior to take advantage of the extended busi-
ness hours. 
• Introduce new technology: Technology, specifi-
cally computerized banking systems, can offer
solutions to decongest banking halls. Implemen-
tation of a wide area network (WAN) that net-
works individual branches together allows an
MFI to offer branchless banking. However, the
effectiveness of the WAN depends on the avail-
ability of an appropriate communications infra-
structure, either through telephone lines, VSAT
links, or microwave-based line-of-site systems.
Optimizing the WAN is vital to ensure fast trans-
action speeds, especially in a fully centralized
system. However, optimal solutions are often
expensive, so the MFI will have to make a con-
scious but informed choice on its communica-
tions strategy. (See chapter 11, Management
Information Systems, for more discussion.) 
Technology also can be used effectively to
increase the accessibility of services by introduc-
ing increased points of access through mobile
banking, cash machines, point-of-sale devices, or
ATMs. ATMs have become a viable solution for
MFIs, as long as regulators provide approval and
oversight, and the MFI ensures secure access.
(See chapter 11, Management Information Sys-
tems, for more discussion.)
Ensuring Continuity of Services
Continuity of services means ensuring appropriate
power management along with appropriate disaster
recovery and off-line procedures. To effectively
offer savings services, power management should
be almost seamless. Constant power availability is
achieved either through inverter-based interrupt-
ible power supplies, through generators on a trip
switch, or at the lowest cost, through generators
started manually. Off-line procedures are manual
procedures enabling basic account functionality to
continue when computerized systems go off line.
Disaster recovery is the MFI’s ability to recover
any lost data. Several layers of data management
are usually required, including tape backup at
the branch and head-office level. In very large
deposit-taking MFIs, disaster recovery can involve
parallel processing of transactions using two simi-
lar but physically separate servers. The regulator
will normally define minimum acceptable disaster
recovery standards for licensed deposit-taking
institutions. 
Managing Cash 
Handling of cash is often new for many transform-
ing NGO MFIs. Proper cash handling ensures that
records are kept for cash movements and stocks of
cash, that stocks of cash are securely kept and con-
trolled, and that no unauthorized persons gain
access to cash or important documents. Further-
more, cash holding must be kept to the lowest level
consistent with foreseeable needs and within insur-
ance limits, with the surplus deposited in nearby
commercial banks. The operations department is
responsible for processing all cash to and from
the central bank, commercial banks, or other
branches. The operations manager is also responsi-
ble for daily monitoring and adherence to cash
limits as established by the head office. This section
provides detailed guidance for transforming MFIs
establishing cash management procedures for the
first time.11
Cash balances include amounts in the cash and
treasury registers and the cashier’s (or teller’s) bal-
ances as per the cashier’s register, and should be
reconciled with the general ledger cash account.
(Some regulated MFIs have a “chief cashier” who
sits behind the tellers [often in a “cash cage”] and
disburses cash to the tellers. Other MFIs have only
tellers, sometimes also called cashiers, who hold cash
at their stations. For the purposes of this section,
the term teller will be used for either cashiers or
tellers when discussing cash management, with the
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exception of the chief cashier. Teller windows, cash
counters, or cashier stations are all referred to as
teller stations.)
Monitoring Cash Levels
The branch must hold sufficient cash to meet
depositors’ demands. However, the amount to be
held at one time should be balanced between the
desired return on investment, security, and liquidity
considerations. Cash levels are part of the liq-
uidity policy established by the asset and liability
committee (ALCO) and will include limits at the
teller stations and each branch (see chapter 10,
Financial Management, for more discussion). Secu-
rity considerations greatly influence the amount of
cash to be held at the teller’s station and in the
strong room.
Treasury book and strong room. The “treasury
book” or “strong room cash record book” is a reg-
ister of stocks of cash held in the strong room. All
movements of cash into and out of the strong room
are recorded in the treasury book. The strong room
is always under dual control of the branch manager
and branch accountant or chief cashier. Both dual
custodians must be in each other’s presence when
entering the strong room. Accessibility to safes in
the strong room is also under dual control. Bundles
of each cash denomination are arranged and stored
separately to facilitate checking. Reserve cash
should be kept in an inner fireproof safe in the
strong room. Keys to the strong room must be
recorded in the keys register, which should also
be under dual control, and signed for by the key
holders. Whenever keys change hands, both the
person giving and the person receiving must
sign the register. Duplicate keys should be kept
with the nearest commercial bank as items for safe
custody.
Throughout the day, if the amount of cash in a
teller’s station exceeds the maximum amount deter-
mined by management, it should be given to the
chief cashier using a treasury voucher. The teller
gives the excess cash balance to the chief cashier
who counts the cash and enters the received
amount in the treasury book. The teller signs the
treasury book and the chief cashier puts the cash
and the treasury book in the strong room with the
assistance of a dual custodian. 
Supervision. The branch manager or operations
manager (or supervisor) should check cash transac-
tions on a daily basis. She or he must monitor cash
levels maintained at each teller’s station for compli-
ance with limits set by management. On a random
basis, the manager or supervisor should count the
cash in each teller’s cash drawer and compare the
amount with the computer balance.
Transaction processing. All cash transactions must
be handled only by the tellers and not by any other
staff members. The teller must always count all cash
from the client in the client’s presence and clarify
any discrepancies before it is placed in the cash
drawer. Once the amount has been counted, the
teller enters the account number and the amount
into the computer system, date stamps and initials
the passbook (if applicable), and returns the pass-
book to the client. Where duplicate vouchers are
involved in a transaction (either with or without a
passbook), the teller should keep the original for
the MFI’s files and give the client a duplicate. 
Transactions are all posted in a receipts or pay-
ments book (sometimes called a “cashiers’ counter
book” or “receiving cashier’s on hand account”).
All receipts and payments made and cash received
from or paid to the treasury (strong room) are
recorded in this book. Posting in this book should
take place before cash is paid out and after cash is
accepted. If an error occurs, tellers should prepare
cash error vouchers that should be approved by the
branch manager or supervisor. 
Procedures for handling excess and shortages. If a
teller does not balance his or her teller balancing
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report at the end of the day, the chief cashier or
supervisor should note any differences and work
with the teller to locate the differences. If the dif-
ference cannot be found, it should be charged to a
suspense account under the tellers’ subledger. If
the difference is above the allowed limit, the bal-
ance should be charged to the teller concerned.
More than three teller shortages should result in
dismissal of that teller.
Cash overages are also credited to the suspense
account and if not claimed for six months (or what-
ever period has been determined by policy) should
be moved into a profit and loss account. If the
shortage can be traced to a client and records
clearly indicate the error, the client’s account is
charged and an advice is sent accordingly. Similarly,
if an overage is traced to a client, his or her account
should be credited and advised through a credit
advice.
Cash Security
To keep control of cash that is held by the tellers,
all tellers must ensure the door to the cash drawer
is locked at all times regardless of whether the
teller is at the station. No cash should be kept in
the cash drawer at the teller’s station overnight—it
should all be in the strong room. Tellers should be
the sole keepers of keys to their teller stations, cash
drawers, and stamps throughout working hours.
Tellers should guard their stamps so they cannot be
accessed by somebody reaching over the service
counter. 
Counterfeit notes. Each branch manager should
maintain a file of circulars from the regulator
informing financial institutions of serial numbers of
counterfeit notes. If the teller detects a counterfeit
or forged note he or she should confiscate it imme-
diately. Particulars of the client including name and
address should be taken for further investigation by
the police. If detected after the depositor has gone,
the teller should record it as a cash shortage and
give the counterfeit note to the branch manager.
The note is subsequently handed over to the police
by the branch manager. The branch manager
should keep a record of the note numbers in a
separate register.
Transfer of cash to banks or head office. Just as
there are limits for cash to be held at teller stations,
limits also need to be set for the total amount held
in each branch. Once this amount is exceeded, cash
needs to be transferred either to a nearby commer-
cial bank branch or to the head office. All physical
cash transfers must be done with security or police
escorts (or both) and times when cash transfers take
place should be varied.12
Deposit Account Management
Because transforming MFIs are generally offering
savings services to the public for the first time,
specific procedures for managing deposit accounts
need to be established and communicated to the
branches. Account procedures should be standard-
ized and documented in a manual that is easily
accessible and understood by all staff involved in
savings account management. Specific policies and
procedures need to be put in place for opening
accounts (savings or term deposits), receiving
deposits, making withdrawals, closing accounts,
dealing with lost passbooks, and handling dormant
accounts. (See Branch and Klaehn 2002 for more
information on how to establish deposit account
procedures.)
One of the areas that becomes vitally important
once a regulated MFI begins mobilizing deposits
from the public is confidentiality. Staff must never
reveal to third parties any information regarding
the savings or deposits of clients unless the third
party produces written authorization from the saver
or a written order from a competent authority in
accordance with applicable law. It must be clear to
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all staff that account information is confidential,
available only to the depositor and his or her bene-
ficiaries or legal representatives.
Some of the processes involved in deposit man-
agement can result in bottlenecks—particularly for
newly transformed MFIs just beginning to mobilize
deposits from the public. These common process-
oriented bottlenecks need to be identified and
removed wherever possible.13 A systematic study of
procedures using flowcharts to portray particular
processes (typically referred to as process mapping)
can be undertaken to facilitate this analysis. The
following reflects specific processes relevant for the
operations of transforming MFIs beginning to
accept public deposits: 
Account opening. Extensive account opening
requirements help protect financial institutions
against potential fraud and money laundering.
However, they also penalize illiterate and semiliter-
ate clients who end up making frequent visits to
open a single account.
Teller limits and supervisor approvals. Low teller
withdrawal limits strengthen internal control but
create additional approval procedures that can sig-
nificantly increase total transaction time. The vol-
ume and value of withdrawal transactions should be
carefully examined when considering appropriate
teller and supervisor limits. 
Manual processes. Manual processes are a signifi-
cant cause of delays. Some delays result directly
from the manual process, for example, the extrac-
tion of client ledger cards. More significant delays
result when manual processes encourage batch
rather than serial processing; for example, while it
may seem much more efficient for a supervisor to
approve five over limit withdrawals at a time, rather
than one individual over limit withdrawal, such
batch manual transactions can significantly increase
client waiting time. 
Passbook replacement. Replacement of passbooks
can be a lengthy process if security features and the
need to perform checks and reconciliations on
passbooks mandate that replacement be performed
centrally. In addition, if the passbook replacement
process is poorly handled, resubmission of docu-
ments can double the time taken to replace the
passbook. 
Account card issuance. Card issuance is a frequent
cause of delays and is a common cause of client
complaints. Client account cards are usually care-
fully configured for security reasons—they include
the client’s photograph, signature, and account
number. Often this means that cards are produced
centrally or even outsourced. Reasons for delays
include an inability to produce cards at a sufficient
rate to meet the demand from new account holders
and for replacements, poor processes resulting in
the mismatch of photograph and client account
details, and batching of cards at branch and at the
printing facility to reduce delivery costs. 
End-of-day processes. Although not an obvious
cause of delays for the client, extensive end-of-day
processes have two major effects on service levels.
First, staff work longer hours than necessary, which
has an inevitable effect on staff welfare and conse-
quently service quality. Second, extensive end-of-
day processes act as a disincentive to extending
banking hours. 
An internal culture of continuous improve-
ment needs to be engrained in transforming MFIs.
Such a culture is difficult to instill, but it starts
with strong individual commitment to a collective
institutional mission. As discussed in chapter 3,
Planning for Transformation, this culture enables
the organization to maintain service quality, despite
growth. It implies that the institution is always
preparing for the future with planned upgrades to
systems, to services, to processes, and in staff capac-
ity, and that a good percentage of these planned
upgrades actually occur.
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Documentation Management
The experience in Uganda of NGO MFIs trans-
forming to regulated microfinance deposit-taking
institutions revealed a surprising lack of documented
and standardized policies and procedures. Much of
the day-to-day operations were based on on-the-job
training and experience being passed on as the MFI
grew. Manuals the MFIs did have had often become
quite out of date and were not being used. Further-
more, many transforming MFIs did not have ade-
quate (for the regulators) document security and
inventory management—both important areas a
transforming MFI likely needs to improve. 
Policies and Procedures
Once an MFI decides to become regulated and
intermediate public savings, it will find it imperative
to ensure all policies and procedures are docu-
mented and standardized throughout the organiza-
tion. Most regulators will not license a financial
institution to take deposits before inspecting the
various operating manuals and ensuring through
branch visits that policies and procedures are
followed in a standardized manner. See chapter 12,
Internal Control and Audits, for more discussion
on the importance of policies and procedures.
An MFI should have stated policies for every
aspect of management and operations, including,
but not limited to the following:
• Personnel, including guidelines for hiring, evalu-
ating, and terminating
• Credit, including client eligibility, loan terms
and conditions, collateral requirements, loan
monitoring and collection, and delinquency
follow-up
• Savings, including account opening, deposits,
withdrawals, interest payments, and account
closing
• Cash management, including cash transfers and
petty cash
• Accounting, including authorization levels and
segregation of duties
• Budgeting
• Financial management, including how to deter-
mine loan-loss reserves and provision for loan
losses
• Asset and liability committee (ALCO)
• Operating expense and asset purchase approvals
• Internal audit (and possibly internal control)
• Physical security of records and assets
• Reporting requirements—who, what, and how
often
These manuals should be written clearly and
concisely. Care should be taken to eliminate contra-
dictions and keep redundancies to a minimum. Fur-
thermore, a system should be in place to ensure
updates to any of the manuals are uniformly dis-
tributed and all branches are operating from the
same manuals.
While all the manuals are important as an MFI is
preparing to transform, one particular area that will
need review is the credit manual. As a previously
credit-focused organization, the assumption may
be that the credit side of operations is well docu-
mented and standardized and, thus, does not need
further attention. However, the regulator will likely
require specific and precise documentation for each
loan and during inspections will randomly check
loan files. The transforming MFI, therefore, must
determine how the regulator will classify risk on
unsecured loans or loans secured by unconventional
collateral and whether the current loan documenta-
tion is acceptable. If not, some policies and proce-
dures currently followed for credit products may
need to be altered or refined and existing docu-
mentation supplemented, which may, in turn,
require a revision of the credit manual.
In addition to ensuring that the loan documen-
tation will comply with regulatory requirements, as
a regulated institution, the MFI must ensure that all
documents, not just credit files, are securely held at
the branch.
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Document Security
All documents held as security for loans should be
registered in a securities register at each branch.
When supervisors conduct on-site inspections at
the branches they will verify (on a random basis) the
physical existence of items recorded in the securities
register and ensure that all security forms are com-
pleted fully and correctly. Supervisors will check
that the MFI’s books, registers, and vouchers are all
properly maintained and only used by authorized
persons. They will also confirm that all important
documents such as government stocks, insurance
policies, title deeds, and all pledges for loans (prop-
erties, crops, and so forth) are recorded in the secu-
rities register and maintained in the strong room,
inaccessible to unauthorized persons (ARB Apex
Bank Limited 2004).
Loan files must be kept in cabinets that are
locked so unauthorized persons do not have access.
Inventory Management
With the addition of voluntary savings products,
various stationery items, such as passbooks, check-
books (if applicable), fixed-deposit receipt books,
and other stationery products, must be held at
the branches. The MFI should number standard
documents, forms, and vouchers to facilitate
references being made to such documents by the
MFI staff.14
In general, all stationery should be procured
through the head office and issued to branches
upon requisition. However, a branch may, under
special circumstances, purchase general stationery
from the local market. Decentralized procurement
of stationery items should be discouraged and
properly controlled. Where the branch is given
some latitude, the MFI must ensure that normal
control procedures are adhered to. All purchases
should be authorized and duly recorded.
All stationery should be properly recorded and
stored, and movements (especially issuance) con-
trolled. Inventory should be taken quarterly at each
branch and the value of physical stock reconciled to
the general ledger at the branch.
Inventories should be kept in good condition
and accessible in a controlled manner. Each item
should have a “bin” or “stock card” or some system
to record different types of stationery. The quanti-
ties and description on the stock card should match
the actual quantity physically in the branch. A reg-
ister should be maintained at the branch for savings
passbook stock and, if applicable, checkbook stock.
Control of passbooks. Control of passbooks is a
serious issue for regulators and must be strictly
adhered to, thus passbooks must be controlled as
part of stationery. When a batch of passbooks is
received, serial numbers must be recorded in the
register from the beginning to the end. When a new
account is opened, a requisition is made to the
branch or operations manager or supervisor. The
branch manager, with another officer with dual
control to the strong room, will provide the new
accounts officer (or teller) with the requisitioned
passbook, and confirm that all numbers of the
quantity removed are numerically accounted for
and that the lowest number follows sequentially
from the last number in the register as removed.
The officer responsible then lists each passbook
serially in the issuance register and accounts for any
balance at the end of the day. A new accounts reg-
ister should be properly maintained at the branch
for each year.
Control of fixed-deposit receipt book. Fixed-deposit
receipts are engraved forms issued in books of
generally 100 to 200 each, with receipts and coun-
terfoils serially numbered. The branch stock of
unused books must be kept under dual control in
the strong room and recorded in the unutilized
“assets in stock” register. The register should show
date of receipt, serial numbers, date of issue, and
unused stock at hand.
Annex 13B provides a summary checklist of the
major aspects of customer service and operations
addressed in this chapter.
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Annex 13A Sample Terms of
Reference: Improving Branch-Level
Customer Service 
Background
Background on the organization including its mis-
sion, target market, client outreach, portfolio size,
and so forth.
Objectives
The objectives of this consultancy are to improve
and standardize customer service levels at MFI A’s
branches, and increase customer satisfaction of
internal as well as external clients. 
Tasks
Phase 1: Analysis 
• Review and document processes and service
quality to establish baseline.
• Collect and analyze information on competition
(to determine expectations).
• Obtain information on client profile and prefer-
ences (data mining or market research or both).
• Analyze information and establish benchmarks
to finalize proposal for approval.
• Compose multifunctional team to diagnose
problems and identify key strategy components.
Phase 2: Design and Develop Customer Service
Strategy
• Diagram the process flow from MFI A client’s
point of view (“client experience”).
• Analyze the delivery channels (that is, branch
layout, appearance, and the like) from a service
viewpoint.
• Define areas of improvement by functional area
(requirements) and strategies by segment.
• Determine how to add value with each point of
contact with the client.
• Recommend new processes, procedures, and
policies.
• Prioritize different recommendations to deter-
mine which can be implemented now (minor
changes) and which will need to be piloted
(major changes) based on cost-benefit, institu-
tional capacity, and other factors.
Phase 3: Conduct Pilot Test(s)
• Establish the pilot parameters (location, dura-
tion, budget) and goals (tracking indicators).
• Establish and validate operational requirements.
• Prepare the pilot branch.
• Test tools and systems.
• Train personnel.
• Implement pilot.
• Supervise pilot and monitor indicators.
• Analyze results and define initial conclusions.
• Revise strategy to present to general manage-
ment for approval.
Phase 4: Rollout 
• Define the strategic and operational implications.
• Develop support materials.
• Establish an action plan.
• Train personnel.
• Develop systems.
• Define goals and indicators for monitoring.
• Draft a customer service manual.
Deliverables
1. A written analysis of current customer service
quality including the establishment of bench-
marks
2. A proposed customer service strategy to be
implemented
3. Results of pilot tests
4. A plan for rollout to all branches
5. A draft customer service manual
Level of Effort 
It is estimated each phase of this consultancy will
take between 1 and 2 days to complete and will be
carried out over a period of 12 months.
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Annex 13B Checklist for Customer
Service and Operations
Customer Service
• Have you defined your institutional vision for
customer service, including where it fits into the
MFI’s competitive strategy?
• Have you mapped out your processes from the
point of view of the customers—internal and
external—to identify customer service problems? 
• Have you conducted a thorough analysis to
determine the root causes of the customer ser-
vice problems?
• Have you met with staff members to engage
them in brainstorming solutions to the customer
service problems? 
• Have you prioritized the different solutions based
on value or importance to the client, feasibility
(in terms of cost and capacity), and anticipated
impact (improvement in customer satisfaction)?
• Have you identified and implemented the quick
solutions?
• Have you planned a pilot for the more complex
strategies, defining the parameters, work plan,
training, and monitoring? 
• Have you developed a customer service manual
that includes frequently asked questions, cus-
tomer handling procedures, functional roles,
feedback loops, and contingency plans? 
Branch Structure and Service
• Have you determined the ideal branch locations
taking into account accessibility, expansion capa-
bilities, competition, security, and facilities?
• Have you ensured the appropriate branch infra-
structure including security, compliance with
regulations, and space allocation? 
• Have you established effective communications
within the branch network including signage,
client service desks, and client information? 
• Have you ensured effective and efficient teller
management including appropriate teller
screening, training, performance monitoring,
and teller positions?
• Have you put in place ways to effectively manage
peak loads?
• Do you have in place appropriate disaster-
recovery and off-line procedures?
Cash and Deposit Account Management
• Have you established effective ways of monitor-
ing cash levels and procedures for handling
excess and shortages?
• Have you established procedures and processes
for managing deposits, including teller limits and
supervisor approvals, end-of-day processes, and
account opening? 
Documentation Management
• Have you documented policies and procedures
to manage all aspects of operations?
• Have you ensured all documents held as security
for loans are registered in a securities register at
each branch?
• Have you ensured processes for appropriate in-
ventory management are in place in all branches?
Notes
Parts of this chapter were drawn from “Serving Deposi-
tors: Optimising Branch Based Banking,” by David
Cracknell, African Programme Director, MicroSave,
February 2005. Contributions to this chapter were made
by Monica Brand, Vice President, Marketing and Prod-
uct Development, ACCION International. The authors
gratefully acknowledge their contributions.
1. Some MFIs create a multifunction team responsible
for brand consistency, separate from the operations
department.
2. For more information on survey instruments, see
Wright, Cracknell, and Parrott (2004). 
3. The Customer Service Framework section was writ-
ten by Monica Brand, ACCION International.
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4. Adapted from Churchill and Halpern (2001) and
Kotler (2002).
5. Tangibles, including the appearance of physical facil-
ities, equipment, personnel, and printed and visual
materials, are one of the five key dimensions used by
consumers in assessing service quality in a broad
variety of service sectors (Zaithaml and Berry 1996).
The other four are Reliability (dependable and accu-
rate performance); Responsiveness (willingness to
help customer and promptness of service); Assurance
(knowledge and courtesy of employees); and
Empathy (caring and individualized attention to
customers).
6. For further information on the design and operation
of feedback mechanisms, see McCord (2002). 
7. Mystery shopping (also known as secret or ghost
shopping) is a research method whereby people
posing as regular customers anonymously visit or
contact a place of business (a branch, for example) to
assess customer service, product quality, employee
performance, cleanliness, and overall experience
(Brand 2003). 
8. A time and motion study is a detailed analysis of
the operations required to carry out a specific job
or transaction to identify bottlenecks, redundancy,
or unnecessary steps with the ultimate goal of
increasing efficiency and productivity.
9. The institution can have a closed pilot for a minimum
time during which intervention is prohibited, to give
the institution time to adapt to the new strategy
before adjusting. 
10. This section is adapted from Cracknell (2005).
11. Drawn from Mungereza & Kariisa Consultants
Limited (2002). 
12. For further information, see Bald (2000) Module 6.
13. The Deposit Account Management section is based
on Cracknell (2005). 
14. Inventory management is summarized in part from
ARB Apex Bank (2004).
References and Other Resources
ARB Apex Bank Limited. 2004. “Internal Controls and
Internal Audit for Rural and Community Banks: Oper-
ational Manual.” Final draft, Accra, Ghana. 
Bald, Joachim. 2000. “Liquidity Management: A Toolkit
for Microfinance Institutions.” Bankakademie.
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ) Gmbh, Eschborn, Germany. 
Bank of Uganda. 2004. Microfinance Deposit-taking
Institution (MDI) Regulations. Kampala, Uganda.
Branch, Brian, and Janette Klaehn, eds. 2002. Striking
the Balance in Microfinance: A Practical Guide to
Mobilizing. New York: Pact Publications for WOCCU.
Brand, Monica. 2003. “Market Intelligence: Making
Market Research Work for Microfinance.” InSight
Number 7, ACCION International, Washington, DC.
Brand, Monica, and Julie Gerschick. 2000. “Maximising
Efficiency: The Path to Enhanced Outreach and Sus-
tainability.” ACCION International, Boston, MA.
Champagne, Pamela. 2004. “Risk Management and
Internal Control Consultancy Completion Report.”
Shorebank Advisory Services, Chicago. 
Champagne, Pam, Lynn Pikholz, Ramesh S. Arunachalam,
Caitlin Baron, Henry Sempangi, David Cracknell, and
Graham Wright. 2004. “A Toolkit for Process
Mapping for MFIs.” Shorebank Advisory Services,
Chicago, and MicroSave Africa, Nairobi, Kenya.
Churchill, Craig, and Sahra Halpern. 2001. Building
Customer Loyalty: A Practical Guide for Microfinance
Institutions. Washington, DC: Microfinance Network. 
Coetzee, Gerhard, Kamau Kabbucho, and Andrew
Mnjama. 2002. “Understanding the Re-Birth of
Equity Building Society in Kenya.” MicroSave,
Nairobi, Kenya.
Cracknell, David. 2005. “Serving Depositors: Optimis-
ing Branch Based Banking.” MicroSave, Nairobi,
Kenya.
Cracknell, David, Henry Sempangi, and Graham A. N.
Wright. 2004. “Costing and Pricing of Financial
Services—A Toolkit.” MicroSave, Nairobi, Kenya.
Helms, Brigit, and Lorna Grace. 2004. “Microfinance
Product Costing Tool.” Technical Tools Series No. 6,
CGAP in collaboration with MicroSave and
Bankademie, Washington, DC.
Holtmann, Martin, and Mattias Grammling. 2005.
“Financial Incentive Schemes for Staff Engaged in
Savings Mobilization.” In Savings Services for the Poor:
An Operational Guide, ed. Madeline Hirschland.
Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. 
Kotler, Phillip. 2002. Marketing Management, 10th ed.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
McCord, Michael J. 2002. “The Feedback Loop: A
Process of Enhancing Responsiveness to Clients.”
MicroSave, Nairobi, Kenya.
Customer Service and Operations | 437
Mungereza & Kariisa Consultants Limited. 2002. “Inter-
nal Controls Manual for Credit and Operations.” Con-
sultancy report for Uganda Women’s Finance Trust,
Kampala, Uganda. 
Wright, Graham A. N. 2001. “Market Research for
Client Responsive Product Development.” MicroSave,
Nairobi, Kenya.
Wright, Graham A. N., David Cracknell, Leonard
Mutesasira, and Rob Hudson. 2003. “Strategic
Marketing for MicroFinance Institutions.” MicroSave,
Nairobi, Kenya.
Wright, Graham, David Cracknell, and Lisa Parrott. 2004.
“Customer Service Toolkit.” MicroSave, Nairobi,
Kenya.
Zeithaml, Valarie A., and Leonard L. Berry. 1996. The
Behavioral Consequences of Service Quality. Parasuraman
Journal of Marketing 60 (2): 31–46.

Case Studies Part IV

441
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The Micro Finance Deposit-Taking
Institutions Act, 2003
Uganda’s economy is one of the most liberal-ized in Africa. After decades of political andeconomic crises, Uganda embarked on a
wide-ranging Economic Reform Program (ERP) in
1987. Since then, reforms have led to the restora-
tion of macroeconomic stability and high economic
growth. A considerable increase of foreign direct
investment has been recorded and progress has
been made in the privatization of state-owned
enterprises. Inflation has been maintained below
10 percent since 1992. In sum, the Ugandan
government has focused its interventions on the
creation of an enabling environment for sustainable,
private sector–driven economic growth. In 1991,
financial sector reforms were introduced as an addi-
tional key element in the overall ERP launched in
1987. The results of the financial sector reforms
have been impressive. Financial sector deepening
increased, interest rates were liberalized, and the
banking sector was strengthened.
In 1997, the government introduced a compre-
hensive policy framework to address widespread
poverty. The Poverty Eradication Action Plan
(PEAP) aims at reducing absolute poverty to less
than 10 percent of the population by 2017. One
of the critical preconditions for poverty reduction
identified in the PEAP is sustained economic
growth. The government’s concentration on
poverty eradication combined with the positive
economic developments led to a drop in the pro-
portion of Ugandans living below the absolute
poverty line from 56 percent in 1992–93 to
35 percent in 1999–2000. However, because of a
slowdown in economic growth caused by a num-
ber of factors, such as unfavorable terms of trade
and the continuing conflict in Northern Uganda,
poverty incidence in 2002–03 increased to 38 per-
cent. Uganda continues to be one of the world’s
poorest nations with a per capita annual income
below U.S.$300.
Chapter 14
This chapter was written by Gabriela Braun and Alfred Hannig of GTZ.
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As the backbone of private-sector activities, the
financial sector plays a major role in all of the gov-
ernment’s reform initiatives. Microfinance in partic-
ular has received much attention as an important
device for poverty alleviation and for increasing the
productivity of the self-employed in the informal
sector, especially in rural areas (MTCS [Medium-
Term Competitive Strategy for the Private Sector]
2000–05) 2000; PMA [Plan for Modernization of
Agriculture] 2000). In June 2005, President Yoweri
Museveni appointed a Minister of Microfinance—
quite remarkable given that, only 10 short years
earlier, microcredit was a fairly new concept.
This chapter chronicles the development of
microfinance regulation and supervision in Uganda.
It begins with an overview of the financial sector in
Uganda, followed by a description of the process
to establish a regulatory framework for microfi-
nance and ultimately, the creation of the Microfi-
nance Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDI) Act
2003, and the supervisory function within the Bank
of Uganda. The chapter concludes with a brief
description of the licensing process, and a review of
the key success factors and remaining challenges
within the Ugandan microfinance sector. 
The Financial Sector
In 2005, Uganda’s banking sector consisted of
15 commercial banks, 12 of which were foreign
owned. In March 2005, foreign-owned banks
together held 84 percent of total assets, with the
two biggest banks, Stanbic Bank and Standard
Chartered, holding market share of about 52 per-
cent and 55 percent of total assets and total
deposits, respectively.1 Having acquired Uganda
Commercial Bank Limited in 2002, Stanbic Bank
was the largest bank in Uganda with 68 branches—
the largest branch network in the country. Cente-
nary Rural Development Bank ranked second with
18 branches nationwide. The remainder of the
banks each had six or fewer branches. In addition to
commercial banks, there were six credit institutions
licensed by the Bank of Uganda (BoU), all locally
owned (five privately and one publicly). These oper-
ated almost exclusively in Kampala, with the excep-
tion of Postbank Uganda Ltd, which offered
savings and credit services up-country. Finally, there
were four licensed microfinance deposit-taking
institutions (MDIs), discussed below.
Because of various far-reaching reforms designed
to strengthen the financial sector and improve bank-
ing supervision, the Ugandan banking system today
is fundamentally sound and more resilient than in
the past. The small number of large and reputable
foreign banks that dominate the banking sector are
well-managed and well-capitalized. In addition, the
banking sector’s profitability over the last few years
has been bolstered by the high interest rates on
treasury bills, a preferred investment instrument for
many of the highly liquid banks, and a steady reduc-
tion in nonperforming loans.
Since 1993, the government of Uganda has
taken considerable efforts to improve financial
intermediation and foster financial sector deepen-
ing. The key elements of financial sector reforms
that were implemented in the structural adjustment
policy package, particularly with the Bank of
Uganda Act of 1993 and the Financial Institutions
Act amendment of 1993, included the following:
• Legal independence of the central bank, the
Bank of Uganda (BoU), establishing monetary
authority and overall responsibility for supervi-
sion of all financial institutions
• Liberalization of interest and exchange rates
• Strengthening of banking supervision
• Strengthening of competition in the financial
sector
• Reduced government ownership in financial
institutions 
• Permission for new financial services
• Other reforms, such as removing restrictions on
capital transfers, reducing the corporate tax rate,
and legalizing foreign exchange deposits
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The new Financial Institutions Act (FIA), which
went into effect March 2004, has further improved
the prudential framework.2
Despite these achievements, the Ugandan formal
financial sector still remains relatively small and is
characterized by a number of structural weaknesses:
• The spread between the deposit and lending rate
has remained relatively high, indicating a lack of
competition as well as high operating costs.
• Commercial banks’ balance sheets reflect their
preference for liquid low-risk and high-yield
treasury bills.3
• The banking sector is highly concentrated. In
2005, the top five borrowers and depositors
for each bank represented about 34 percent of
all loans and 18 percent of all deposits in the
system. 
• Lending is also highly concentrated by sector.
Commercial bank loans to manufacturing, trade,
and services account for about 80 percent of total
private sector lending. Agriculture, which
accounts for 40 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), received only 11 percent of commer-
cial bank loans as of June 30, 2004 (IMF 2005). 
Regional concentration is considerable. Almost
all banks concentrate their activities around the
capital Kampala and in one or two other large
towns. While certainly improving, the Ugandan
financial sector, even in comparison to other East
Africa countries, is characterized by a lack of finan-
cial depth. 
The steps taken to strengthen the financial sector
are expected to increase the public’s confidence in
bank operations, lead to a broader deposit base, and
finally result in more efficient financial intermedia-
tion. Nonetheless, the effects of these measures will
only be felt in the medium term. Given the low
level of competition and the attractive options for
investing in low-risk liquid assets,4 whether banks
will be willing in the next few years to lend to the
largely neglected micro, small, and medium-size
enterprises sector, especially in rural areas, is ques-
tionable. Thus, microfinance institutions (MFIs)
are expected to play a critical role in addressing
huge segments of the population with little or no
access to financial services. 
With growing donor support for the sector,
Uganda experienced a proliferation of MFIs during
the 1990s. In 1990, it was estimated that MFIs
were providing loans to approximately 50,000
clients; in 2003 there were an estimated 1,500
microfinance outlets serving about 400,000 bor-
rowers and 900,000 savers. Given that the clients of
these institutions are typically very poor women
with no collateral and that legal enforcement of
these loans is almost impossible, Ugandan MFIs
typically employ a lending technology based on
joint-liability groups combined with compulsory
savings to ensure timely repayment. A number of
the larger institutions (and all of the MDIs) also
now offer individual loans.
Regulation of Microfinance 
Deposit-Taking Institutions 
This section reviews the early steps made regarding
the principles for regulating MDIs, then examines
the BoU policy framework from which the legisla-
tion ultimately emanated.
Early Progress
Discussions on microfinance regulation in Uganda
began in April 1996. The initiative to regulate
microfinance business originated from different
stakeholders—MFIs, policy makers, and the central
bank—all with somewhat differing interests and
motivations. Larger MFIs taking compulsory sav-
ings were witnessing increasing demand from their
customers to provide small voluntary deposit facili-
ties. Although it is difficult to assess to what extent
illegal deposit-taking took place, undoubtedly a
number of MFIs took deposits from the public for
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on-lending purposes. In this context, a growing
number of MFIs voiced their interest in creating a
regulatory framework for microfinance that would
enable them to broaden their funding base and
increase their business and services to clients. So
while a certain degree of regulatory drive originated
from the industry itself, it was not necessarily with
full awareness of the consequences and require-
ments a prudential regulatory regime for micro-
finance would imply. 
At the same time, microfinance was already
appearing on the political agenda as a potentially
effective tool for poverty alleviation. Policy makers
and politicians argued in favor of regulating microfi-
nance operations, but again without being fully
aware of the implications for the industry of a legal
framework. Many were driven by the belief that low-
interest microcredit would lift people out poverty. 
The central bank—following a prudential view—
also developed more interest in microfinance activ-
ities. In particular, the executive director supervi-
sion began to gather information to understand the
microfinance business. The BoU became increas-
ingly aware that the microfinance business was
growing, and that some services provided by MFIs
apparently took place in a regulatory void. The
BoU also started to feel growing pressure from
groups outside the central bank to handle microfi-
nance under a regulatory framework still to be
developed. In early 1996, based on initial talks at an
African Banking and Finance Seminar in Berlin,
BoU officials requested the German government,
through their development agency Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ), to carry out a financial sector study in
Uganda with the objective of identifying possible
fields for cooperation. When the study was carried
out in February 1996, the BoU clearly voiced the
need, among others, to source best practice policy
and technical input to set up a microfinance regula-
tory framework. 
This request proved to be the start of what was
to become a five-year capacity-building initiative for
the BoU. During an appraisal conducted in mid-
1997, one of the major project components identi-
fied was microfinance regulation and supervision. 
In late 1997, the Minister of Planning chaired a
meeting at which it was agreed that the government
and the private sector involved in microfinance
needed to meet as a group to discuss issues of
policy, capacity building, and outreach. In February
1998, this group, under the auspices of the Con-
sultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) Working
Group on Savings Mobilization, and in conjunction
with GTZ, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), and the French government
(which provided the funding and logistical sup-
port), held an Africa-wide conference on micro-
savings mobilization in Kampala (GTZ/UNDP/
Cooperation Francaise 1998). The conference
gained strong support from the BoU. These discus-
sions in particular had a strong bearing on the
BoU’s inclination to address the issue of small
deposit mobilization more actively.
In May 1998, several sponsors (the government
of Uganda, the World Bank, the European Union,
the UK Department for International Develop-
ment, the UNDP, and the USAID-funded project
Private Enterprise Support, Training, and Organi-
zational Development [PRESTO]) organized a
workshop on the national policy and strategic
framework for micro and rural finance covering a
broad range of issues such as regulation, apex struc-
tures, capacity building, and funding strategies. The
workshop turned out to be a seminal event bring-
ing practitioners, government officials, members of
parliament, BoU representatives, and relevant
donor agency representatives together.
Initial discussions between stakeholders were
characterized by some degree of confusion. In par-
ticular, the reasons for regulating MFIs were not
well understood. Some stakeholders perceived reg-
ulation as a way to promote MFIs and hence im-
prove access to financial services for the poor, while
others wanted to enable strong MFIs to mobilize
deposits. Many matters remained unresolved,
including the basis for classifying MFIs and licens-
ing them; determining acceptable performance
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ratings on capital, asset quality, and loan-loss provi-
sioning, profitability, and efficiency indicators; as
well as the potential of self-regulation. It was agreed
that continued deliberation in this area would be
undertaken by the BoU. The Ugandan government
took the lead in the microfinance policy debate and
formed a committee on which the government as
well as MFIs and donor organizations were repre-
sented. This committee was chaired by the Ministry
of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
(MoFPED). At a later stage it became the Microfi-
nance Forum (MFF). The MFF, which remains
active to date, meets on a regular basis to discuss
key policy issues in microfinance development in
Uganda and has played an important role in
furthering the industry.
Despite the lack of clarity and the large number
of unresolved issues, political pressure on the BoU
to license and regulate MFIs increased. The BoU,
however, followed a cautious approach and empha-
sized the need to balance competing interests
before drafting a law. This approach proved fruitful,
not only because there was still a lack of consensus
among stakeholders on how to deal explicitly with
the microfinance sector, but also because internal
BoU knowledge and experience on microfinance
had to be developed gradually before substantial
steps in drafting a law could be taken. The strategic
approach, therefore, was to draft a policy statement
on microfinance as an initial step to first clarify
major principles and standards for microfinance
regulation. After cabinet approval of the policy
statement, the drafting of the legislation was meant
to follow based on an established consensus on
principles and standards.
BoU Policy Framework as a Strategic
Approach to Microfinance
The BoU took the lead in proposing a policy frame-
work for microfinance regulation. However, consen-
sus on the general approach to microfinance regula-
tion was lacking inside the BoU itself, the result of
both minimal knowledge of best practice microfi-
nance, which is to be expected in many central
banks, and the fact that the various departments
with a stake in microfinance had very different views
on what the policy should be. Because the develop-
ment finance department was involved in channeling
credit to specific sectors, it argued that the policy
should explicitly focus on lending conditions to
banks and MFIs involved in microfinance business.
The research department thought the policy state-
ment should emphasize the role of MFIs in poverty
alleviation. The supervision department argued that
the policy should focus on clear and strict principles
to ensure safety and soundness of microfinance
operations applying a conservative approach to reg-
ulate and supervise microfinance in accordance with
supervision principles for commercial banks.
After numerous efforts to reflect best practices
and balance the differing views of the different
departments, a consensus was gradually reached.
The various BoU parties agreed that developing a
good framework was the best way to promote micro
and rural finance and would improve financial deep-
ening, as opposed to having the government and the
central bank directly participate in market transac-
tions. With the objective of encouraging the broad-
ening and deepening of the financial sector by
including MFIs as fully fledged sustainable financial
intermediaries, the supervision department of BoU
finally took the lead in drafting a policy paper.
Throughout the process, the policy direction
and major principles were discussed bilaterally with
major stakeholders, in particular government repre-
sentatives, practitioners, and some donors. In these
early stages of policy discussion, the stakeholders
had differing views on the effectiveness of the con-
sultative process. Some of them made substantial
efforts to position their interests in the design of
microfinance policy. With the BoU leading the
regulatory debate at that time and following its
strictly prudential approach on microfinance, some
stakeholders expressed their frustration, because
from their point of view, their recommendations
were not adequately reflected in the discussions.5
Although the discussions were controversial, the
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draft policy statement benefited considerably from
these consultations. 
One example of a fruitful discussion was the
debate over how to handle compulsory savings.
Opposing the initial BoU preference for treating
compulsory savings as regular deposits from the
public, the practitioners successfully forwarded
convincing arguments that explained the common
practice of using compulsory savings to secure loans
and highlighted the net borrowing position of such
clients. Therefore, such savings were seen as an inte-
gral part of the lending methodology rather than
funds for financial intermediation. The BoU finally
agreed to allow credit-only MFIs to continue to
employ compulsory savings (or loan insurance
funds as they are often called) as part of their lend-
ing methodology, as long as they were tracked sep-
arately and not used for on-lending purposes.
Consultations also focused on key issues such as
minimum capital for MFIs (higher capital as a
cushion for potential losses or lower capital to ease
entry for many institutions), the definition of
microfinance as a “line of business” (rather than a
product only offered by a specific type of institu-
tion), and the role of savings and credit coopera-
tives (SACCOs), which were not to be covered by
microfinance legislation.
The draft policy statement was finally presented
to and approved by the BoU Monetary and Credit
Policy Committee (MCPC) in April 1999. It was
then approved by the cabinet in July 1999 as the
Government of Uganda Policy on MFI Regulation.
In the policy statement, BoU spelled out the fol-
lowing guiding principles (BoU 1999; Katimbo-
Mugwanya 2000):
• The rationale for regulation is to protect deposi-
tors and to ensure the stability of the financial
sector. As a consequence, no organization shall
be allowed to take deposits from the public until
it is regulated and supervised by the BoU. 
• To ensure that MFIs are strong enough to cover
the risks of intermediation, they must be suffi-
ciently capitalized. Minimum capital and ongo-
ing capital requirements must be strong enough
to enable the organization to absorb any losses
without losing depositors’ money. 
• It is necessary to encourage excellent portfolio
quality for those MFIs that mobilize deposits,
especially because the portfolio constitutes the
major asset of most MFIs. 
• Sufficient liquidity levels must be maintained at
all times. 
• Because of specific features of microfinance (for
example, character-based lending, decentralized
decision making, dependence of loan decision on
loan officers’ experience, appropriate incentive
schemes for clients and staff), the success of
MFIs is particularly dependent on the qualifica-
tions and proper conduct of management.
Therefore, management standards for MFIs that
mobilize deposits must be high. 
To regulate microfinance, the BoU policy state-
ment suggested a tiered framework that reflects
the concept of microfinance as a line of business. The
tiered approach in Uganda defined four categories of
financial institutions offering microfinance services:
Tier 1: Commercial banks, licensed under the
Financial Institutions Act of 2004 (FIA).
Tier 2: Credit institutions, licensed under the
Financial Institutions Statute 1993 (since
replaced by the FIA 2004). Credit Insti-
tutions have lower minimum capital
requirements than commercial banks
and are not permitted to perform all
operations and services banks are
allowed; they can, however, take
deposits from the public.
Tier 3: MFIs that are allowed to take deposits
from the public and as such are regu-
lated and supervised by the BoU under a
new framework (now the MDI Act of
2003).
Tier 4: Non-deposit-taking institutions such
as credit-only NGOs or any other non-
deposit-taking initiatives and small
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member-based institutions mobilizing
subscriptions from their members alone
are not regulated by any law governing
the financial sector nor supervised by
the BoU.
This basic approach was extensively discussed at
the MFF and finally gained approval from all rele-
vant stakeholders. Consultation was then taken to a
higher level in November 1999, when the microfi-
nance regulatory policy was discussed with an inter-
national audience at a high-level policy workshop
held in Kampala with representatives from the BoU,
Ugandan Ministries, selected practitioners, donor
agencies, and representatives of central banks and
finance ministries from seven African, Asian, and
Latin American countries (Hannig and Katimbo-
Mugwanya 2000). The strategic approach proposed
by Uganda found broad acceptance in this forum,
encouraging major stakeholders to continue with
the next step—the drafting of a microfinance regu-
latory framework.
With the BoU’s increasing understanding of
microfinance, and in particular with the role the
BoU assumed it would have in supervising microfi-
nance in the future, the BoU board approved in
mid-1999 the establishment of a Microfinance
Unit. This move was in response to the request by
the executive director supervision, who clearly
anticipated an enormous additional workload for
the BoU in drafting a legal framework for microfi-
nance and managing the complex supervisory tasks
thereafter. The new unit was given a budget and
formed under the nonbank financial institutions
department.6 It initially consisted of four inspectors
with strong accounting backgrounds. One of these
four was the senior inspector who assumed the
coordination role; the other three were younger
inspectors who showed a willingness to learn about
state-of-the-art microfinance practices. 
The decision to place the new unit under the
nonbank financial institutions department was
based on the understanding that microfinance is a
nonbank financial service. Given the relatively early
stage of regulating microfinance in Uganda, creat-
ing a stand-alone microfinance supervision depart-
ment within the BoU was not seen as an option.
Most of the staff of the commercial banking
department at that time was highly absorbed in
consultations on the new banking legislation (the
Financial Institutions Act) with the Ministry of
Finance and the financial industry. However,
because regular meetings to discuss the various
drafts of the microfinance legislation were usually
chaired by the executive director supervision, the
staff of the commercial banking department was
deeply involved in the microfinance discussions
as well.
Immediately after the creation of the new unit,
staff training became a top priority. Staff members
were sent to participate in international microfi-
nance training programs (such as the microfinance
training programs at Boulder, Colorado, and
Frankfurt, Germany, as well as exposure trips to
other countries with relevant microfinance
experience—Bolivia, Indonesia, and India, for
example). In addition, on-the-job staff training was
provided by international experts. As a result, the
BoU staff in charge of microfinance became highly
qualified in a comparatively short time and there-
fore were in a position to lead the consultations
with stakeholders on the microfinance legislation
most effectively.
The Micro Finance Deposit-Taking
Institutions Act 
The BoU was assigned the task of drafting legis-
lation for the legal framework for tier 3 institu-
tions, taking into account the specific nature of
the microfinance business. The systematic drafting
was carried out by a task force set up by the BoU
supervision department comprising representatives
from the BoU supervision and legal departments
and a GTZ adviser as a resource. From the begin-
ning, the members of the task force followed a risk-
based approach focusing on the major risks of
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microfinance institutions and operations. To keep
the legislation lean, the members agreed to address
ownership, governance, and management risks
under the law, while the more concrete provisions
on how to deal with credit, liquidity, and interest
rate risks would be addressed under specific regula-
tions. At the same time, the task force was asked
to ensure that the microfinance legislation was fully
in line with new Financial Institution bill (FIA
2004) that was at the time under parliamentary
discussion.7
Elements of the Act
According to the MDI Act, MDIs can conduct
microfinance business, defined as accepting and on-
lending deposits from the public using microfinance
methodologies. 
MDIs are prohibited from engaging in high-risk
activities without approval of the central bank. The
assumption is that these institutions neither have
the capacity to absorb potential losses associated
with these activities nor the necessary risk-manage-
ment systems in place that would enable them to
mitigate associated risks. Section 19 of the MDI Act
provides a long list of activities that are not allowed
for MDIs, including the following: 
• Engage in foreign exchange transactions.
• Operate current accounts (demand accounts
with checking facilities).
• Underwrite securities.
• Engage in commerce. 
• Engage in trust operations. 
• On-lend compulsory savings taken as a collateral
substitute. 
According to the MDI Act, any institution
applying for a license to carry out microfinance
business shall become a company limited by shares.
Because of the history of bank failures in Uganda,
the BoU was sensitive to the issue of good corpo-
rate governance. MFIs that evolved out of the
nonprofit sector operating as NGOs do not have
real owners, because their funders are typically not
in a position to provide additional capital if needed
nor do they have appropriate incentives to provide
adequate management oversight. In addition, they
may be more concerned with meeting social rather
than financial objectives. The need to have owners,
and specifically owners with “deep pockets,”
became a crucial element of the MDI Act. Bank
supervision requires clear identification and demar-
cation of the roles and responsibilities of owners
and prompt reactions to emerging problems. In
addition, owners and senior management have to
be “fit and proper,” the MDI must have a proven
track record in microfinance, and the MDI must
have proper legal status, which, according to
Ugandan legislation is best achieved by registering
as a company limited by shares. 
The MDI Act also provides for good corporate
governance though a system of checks and balances
created by mandatory positions that have to be
approved by the BoU. These include the chief exec-
utive officer, senior managers (finance, operations),
and internal and external auditors. 
When drafting the legislation, the BoU consid-
ered minimum capital of 35,000 currency points,8
the equivalent of 700 million Uganda shillings
(approximately U.S.$387,000), invested in liquid
assets as adequate to obtain a license as an MDI.
This was changed to 25,000 currency points, the
equivalent of 500 million Uganda shillings (approx-
imately U.S.$276,000) in the final version of the
Act. To take deposits, any financial institution must
be adequately capitalized to absorb losses without
resorting to using depositor funds. Furthermore, by
bringing in considerable capital, owners of an MDI
show they have sufficient stake in the institution
and thus will be motivated to ensure its continued
capitalization. 
Because of the different risk profiles of MFIs
compared to traditional financial institutions, ongo-
ing capital requirements are stricter than those for
commercial banks and credit institutions. The core
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capital adequacy ratio, therefore, was set at 15 per-
cent of risk-weighted assets and the total capital
adequacy ratio cannot fall below 20 percent at
any time, compared to 8 percent and 12 percent,
respectively, for commercial banks in Uganda as set
in the FIA 2004. 
Recognizing the danger of abuse when owner-
ship is concentred in a few hands, the draft legisla-
tion also included provisions to restrict ownership
by an individual or a group of individuals to 20 per-
cent of the shares of an MDI. This was subse-
quently changed to 30 percent in the final version
of the MDI Act. Furthermore, an individual seek-
ing to own more than 10 percent of the shares must
obtain explicit approval from the BoU.
Minimum capital and other licensing require-
ments act as a rationing device allowing only strong
institutions to come under the surveillance of the
BoU—a logical decision given the limited capacity
of any central bank to supervise financial institu-
tions, and the necessity of ensuring only financially
viable institutions engaging in deposit mobilization
from the public, particularly the poor. 
While the political pressure on the government
to issue the MDI law was increasing, the final draft
of the bill submitted in April 2001 to MoFPED was
delayed by intense discussion between MoFPED
and the BoU. Numerous sessions took place, often
ad hoc, with both the government and the BoU
favoring, in principle, the same approach to safety
and soundness of MFI operations. Discussions
focused on particular aspects such as the new name
of tier 3,9 on deposit protection, and on the num-
ber of shareholders. The prudential spirit of the
draft bill, however, was never questioned. 
In September 2001, the draft MDI bill was
accepted by the cabinet. The next step was for Par-
liament to pass it into law. In October 2001, a first
Information Exchange and Lobbying event on the
MDI bill10 was held, organized by the Association
of Microfinance Institutions of Uganda (AMFIU)
in its function as the chair of the MFF Sub Com-
mittee on Lobbying.11 The new Parliament had just
been elected in June 2001 and was therefore not
familiar with the process that had already taken
place; thus, stakeholders felt it necessary to sensitize
Members of Parliament (MPs) on microfinance
before submitting the bill and to provide a forum
for interaction between MPs and microfinance
practitioners. During the event, no major issues
were raised on the MDI bill. MPs were much more
concerned about high interest rates, the future role
of tier 4 MFIs, outreach, and the role of the gov-
ernment in microfinance. 
Following the bill’s submission to Parliament in
January 2002, a second Information Exchange and
Lobbying event was organized in April 2002, facil-
itated by AMFIU, the MFF, and the BoU supervi-
sion department.12 The purpose of this event was
for members of the relevant committees of the
Ugandan Parliament13 to learn the contents of the
MDI bill and its context for them to be able to
explain and present it in the plenary sessions of
Parliament. Attendance by MPs was relatively high,
with 59 out of 75 invited MPs participating. 
The debate focused on the following issues:
• How would the new law promote smaller MFIs,
especially in rural and remote areas? Because
MPs perceived the MDI bill as an instrument to
promote microfinance, one of the major con-
cerns was the minimum capital requirement of
(at that point) 700 million Uganda shillings,
which was felt to be too high to enable small
MFIs to come under regulation of the BoU.
• Were interest rates on microloans too high and
loan terms too short term? The MPs argued that
poor people could not afford to pay high inter-
est rates, and loan terms were too short term to
facilitate productive investment. Some of the
MPs insisted that the MDI bill address these
issues.
After long deliberation, many of the participants
understood that the law and the policy framework
would not affect tier 4 institutions as long as those
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institutions abstained from mobilizing deposits
from the public, but would enable stronger MFIs to
offer additional financial products and services.
However, many MPs still had concerns.
The MDI bill was discussed in Parliament in
August 2002 and the final reading took place in a
two-day plenary session in November of that year.
In the meantime, the Parliamentary Finance Com-
mittee had several hearings with officials from the
BoU supervision department and MFI practition-
ers. After lengthy debate the bill was finally passed
on November 20, 2002. The still-persisting con-
cerns of some MPs were addressed by the following
motion: 
It is hereby resolved that the Cabinet under-
takes to bring to the August House within
six months a Bill regulating the activities of
Community-Based Financial Institutions
referred to as Tier IV in the Report of the
Committee on Finance, Planning and Eco-
nomic Development guaranteeing afford-
able interest rates and reasonable period of
repayment to the borrowers. (Staschen and
Akampurira 2003, p. 1)
Apart from a few amendments that saw the
MDI’s minimum capital requirements reduced to
25,000 currency points (500,000 Uganda shillings
or approximately U.S.$276,000)14 and the maxi-
mum shareholding by one party raised to 30 per-
cent, the original bill remained intact. The MDI Act
was assented to by the President in April 2003 and
came into force on July 1, 2003. In the meantime,
the BoU developed regulations through discus-
sions with potential MDIs; these regulations
were finally approved by BoU management in
December 2003.
Following the discussions in Parliament, the
MFF commissioned AMFIU to prepare a proposal
to regulate MFIs not covered by the MDI Act. In
March 2003, AMFIU, with the support of the
GTZ/Sida Financial System Development Pro-
gramme, conducted a study to analyze the existing
legal and institutional framework for tier 4 MFIs
(Staschen and Akampurira 2003). Discussions on
whether to nonprudentially regulate credit-only
MFIs to ensure sound business practices and trans-
parency were still ongoing at the end of 2005. 
To summarize, although the MPs reiterated their
commitment to support microfinance, their enthu-
siasm for poverty alleviation (particularly within
their own constituencies) without sufficiently
understanding the basic principles of microfinance
complicated the debate and the passage of the bill.
Because the deliberations on the bill created an
increased public awareness of microfinance prac-
tices, throughout the parliamentary process, the
danger existed that MPs would insist on reintro-
ducing interest rate caps or other restrictive mea-
sures that would have been tremendously detri-
mental to the industry. Furthermore, it seems that
the skeptical view of the bill held by MPs was partly
due to the fact that the new Financial Institutions
Act governing tier 1 and 2 financial institutions,
which would give the BoU more power to inter-
vene in weak financial institutions, had been tabled
to Parliament shortly before. Meanwhile, the BoU
began to get ready for the next step—preparing to
license and supervise MDIs. 
BoU Approach to Risk-Based 
Supervision of MDIs
The MDI Act clarifies and defines the term micro-
finance business and outlines the most important
requirements for licensing, restrictions on certain
transactions, ownership and corporate governance
of MDIs, and principles for supervision and
receivership or liquidation. These principles were
based on the perception that the risk profile of
MDIs differs significantly from that of commercial
banks and credit institutions.
The risk-based approach to supervising microfi-
nance is based on an understanding of the MFI’s risk
profile. This approach identifies the key strategic,
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operational, and financial risks of the MFI, allowing
supervisors to concentrate resources on the areas of
highest risk. The supervisor puts more emphasis on
assessing future performance than on past perform-
ance and also gives greater emphasis to some of the
more qualitative aspects of an MFI’s operations,
including management practices, the effectiveness
of governance and internal control, quality of man-
agement information systems, soundness of corpo-
rate policies, and the professional capacity of staff
and procedures. The risk-based approach relies on
ongoing off-site surveillance and targets on-site
supervision to those MDIs with a high risk profile.
In addition, the approach uses intense licensing
procedures to carry out substantial inspections of
MDIs prior to licensing. Furthermore, it requires
comprehensive information disclosure by the super-
vised institutions. 
The statutory instrument lays down the detailed
regulatory principles of microfinance institutions
and operations as the foundation for risk-based
supervision. To determine the risk profile of poten-
tial MDIs, the BoU conducted a survey of selected
microfinance institutions throughout 2001. 
Taking into consideration international practices
for regulation and supervision of microfinance as
well as the risk categories that were felt to be most
relevant in Uganda,15 the BoU designed a risk-
based framework that incorporates both quantita-
tive indicators and qualitative measurements for
each risk category. For a detailed outline of the risk
framework, see annex 2B, Risk Framework Using
the Uganda Example at the end of chapter 2,
Regulation and Supervision: The Policy Frame-
work. The application of this framework requires
considerable effort and upfront cost when potential
MDIs apply for a license. However, once the licens-
ing process is completed, the framework focuses the
ongoing supervision on areas of greatest risk within
the particular MDI, combining a prospective view
with the assessment of past performance. 
Risk-management systems lie at the heart of risk-
based supervision. These include the governance
role of the board of directors, the adequacy of the
management information system, and the MFI’s
internal control policies and procedures. 
Licensing Begins 
At the time of publication, four MFIs in Uganda
had been licensed as microfinance deposit-taking
institutions. In order of licensing these are FINCA
Uganda Limited, PRIDE Microfinance Limited,
Uganda Microfinance Limited, and Uganda
Finance Trust Limited. Each of these institutions
underwent a prelicensing, on-site examination that
included a detailed analysis of the institution’s
strategic, credit, and operational risks. These
inspections all took place in mid-2004, following
the official adoption of the MDI implementing
regulations.16
As shown in table 14.1, the gap between the
inspection and actual licensing varied widely, from
5 months in the case of FINCA Uganda to
19 months for Uganda Finance Trust. 
The primary cause for the difference was the
time it took for each institution to finalize its own-
ership structure. Each of the MDIs faced different
challenges in meeting the BoU’s ownership
requirements, as discussed below. In addition, there
was some confusion surrounding the timing
requirements set forth in the MDI Act. Article 91
of the act states that 
any person who, immediately before the com-
mencement of this Act was carrying on micro-
finance business in Uganda shall, immediately
upon the coming into force of this Act apply
for a license under this Act and within twenty
four months from the commencement of this
Act comply with the requirements of this Act
or wind up its business within six months. 
The BoU warned MFIs taking deposits from
the public against doing so until they were
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licensed, meaning that most of the largest MFIs
would have 24 months to become licensed or
return customer deposits (which one ultimately
ended up doing). However, the Act was gazetted
(published in the official government newspaper)
on September 5, 2003, with a retroactive effective
date of July 1, 2003. It was thus unclear if the
institutions had until July 1, 2005 (two years from
the effective date) or September 5, 2005 (two
years from the date of gazetting). The issue was
finally clarified in May 2005 by the BoU, with
July 1 set as the deadline—hence the licensing of
two institutions (PRIDE Microfinance Ltd. and
Uganda Microfinance Ltd.) on the same date.
Uganda Finance Trust Ltd. had been relying on
the September 5 date, and took several extra
months to finalize its ownership and become
licensed. (Based on the substantial progress made
in meeting the licensing requirements, the BoU
allowed it the extra time.)
FINCA Uganda 
At the time of licensing, FINCA Uganda Ltd.
(FU) had over 48,000 loan clients and a port-
folio of 10.5 billion Uganda shillings (about
U.S.$5.8 million), making it the second largest
MFI by clients and third by portfolio. As the
Ugandan affiliate of FINCA International (FI),
FU’s management and its overall strategy were
heavily influenced by the FI head office in
Washington, DC. One of FI’s main requirements
in transforming FU was that the company remain
under its control. As discussed previously, the MDI
Act limits ownership by any one organization or
individual to 30 percent. The law does, however,
allow an MDI to be a wholly owned subsidiary of
a reputable financial institution. FI was able to
demonstrate to the BoU that it met this require-
ment, and accordingly the license was granted with
FI effectively owning 100 percent of the shares of
FU. This greatly simplified the licensing process,
because there was only one investor to be vetted,
and no shareholder group to negotiate with and
finalize. FI has undertaken to reduce its ownership
over a five-year period, but to date no other
investors have purchased shares in FU.
PRIDE Microfinance Limited 
PRIDE Uganda began as a Ugandan government
project with funding from the government of
Norway. In 2002, a registered NGO was formed,
which assumed all of the project’s assets and liabili-
ties. Then, in 2004, in anticipation of transforma-
tion, a share company called PRIDE Microfinance
Ltd. (PML), majority-owned by the NGO but with
additional shareholders, was formed and the assets
and liabilities of the NGO transferred to it. How-
ever, before licensing, questions were raised by the
government as to the procedures followed in the
creation of PML. Ultimately the full ownership of
Table 14.1 Licensing Sequence
MDI Prelicensing inspection Submission of application Issuance of license
FINCA Uganda Ltd. July 2004 August 16, 2004 November 23, 2004
PRIDE Microfinance Ltd. February 2004 September 10, 2004 June 30, 2005
Uganda Microfinance Ltd. August 2004 December 17, 2004 June 30, 2005
Uganda Finance Trust Ltd. April 2004 June 29, 2004 October 12, 2005
Source: Contributed by Lloyd Stevens, DFID Financial Sector Deepening Programme, Uganda, January 2006.
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the company reverted to the government of
Uganda. This resolved, at least on an interim basis,
the question of ownership of PML, allowing the
BoU to grant it its license before the July 1 dead-
line. At the time of its licensing, PML had 51,500
loan clients and 18.4 billion Uganda shillings
(U.S.$10.2 billion) in portfolio, ranking first in
clients and second in portfolio.
PML has been given a limited time to reduce the
government’s ownership and bring in private own-
ers who will jointly hold a majority position. At the
time of publication, no other investors had
purchased shares in PML.
Uganda Microfinance Limited 
At the time of licensing, Uganda Microfinance
Limited (UML) was the largest MFI in the country
by portfolio (20.7 billion Uganda shillings, or
U.S.$11.4 million) and the third largest by bor-
rowers (35,000). UML is the subject of chapter 15,
The Creation of Uganda Microfinance Limited, so
is not discussed in detail here. 
Uganda Finance Trust 
Although its parent Uganda Women’s Finance
Trust (UWFT) was the oldest MFI in Uganda,
UWFT was the last of the four MDIs to receive its
license. Its portfolio of 12.2 billion Uganda
shillings (U.S.$6.7 million) ranked third in size
among the four MDIs, and its borrower base of
20,100 ranked fourth. However, UWFT had been
actively mobilizing savings deposits from the public
for years, accumulating 4.4 billion Uganda shillings
(U.S.$2.4 million) in savings from 72,000 deposi-
tors, far more than its competitors. With the pas-
sage of the MDI Act, UWFT was in clear contra-
vention of the law and, therefore, under the most
pressure to become licensed.
In many ways, U-Trust followed the most tradi-
tional path and was the only MDI to strictly adhere
to ownership limitations: it formed a new company
with the NGO retaining 29.8 percent of equity
(just under the 30 percent ceiling outlined in the
MDI Act); and outside investors, comprising a
number of social investors (44.6 percent), founders
(13.5 percent), and a staff investment vehicle
(12.1 percent), holding the remainder. However,
the presence of so many parties, as well as the
company’s belief that it had until September 2005
rather than July 2005 to become licensed, led to
delays in its final approval.
One other MFI in Uganda (Faulu Uganda Ltd.)
is in the process of transforming and hopes to
submit its license application to become an MDI
sometime in 2006. No other MFIs in Uganda inter-
ested in transforming are yet financially sustainable
so it is unlikely that additional MDIs will be
licensed in the near future.
Key Success Factors
Because of its overall positive experience, microfi-
nance in Uganda has increasingly drawn attention
from governments, donor agencies, experts, and
practitioners from numerous other countries. One
of the areas of greatest interest is microfinance reg-
ulation and supervision, with Uganda becoming a
showcase for the collaborative development of a
legislative framework. 
The major success factors are summarized below.
Enabling Policy Framework
Microfinance was and still is high on the political
agenda of the country. Uganda has a consistent and
enabling policy framework for financial sector
development. The government is committed to cre-
ating and maintaining an environment conducive
to the sustainable growth of the microfinance
industry. This includes divesture from direct credit
delivery through government programs, the
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promotion of national coordination and linkages
through the MFF, and support of an enabling
policy and regulatory framework. Moreover, the
government continues to support capacity-building
efforts within the industry. 
Clear Policy on the Way in Which to Regulate
The 1999 policy statement clearly defined the goals
of the new legislation. Because this policy, which
focuses on safety and soundness of microfinance
operations, was widely adopted, drafting of the
microfinance legislation was based on agreed upon
principles and could, therefore, take place under
relatively benevolent circumstances.
Clear Mandate for the BoU in Formulating 
the Draft Policy and MDI Bill
After the many unresolved issues and lack of clarity
on microfinance regulation that emerged at the
policy workshop in May 1998, it was important to
clearly give the BoU the mandate to lead the dis-
cussion. A small group within the BoU developed
major principles on how to regulate the industry. By
following a strictly prudential view driven by the
understanding that the best way to promote micro-
finance would be to provide a conducive regulatory
framework for the industry, the BoU could limit
politicization of the debate and push forward a set
of principles in line with international best practices. 
Stakeholder Consultation and Collaboration
Consultation and collaboration among the relevant
stakeholders contributed significantly to the success
of the legislative process in Uganda. The proactive
commitment of a number of key leaders in public
agencies, MFIs, and donor organizations led to the
collaborative atmosphere. The MFF chaired by
MoFPED, in existence since 1997, played a major
role in guiding the strategic coordination of the
relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, numerous indi-
viduals in Uganda became “champions of change”
and played key roles in leading the change process.
Donor Support, Coordination, 
and Collaboration
Donor funding, policy advice, and technical input
played a substantial role in the development of the
Ugandan microfinance regulation; however, in each
phase of drafting policy and regulations for microfi-
nance, the ownership of the process was clearly with
the BoU and other Ugandan stakeholders. Even so,
a crucial success factor was the close collaboration
among major donors in providing skilled technical
staff as well as relevant best practices.17 Donor coor-
dination has been particularly strong in Uganda. All
relevant donor agencies recognize and agree on
good microfinance practices. In January 2002, 13
donor agencies adopted guidelines incorporating
sound principles for providing support to microfi-
nance in line with good practices18 and in 2003,
15 donor agencies endorsed an MFI Performance
Monitoring Tool that provides uniform reporting
formats for all donor-funded MFIs (Ledgerwood,
Mutebi, and Mpendo 2003). As discussed in chap-
ter 2, Regulation and Supervision: The Policy
Framework, the leading donors supporting trans-
formation also formed a Transformation Steering
Committee to coordinate support to the industry
on transformation-related issues. 
Role of Politics
There was strong political will to promote microfi-
nance as part of the overall development agenda in
the country. Government not only actively sup-
ported the design of the legal framework, but also
addressed the bottlenecks in microfinance—such as
deficient infrastructure, lack of skilled human
resources, and the need for capacity building—in
relevant policy documents. As a result, an overall
vision for microfinance emerged, which included
the regulatory framework as a major strategic target.
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Role of AMFIU
AMFIU played a critical role in influencing the
overall policy framework for microfinance in
Uganda, particularly when the draft MDI bill was
discussed in Parliament. As discussed above,
AMFIU, in cooperation with the BoU and sup-
ported by several donors, organized a number of
information exchange events to explain the bill to
the MPs. In addition, AMFIU regularly partici-
pated in policy debates to encourage the govern-
ment to adopt good microfinance practices and was
called to several hearings of the Parliamentary
Committee on Finance when the bill was being
evaluated. AMFIU also actively disseminated
general information on microfinance, and educated
the public on the importance of savings for poorer
clients and other issues that were considered critical
(for example, the reason for high interest rates rela-
tive to traditional commercial lending) through
publications in the mass media, flyers, and work-
shops. The role AMFIU played in promoting
understanding by MPs and addressing their con-
cerns cannot by overstated. 
Remaining Challenges
Despite the measurable success of the efforts to
supervise and regulate the microfinance sector to
ensure its sustainability and continued assistance
to poor people, several challenges still remain.
Lack of Clear Vision for a Financial 
Systems Approach
Despite lengthy discussions on the new legislation,
the majority of stakeholders do not yet have a clear
understanding of how microfinance can be inte-
grated fully into the formal financial system. To
make microfinance sustainable in the medium
term, all stakeholders must gain a better under-
standing of the financial systems approach19 and
develop a shared vision of further steps to achieve
this (Goodwin-Groen, Bruett, and Latortue 2004).
Lack of Clear Strategy for Addressing 
Failing MDIs
The corrective action tools available to supervisors
for dealing with weak or failing banks do not always
work well or as desired when applied to regulated
microfinance institutions. Stop lending orders, for
example, would be inappropriate to apply to MDIs
because the asset quality of MDI loan portfolios is
so largely dependent on the promise of accessing
future loans.
Danger of Politicization
Through the intense political debate on the MDI
legislation, microfinance gained much public and
political attention. Some politicians seem to see
microfinance as a panacea for poverty alleviation
and insist that interest rates should be brought
down. Stakeholders, therefore, have to take a proac-
tive approach to rapidly react to political state-
ments or initiatives that might have harmful effects
on the industry (Goodwin-Groen, Bruett, and
Latortue 2004).
Regulation and Supervision of Savings 
and Credit Cooperatives 
The 1999 policy statement makes clear that sav-
ings mobilization by member-based institutions
will not fall under the regulation of the central
bank. Nonetheless, in Uganda more than 1,300
savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) mobilize
resources from mostly poor people. Stakeholders
increasingly express concern about the lack of pru-
dential oversight for these savings. A way needs to
be found to increase transparency and oversight
for the sector without overstretching the BoU’s
capacity. 
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If SACCOs continue to grow, the BoU may con-
sider submitting the largest ones to direct supervi-
sion as is done in some Latin American countries
(Jansson, Rosales, and Westley 2003).
Notes
The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of
Lloyd Stevens, DFID Financial Sector Deepening Pro-
gramme, Uganda, who provided the section, “Licensing
Begins.”
1. Bank of Uganda Web site http://www.bou.or.ug. 
2. The FIA 2004 seeks to rectify weaknesses in the cur-
rent banking legislation and to improve corporate
governance by clearly stipulating the responsibilities
of the board of directors, external and internal audi-
tors, and management of financial institutions. It
places tighter restrictions on insider lending and large
exposures than the Financial Institution Statute 1993
(which the FIA 2004 replaced) and seeks to reduce
ownership concentration to prevent financial institu-
tions from being owned and controlled by one per-
son or family. The new FIA updates Uganda’s bank-
ing legislation to an international code of best
practice as set out in the Basle core principles for
effective banking supervision.
3. Public expenditure as a share of GDP increased from
16.4 percent in 1997–98 to 24.9 percent in 2001–02
(IMF 2003, p. 3). Given the insufficient rise in
domestic revenue, the large deficits have been cov-
ered by increased donor support resulting in
increased injections of liquidity to contain inflation.
These sterilization operations have exerted pressure
on real interest rates and the exchange rate, raising
concern about crowding out of the private sector and
adversely affecting export growth. 
4. In 2004, longer-term government bonds with
maturities between two and ten years were issued,
which led to a decline and stabilization of the Treasury
Bill rate. In the medium term this might have an effect
on the commercial banks’ investment strategies.
5. Some stakeholders apparently felt their views were
successfully included in the general debate on micro-
finance regulation (CGAP 2000, box 6 on Uganda).
Other observers of the consultative process found
that in 1999 “the dialogue was mainly just between
GTZ and BoU until a letter was sent in November
1999 to the BoU Governor” on behalf of 12 to 15 of
the largest MFIs and apex organizations (Bell 2003,
p. 20). The reality was that the consultative process
involving stakeholders was intense but initially mostly
bilateral. 
6. The Bank of Uganda at the time had a commercial
banking department that supervised tier 1 institu-
tions, and a nonbank financial institutions depart-
ment, which supervised tier 2 and eventually tier 3
institutions.
7. It should be noted that members of the task force
were of the opinion that converting MFIs into
deposit-taking intermediaries could have been
achieved with lower transactions costs by amending
the draft Financial Institutions bill rather than creat-
ing new legislation. However, this political decision
had already been made.
8. The minimum capital is expressed in currency points
to allow for inflationary adjustments. According to
the MDI Act 2003, minimum capital can be varied
by MoFPED with approval of Parliament and the
definition of currency points (Schedule 1) can be
changed by the MoFPED with approval of Parlia-
ment. In May 2006, one currency point was equiva-
lent to 20,000 Uganda shillings. (As of May 2006,
the exchange rate was 1,810 Uganda shillings per
U.S. dollar).
9. The name of the new institutional type was discussed
at length. In late 2000, stakeholders finally agreed on
the term micro deposit-taking institutions, which, with
the passage of the law, was changed to microfinance
deposit-taking institutions. 
10. For a summary of all workshops and information
exchange events that were conducted before the
MDI Bill was passed by Parliament, see Ledgerwood,
Burand, and Braun (2002). 
11. AMFIU is a national microfinance network with 79
regular member microfinance institutions and 14
associate members (apex bodies and donor projects)
as of December 2004. It was established in 1996
through the association of several institutions inter-
ested in microfinance and was registered in 1999 as a
company limited by guarantee. AMFIU actively lob-
bies government to create and support a conducive
environment for microfinance, disseminates informa-
tion, and links local and international microfinance
stakeholders. AMFIU is highly regarded by its mem-
ber organizations and generally accepted as the voice
of the Ugandan microfinance industry. 
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12. Throughout the process a number of additional
workshops on experiences with transformation in
other countries, tax implications for transforming
MFIs, and general policy issues for various groups of
stakeholders were held. See Ledgerwood, Burand,
and Braun (2002). 
13. The committees were the Committee on Finance,
Planning and Economic Development, which was in
charge of presenting the bill and providing recom-
mendations to the plenary; the Committee on Agri-
culture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, which is in
charge of the PMA (Plan for Modernization of Agri-
culture) and closely linked to the Strategic Plan for
Expanding Outreach and Capacity for Sustainable
Microfinance in Uganda; and the Committee on
Social Services, which is linked to some past directed
government lending programs.
14. To ensure the BoU cannot raise minimum capital
without the consent of Parliament by raising the
value of one currency point, the MDI Act stipulates
that the value can only be changed by MoFPED with
the approval of Parliament (see endnote 8 above).
The draft MDI bill had provided that the value of
currency points could be adjusted with the approval
of the Cabinet. 
15. Ownership and governance risk, management risk,
credit risk, liquidity risk, and interest rate risk. 
16. The BoU was already focused on these institutions
for several reasons. They comprise the four largest
MFIs in the country, several were already mobilizing
savings deposits (in various ways and to varying
degrees), and each had formally indicated its inten-
tion to transform in writing to the BoU.
17. USAID provided assistance in the field of strengthen-
ing MFIs through the PRESTO project and between
2001 and 2004, through the Support for Private
Enterprise Expansion and Development (SPEED)
project, which provided direct support to MFIs with
potential to transform into MDIs. Since 1998, GTZ
has provided assistance to the BoU on the design of
the BoU policy framework for microfinance and the
drafting of the MDI Bill. GTZ also supported train-
ing and capacity building for BoU staff and facili-
tated the transfer of know-how through various
capacity-building trips for BoU staff to other coun-
tries (Bolivia, Indonesia, and India, for example).
Both agencies also provided considerable support
for the information exchange and lobbying activities
that were organized when the bill was discussed in
Parliament. In addition, expertise from other coun-
tries (Bolivia, in particular) was brought to Uganda,
especially when the legislation and the regulations
were developed. Other agencies involved included
the European Union-SUFFICE Programme, the UK
Department for International Development, SNV,
the World Bank, and the Stromme Foundation.
18. Donor Principles for Support to Uganda’s Microfi-
nance Industry, 2001. 
19. The financial systems approach applies market-driven
principles used by formal financial institutions to the
provision of financial services to the poor, as defined
in Otero and Rhyne 1994.
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The Creation of Uganda 
Microfinance Limited
On June 30, 2005, Uganda MicrofinanceUnion (UMU) received official noticefrom the Bank of Uganda (BoU) that
Uganda Microfinance Limited (UML) had been
licensed as a microfinance deposit-taking institu-
tion (MDI). Long anticipated, this notification
marked the realization of a long-term vision that
motivated two aspiring entrepreneurs to launch
UMU in August 1997, as well as the culmination of
three years of intensive preparation, planning, and
negotiation. 
From UMU’s initial days, the founders were
clear about their vision for the organization—to
offer quality financial services to microentrepre-
neurs and low-income people living in Uganda.
When presented with the opportunity to change
institutional form and come under the supervision
of the BoU to offer even more services (in particu-
lar savings), as well as to access broader sources of
funding (equity capital and public deposits) and
thus expand operations further, UMU’s founders
did not hesitate. In early 2002, UMU embarked on
transforming to an MDI through restructuring
operations, formalizing policies and procedures,
hiring new staff and investing in staff training,
upgrading systems, redesigning products, and
negotiating and renegotiating with investors.
In early 2002, before officially launching prepa-
rations for transformation, UMU operated out of a
small, four-room house. The senior management
team included two executive directors and a head-
office manager, the latter tasked with branch
operations, human resources, and new product
development. The staff complement totaled 120,
most of whom knew each other personally. The
organization served just over 10,000 active bor-
rowers and approximately 20,000 savers out of nine
service centers, and relied on a completely paper-
based, manual accounting and account-tracking
system. Portfolio quality was excellent, and the
organization had experienced no known cases of
fraud.
By June 2005, UMU no longer resembled the
organization it had been just three years earlier. It
had long since shifted premises to a 14-room, two-
floor professional building. A core group of exter-
nal investors, none of whom had been involved in
the initial transformation planning, had been
Chapter 15
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assembled to finance and lead the new MDI going
forward. The senior management team had been
expanded to include eight department heads, each
managing fully staffed departments, including
operations, credit, internal audit, human resources,
finance and administration, information tech-
nology, research and development, and marketing.
The organization’s geographic presence had grown
from 9 to 20 service centers (including branches
and agencies or subbranches), staffed by a total
complement of 330. Client outreach had more than
tripled to 91,000 savers and 36,000 active borrow-
ers. The manual management information system
(MIS) had been replaced by a sophisticated banking
software, and formalized policies and procedures
manuals had been developed for all operational
activities. At the same time, however, portfolio
quality had deteriorated and incidents of fraud had
been detected at some of the branches. 
These transition years were both challenging and
defining for UMU—reflecting in many ways the tra-
ditional evolution from an entrepreneurial start-up,
dependent on the visionary drive of a few key lead-
ers, to a professional organization with systems and
procedures led by a core management team and pro-
fessional board. Significant improvements in stan-
dardization and overall professionalization had been
made, yet transformation also challenged the corpo-
rate culture of the institution, previously defined by
flexible operating procedures, informal communica-
tion patterns, and close-knit personal relations. Sub-
stantial investment in both financial and human
resources had been made, and had tested the orga-
nization’s leadership and independence throughout
years of complex investor negotiations. Although it
is still too soon to reflect on the full impact of trans-
formation, this chapter tells the story of these years
preparing for licensing as a regulated deposit-taking
institution. It highlights the unique aspects of
UMU’s transformation process, including the oper-
ational, structural, and financial challenges it faced as
it evolved from a young entrepreneurial NGO to
one of the first licensed MDIs in Uganda. 
Background 
Despite initial start-up challenges, the founders’
commitment to offering quality financial services to
a broad range of Ugandans facilitated organiza-
tion’s growth from a small project to one of the
leading microfinance institutions in Uganda. 
From Boston to Busiika
In September 1996, two students from Brandeis
University’s Institute of Sustainable International
Development in the United States discovered they
shared a similar passion—to create a full-service
financial institution for microentrepreneurs and
low-income people. Having both worked in Africa
and seen microfinance in operation in the African
context, they also shared a dream of creating a new
kind of microfinance institution, one that from the
beginning would seek to become a leading com-
mercial entity, offering both loans and savings serv-
ices to traditionally unbanked communities. Charles
Nalyaali, a Ugandan bank examiner on study leave
from the Bank of Uganda, and Rodney Schuster, an
American entrepreneur with small business devel-
opment experience in West Africa, spent their first
year at Brandeis jointly developing a business plan
for this dream. The then Governor of the Bank
of Uganda, Mr. C. N. Kikonyogo, was an early
supporter of the initiative. As quoted in a speech
in June 1997, “Following a recent Seminar at
Brandeis University in the USA where I was invited
to present a paper . . . , I reached an understanding
with that University to jointly carry out an experi-
ment on micro-finance programs in Luwero dis-
trict.”1 This experiment became known as the
Uganda Microfinance Union, launched by the two
friends with an initial start-up grant of U.S.$32,000
from the BoU. 
Uganda Microfinance Union was incorpo-
rated on July 21, 1997, as a company limited by
guarantee2 and registered as a nongovernmental
organization (NGO). The company’s initial board
was composed of six directors, including its two
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founders, two Ugandan businessmen, a central
banker, and a human rights activist.3 The original
vision of the institution was “to offer quality finan-
cial services to micro-entrepreneurs and low-income
people (female or male) living in the rural, peri-
urban, and urban areas in the Republic of Uganda”
(UMU 2001 End of Year Report). With the goal of
serving marginalized communities, UMU began
operations in the small township of Busiika, Charles’
hometown located in Luwero district, approxi-
mately 22 miles from the capital city Kampala. After
less than a month of additional research and plan-
ning, UMU’s first loan was disbursed on August 11,
1997. During those initial months, Charles played
the role of finance manager, systems manager, and
client mobilizer; Rodney served as the commercial
manager, loan officer, and collections officer. Their
first employee, who served as the sole teller, was
also hired at this time, someone who remains an
employee of the company today.
These initial start-up days were not easy ones.
Funding, both to cover operating costs and to
finance the loan portfolio, was limited, leading
Charles and Rodney to forgo their own salaries for
some of this time. The initial start-up grant from the
BoU was fully utilized within three months, and
efforts to seek additional funding from the formal
financial system were unsuccessful. In March 1998,
however, the BoU granted UMU a loan of 40 mil-
lion Uganda shillings (approximately U.S.$35,000
at the time), repayable over five years. To secure this
loan, the directors had to execute promissory notes
in favor of the BoU to the extent of the loan balance.
With a year of operations under its belt, UMU
began a number of fruitful discussions with the
donor community. In late 1998, Novib (Oxfam
Netherlands) provided a sizable grant of approxi-
mately U.S.$300,000 to support both the capital-
ization of the loan portfolio and operating costs.
In 1999, an additional U.S.$500,000 grant was
secured from the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) Private Enterprise
Support Training and Organization Development
(PRESTO) project, $400,000 of which was for the
loan portfolio and the remaining $100,000 for fixed
assets. In addition, in late 1999, UMU received a
second loan from the BoU for 100 million Uganda
shillings (approximately U.S.$66,000 at the time)
repayable over one year. By late 2000, the small
research project, started with a minimal $32,000 in
1997, had amassed a capital base of over 1.2 billion
Uganda shillings (approximately U.S.$700,000). 
During this time, UMU was experimenting with
solidarity group lending (groups of five borrowers),
much smaller groups than were currently the norm
among microfinance institutions in Uganda, most
of which were using village banking methodologies
with groups of 25 to 30 borrowers. With the moti-
vation of “doing things differently,” Charles and
Rodney sought to create a different kind of institu-
tional culture at UMU. The tagline of “quality,
innovation and flexibility” was born during this
time, in reflection of the kind of staff, services, and
products they anticipated offering. The “UMU
way” was defined as Microfinance with a Difference.
Growth of Operations
Since reaching their 100th client in September
1997, UMU grew steadily and became one of the
largest MFIs operating in Uganda. As illustrated in
table 15.1, UMU registered exponential growth as
the organization moved quickly to open branches
throughout the country. In 2001, the organization
posted its first profit of approximately U.S.$40,000,
achieving self-sufficiency after only four years of
operations. While the combination of a burgeoning
private sector and a relatively shallow financial sys-
tem in the late 1990s created significant demand for
microfinance services in Uganda, UMU’s particular
operating strategy also helped encourage rapid mar-
ket penetration. 
Broad market perspective. From its opening days,
UMU’s goal has been to provide a range of finan-
cial service to eligible unbanked member of the
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community, and ultimately even attract clients away
from banks by offering better and more efficient
service. As such, UMU’s target market has included
both self-employed microentrepreneurs and salaried
workers in the branches’ catchment areas.
Investment in research and development. The
organization’s wider perception of target market
spurred a significant amount of product develop-
ment work within UMU’s research and develop-
ment department. From early on, UMU made
responding to client needs a top priority, most
noticeably demonstrated by the resources, both
human and financial, that the organization directed
to research and development efforts. In fact, the
research and development function preceded the
creation of both the human resources and internal
audit departments. 
Range of products and services. Unlike other MFIs
operating in Uganda at the time, UMU was never
a one-product organization. The organization
started operations by offering a range of credit
products and today offers microenterprise working
capital loans (both group and individual), various
loan products for salaried employees, a home
improvement loan, a school fees loan, and a small
and medium enterprise loan. 
Consolidating Resources
Similar to other MFIs in Uganda, UMU’s lending
methodology included a compulsory savings com-
ponent, mandated at 20 percent of the loan amount
for some of its products. The organization also
offered its members the choice to save above the
minimum required, which many did, despite both
minimal interest rates and monthly account mainte-
nance fees. By early 2002, UMU’s savings portfolio
had already reached over 2 billion Uganda shillings
(approximately U.S.$ 1.2 million), tripling to 6 bil-
lion Uganda shillings (approximately U.S.$ 3.5 mil-
lion) by mid-2005, indicating an active demand
among clients for savings services and increasing
public confidence in UMU. As an NGO, however,
UMU was prohibited from intermediating these
deposits, requiring the institution to maintain at
all times an equivalent balance at corresponding
banks. In addition, while the BoU specifically
prohibited nonlicensed institutions from mobiliz-
ing savings from the public, the regulations at the
time were less clear about member-based organiza-
tions. Because all UMU clients paid a membership
fee to access services, all clients were considered
“members” of the Union, and as such, the addi-
tional voluntary savings that were accepted by
UMU were technically not being mobilized from
the public. Once the MDI Act was passed on July 1,
2003, however, the BoU was much clearer in its
guidance—MFIs that were mobilizing deposits
either had to apply for a license and comply with
the requirements of the MDI Act within 24 months
from the commencement of the act or wind up
business within six months. 
With growth in the loan portfolio continuing at
a rapid pace, UMU’s funding needs became more
Table 15.1 Growth of UMU’s Credit Operations
Outstanding 
portfolio
Number of (million Number 
active Uganda of service
Year loan clients shillings) centersa
1997 421 38 1
1998 1,098 126 1
1999 1,762 278 2
2000 7,598 1,202 5
2001 10,417 2,858 7
2002 20,598 6,730 11
2003 28,625 12,285 14
2004 36,864 18,812 15
August 1, 27,700 19,035 18
2005b
December 31,145 20,601 20
31, 2005c
Source: UMU internal documents.
a. Includes branches and agencies (subbranches).
b. UML statistics.
c. UML statistics at year end 2005.
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and more urgent. While the organization had his-
torically relied on a combination of loans from
local commercial banks and international lenders
to finance its loan portfolio, these sources were
relatively expensive. In addition, by year end 2004,
UMU was already leveraging its capital base by
almost 3:1, a leverage ratio for an NGO that made
some lenders uncomfortable. Having achieved self-
sufficiency a few years earlier, raising additional cap-
ital from donations was also unlikely, limiting the
institution’s equity growth to the rate at which it
could reinvest its retained earnings. Managing
growth within the confines of the NGO structure
was proving to be a challenge. 
In addition to funding constraints, UMU’s rela-
tive slowdown in borrower growth since 2004
was largely attributable to management’s more
concentrated focus on transformation. The investor
negotiation process, explained in more detail below,
consumed a great deal of senior management’s
time, leaving less time to support midlevel man-
agers in their growth targets. Around this same
time, UMU’s portfolio at risk (PAR) began to creep
upward. (Until mid-2003, UMU’s PAR had never
risen above 3 percent.) Furthermore, UMU had
expanded its offerings of individual loan products,
which resulted in increased demands on middle
management. Combined with a corresponding rise
in the incidence of fraud, the quality of the portfo-
lio began to deteriorate. By late 2004, PAR greater
than 30 days exceeded 5 percent, increasing to as
high as 9 percent by June 2005. 
Planning and Managing 
the Transformation 
Given UMU’s desire to accept and intermediate
deposits from the public, both for purposes of
expanding its funding sources and offering clients a
needed service, transformation to a regulated
deposit-taking institution was a logical step. Based
on its experience and because Uganda has few
banking outlets, especially in the rural areas. UMU
believed the demand for savings services would be
quite high, particularly outside Kampala. In addi-
tion, because Ugandan capital markets are not yet
well-developed, deposits represented the best
source of local funding for the loan portfolio for the
longer term.
UMU also saw transformation as a means of
acquiring greater legitimacy in the marketplace—
among clients, staff, local supporters, funders, and
creditors. Transformation would require the organ-
ization to upgrade its systems and processes, to
standardize its operations throughout its branch
network, and to improve its reporting and controls.
In addition, transformation would mean the injec-
tion of new investor capital, thus facilitating
UMU’s ability to raise additional funding from
other commercial sources. Finally, the presumed
gains from central bank oversight and professional
governance from board members with their own
capital at stake were viewed as important benefits
as well. 
Transformation Options
The decision to transform was ultimately spurred by
the evolution of events occurring at the regulatory
level and the corresponding time line of donors con-
tributing to the sector. The process of developing a
regulatory and supervisory framework for microfi-
nance in Uganda had started as early as April 1996,
and in July 1999, the BoU policy statement on
microfinance regulation and supervision was passed
by cabinet, creating separate tiers for different finan-
cial institutional types.4 Within this policy frame-
work, the new MDI legislation was developed to
specifically respond to the special characteristics of
microfinance. Minimum capital was set at a modest
level (500 million Uganda shillings, approximately
U.S.$276,000), though balanced by a relatively
conservative minimum capital adequacy ratio of
20 percent (total capital to risk-weighted assets).
The legislation expects the primary services of an
MDI to be short-term loans (up to two years) to
microentrepreneurs, and savings and time deposits
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from the public, although it is acceptable for MDIs
to have some loans of longer duration, provided
that short-term loans remain the core of the busi-
ness. Special permission is required for an MDI to
engage in payment services, international money
transfers, and other services. MDIs are prohibited
from a range of activities, including current
accounts and foreign exchange operations. In the
short to medium term, however, UMU felt the leg-
islation would provide the institution room to offer
all its current products (provided it obtained per-
mission on payments and transfers) and to aggres-
sively develop new savings products as well.5
As discussed in more detail in chapter 14, Creat-
ing a Separate Tier: The Micro Finance Deposit-
Taking Institutions Act, 2003, the BoU followed a
relatively transparent and participatory process in
drafting and circulating the new microfinance legis-
lation and the corresponding regulations. UMU,
along with other transforming MFIs in Uganda,
was an active participant in the numerous forums
and discussion groups held to develop the overall
strategy and approach to regulating microfinance
operations. In addition, UMU’s chief executive
officer himself was a former BoU examiner, and
thus well versed in the general procedures and
expectations of the BoU. Although continual delays
in the publishing of the final regulations did add
some confusion to the process, the path toward
transformation for UMU initially appeared to be
relatively straightforward. 
Managing and Funding the Transformation
As early as 2001, UMU began discussions with
various donors to explore accessing financial and
technical support for the transformation process.
As part of a larger donor effort to support the
microfinance industry, a number of donors includ-
ed funds in their projects to finance technical assis-
tance and anticipated capital expenditures to pre-
pare MFIs for licensing. The donors included
USAID, through its Support for Private Expansion
and Enterprise Development (SPEED) Project; the
European Union, through the Support to Feasible
Financial Institutions and Capacity-building Efforts
(SUFFICE) Programme; and DFID, through its
Financial Sector Deepening Uganda (FSDU) Pro-
grammme. The SPEED Project, for example, con-
ducted a competitive tender to select institutions
for assistance based on interest, potential for suc-
cess, and current and projected financial perform-
ance, with the aim of selecting three institutions for
significant financial support in the transformation
process. In what was ultimately a pivotal point in
the institution’s evolution, UMU was one of the
three institutions selected for this assistance, mak-
ing it eligible for substantial technical and financial
support for transformation.
As a starting point, the SPEED project jointly
contracted ACCION International and Shorebank
Advisory Services, two U.S.-based organizations, to
conduct due diligence of UMU and to develop a
preliminary transformation plan for the institution.
This exercise was carried out in October 2001; at
its conclusion, a detailed transformation plan was
agreed on by the institution and funders. This plan
included a total of 111 activities that needed to be
completed prior to licensing. Key areas included
strategic and business plan development, credit
methodology refinement, financial management
upgrading, improvements in governance, human
resources capacity building, development of an
investor relations function, MIS upgrading, savings
product development, and ultimately submission of
the application to BoU. Responsibility for these
activities was primarily allocated to UMU and a
newly appointed in-house transformation manager,
seconded from ACCION, with additional support
provided by other ACCION staff members, Shore-
bank staff members, and MicroSave6 staff members
in key technical areas. The transformation manager
was contracted for one year (though extended to
14 months) beginning in April 2002 and was tasked
with ensuring completion of these 111 activities.
Funding for the transformation manager and
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numerous short-term technical assistance missions
was provided by the SPEED project, for a total of
just over U.S.$450,000. In total, this funding sup-
ported approximately 500 days of external technical
support to UMU over a period of 18 months. With
the departure of the transformation manager in
June 2003, ACCION International continued to
support additional short-term missions to UMU
and in 2004 installed a resident adviser to work
closely with the organization on product develop-
ment. The cost of this additional support totaled
approximately U.S.$200,000 and was provided by
ACCION (funded from various sources).
Donor funds were also provided to facilitate cap-
ital improvements and computerization. In addi-
tion to its support for technical assistance, the
SPEED project provided $125,000 for capital
improvements, such as branch upgrades and sign-
age. Support was provided by FSDU in the amount
of 125,000 British pounds (approximately
U.S.$200,000) and the SUFFICE project in the
amount of 65 million Uganda shillings (approxi-
mately U.S.$35,000) for MIS upgrades. 
During the transformation planning period,
external and internal transformation committees
were organized and met on a consistent basis. The
external committee included representatives from
the primary funders, UMU board members, mem-
bers of senior management, and the transformation
manager. The internal transformation committee
included one board representative, members of
senior management, a representative from the staff,
and again, the transformation manager. These meet-
ings served as useful benchmarking sessions for
tracking completion of the various activities in the
transformation plan, an exercise that ultimately took
three years to complete. The meetings were also
important for discussing strategic issues that arose
during the transformation process and, even more
important, for building buy-in to transformation.
While staff in general supported UMU’s plans to
transform, a key agenda topic in these meetings was
agreeing on communication strategies for the range
of changes being introduced within the organiza-
tion. Transformation implied a significant change in
UMU staff requirements, and care was taken from
the beginning to ensure staff were aware of and in
support of the changes taking place. One of the crit-
ical information dissemination tools was Transfor-
mation News, a monthly newsletter sent to all staff
that documented the key activities under way in
preparation for licensing. In addition, the transfor-
mation manager provided monthly updates in the
monthly branch manager meetings and was a partic-
ipating member in senior staff meetings. 
Operational Transformation:
Upgrading and Systemizing
Operationally, the most challenging aspects of the
transformation process were the comprehensive
formalization, systemization, and documentation of
policies and procedures at UMU. Before preparing
for transformation, very few of UMU’s procedures
were formally documented and the MIS was largely
manual. As a demonstration of their commitment
to flexibility, the organization prided itself on not
requiring wholesale standardization of all policies
and procedures, and encouraged staff to “think
outside the box.” As such, the dissemination of
policies and procedures occurred primarily through
on-the-job training, passed down from head office
to branch managers and from branch managers to
senior staff who then advised more junior staff.
With transformation, however, UMU recognized it
would need to systemize and standardize most of its
operating procedures. 
Human Resources Management
When UMU first began preparing for transforma-
tion, its senior management team consisted of the
chief executive officer, the executive director, and
a head-office manager, who was tasked with
branch oversight, human resources, and product
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development. The absence of a second tier of senior
managers at head office made sense for UMU as a
young, start-up NGO. However, with over 20,000
members and more than 10,000 loans when it
began the transformation process, UMU needed
to reinforce and expand its management team.
Thus, one of the more urgent initial tasks was to
recruit a number of senior managers, including a
chief financial officer, a chief internal auditor, a
human resources manager, and an information
technology manager. These positions were filled
over a 6- to 12-month period, resulting in a very
different organizational structure and senior man-
agement team. In addition, in early 2004, UMU
created a head of credit position, reporting directly
to the chief executive officer, and staffed for the first
two years by an individual seconded from ACCION
International. The head of credit is responsible for
overseeing credit operations in the organization,
including maintaining strong portfolio quality,
ensuring adherence to policies and procedures, and
managing the collections team.
Significant effort was also made to create a series
of in-house training courses, including general
staff orientation as well as courses on delinquency
management, credit analysis for individual loans,
and customer service, among others. Throughout
the transformation process, UMU remained com-
mitted to retaining all staff, building capacity
through training and other measures. (With the
launch of Uganda Microfinance Limited, all UMU
staff and their benefits were transferred to the new
organization.)
The overall performance management system,
including compensation and staff incentive
schemes, was also overhauled during this period.
Before transformation, UMU’s incentive scheme
was limited to annual performance raises, subjec-
tively determined by a staff member’s supervisor.
The organization was wary of implementing any
incentive scheme based on individual performance,
fearing the rise of negative competition among
staff. At the time, this also reflected the overall
operating environment at UMU, for example, loan
officers were not individually responsible for specific
clients—they were jointly served by all branch staff.
As such, branch performance was considered the
main indicator of staff performance. With the
increase in client numbers, weakening portfolio
quality, and an increase in incidents of fraud, how-
ever, UML decided to begin tracking performance
by loan officer, and thus shifted to individual-based
incentive schemes, though branch performance is
still a component. Incentives for loan officers are
based on number of loans disbursed, portfolio
growth, and portfolio quality. Branch manager
incentives include these same parameters, plus com-
pliance with reporting requirements and operating
policies, as well as branch profitability. Back-office
staff including accountants, cashiers, and support
staff, such as customer care officers, receive incen-
tives based on the profitability of the branch.
Financial Management
Before transformation, UMU’s finance function
was staffed by a senior accountant assisted by a few
junior accountants, and was primarily tasked with
preparing financial statements and monitoring
liquidity at the branches. The overall financial
management function at UMU underwent signifi-
cant upgrading during the transformation process.
This included recruiting a chief financial officer and
a treasurer, developing and documenting key finan-
cial management policies and procedures, develop-
ing appropriate financial management tools
including a liquidity management model and the
tools and procedures for an institutional budget-
ing process, and developing a long-term financial
projection model. An Asset and Liability Commit-
tee (ALCO) was established to meet on a monthly
basis to review critical risk categories in UMU’s
financial position. Branch managers and senior
management were trained to use a branch-level
budget tool, developed to assist with the annual
budgeting process. 
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Additionally, UMU’s financial statement pre-
paration was significantly upgraded to adhere to
appropriate accounting principals and to respond
to BoU reporting requirements. The upgrading
included changing the organization’s chart of
accounts, introducing cost center financial report-
ing at the branches (for example, allocating fixed
asset depreciation and loan loss provisioning to
each branch), introducing accrual accounting (as
appropriate), conducting monthly budget to actual
analysis, and developing a new series of reports to
be submitted to the BoU. 
Management Information Systems
UMU recognized that a key factor in the organiza-
tion’s successful MDI application would be the
effectiveness of its tracking systems and the accuracy
and timeliness of its reporting. UMU’s manual
account management system, built primarily with
ledger cards (yellow for loans, and pink for savings)
and a separate centrally based automated account-
ing package (Solomon IV) faced limitations in
efficiency, consolidation of data, and trend analysis.
It was clear the system would be insufficient to
respond to the reporting and tracking requirements
of a regulated MDI. Moreover, the BoU specifically
required MDIs to have an acceptable, automated
MIS to ensure accurate and timely reporting. The
process of conceptualizing and implementing a new
MIS was thus a critical component of the transfor-
mation process. 
UMU initiated its system selection process by
conducting an in-house needs analysis. Based on
this exercise, seven systems were evaluated, three of
which were short-listed for further consideration.
UMU ultimately selected Bankers’ Realm, a holistic
banking software developed by the Kenya-based
firm Craft Silicon and installed in a number of MFIs
and smaller banks in Eastern Africa. The selection
was based on a general analysis of the system’s
capacity, commitments of timely and regionally
based support, and a relatively competitive price.
The conversion from a totally manual system—
characterized by ledger cards, ledger keepers, waste
sheets, and tedious month-end balancing—to an
automated, computerized one was not easy. The
first branch to go “live” was UMU’s newest urban
branch, opened in August 2002, and computerized
in October of the same year. The computerization
of all UMU branches took over two years to com-
plete and was challenged by data migration hurdles,
a lack of proper version control, an understaffed
IT department, ongoing delays by the supplier in
responding to customization requests for reports,
and a series of challenges linked to data consolida-
tion. While some issues were due to UMU’s own
staffing constraints, bugs in the system and the sup-
plier’s overstretched project management abilities
at the time contributed to the ongoing delays in
system implementation. These issues have become
even more urgent since licensing and the need to
submit timely and accurate reports to the BoU,
requiring UML to invest additional resources in a
separate report writing solution. 
Internal Controls and Audit
While UMU’s original manual policies and proce-
dures had been designed with internal controls in
mind, the organization recognized that the level
of internal controls needed for a primarily credit
organization were quite different from those
needed for an organization mobilizing and inter-
mediating savings from the public. It was also rec-
ognized that the opportunities for fraud and error
were likely to increase substantially during the tran-
sition period from a manual system to an auto-
mated MIS. At the start of the transformation
process, however, the organization lacked a formal
internal audit department, and did not have an
internal auditor on staff. The transformation plan-
ning exercise helped to identify weak spots and
develop checks and balances to ensure that UMU’s
internal controls were adapted to the new system
and expanded to account for new risks (for example,
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risks associated with money transfers or larger indi-
vidual loans.
The large portfolio of responsibilities implied
that the internal auditor, once hired, would require
dedicated and trained staff and that UMU would
need to create an internal audit department. A
detailed Internal Audit manual was needed to doc-
ument UMU’s various audit policies and proce-
dures, as well as the distinct UMU internal audit
methodology. A manual was thus developed that
incorporated internal control systems, risk method-
ology, personnel qualifications, audit methodology,
audit responsibilities, audit reporting require-
ments, standards for each audit, and a variety of
audit tools. An internal audit department was
created and a chief internal auditor hired as well as
three internal auditors. 
Product Mix and Branch Operations
The transformation process encouraged UMU to
introduce greater standardization into its policies
and procedures, as well as to refine its product
offerings further by introducing new loan products
and undertaking significant research on developing
appropriate savings products. 
Loans. In recognition of increasing demand for
individual loan products, both from its current
client base and the anticipated new target market
after licensing, UMU made the strategic decision to
focus its product development efforts on improving
its individual working capital loan product, known
as the microcorporate loan. Before product reengi-
neering, UMU relied primarily on formal collateral
such as car logbooks (the document used for vehi-
cle registration in Uganda), or land titles, in its
underwriting of individual loans—an approach that
limited its market to clients at the higher end of the
target population. With input from ACCION’s
technical staff, UMU redesigned its approach to
analyzing the client’s capacity to repay by placing
greater emphasis on the client’s cash flow rather
than on the value of the collateral. This new
approach, although requiring significantly more
investment in loan officer training, allowed loan
officers to reach a wider market and to provide
clients with loans tailored more to their specific
working capital needs. 
Using this refined individual loan as a base,
UMU developed a new home improvement loan
product. Similar to the microcorporate loan, the
home improvement loan assesses capacity to repay
through an analysis of the client’s cash flow, with
some additional examination of construction plans
and budgets and certain guarantee requirements.
Savings. Over the three years of transformation
preparation, UMU invested significant time and
resources in designing new savings products to be
launched as soon as its license was granted. Working
closely with MicroSave, the UMU research and
development department conducted numerous
focus groups with clients to better understand their
savings behavior and needs. While UMU historically
offered its members the option of saving more than
the required compulsory amount, the fee and inter-
est rate structure did not encourage significant sav-
ings mobilization. With the goal of offering clients
a range of products appropriate to their savings
needs, once licensed, UML launched an aggressive
savings mobilization campaign, promoting two
principal savings products—ordinary savings and
time deposits. The ordinary savings product in-
cludes three tiers of interest based on minimum
account balances and charges no transaction fees,
except for a monthly account fee. UML also offers
time deposits for terms of 91, 182, and 365 days,
each with increasing rates of interest. Though still
too soon to evaluate the success of these products,
UML expects savings to be a significant source of
funding for the organization in the future.
Unlike many of the MFIs operating in Uganda,
which frequently meet clients in informal commu-
nity venues, UMU, from day one, had formal bank-
ing halls, tellers, safes, and security, with all client
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transactions occurring in the branches. Loans are
disbursed to the client’s savings account, and repay-
ments are accepted, at the teller windows. The
introduction of voluntary savings services in UML,
however, increased the volume of transactions in the
organization, requiring changes in back office oper-
ations and the refurbishing of some banking halls.
The launch of savings operations also required a
more formal and professional marketing strategy. As
part of preparing for transformation, UMU added
and has slowly started to staff a marketing depart-
ment, tasked with overall product development,
branding, and customer service. One of the most
important image management strategies has been
UML efforts to upgrade its branch “look” by doing
the following:
• Redesigning the logo: UMU NGO’s logo was a
three-dimensional blue diamond, with the orga-
nization’s name (in blue and red) and the two
words, “trust” and “work” inscribed inside (see
top portion of figure 15.1). This logo had been
drafted by the founders in the initial days and
was meant to convey a trustworthy, reliable
organization. With competition increasing and
the organization aiming for a more professional
look, the decision was made to redesign the logo
for UML to portray a clean, professional look,
while retaining the blue and red color theme
(see bottom portion of figure 15.1). 
• Relocating “hidden” branches: To try to encour-
age greater brand recognition, UML has relocat-
ed some of its branches to higher traffic
locations.
• Differentiating “hot spots” from “cold spots” in
branches: Within its branches, UML distin-
guishes between high traffic areas, better for
placing UML publicity materials, and “cold
spots” better for general administration or
operations communication materials. 
• Adding customer service agents: Each branch is
now staffed with a customer service agent, avail-
able to answer any client questions or advise
clients on UML’s products and services. 
Uganda Microfinance Limited Logo
UGANDA
MICROFINANCE
LIMITED
UML
UGANDA MICROFINANCE UNION
P.O. BOX 10184, Telephone: (256) (77) 413738, 500984.
Kampala Uganda
UGANDA
UNION
icrofinance
Microfinance with a Difference
Uganda Microfinance Union Logo
TR
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W O R K
Figure 15.1 The Evolution of Uganda Microfinance Union’s Logo
Source: UML Marketing Department.
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Structural Transformation: Creating
UML and Attracting Investors
In addition to the multitude of operational changes
required to comply with BoU MDI regulations,
UMU also needed to transform into or create a new
for-profit company, capitalized with a minimum
of 500 million Uganda shillings (approximately
U.S.$ 276,000) and owned by BoU-approved
investors, none of whom could own more than
30 percent of the organization.7 The MDI Act and
accompanying regulations also provide specific
requirements for the composition and duties of the
board of directors in line with sound corporate gov-
ernance practices. The BoU made clear there would
be a rigorous investigation of prospective owners.
They expressed particular concern that owners be
able to provide the “deep pockets” necessary to
supply the MDI with additional capital if required.
In connection with this, the BoU expressed some
skepticism that local NGOs would have the financial
resources to be significant owners of MDIs.
Creation of UML
In anticipation of transformation, the UMU board
took steps in early 2002 to incorporate a private
company limited by shares, known as Uganda
Microfinance (MDI) Limited. A shell company at
the beginning, the entity was launched with negli-
gible paid-in capital but with authorized share cap-
ital of 4 billion Uganda shillings (U.S.$2.3 million at
the time). The initial subscribers included Uganda
Microfinance Union (the NGO), the four board
members, and UMU staff. At the time of licensing,
UMU planned to transfer the NGO’s business to
the MDI (selling the NGO’s net assets in exchange
for debt and equity in the MDI), thereby launching
a new company with a solid business practice
already in place. The NGO itself was envisioned to
cease operations and to just be an investor in the
new entity. As it turned out, the structural transfor-
mation of UMU, and in particular the formation of
the investor group, proved to be one of the most
challenging aspects of the transformation process. 
Attracting Investors
UMU’s initial vision for UML’s ownership group,
as articulated in the transformation plan, included a
diverse group of investors, including the founding
directors, the NGO itself, UML staff through an
employee share ownership program, local private
investors, and some international investors includ-
ing various technical partners, multilaterals, and
socially responsible investment funds. Over the
course of three years, the types of investors in-
volved, the anticipated ownership role of the NGO
and the founding directors, and the structure of the
MDI’s overall capital base changed significantly (see
table 15.2). 
The investor negotiation process was not easy. It
involved numerous starts and stops, a range of dif-
ferent players, and consumed significant time for all
involved. 
Investor Negotiations: Round One
Early in the transformation process, a few local
private companies were approached as potential
investors in UML. While UMU’s projected returns
were impressive, these private investors were ulti-
mately deterred by what they perceived to be an
illiquid market for the shares. Although a viable
exit strategy remained an important issue for all
prospective investors, international investors, and
particularly those seeking both social and financial
returns, were easier to attract. At the time of trans-
formation, UMU was already borrowing from a
number of international funders including Triodos
and Novib, who also sought equity investments in
the sector. In addition, UMU had established tech-
nical assistance relationships with organizations that
also had investment arms, including ACCION
International with ACCION Investments in Micro-
finance and Shorebank Advisory Services with its
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Shorecap Fund. The organization’s first prospective
investors meeting, held on July 16, 2002, thus
included five international institutional investors:
Novib, Triodos, ACCION Investments in Microfi-
nance, Shorecap, and the East African Develop-
ment Bank, the first four already partners of UMU. 
This first investor meeting was the kick-off
gathering for what became a complex and ulti-
mately inconclusive negotiation process between
the four founding directors of UMU and the four
international investors, Novib, Triodos, ACCION
Investments, and Shorecap. A series of investor
meetings was held in late 2002 (the second of
which was also attended by AfriCap Microfinance
Fund, a socially responsible investment fund for
regulated MFIs in Africa) and throughout 2003. In
addition, a due diligence exercise was carried out in
April 2003 jointly by representatives of each of the
international investors. Discussions throughout this
period focused on the terms of the investment,
including the amount of capital, percentage owner-
ship, investor rights, exit strategies, and governance
implications. Although agreement was achieved
among the investors on most of these topics, two
issues proved to be significant stumbling blocks for
all parties involved—the mechanism for facilitating
ownership for the founding directors and the valu-
ation of the NGO’s net assets. 
Ownership for the founding directors. For any start-
up company that decides to sell shares to external
investors, the issue of founder compensation is likely
to arise. The technology world, for example, is full
of stories of entrepreneurs who were compensated
for their initial efforts by receiving shares on favor-
able terms to reflect the value they had added and,
in many cases, will continue to add to the company.
This concept of “sweat equity,” however, is difficult
to apply when start-up and ongoing capital is
composed of public money, granted by donors for
charitable purpose, and retained earnings, at least a
portion of which has been earned from these grant
funds. Historically, some transformed MFIs have
compensated the founders and leaders through pref-
erential terms on shares they purchase in the new
company or, in a few cases, through granted bonus
packages to facilitate share purchase. Determining
what is appropriate compensation and how such
benefits should be funded can become particularly
difficult negotiating points.
In UMU’s case, the directors argued that their
role in building UMU from the ground up pro-
vided the rationale for them to acquire shares on
preferential terms. The legitimacy of such a claim
was generally acknowledged, though one investor
emphasized the importance of structuring such an
agreement to provide incentive for longer-term
Table 15.2 Ownership Structure of UML
(percent)
Initial Structure at licensing Current structure
proposal (August 2005) (at time of writing)
Local private investors and directors 10 99.99 40
UMU NGO 25 1 1
Staff 10 0 0
Technical partners 20 0 0
Multilaterals and bilaterals 20 0 30
Socially responsible investors 15 0 0
Commercial funds 0 0 30
100 100 100
Source: Uganda Microfinance Union Transformation Plan; author.
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commitment of the founders and continuing man-
agement performance. It was also argued that the
directors should make a contribution of their own
funds to the degree possible. The relatively high
starting capital (at the time, estimated to be approx-
imately U.S.$3 million—based on capital adequacy
requirements, not minimum capital), however,
made this a difficult proposition in light of the
founders’ desire to hold a stake significant enough
to ensure board representation and ongoing influ-
ence. A myriad of alternatives was considered to
facilitate ownership by the founders, such as a loan
facility from the NGO, discounted shares, and stock
options based on future performance of the MDI,
none of which, however, was ultimately acceptable
to all parties.
NGO valuation. A second stumbling block in the
negotiations was the process for valuing the NGO
itself. As with many previous NGO transformations,
the assumption among this initial group of investors
(including UMU’s representatives) was that the
NGO would sell its net assets to the new company
in exchange for debt and equity in the new com-
pany. Although there was general agreement on
the percentage ownership for the NGO (at the
time, it was assumed it would range between 10
and 25 percent), the approach to valuing the worth
of the NGO holding, and thus the value of how
much debt the NGO would receive, differed signif-
icantly among the parties. The founders of UMU
initially argued that the organization’s positive rep-
utation in the market, its existing client base, its
demonstrated profitability, and, perhaps most
important, its even more profitable projections,
justified a value in excess of the NGO’s book value,
a view also supported by a few of the external
investors. Other external investors, however, incor-
porated more conservative profitability assumptions
as well as a discount rate that reflected what was
perceived to be a relatively illiquid market for MFI
shares and relatively high country risk, thus result-
ing in a value for the NGO below its book value. 
While the valuation process in any industry ulti-
mately requires just as much negotiation as calcula-
tion, one of the more challenging factors in this
negotiation process was that the founders of the
NGO were representing both the NGO and them-
selves as individual investors in UML. The combi-
nation of dissension between the various parties on
how best to facilitate share ownership for the
founders and how to value the NGO proved too
difficult to overcome. Throughout 2003, various
proposals were put forward to address these two
issues in particular, none of which were ulti-
mately acceptable to the parties involved. In early
September 2003, Triodos withdrew from the
investor group, citing differing views on the issue
of directors’ shares and the discount rate being
applied to the NGO. Six days later, a similar state-
ment was issued by Novib. 
With the withdrawal of Triodos and Novib from
the prospective investor group, the group was
narrowed to the founders, ACCION Investments,
and Shorecap. Throughout 2004, ACCION Invest-
ments and Shorecap continued to negotiate with
the UMU founders. Various proposals on each
side were put forward and each ultimately rejected
by the other side. Negotiations appeared to be at a
deadlock.
Investor Negotiations: Round Two
With the breakdown in discussions with ACCION
Investments and Shorecap, UMU began exploring
other investment partners, including Aureos East
Africa Fund, a Nairobi-based investment fund capi-
talized by Norfund, CDC (the UK government’s
instrument for investing in the private sector in
developing economies), and others. By late 2004, a
separate agreement had been reached between
UMU’s founding directors and Aureos, outlining a
significantly different ownership and capital struc-
ture. This structure included a very small amount of
common equity and a significant portion of pre-
ferred shares. The founders would own 40 percent
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of the common shares (none would individually
own more than the 30 percent limit), with the
remaining 60 percent to be held by Aureos and
others. Aureos also agreed to place a convertible
loan with UMU NGO to be converted into perpet-
ual preferred shares in the MDI once a license was
granted, and in addition, offered a term loan to
UML once licensed. The NGO’s value would be
nominally reflected in the face value of perpetual
preferred shares issued to the NGO. These shares
would carry a predetermined rate of return and
would ensure a steady income stream for the NGO.
The NGO itself would cease microfinance operat-
ing activities but in the future was anticipated to
offer various grants to the community out of the
stream of dividends from the preferred shares. 
This new proposal was a creative one. It estab-
lished different tranches of investors and thereby
addressed many of UMU’s founders’ previous con-
cerns. The smaller amount of common equity
allowed the founders to obtain a significant stake in
the common equity for a minimal investment. The
preferred shares were envisioned to provide a home
for the NGO’s capital and a significant source of
funding for UML, yet would not place UML in
violation of the 30 percent maximum ownership
restriction, because this was applicable to core cap-
ital only (which does not include preferred shares).
It also would mean the NGO would not have a
governance role in the MDI. The issue of valuation
for the NGO was to be encapsulated in the rate of
return of the preferred shares rather than the
amount of investment (that is, the book value of the
transfer). 
This new agreement was presented to ACCION
Investments and Shorecap for consideration in late
2004. Despite significant efforts on both sides to
find a mutually agreeable deal, both investors ulti-
mately declined to participate, citing concerns
about the variation in economic and political rights
among the parties. In early 2005, a Shareholder
Agreement was signed between the four found-
ing UMU directors and Aureos. Soon thereafter,
Aureos invested U.S.$960,000 in a convertible loan
with UMU, portions of which were anticipated to
be converted into both common and preferred
shares in UML, ensuring Aureos a 30 percent hold-
ing in the new MDI. The remaining 30 percent of
the company was offered to Norfund, which would
also invest a similar amount in a similar combina-
tion of debt, common equity, and preferred shares.
After three years of negotiation, the investor nego-
tiation process appeared to be concluded. 
Submitting the Application
With the planned upgrades in operations largely
in place and investor negotiations seemingly con-
cluded, UMU was ready to submit its application
for an MDI license. In anticipation of receiving
UMU’s application, the BoU scheduled a prein-
spection visit to UMU in August 2004. The pur-
pose of this visit was to conduct a preliminary risk
assessment of the organization. In particular, the
examiners focused on the strategic, credit, and
operational risks inherent in UMU’s operations,
concluding that while risk was high in each of these
categories, the institution’s risk management was
generally acceptable. With time running out on the
deadline by which all MFIs needed to transform or
cease savings operations (July 1, 2005), UMU
assembled the necessary documentation and sub-
mitted its application for an MDI license to the
BoU on December 17, 2004. The formal approval
by the BoU, received approximately six months
later on June 30, 2005, cleared the way for the final
component of the transformation process—the
launch of UML. 
Financial Transformation: 
Launching the MDI
With license in hand, the final step in UMU’s trans-
formation was the formal transfer of the NGO’s
assets and liabilities to the new entity. After years of
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profound institutional change, accompanied by
complex investor negotiations, this final step was
assumed to be a relatively straightforward exercise.
A number of critical regulatory factors, however,
presented a final set of hurdles that, while eventual-
ly overcome, served to redefine UML’s final capital
structure. This section starts by highlighting the
more critical regulatory implications of becoming
an MDI, explores the method by which the assets
and liabilities of the NGO were ultimately trans-
ferred to the new MDI to respond to these require-
ments, and notes the corresponding implications
for UML’s board formation.
Regulatory Implications
As a licensed MDI, UML is mandated to adhere to
various regulatory and fiscal requirements that
significantly affect the organization’s financial
structure.
Core capital. UML must maintain core capital
equal to no less than 500 million Uganda shillings
(approximately U.S.$276,000). In the regulations,
core capital is defined as shareholder equity “in the
form of issued and fully paid-up shares including
disclosed nondistributive reserves approved by the
central bank, share premiums, less any unconsoli-
dated investment in financial companies, less provi-
sions for loan portfolio or expenses, less accumu-
lated and current losses” (Bank of Uganda, Capital
Adequacy Regulations, 2004). It does not include
the value of any preferred shares, a key distinction
in UML’s final capital structure.
Capital adequacy. The funding structure for UMU
the NGO was primarily limited to subsidized short-
and long-term debt and donated grant capital.
Liabilities, which at the end of 2001 were about
1.25 times capital, were primarily composed of
compulsory savings and various concessional fund-
ing, the latter being mostly long-term loans from
Novib and Triodos. By 2004, this leverage had
increased to over three times capital and the capital
adequacy ratio (total capital to risk-weighted assets)
hovered between 25 and 30 percent. As an MDI,
UML needs to maintain core capital at no less than
15 percent of risk-weighted assets and total capital
at no less than 20 percent of risk-weighted assets.
Total capital includes core capital as well as supple-
mentary, or tier 2 capital (using Basle capital accord
definitions), defined as subordinated debt up to 50
percent of core capital, revaluation reserves on
premises, and voluntary general provisions at not
less than 1 percent of current loan portfolio. 
Ownership restrictions. As an MDI, the portion
of common shares any one investor can own is
limited to 30 percent of the total. Exemptions,
however, can be obtained from this restriction for
wholly owned subsidiaries of banks already licensed
under Uganda’s Financial Institutions Statute or
“reputable financial institutions.”8
Liquidity ratio. As an MDI, UML will need to
ensure its liquid assets equal or exceed 15 percent
of total deposit liabilities, defined as the total of
savings and time deposits. Compliance is monitored
through the submission of weekly liquidity reports
and thus requires UML to maintain strong liquidity
management. For purposes of this requirement, liq-
uid assets include cash, balances with the central
bank, balances with other banks licensed to accept
deposits by the central bank, and treasury bills and
securities issued by the Ugandan government. 
Compulsory savings. As previously mentioned,
once the MDI Act was passed, MFIs that were
mobilizing deposits either had to apply for a license
and comply with the act’s requirements within
twenty-four months or wind up business within six
months. This included being able to demonstrate
that all compulsory savings (also known as loan
insurance funds) pledged as security for a loan
agreement were both unencumbered and managed
in a separate account. Thus, such funds cannot be
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on-lent and must be managed quite distinctly from
voluntary savings. 
Provisions. UMU’s prior provisioning policy was
significantly less conservative than that required by
the BoU (see table 15.3). In preparation for trans-
formation, UMU converted its policy to be in line
with the BoU’s requirements. This policy change
coincided with an increase in delinquency in the
loan portfolio, resulting in significantly higher
provisioning expenses than the organization had
previously witnessed. 
Tax requirements. As a for-profit company, UML is
liable for corporate income tax on its profits. Cur-
rently set at 30 percent, this represents a significant
change for an organization that was tax exempt for
its first seven years of operations.
Transfer of Assets and Liabilities
Given the decision that UMU NGO would cease
microfinance operations and remain an investor in
UML, UMU’s directors decided to transfer all
assets and liabilities to UML, with one exception.
Loans with installments more than 30 days past
due as of July 31, 2005, which totaled approxi-
mately 2 billion Uganda shillings (U.S.$1.1 mil-
lion), remained on the NGO’s books. The balance,
totaling 30 billion Uganda shillings (U.S.$17 mil-
lion), less approximately 24 billion Uganda shillings
(U.S.$13 million) in liabilities, was sold to UML in
exchange for shares in the new institution. 
The original decision to offer the NGO preferred
shares in UML as opposed to common shares in
exchange for its net assets was made in response to
the BoU ownership limitation. Because the NGO’s
net assets, valued at approximately 6 billion Uganda
shillings (or U.S.$3.4 million), were significant at
the time of transformation, exchanging this value
for common shares would have either swamped the
share contributions from the other parties, violating
the 30 percent limit, or required the other parties to
inject significantly more capital than the organiza-
tion needed simply to realign percentage owner-
ship. By exchanging irredeemable preferred shares
for this value, the NGO’s net worth would be
injected in the MDI without affecting the owner-
ship structure, because preferred shares are not
included in the 30 percent ownership calculation.
After submitting its application, however, the BoU
clarified that in accordance with its regulations, pre-
ferred shares—even irredeemable ones—are likewise
not eligible for inclusion in the minimum capital
requirement. The proposed capital structure there-
fore would not satisfy the capital requirements of
the BoU, given their growing asset base. 
This created a conundrum for UMU: if it con-
verted the NGO’s net worth to common shares, it
would violate the ownership limitation. Even if only
a portion of the NGO’s net worth was converted to
common shares, the founders were actively seeking
a solution that would not install the NGO, which
itself had no owners, as a significant owner of
the MDI. (Because the founders of the NGO were
all themselves becoming owners of the MDI, the
NGO itself was not represented by a separate inter-
est group seeking a separate stake in the new entity.)
Likewise, if the NGO’s net worth was converted to
preferred shares, the remaining core capital com-
posed of the founder’s own contributions would be
insufficient to ensure adherence to capital adequacy
requirements. The third option, renegotiating with
the external investors to have them increase their
Table 15.3 MDI Provisioning Requirement
(percent)
Time Regular Rescheduled
Current 1 5
31–60 days 25 50
61–90 days 50 75
91–180 days 75 100
180 days 100 100
Source: Bank of Uganda, MDI Act 2003; BoU Asset Quality Regulations
2004.
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committed contributions, would add significant
time delays to the process and was thus not consid-
ered a viable option. 
A solution was ultimately found in the creation of
a premium account—the NGO could purchase a
minimal amount of common shares, but at a premi-
um. The value of this “premium” would be reflected
in a premium account. This premium is included in
the core capital calculation, yet does not affect the
ownership structure, which is determined solely by
the number of common shares held by each party. As
such, UMU NGO is an investor in UML, but not a
relevant owner (ownership of common shares is less
than 1 percent). Its value has been converted into a
premium share account in the MDI’s core capital, as
well as into preferred shares.
The past-due loan portfolio that remained with
the NGO continues to be monitored and recovered
by UML staff. In exchange for this service, UML
receives 10 percent of the value of any loans recov-
ered with 90 percent staying with the NGO. It is
assumed that in the future UMU NGO will invest
these amounts in UML. Whether these funds will
be invested in common or preferred shares will
depend on the capital requirements of the organi-
zation at the time. (Such a transfer will probably be
accomplished whenever the amounts become siz-
able enough to warrant the transaction, estimated
to be approximately 500 million Uganda shillings
[approximately U.S.$ 276,000].)
On the liability side, all external loans and other
liabilities were also directly transferred to UML,
pending no objection from the lenders. The trans-
fer of client savings, however, was complicated by
regulatory hurdles. As previously mentioned, the
BoU requires compulsory savings to be both unen-
cumbered and managed in a separate account. In
UMU’s case, clients maintained their savings, both
compulsory and voluntary, in their own savings
accounts. Compulsory and voluntary savings were
not separately accounted for in UMU’s system.
Thus, UMU was unable to separate the compulsory
from the voluntary savings to meet the BoU’s
requirement that they be unencumbered and
separately managed. Therefore the entire value of
UMU NGO’s savings was transferred to UML as
voluntary savings, and clients were informed of
the transfer and change through an advertisement
placed in the newspaper. Given the relatively short-
term nature of UML’s loans and the likelihood that
most clients were unaware of the implications of
this change, this did not create as significant a risk
exposure for UML as was initially feared. Going
forward, all new loans issued by UML that require
compulsory savings are managed in accordance
with BoU guidelines. 
Another variable in this transfer exercise was
whether the asset transfer between the two com-
panies would raise a tax liability for UML. The
Uganda Revenue Authority ultimately issued a
waiver for this transfer, agreeing with the argument
posed by UMU that the sale of assets was occa-
sioned by a change in legislation, with which the
NGO was trying to comply and that there would be
no new benefit to the organization. 
Equity Assignment and Board Formation
On August 1, 2005, UML was officially launched
with total assets of 29.9 billion Uganda shillings
(U.S.$16.8 million), financed by 23.7 billion
Uganda shillings (U.S.$13.3 million) in debt and
6.4 billion Uganda shillings (U.S.$3.5 million) in
equity. This equity base was composed of 500 mil-
lion Uganda shillings (U.S.$276,000) of common
shares contributed personally by the four founders.
The sale of the NGO’s net assets contributed
another 6 billion Uganda shillings (U.S.$3.4 mil-
lion) to UML’s total capital base, split between a
premium share account (4 billion Uganda shillings,
or U.S.$2.2 million) and preferred shares (2 billion
Uganda shillings, or U.S.$1.1 million). As such,
UML’s core capital totaled 4.5 billion Uganda
shillings (U.S.$2.5 million) and total capital totaled
6.4 billion Uganda shillings (U.S.$3.7 million), well
above the minimum required and enough to satisfy
capital adequacy requirements of 20 percent of risk-
weighted assets.
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Since the launch, and following formal confir-
mation of the Uganda Revenue Authority’s tax
waiver on the net asset transfer, Aureos converted
a portion of its convertible loan by purchasing
30 percent of UML’s common shares (from the
founders) and purchasing additional preferred
shares. In December 2005, Norfund injected an
equivalent amount to Aureos in convertible debt.
Shortly thereafter, in April 2006, this debt was con-
verted into common and preferred shares for an
ownership stake of 30 percent. This purchase com-
pleted the first round of UML investors. 
Governance
As of May 2006, the board of UML is currently
composed of investor representatives, including
three of the four founding directors of UMU, and
two representatives from Aureos, one of whom
also represented Norfund’s holding. The organiza-
tion is also planning to add other independent
directors.
With only a minimal holding of common shares,
the NGO is not represented at the governance
level. UMU’s founders have agreed that UMU
NGO will cease its microfinance and related busi-
ness activities (after collecting on the nonperform-
ing UMU loans) and will essentially remain a shell
company, concerned initially with the perform-
ance of the MDI. The NGO’s investment in UML,
however, is anticipated to generate an income
stream, which may be reinvested back in UML or
distributed through grants to other community
development projects. Should the NGO undertake
development or other activities in the future, no
financial services activities will be included.
UML and the Future
As of May 2006, UML had been operating for ten
months. Although licensed, it has only just com-
pleted the transfer of assets, solidified its investor
group, and continues to upgrade its systems and
processes to BoU standards. Although much was
accomplished during the three years of preparation
and negotiation, UML as a new operating entity is
still establishing itself, particularly in the eyes of the
regulators and investors—its new stakeholders.
UML anticipates some immediate challenges. 
Maintaining strong portfolio quality. When UMU
first began planning for transformation in late 2001,
its PAR greater than 30 days was approximately
1 percent. Just before transformation in mid-2005,
this indicator was close to 10 percent, indicating a
decrease in the quality of the portfolio. While
the decision to leave all loans with installments past
due more than 30 days with the NGO certainly
improved the impression of portfolio quality for
UML, portfolio quality continues to be a challenge.
Over the last few years, some of the urban market
areas in Uganda have become saturated with
microlenders—it is not unusual for clients to have
multiple loans with multiple institutions. Although
efforts are under way to develop a credit reference
bureau in Uganda, it not yet functioning. At the
same time, the growth of UMU’s operations over
the last few years stretched both its management and
systems. If UML is to continue its aggressive growth
rate and maintain profitability, PAR will need to be
maintained at a level less than 5 percent.
Balancing entrepreneurial spirit with ongoing
professionalization. Transformation of UMU to a
regulated MDI places the organization under the
spotlight of BoU regulators and profit-seeking
investors. While UMU has always prided itself on
its entrepreneurial spirit, the flexibility and innova-
tion that defines this spirit needs to be continuously
balanced with ensuring sufficient standardization
and well-managed growth. The opening of new
branches now has to be approved by the BoU and
key performance ratios need to be maintained at all
times. In addition, the new board, composed of
both direct investors and (eventually) independent
directors, introduces external parties to UML’s
governance structure, and each has specific operat-
ing and performance expectations. 
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Mobilizing savings. UML’s long-term financial
projections show a considerable reliance on public
deposits to fund the projected growth in the loan
portfolio. With just ten months of new marketing
efforts, it is still too soon to evaluate the success of
UML’s new savings products. The institution’s
ability to shift its market perception from primarily
a microlender to also providing a safe place for sav-
ings will determine the success rate of its savings
efforts. This will be further challenged by the fact
that the other newly licensed MDIs—FINCA
Uganda Limited, PRIDE Microfinance Limited,
and Uganda Finance Trust Limited—are embark-
ing on the same efforts. 
Incorporating staff ownership. UML remains com-
mitted to bringing in staff as owners. The current
intention is to make 7.5 percent of the company
available for employee share ownership, although
details of this plan are still being finalized.
Maintaining good relations with the BoU. As an
innovative start-up NGO, initially funded by a spe-
cial facility from the BoU and led by two entrepre-
neurs, one of whom was a former BoU staff mem-
ber, UMU started its operations with positive BoU
relations. Ongoing system challenges and the rela-
tively complex capital structure of UML, however,
have led to some strains in this relationship. As one
of the first MDIs to be licensed, UML will undoubt-
edly be under close surveillance by the BoU and will
need to ensure it maintains good standing. 
Notes
The authors would like to thank Rodney Schuster and
Charles Nalyaali for their valuable inputs into the numer-
ous drafts of this chapter. In addition, special thanks
are extended to Michael Kasibante, Geraldine O’Keeffe,
Evelyn Nanyonga, Catherine Mwiri, Juliet Nakyazze, and
the other senior managers at UMU for their tireless
efforts in preparation for transformation. 
The writing of this chapter was largely supported by
funding provided by the Special Unit for Microfinance
(SUM) of the United Nations Capital Development
Fund (UNCDF). A version of this publication also
appears as ACCION Monograph 15, “A Case Study in
Transformation: The Creation of Uganda Microfinance
Ltd.” by Victoria White.
1. Speech by Mr. C. N. Kikonyogo, Governor, Bank of
Uganda on the Opening of the Co-operative Bank’s
First Microenterprise Agency Office, June 1997.
Nakivubo, Uganda. 
2. “A company limited by guarantee is an alternative type
of incorporation used primarily for nonprofit organi-
zations that require corporate status. A guarantee
company does not have share capital, but has mem-
bers who are guarantors instead of shareholders. The
guarantors provide an undertaking to contribute a
nominal amount toward the winding up of the com-
pany in the event of a shortfall upon cessation of
business. It cannot distribute its profits to its mem-
bers, and is therefore eligible to apply for charitable
status if necessary.” (Company Registration Online
Web site)
3. Initial board members included Rodney Schuster,
Charles Nalyaali, Ronald Kasibante (former Managing
Director of Shell, Uganda), Willie Patrick Ogule
(Group Secretary and Head of Legal Services of dfcu),
Joannita Babumba (Principal Banking Officer of the
Bank of Uganda), and Taaka Awori (human and
children rights activist, as well as Program Advisor,
UK Department for international Development). By
2001, the latter two were no longer active board
members.
4. See chapter 14, Creating a Separate Tier: The Micro
Finance Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2003, for a
detailed description of the Ugandan legislation and
the process its of development.
5. MDIs or “tier 3 institutions” can move up to tier 2 or
tier 1 licenses as they mature. See chapter 14, Creating
a Separate Tier: The Micro Finance Deposit-Taking
Institutions Act, 2003, for more information.
6. MicroSave is a Nairobi-based project that promotes
the development of a market-led and client responsive
approach to delivering financial services among MFIs.
See http://www.microsave.org for more information.
7. See chapter 14, Creating a Separate Tier: The Micro
Finance Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2003, for a
complete explanation of Uganda’s microfinance regu-
latory environment. 
8. See Part IV Ownership and Corporate Governance,
of MDI Act 2003, clause 21 (Government of Uganda
2003).
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Sequencing the Introduction of
Public Savings in Regulated MFIs
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) that areconsidering the process of introducingsavings facilities for the public should pay
careful attention to the sequencing that will be
needed—and to the time and the human and finan-
cial resources required. And most important, such
MFIs must be prepared for the fact that their
institutions—but not their missions—will change
fundamentally and irreversibly. 
Fifteen steps—from initial training to investing
excess deposits—are discussed below. Before pro-
ceeding, however, both regulatory authorities and
MFIs should make sure that basic country pre-
conditions are met: at least a moderately enabling
macroeconomy, an appropriate policy and regul-
atory environment, and a supervisory body that
has the capacity to monitor MFI performance
effectively. 
And the MFI must also examine itself—without
use of rose-colored glasses! Does it have the quality
of ownership, governance, and management
needed for a financial intermediary? Has it demon-
strated a track record of high-level performance,
broad outreach to microfinance clients, trans-
parency, and consistent profitability? Is its corporate
culture open to new ideas, products, clients, and
methods? If the answers are positive, the MFI is
ready to start.
Fifteen Steps: From Studying Savings
Demand to Investing Excess Liquidity
It takes time and considerable work to develop the
capacity for designing the components that meet
savers’ demand for security, convenience, liquidity,
good service, confidentiality, returns, and access to
loans—and for delivering this package effectively
and efficiently. But this is the package that brings
large numbers of savers to MFIs, enabling them to
mobilize, and maintain, large-scale and relatively
stable savings. However, appropriate sequencing in
introducing savings to the public is essential for
achieving that goal.
A series of 15 steps is shown in box A.1. This
sequencing may seem time-consuming and
Appendix 1
This appendix was written by Marguerite S. Robinson.
482 | Transforming Microfinance Institutions
cumbersome—because it is. But these stages in
developing the MFI’s capacity for collecting and
intermediating savings are necessary to establish a
solid foundation that will serve the institution well
over time—and that will also help greatly in pre-
venting costly and time-consuming mistakes.
Circumstances will vary somewhat among differ-
ent institutions, and some will have already com-
pleted, in full or in part, some of these steps before
becoming regulated. Thus, sequencing the intro-
duction of savings mobilization from the public
should be adapted by each MFI to its current stage
of development. The sequencing can be somewhat
flexible, depending on particular circumstances. But
newly regulated MFIs should be careful not to skip
steps they need. Most of them will need most steps
described here—though some may find this difficult
to believe at first. The motto here is “Haste makes
waste!”
Depending on a wide range of factors—including
country-level economic, political, and natural
events and changes; the quality, skills, leadership,
and patience of MFI boards and managers; the
MFI’s financial and human resources; and others,
not the least of which is luck—large MFIs will need
about three years to complete these steps. Small
MFIs with few branches may be able to manage
with less time. But in years two and three, MFIs
following this general sequencing should be mobi-
lizing substantial amounts of savings and begin-
ning to establish their reputations as microfinance
intermediaries.
Box A.1 Sequencing the Introduction of Public Savings in Regulated MFIs: 15 Steps
1. Assess internal capabilities, identify gaps, recruit
new staff as required, and retain outside
experts as necessary. 
2. Conduct research on demand among potential
savers of different kinds, and on the supply of
savings facilities among competitors.
3. Plan the pilot project, and design and price
products and services for the pilot.
4. Is the necessary institutional capacity in place to
open savings facilities for the public? Create a
checklist and make sure that the tasks are com-
pleted before introducing savings to the public.
5. Develop criteria for a pilot project site and
select the pilot branch.
6. Prepare for the first pilot project—a complex
and multifaceted task.
7. Conduct the first pilot project, ensuring that
adequate resources are available (and used) for
the pilot and for its close supervision and regu-
lar monitoring. 
8. Assess pilot results, and revise products,
pricing, operations, management information
systems (MIS), and so forth, as necessary. If a
second pilot is needed (very likely), begin the
planning and preparations for step 9.
9. Plan the second pilot, selecting branches
located in different environments, and train
managers and staff of the pilot branches. 
10. Implement and evaluate the second pilot. 
11. Train the trainers of the trainers in preparation
for the rollout phase. 
12. Expand gradually to all branches, training man-
agers, and staff in each location. Do not rush
this step! 
13. To penetrate the market, develop a detailed,
systematic approach to identifying potential
savers and mobilizing their savings.
14. Select a pilot area, train managers and staff,
and conduct a pilot in market penetration. Eval-
uate results, revise methods, and gradually roll
out to all the MFI’s branches. 
15. Develop appropriate strategies for investing
excess liquidity.
Source: Author. 
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1. Assess Internal Capabilities, Identify Gaps,
Recruit New Staff as Required, and Retain
Outside Experts as Necessary.
Transforming MFIs generally do not have in-
house management and trainers who are experi-
enced in voluntary savings mobilization and com-
petent to train managers and staff in collecting and
intermediating public savings. Such institutions
typically lack many of the resources and skills
needed for building and managing large-scale sav-
ings facilities, for undertaking financial intermedia-
tion, and for managing rapid growth. They may
also be inexperienced in research on savings
demand and in the design, pricing, and delivery of
savings products (and individual loan products as
well). Sometimes MFIs hurriedly hire local bank
staff who often turn out to be the wrong people
for the job.
At this stage MFIs usually need internationally
experienced outside experts to work closely with
management in assessment of internal capabilities
and, where needed, recruitment of new managers
and staff—and to advise on the MFI’s overall plan-
ning, research, and sequencing. Donors have begun
to play an important role here by funding some or
all of this kind of expertise for a year or so at the
time of an MFI’s transition to regulated status.
Thus, outside experts are brought in to work with
management in demand research, product design,
product delivery, pilot projects, cost studies,
accounting and auditing, internal controls, and the
like. They also help to train the institution’s train-
ers, as well as head office, regional office, and
branch office managers and staff. In addition, man-
agers and staff may be sent to regional or interna-
tional microfinance training programs.
Watch out for:
• Ignorance—it is not bliss, and it can hurt you! 
Newly regulated MFIs need to go slowly at this
stage and make sure they know what they are doing.
However, they may now be pushed by their owners,
boards, or managers (or in some cases by regulatory
authority deadlines) to mobilize savings soon after
they are licensed to do so. Those taking this posi-
tion are often unaware of the risks of opening
voluntary savings facilities before the MFI is ready.
Outside experts can sometimes help by discussing
with owners and managers the basic reasons that
the MFI should not begin collecting savings until it
is well prepared—and by explaining the consider-
able risks of not accepting this view. In addition,
the microfinance training programs to which MFI
managers and staff are sent need to be carefully
selected, because many provide little information
about savings.
2. Conduct Research on Demand Among
Potential Savers of Different Kinds, and 
on the Supply of Savings Facilities Among
Competitors.
Demand research must be carried out to learn the
views of current and potential clients about savings
products and services. Research on what the com-
petition is doing is important for product design
and pricing.
As discussed in chapter 1, Mobilizing Savings
from the Public: 10 Basic Principles, transformed
MFIs need to attract savings from middle- and
higher-income clients and from institutions, as well
as from low-income savers. Therefore, samples of all
types of savers should be included in the demand
research. The MFI’s managers and staff need to be
trained in how to identify, interview, and interest
such potential clients in the institution’s new sav-
ings program. The MFI’s first task in demand
research is to learn in what forms and for what pur-
poses people in the area to be served are currently
saving—and what they like and dislike about their
current options (see chapter 1). Accurate answers to
these questions can be elicited only by in-depth
interviews, and experts are usually needed to guide
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this process in the beginning. Questionnaires can be
used effectively after the first pilot project—when
the institution has learned what questions to ask,
how to ask the questions, and how to understand
the answers. The knowledge that comes from this
process of learning about savers enables an MFI to
design products and services that combine the char-
acteristics of informal savings methods that savers
like with solutions to the problems of informal
savings methods they dislike. This information is
essential input for the MFI’s product design stage. 
Research on the competition is somewhat easier,
but also must be carefully done. A transformed MFI
entering the savings market needs to know about its
main competitors: their market segments and
shares, their comparative advantages and disadvan-
tages, and their products and services. An accurate
assessment of the competition is a strong advantage
for a newcomer to the market.
Some transformed MFIs contract their demand
research out to local research firms. But serious
problems can arise from this approach. Often such
firms, even those experienced in other kinds of
research, are not competent to conduct these kinds
of field research or to analyze the results at a quality
level. The reported results may be useless—or worse,
accepted nonetheless and used by the MFI. Also, by
using this approach, the MFI’s managers and staff
do not acquire the field experience they need to
understand the complex conceptual frameworks
within which their potential savers make decisions
about savings. Nor do they learn firsthand the
strategies and tactics employed by their competi-
tors. And MFIs that outsource demand research
will not gain the in-house experience needed to
train their staff in best practices research methods. 
However, the capacity of some research firms to
carry out such work is beginning to improve. This
early trend should accelerate in the future as the
commercial microfinance industry (and its prof-
itability) become more widely known, and as the
opportunities the industry affords for research
become better understood.
But the best option for transforming MFIs today
is to have internationally experienced outside
experts working closely with their own managers
and staff to conduct demand research (the relation-
ship between MicroSave and its MFI partners is an
excellent example of this approach). If a research
firm is used, it should be carefully vetted by outside
experts, and it should conduct the research as a
team with the MFI’s own managers and staff. The
demand research should not be entirely, or even
largely, contracted out. 
Watch out for: 
• Missing the market, while misinterpreting the
demand.
Managers and staff who come from microcredit
organizations may be uncomfortable interviewing
middle-income clients and heads of local organi-
zations and institutions that are potential savers.
They may also have difficulties learning about
competition from banks and larger financial insti-
tutions. In such cases they may be unable to obtain
accurate information (and may not report—or
even know themselves—that their information is
inaccurate). Staff who are not well trained in sav-
ings may have a tendency, especially when inter-
viewing low-income people, to put words in
respondents’ mouths, rather than listening care-
fully to what they say. But contracting out demand
research does not resolve these problems, and it
adds others. Outside experts should be closely
involved, as needed, in the research and analysis
and should work directly with the institution’s
managers and trainers.
3. Plan the Pilot Project, and Design and Price
Products and Services for the Pilot.
When the research on demand and on the compe-
tition has been completed and its results analyzed
and discussed by managers and staff (with outside
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experts where needed), it is time to plan the pilot
project. And trial products, services, and systems
must be designed for use in the first pilot.
The transforming MFI will need to design and
price products and delivery systems to be tested in
at least one, and usually two, pilot projects—with
the second based on the results of the first. The
MFI’s new products and services are then revised
and gradually expanded to all branches. Continuing
monitoring of the competition is advisable because
the nature of the competition, and sometimes the
competitors themselves, can change quickly in
response to new entrants to the market (or for other
reasons).
The first pilot project is essential for four main
reasons:
• To determine whether the products that have
been designed are in demand, and whether they
can be efficiently and effectively delivered by the
pilot branch.
• To analyze the costs and the pricing structure.
Pricing products for the first pilot project is dif-
ficult because neither the extent of demand for
the different products nor their costs is yet
known. Only provisional interest rates and fees
can be set for the pilot. One of the main func-
tions of pilot projects is to ensure that the MFI’s
products and services are priced correctly before
they are rolled out to all branches, that operating
costs are understood, and that spreads enable
profitability. The information needed for costing
and pricing must be collected from the pilots,
carefully analyzed, and incorporated into prod-
uct design and pricing—before the institution
attracts large amounts of savings. 
• To test information systems, communication
facilities, security methods, space requirements,
backroom operations, accounting, reporting,
internal controls and audit, and the like.
• To train managers and staff and to test a per-
formance-based incentive scheme suitable for a
financial intermediary.
Information from the demand research should
be used to design a few simple products. A good
package of products with which to begin consists of
a passbook savings account with unlimited with-
drawals, a fixed deposit account, and a limited with-
drawal account. Remittances and money transfers
should be added at the second pilot or, for small insti-
tutions, at the rollout stage. There is no one right
way to design the initial products, but some things
seem to work better than others. Some thoughts on
product design and pricing are given below.
Passbook savings account. This is the single most
essential account, because there is enormous
demand for a savings account with unlimited trans-
actions. Savers who open other types of accounts
usually open a passbook savings account as well.
Although some passbook accounts do not provide
interest, an interest-bearing account is a better
option for an important reason. Fully liquid pass-
book accounts are very popular, but they tend to be
labor-intensive. If the MFI offers passbook accounts
to large numbers of poor people with small account
balances, the average account size must be raised
with larger accounts. And larger account holders
tend to be interest-sensitive. Thus, the pricing of
the passbook account is crucial. It should be
designed with a tiered interest rate so that no inter-
est is paid on minimum monthly balances up to a
certain amount (say, U.S.$10 to $20). But the
largest savers—who are crucial for the viability of the
product—must be paid market rates. In between
there should be one or two tiers of interest rates, de-
pending on how the account size distribution falls.
Fixed deposit account. Fixed deposit accounts (also
known as time deposits) are useful for a wider range
of savers than is generally understood. These
accounts should be offered with one-, two-, and
three-month maturities, in addition to those with
longer maturities. To be competitive, fixed deposit
accounts must offer market rates to all account
holders.1 Middle- and high-income savers use fixed
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deposit accounts, as do local businesses and institu-
tions. But these accounts are also used by some
low- and lower-middle-income savers who generally
choose the shorter maturities. Thus, some farmers,
fishing people, and others with irregular seasonal
incomes use the accounts to store excess liquidity at
high season for use during the low season. Some
artisans use fixed deposit accounts as well. They
monitor the prices of the raw materials they use on
a monthly or bimonthly basis. If the price is low,
they close the account and purchase the materials
they need (wood, leather, cloth, cement, and the
like). But if the price is high, they roll over their
accounts and wait for a drop in the price of the
product in demand. And some low-income people
use these accounts as well for long-term savings
goals (weddings, funerals, education, ceremonies,
pilgrimages, house repairs, business expansion, and
so forth). Fixed deposit account holders often hold
passbook savings accounts as well.
Interest-bearing, limited withdrawal account. This
account may offer interest on all deposits while
restricting the number of withdrawals (commonly
charging fees for withdrawals above the number
permitted). Typically, the interest rate for limited
withdrawal accounts is lower than the rates for both
the highest tier of the passbook account and the
fixed deposit account. And this intermediate
account is usually more liquid than the fixed deposit
account, but less liquid than the passbook account.
Transaction costs are usually highest on the pass-
book account and lowest on the fixed deposit
account, with the limited withdrawal account again
in the middle. But this account often offers interest
to all account holders, thus providing an opportu-
nity for savers with small accounts to obtain interest
on their deposits. These accounts are used to save
for such purposes as paying rent, paying employees,
and other regular weekly or monthly expenses.
The limited withdrawal account is also a product
that can be politically useful for the institution. Peo-
ple with very small financial savings are generally
not eligible for the fixed deposit account because it
typically has a relatively high opening balance. And
such savers would also not normally receive returns
on their passbook accounts—because their month-
ly balances would be below the minimum required
for payment of interest. This leaves an opening for
political criticism that the institution pays interest to
high-income savers but not to low-income ones.
Such criticism can be deterred by the limited with-
drawal account. Inquiring politicians and journalists
can be informed that savers with very small
accounts are free to choose between a passbook
account that provides no interest on small balances,
and the limited withdrawal account that pays inter-
est but limits liquidity. Many low-income savers
with small accounts choose liquidity over interest.
The limited withdrawal account is not generally a
very popular account. But it gives people a choice,
and it can be politically advantageous. And it is use-
ful for rounding out the initial package of savings
products—which clients use in various ways, cus-
tomizing their savings portfolios to meet their par-
ticular needs.
Lotteries. If country regulations and local culture
permit, the liquid and limited withdrawal accounts
can have a lottery attached to them, whereby savers
receive free lottery tickets each month based on
their minimum monthly balances (for example, one
ticket for every U.S.$5 or $10 of savings). Such lot-
teries are often run semiannually. If the first prize
is a large one (a motorcycle, car, or a substantial
amount of cash), and if smaller prizes are also given,
lotteries are generally very popular with savers and
encourage saving. But they must be operated with
scrupulous transparency—and perceived as such.
The costs have to be carefully analyzed, but such
lotteries can be (and are) conducted profitably, and
on a large scale. They should be run at the branch
or regional office level, not at the national level—
they work best if savers know people who have won. 
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Keep it simple and efficient. These three accounts
are a good way to start. Though it is not easy, these
accounts can be administered efficiently and effec-
tively, even in the first years. And the combination
of the three accounts is popular. Bank Rakyat
Indonesia’s (BRI’s) microbanking system has used
a combination of accounts similar to these for
20 years now, and BRI microbanking has been
profitable every year. As of 2005, the fully liquid
accounts (with tiered interest rates) in the
microbanking system account for 90 percent of the
total value of microbanking savings (which is
U.S.$3.7 billion), and for 99 percent of the total
number of microbanking savings accounts (32 mil-
lion). Of the three types of accounts, the fully liquid
account is the most difficult to design, price, and
implement (see Robinson 2002b, chapter 13). But
it is well worth getting it right.
It is also useful to analyze what kinds of savings
products do well among the competition. There
may be local variations on what products are popu-
lar, and this is well worth investigating. MFIs can,
of course, add other special accounts later on, if
they consider them manageable, cost-effective, and
in demand—for example, long-term fixed deposits
for education, housing, and retirement; checking
accounts; savings accounts that are coupled with
loans (a loan is provided after a contractual savings
requirement has been met); and others. Remittance
services are especially important in many areas. But
it is best to start with a few carefully selected, com-
plementary products.
Watch out for:
• Too many products and too low an interest rate
spread.
Offering too many products, especially in the first
pilot project, makes the pilot difficult to manage and
expensive to administer. It is not necessary to pro-
vide all the products that savers may have mentioned
during the demand research. What is essential is to
design a small number of complementary products
so that each client can customize the use of these
products to suit his or her own needs. The interest
rate spread must be set carefully, with interest
income estimated to cover the operating costs of
savings mobilization at the pilot project (one-time
start-up costs should be budgeted separately). Inter-
est rates for loans may need to be raised.
4. Is the Necessary Institutional Capacity in
Place to Open Savings Facilities for the
Public? Create a Checklist and Make Sure
the Tasks Are Completed Before Introducing
Savings to the Public.
The MFI’s managers (advised by experts and over-
seen by some board members) should check care-
fully for overall institutional readiness for mobiliz-
ing public savings. A detailed list is needed for the
tasks that must be completed before savings
accounts are offered in the first pilot project. The
contents of the list will vary somewhat depending
on the country, the MFI’s history, and other fac-
tors. Nonetheless, some requirements are essential
for all newly regulated MFIs; others can be added as
necessary for particular environments or special cir-
cumstances. Some examples can illustrate the kinds
of institutional capacities that are required. Thus,
the questions below must be answered affirmatively,
and the tasks completed, before the MFI begins its
new savings program in the first pilot branch. 
• Have all outstanding matters affecting the legal
status of the MFI and issues of ownership been
resolved? 
• Is an appropriate governing board in place? 
• Is the management capable of operating a rapidly
growing financial intermediary? 
• Is the financial management team in place,
trained, and ready? Do they have the facilities
they need? 
• Is the MIS appropriate and reliable? Is it capable
of accurate tracking of deposits, withdrawals,
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and funds transfers? Do managers and staff
know clearly how to operate it, and are they able
to use the information that is generated to make
timely decisions? 
• Have the MFI’s physical infrastructure (its head
office and any regional offices, and branches and
any subbranches), its communications, and its
transportation facilities been carefully evaluated
in light of the new demands to be placed on
them? Have the plans for needed changes,
including increased security, been made, and
have the costs been estimated? Are the funds
available for the necessary upgrades of facilities? 
• Are the internal controls and the internal super-
vision processes ready and tested? Have appro-
priate reporting, bookkeeping, and internal audit
systems been established? 
• Have the MFI’s treasury management, asset-
liability management, and liquidity management
been revised to reflect the MFI’s new financial
responsibilities? 
• Has the MFI carefully studied underlying loan
delinquency issues? MFIs that use compulsory
savings to cover borrower delinquency will need
to introduce alternative risk mitigation strategies
before introducing voluntary savings for the pub-
lic. Savers often do not like to keep compulsory
and voluntary savings accounts in the same insti-
tution, and the MFI should phase out its com-
pulsory savings when its new savings products
have been tested and introduced.
• Has the MFI established sources of finance for its
loan portfolio—first for pilot branches and then
for all branches—when compulsory savings are
phased out? There will be at least a several-year
period when savings cannot yet finance the total
portfolio and when mandatory savings should
have been phased out. Financing for the portfo-
lio during this period must be carefully planned. 
• Has the cash management system been estab-
lished, and the transfer price mechanism planned?2
• Do the human resources managers understand
the changes that will occur in the institution—
and the ways in which these will affect recruit-
ment, training, staffing, and distribution of
responsibilities? Are they capable of moving
ahead in the new directions required? Are they
on board? 
• Are appropriate training programs and
performance-based incentive systems in place
and fully understood by managers and staff? 
Watch out for: 
• The common syndrome: “We’re too busy now.
Let’s just start collecting the savings and do the
rest later.” 
Completing the requirements on the checklist
must precede the opening of the new savings pro-
gram. Inverting the sequencing order will likely
result in quite rapid, extended, and costly chaos—
which will probably also have a negative effect on
the MFI’s reputation. Watch out particularly for
perfunctory or evasive answers about the MFI’s per-
formance and capability. The board should require
that responses to the above questions are both
affirmative and backed by compelling evidence.
5. Develop Criteria for a Pilot Project Site
and Select the Pilot Branch.
When developing criteria for the location of the first
pilot project, a number of factors need to be taken
into account. There will undoubtedly be considera-
tions related to specifics of the country and region,
including demography, infrastructure, politics, and
the like. But there are also important criteria that
apply generally. Thus, the pilot branch should have
a track record of performance in the top quarter or
so of the MFI’s branches, but should not be among
the very best. It must be an experienced, well-
performing branch because if the first pilot does not
succeed, there are not likely to be others. But the
pilot branch should experience the same kinds of
problems that are likely to be encountered by other
branches later on.
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• The population in the pilot location should be
reasonably typical of at least a major portion of
the country. And there should not be a language
barrier between the MFI personnel and the
potential clients. 
• The location should be above average for popu-
lation density, should have a mixed market
economy, and should not be in an acute state of
conflict. 
• The first pilot should not be located in an area of
intense microfinance competition.
• The pilot branch should be located in a province
and district where the authorities are not heavily
engaged in subsidized microcredit or opposed to
commercial microfinance. 
• The branch selected should be not more than
about two hours from the head office on reason-
ably dependable roads, because high-level man-
agers must be at the site frequently. But the pilot
should not be conducted near the head office.
Among other reasons, mistakes will inevitably be
made, and it is best to make them in a less visible
place! 
• Adequate space will be required at the branch
for a substantial projected increase in the number
of clients. The branch will also need space to
accommodate additional staff, as well as some
on-the-job trainees from other branches. The
spatial layout of the branch building and
grounds must allow for this expansion. 
• The pilot branch should have a good operational
and financial performance track record for at
least three years. It should not have any major
organizational, management, or operating
problems—for example, endemic staff conflict,
recent fraud, high or volatile portfolio at risk
(PAR), and the like. On the contrary, the pilot
branch should have a good reputation in the area
it serves. 
• A highly qualified branch manager must be
responsible for the pilot branch—a person with
strong leadership skills who is experienced,
financially skilled, hardworking, open-minded,
committed, and motivated. Ideally the pilot
branch selected would already have a well-
qualified manager who knows the service area.
However, if the branch that best fits the other
requirements does not have such a manager,
another manager can be transferred there. But
one way or the other, a well-qualified branch
manager is essential for the first pilot.
Watch out for:
• Too many branches in the pilot project. MFI
boards and managers often have a tendency to
want to conduct a number of pilot projects in
different areas right at the start. This is a serious
mistake. The first pilot is difficult, and it requires
the constant attention of high-level managers
from the head office. The pilot should be carried
out only in one limited service area, although all
the MFI’s subbranches and other outlets in that
area can be included.
• Selecting a favorite branch in an inappropriate
location. Board members and managers some-
times have their own favored areas and may want
the pilot project to be located in a particular
branch for personal or political reasons. Inform-
ing them early in the process about the selection
criteria—and the reasons behind them—helps to
mitigate problems of this kind. 
• Selecting a branch in an area with especially poor
infrastructure and communications, endemic
conflict, or strong political opposition.
• Selecting a pilot branch that does not have a
well-qualified manager, and not transferring a
highly qualified manager to the pilot branch. 
6. Prepare for the First Pilot Project—A
Complex and Multifaceted Task.
This is a crucial step that too often is dangerously
shortened because the board or the chief executive
officer wants to get savings started quickly—usually
because the loan portfolio is expanding. This is not
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the time to rush savings mobilization to finance
loans. It is also not the time for major expansion in
the loan portfolio. If additional funds are required
for the portfolio, the MFI should borrow from the
financial markets or access other commercial
sources of funds. In addition to the checklist for the
institution discussed above, another list is needed
for the preparations to be made for the pilot project
itself. The pilot branch management and staff will
need to be trained, the building may need renova-
tion, operations will need to be revised, and the
logistics for the introduction of voluntary savings
products and services (and the documentation of
their results) must be organized.
Some examples of questions that must have pos-
itive responses based on completed tasks—before
the pilot project opens for savings collection—are
given below: 
• Has the license for a regulated MFI been issued?
Have the regulators given final permission for
the MFI to take deposits from the public, and
have other requirements been met? Do the per-
missions cover the pilot branch?
• Have the head-office managers and the pilot
branch manager taken an active part in the plan-
ning of the pilot project, and have they demon-
strated that they are capable of running the pilot? 
• Have the appropriate high-level managers at the
head office allocated substantial portions of their
time to the pilot for an extended period? Have oth-
ers been appointed to take over some of their other
responsibilities? There will undoubtedly be prob-
lems and mistakes in the pilot. But the pilot must
succeed if the MFI is going to become a financial
intermediary—and it is the responsibility of the
head office to make sure that the pilot works.
• Have prototype products and pricing, delivery
mechanisms, and simple manuals been devel-
oped? (These will be revised later when the
results from the first pilot are known). 
• Is an appropriate MIS in place and tested at the
pilot branch, and are the branch managers and
staff able to use it effectively? 
• Have the record-keeping systems for monitoring
the pilot project and for use in analyzing its
results been set up, and are they ready for opera-
tion? These would include, for example, record-
ing the number of savers and amount of savings
by product; the account size distribution by
product (crucial for setting interest rates when
the savings products are introduced in other
branches); and the information needed for cost
analyses—including labor costs—by product.
Also, in the financial reporting, start-up costs
such as extensive training, renovation of build-
ings, and purchase of new security systems and
of MIS for the pilot branch should be accounted
for separately from recurring costs. If grants or
subsidized loans are provided for these capacity-
building expenses (an excellent use of donor
funds for highly promising institutions), these
should be accounted for separately. And in the
financial statements of the branch, adjustments
should be made for any grants and subsidies used.
• Have arrangements been made for careful mon-
itoring of the loan portfolio so that in the midst
of all the new savings activity, the pilot project is
not marked by a decline in portfolio quality? If
compulsory savings have been used to cover loan
delinquency, other risk-management strategies
for overdue loans must be introduced and tested
now. They will be essential for use in the second
pilot project as mandatory savings are phased out
(step 7).
• Is the training of the pilot branch staff under
way? This is a crucial activity that requires con-
siderable continuing attention from the head
office. Qualified and experienced trainers are
needed to conduct the training sessions, and suf-
ficient time must be allowed for the training ses-
sions. One month, including fieldwork among
potential savers (who should not live or work in
the service area of the pilot branch), is about
right for most institutions. In addition to the
pilot branch personnel, members of the MFI’s
training department and a few managers and
staff from other branches should be trained at
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these pilot training sessions—so that there will
be trainers and staff reserves to draw upon as the
savings program is gradually rolled out to other
branches. Participants should be tested and eval-
uated. At the end of the training, a careful review
is needed. 
• Have simple, local marketing strategies been
developed? (This is not the time for a major mar-
keting effort). Are managers and staff able to
explain accurately and understandably to
prospective clients the comparative advantages of
each product, and how the products can be used
together to meet a client’s particular needs? 
• Has a draft been developed of the criteria that
will determine when the pilot has achieved suf-
ficiently good results for the MFI to proceed
safely to the next step? These must be general
criteria, not specific targets. The criteria should
be designed for use in an evaluation of the results
for each product after six months of the pilot, as
well as for assessing the overall pilot (step 8).
These draft criteria will be used to rate such indi-
cators as branch resources, level of outreach to
low-income savers and to other individuals and
organizations, amount of savings, account bal-
ance distribution, and average account balance.
(Is it high enough for institutional profitability?).
Also included are measures for ascertaining
whether operational efficiency, product costs and
pricing, and the blended cost of funds are suit-
able. Others focus on PAR, results from confi-
dential customer and staff feedback, and a variety
of additional indicators. The draft criteria should
be revised during the pilot, as more information
becomes available on the challenges, risks, and
strengths of the branch’s performance.
• Has the branch been renovated (if necessary),
and is the use of space appropriate for the activi-
ties to be carried out? Is the space in the branch
suitable for rapid expansion should this become
necessary? 
• Are the branch’s transportation and communica-
tions facilities adequate? 
• Are there enough cashiers? 
• Is the branch neat and attractive, with informa-
tion about the new products clearly posted? 
• Are the security arrangements adequate and have
they been tested? 
• Are there sufficient supplies of bankbooks,
forms, brochures, and other supplies on hand?
(It is amazing how often this is forgotten!)
Watch out for: 
• Haste! The pilot project should not be started
until both the pilot branch and the head office
are ready. It should not be ended until it works
well (or is terminated because of exogenous rea-
sons or severe problems at the MFI).
• Underestimating the difficulties and the man-
agement needs of the pilot project. The MFI
should keep in mind that it cannot go forward
with savings mobilization until the first pilot
works—and that there is no replacement for suf-
ficient, high-quality management resources. This
needs to be planned from the start—and imple-
mented throughout.
7. Conduct the First Pilot Project, Ensuring
That Adequate Resources Are Available 
(and Used) for the Pilot and for Its Close
Supervision and Regular Monitoring.
The aim of the first pilot project is to introduce
the new savings projects successfully, to maintain a
high-quality loan portfolio, to remain profitable—
and to learn from the experience. As noted, the
primary objectives of the first pilot include testing
both the new products and the ability of the pilot
branch to deliver them effectively; monitoring costs
by product and preparing any pricing revisions that
may be needed for the next stage of the program;
and training managers and staff. Other aims are
testing information, communication, and security
systems; learning the market for savings; and testing
a performance-based incentive scheme suitable for a
financial intermediary.
When the items on the checklists discussed in
steps 4 and 6 above are complete, the MFI is ready
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to open its doors to savers. At this point, MFIs have
a tendency to want maximum publicity in advance
of opening their new savings programs. But
this must be avoided. The MFI should publicize its
new savings program locally and quietly at first.
Otherwise, the institution may be swamped with
large numbers of savers before it is able to serve
them adequately.
Another tendency at this stage is to place targets
on savings amounts and numbers of accounts, as
well as to set targets for specific products. Both
should be resisted. The pilot project is not the time
for savings targets (one reason is that no one has
any idea how to set such targets). An overall target
may result in more savings clients than can be
responsibly handled at first, while the resultant
overload on the branch can result in a decline in the
quality of the loan portfolio. 
Product targets are also counterproductive for a
pilot designed to learn the products that savers
want, and the costs of delivering these products. If
a saver wants a passbook account, but the staff sells
her on a limited withdrawal account so the branch
can meet the target for that product, the MFI will
not get the information it needs. And savers using
products inappropriate for their needs are unlikely
to stay long. Staff should explain products and their
uses to clients. They should not try to sell one prod-
uct over another (which will happen if product tar-
gets are introduced).
During the pilot project, especially in the first
few months, head-office managers should be avail-
able on a daily basis to troubleshoot and to moni-
tor and analyze results. Considerable evidence indi-
cates that even when pilot staff are well-trained in
new products and methods, a long period typically
elapses before the new approaches and attitudes are
firmly ingrained at the branch. Close monitoring,
supervision, internal controls, and on-the-job train-
ing are key. The pilot project should be analyzed
and evaluated on a weekly and monthly basis for the
first six months. Customers of different types should
be interviewed, and both praise and complaints
should be recorded and analyzed—for immediate
action and future analysis.
This is also the time to revise and refine the
criteria (developed in step 6) that will be used for
the more formal six-month overall evaluation of
the pilot (step 8). The evaluation process should be
designed to indicate clearly whether the products
meet specific client needs, whether they are priced
to enable profitability, whether managers and staff
are qualified for their new responsibilities, whether
operations and product delivery are effective and
efficient, whether portfolio quality remains high,
and overall, what the effects of the pilot have been
thus far on branch outreach and profitability.
Specifically, costs need to be carefully monitored
by product (including operating costs and costs of
funds). Minimum monthly account balance distri-
bution must be carefully watched, because the
results will be needed for setting interest rates in
the second pilot. MIS and other systems need to
be tested. Asset-liability and liquidity management
must be closely monitored. Accounting, reporting,
and audit need to be regularly reviewed, as do
internal controls and supervision. Space use should
be analyzed. But unless problems are very serious,
it is best not to alter the products, services, and
pricing during the first six-month period. Such
changes may confuse or disappoint customers and
could also make the results of the pilot difficult to
interpret.
The morale of branch managers and staff also
needs to be examined. They may feel confused,
overworked, or underappreciated—or all of the
above. More staff (and space and computers) may
need to be added. If gaps are found in training, or
incentive programs are not serving to motivate
staff, these should be recognized as matters that
must be addressed quickly by the head office. And
all the ongoing activities of the branch need to be
continued at a high level of quality. This is a diffi-
cult time for managers and staff (and for internal
supervisors). But frequent recognition and praise
from the head office for achievements can go a long
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way toward heading off staff demoralization. At
the end of six months, materials should be prepared
for a careful overall review of the pilot (see step 8
below).
Watch out for:
• Requests for quick results by the chief executive
officer or board 
• Difficulties in branch management 
• Decline in loan portfolio quality 
• Very low average account size 
• A high weighted cost of funds
• Mismatched asset-liability structure (for example,
long-term loans and short-term savings)
• Publicity about the savings products that is too
early and too widespread 
• Long lines and client complaints 
• Security lapses
• Overworked and demoralized staff
• Inadequate internal controls
• Problems with MIS and security systems 
• Poaching of best managers and staff members by
competing MFIs (if the pilot is successful, word
will get around!)
8. Assess Pilot Results and Revise Products,
Pricing, Operations, MIS, and so Forth as
Necessary. If a Second Pilot Is Needed 
(Very Likely), Begin the Planning and
Preparations for Step 9.
At the end of six months of operating the first pilot,
the head office (with the help of outside experts)
should carry out a careful assessment of the results
of the pilot project. The evaluation, which should
take about a month, can be carried out simultane-
ously with initial planning for a second pilot (which
will be needed in most cases).
This evaluation should include calculation of
standard indicators and ratios for financing struc-
ture, financial performance, risk, outreach, efficiency,
productivity, loan portfolio quality, and others.
Asset-liability, liquidity, and cash management are
crucial. Start-up costs should be calculated sepa-
rately. Indicators and ratios for the pilot branch
should be compared with those of similar branches
at the MFI that do not yet have voluntary savings. 
In addition, other items that will help in assess-
ing the pilot and in planning for the next steps
should be reviewed and evaluated, including these:
• Management, staff capability, and workload 
• Management and staff training, incentives, and
morale
• MIS and communications 
• Security systems
• Backroom operations 
• Loan portfolio quality and, for MFIs that have a
history of using compulsory savings to cover
borrower delinquency, achievement of a success-
ful alternate risk-mitigation strategy so that such
savings can be safely phased out in the second
pilot
• Client satisfaction with products and product
delivery (a representative sample of savers should
be interviewed and asked for their suggestions
for improvement)
• The economic activities and other characteristics
of a sample of savers’ households 
• The number of savers with multiple accounts
(a sample of these savers should be interviewed
to learn how they use the different accounts,
because this information will help in later stages
of introducing new products to potential clients)
• Other specific achievements or problems of the
pilot project that can be useful for designing and
delivering the institution’s products and services
in its other branches, as well as for improving
future performance in the pilot branch.
After the review, the MFI should decide whether
the pilot has achieved sufficiently positive results for
the institution to move to the next step. If the results
are not clear, or not satisfactory, the problem areas
should be addressed and the pilot continued with
necessary changes made. However, if the results are
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generally good—savers like and use the products,
managers and staff members are well trained and
active, the loan portfolio quality is high, and the
interest rate spread is sufficient for profitability—the
MFI is ready to move to the next step. 
The decision on whether to revise and continue
the first pilot project or to move on to a second
pilot is rarely clear-cut. At this point, it is a judg-
ment call. The only answer lies in having managers
with good judgment.
Watch out for: 
• A too-rigid schedule
Boards and managers have a tendency to sched-
ule pilot projects for specific periods and then
move on to the next stage according to the calen-
dar. The answer to when the MFI is ready to move
to the next stage cannot be found on the calendar.
That approach can cause very serious difficulties
later in the sequence. The first pilot can take from
six months (a minimum for useful results) to a year,
and longer if major problems arise. The products
and operations being tested in the pilot should not
be offered elsewhere until they work well enough in
the pilot branch to be revised and used in other
branches with reasonable confidence, and until the
costing and pricing are well understood. The find-
ings from the review of the first pilot are then used
to design revisions to products, pricing, and opera-
tions that will be tested in the second pilot.
9. Plan the Second Pilot, Selecting Branches
Located in Different Environments, and Train
Managers and Staff of the Pilot Branches.
Most MFIs will need to move to a second pilot,
conducted in multiple environments and incor-
porating specific revisions in products, pricing,
operations, training, incentives, management and
staffing, and the like. However, some small institu-
tions with only a few branches can use the gradual
rollout to all their branches as their second learning
experience. Thus, MFIs that are small, that had
excellent results in the first pilot, and that are not
geographically dispersed can skip the second pilot.
But MFIs that do not fit all these criteria should not
do so.
The primary purposes of the second pilot are to
do the following:
• Test revised products, pricing, and operations, as
needed; revise training programs and conduct
additional training; and make any necessary
management and staff changes at the head office
and at the pilot branch offices.
• Test the revised savings products in a number of
locations in both urban and rural settings. The
branches selected for the second pilot should
represent a range of economic, political, geo-
graphic, and demographic environments. They
should be located in areas with different levels of
infrastructure and communication facilities and
different degrees of competition. 
• Test the ability of the head office to coordinate
the introduction of savings mobilization simulta-
neously in different areas.
The second pilot is also the time to introduce two
other important changes—first, to introduce indi-
vidual loans (or where relevant, to expand these),
and second, to phase out compulsory savings where
possible, convincing clients to transfer their manda-
tory savings to one or more of the MFI’s new sav-
ings products. It is usually too difficult to undertake
these two changes in the first pilot, but they need to
be included in the second pilot so that the MFI has
had experience with both when it begins financial
intermediation in all its branches.
Individual loans. Pilot branches at this stage should
begin offering individual loans or expanding the
number of such loans already offered. It is usually
too demanding of MFI resources for this major
change to be introduced in the first pilot. How-
ever, for reasons discussed in chapter 1, Mobilizing
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Savings from the Public: 10 Basic Principles, the
MFI’s capacity to evaluate individual loan applica-
tions and to make and collect such loans is an
important component of its savings mobilization
effort, as well as of its lending portfolio.
Phasing out compulsory savings. The other key
change is to phase out compulsory savings. Volun-
tary savings products—which are what clients
want—are fundamentally different from compul-
sory savings products, and the two approaches
reflect widely disparate philosophies. Microcredit
institutions that require mandatory savings as a
condition of obtaining a loan generally assume that
poor people must be taught to save, and that they
must learn financial discipline. In such institutions
borrowers are often required to save in illiquid
products, with their savings used by the micro-
credit institution to finance its loan portfolio. Also,
many microcredit institutions treat compulsory
savings as collateral, using the savings to cover
missed loan payments. The compulsory savings
approach typically provides clients with little or no
choice of savings products (and often with no
returns on their savings). And frequently the client
has no access to her savings—except by forgoing
her option to borrow from the institution. In addi-
tion, the client is usually not permitted to save
unless she borrows. Compulsory savings raise the
cost of loans to the client, but do not meet the
needs of most low-income savers.
In contrast, MFIs that emphasize the role of vol-
untary savings in microfinance typically assume that
the economically active poor already save in a vari-
ety of forms, and that they do not need to be taught
to save. Such clients do, however, need a choice of
products. And low-income people, as well as others,
demand savings facilities that do not require them
to go into debt to save. An institution aiming at col-
lecting savings from the public—including substan-
tial numbers of poor customers—needs to learn to
provide a choice of savings products and services
appropriate for client demand. 
For the second pilot, the salient point is that
compulsory savings provide savers with multiple
disadvantages—and that many savers do not want
to place voluntary savings of significant amounts
in institutions that require mandatory savings.
Accordingly, compulsory savings should be phased
out when the new savings products have been
introduced in the pilot branches, and when these
branches are operating fairly smoothly. At that stage
borrowers can be told that they no longer need to
maintain compulsory savings, but they should be
encouraged (not forced) to move their compulsory
savings to one or more of the new savings products. 
This is a crucial point for the MFI. As indicated,
where compulsory savings are used to cover loan
delinquency, the second pilot should not start until
alternate risk mitigation methods have been intro-
duced and used successfully. In addition, a carefully
developed plan for financing the loan portfolios of
the pilot branches (one that is replicable in all
branches) must be in place during the second pilot
as compulsory savings are phased out.
Both these innovations—introducing or expand-
ing individual loans and phasing out compulsory
savings—should be tested in a quarter to a third of
the branches selected for the second pilot (and a
minimum of two branches in smaller institutions).
The branches need not start these two activities at
the same time, nor do all pilot branches need to
undertake these changes simultaneously. Each
should start when the head office and the branch
manager think the branch is ready. 
Locating the pilots. As discussed, the first pilot
branch must be fairly close to the head office. But
the branches in the second pilot can be farther away,
and as noted, they should represent a range of envi-
ronments. However, all selected branches should
have experienced branch managers with above aver-
age performance records and an interest in learning
and implementing new approaches, products, and
services. Depending on the size of the institution
and its management capacity, the second pilot could
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add 2 to 10 branches to the ongoing first pilot
branch.
The first pilot branch should be continued along
with the branches of the second pilot, both because
its clients need continuing service and because the
first branch is a source of longer time-series data.
But revisions should be made in products, pricing,
operations, and the like, so that this branch operates
with the same products and procedures as the new
pilot branches.
Training managers and staff of the pilot branches.
As soon as the branches have been identified, their
managers and staff should be trained at the head
office in the new concepts, products, and opera-
tions that are to be tested in their branches. The
experiences of the first pilot should be thoroughly
reviewed as part of the training. The participants
should then be assigned on a rotating basis to sev-
eral weeks of “on-the-job” training at the first pilot
branch. To the extent feasible, managers and staff
involved in the first pilot branch should help in the
training for the new pilot branches. 
By this time there should be some in-house
trainers capable of providing this type of training—
some of it general and some specific to particular
positions (manager, cashier, bookkeeper, internal
supervisor, and others). But outside trainers will
probably also be needed to meet the training needs
of the second pilot.
A “flying squad” should be established at this
point. This is a small team of people who are trained
to be experts in operational and technical aspects of
introducing and intermediating savings collected
from the public. Members of this team will then be
available to travel to any of the pilot branches for
troubleshooting (and they will be available later in
the rollout phase when the savings products are
expanded to all branches).
Managers and staff located in the pilot branches
selected to introduce individual loans and phase out
compulsory savings need to be well trained in eval-
uating individual loan applications and in encourag-
ing borrowers to move their compulsory savings
into one or more of the new savings accounts being
offered. Once these pilots are running, selected
managers and staff from the other pilot branches
should be sent on a rotating basis for “on-the-job”
training at these pilot branches, so they will be
better prepared for the rollout stage.
Watch out for: 
• Underestimations of the difficulties and the
management needs of the second pilot project
• A mismatch between the number of pilot
branches selected and head-office management
capacity (The second pilot requires substantial
head-office coordination and rapid trou-
bleshooting, and it involves considerable man-
agement and staff training as well as extensive
travel to the various pilot branches. If high-level
management is not available on a continuing
basis, serious problems can develop quickly.)
• Deterioration in loan portfolio quality
• Insufficient or inappropriate training and branch
managers and staff who are not well trained in
how to explain the new products and services to
customers and in how to deliver them effectively
• Possible resistance, especially from some former
microcredit institution staff, to the introduction
of individual loans and to the phasing out of
compulsory savings (If such resistance occurs, it
is likely to come from management and staff—
not from clients!)
10. Implement and Evaluate the Second Pilot.
Implementation of the second pilot is similar to
that of the first pilot, except that it requires far more
coordination. Needed changes in the first pilot’s
products, pricing, operations, reporting, incentives,
supervision, and the like must be made, and the
revised program then introduced in all the pilot
branches. In each branch, accurate and transparent
records must be kept of the performance and the
costs of the revised products. The loan portfolio
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quality of each branch and subbranch has to be
carefully watched (with immediate action taken in
case of missed payments). Steps 7 and 8 above need
to be followed carefully in all pilot branches.
Evaluation of the branches in the second pilot
should be conducted after about six months of
operation. The first pilot branch should be reevalu-
ated at the same time. About two months are then
required for the full evaluation of the second pilot
(the amount of time needed depends on the skill of
the evaluators, the size of the institution, the num-
ber of pilot branches, and the results of the pilots).
At that point the decision should be made whether
to continue the pilots or to move to the rollout
stage. If the latter decision is made, it will then take
at least another month to revise products, opera-
tions, and pricing as necessary for the rollout; and
to plan and organize the large-scale training pro-
gram that will be needed before the rollout of the
savings program to all branches. 
Careful analysis of the data is crucial, because the
lessons from the pilot branches must be learned
before the products are rolled out to all the MFI’s
branches. For example, in branch A a product does
extremely well but there are few takers for the same
product in branch B. Why? Or a product is success-
ful in all the MFI’s branches but is very costly in
some and not in others. What are the reasons? Do
the problems arise from inefficiency, too low an aver-
age account size, poor management, untrained or
unmotivated staff—or various combinations of such
factors? The reasons for the problems that arise and
their solutions need to be understood. Any major
difficulties should be resolved at the pilot stage to
avoid widespread problems at the rollout stage.
Watch out for: 
• A substantial increase in the complexity and
demands of the work (often not sufficiently
anticipated). Head-office managers must now
analyze far more data than in the first pilot
branch, troubleshoot quickly wherever needed,
and focus on understanding the reasons for
major difficulties and significant differences in
performance among the pilot branches.
• Rushing this step. MFIs should not move to the
rollout phase until they are sure they have got
the pilots right! 
• These pilots being perceived locally as being
successful. If so, there are likely to be increasing
attempts by other institutions to hire the MFI’s
best managers and staff.
11. Train the Trainers of the Trainers
in Preparation for the Rollout Phase.
At this stage in its savings effort, the MFI should
have a core group of head-office managers, branch
managers and staff, trainers, and a flying squad—all
with extensive involvement in the pilot projects.
They should be knowledgeable about the savings
products (and any new loan products), pricing,
operations, intermediation, and other aspects of the
new facilities to be offered to the public. However,
the other managers and staff members of the MFI
typically know relatively little about these products
and processes, and they need to be brought up to
speed before the rollout takes place.
There are two main objectives in this step. The
first is to conduct a short but intensive training
program so that all the MFI’s senior managers are
knowledgeable about savings mobilization in gen-
eral, and about the planning for the institution’s
development as a financial intermediary, in partic-
ular. This savings training program should take
about four days on average and should cover the
conceptual background, all aspects of the first
and second pilots, lessons learned, and plans for
expansion.
A wide variety of topics and issues must be cov-
ered in this program for senior managers. These
include treasury management, asset liability man-
agement, liquidity and cash management, transfer
pricing, funding needs for start-up costs, MIS, infra-
structure, security, internal controls, accounting,
reporting, client profiles, customer service, staffing
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needs, training, and others. Exposing all head-office
managers and senior staff to the main issues at this
juncture is well worth the effort. Also, a summary of
this training session should be provided in a one-day
or half-day session at a board meeting (with longer
briefings for interested board members).
The second objective is to provide extensive
training to the group of trainers and managers who
will then be responsible for training regional and
branch managers and staff—as a crucial part of the
gradual expansion of savings mobilization to all
branches. Depending on the size of the institution
and other factors, there may not yet be a sufficient
number of in-house trainers qualified to conduct
this training of the trainers. In that case, head-office
managers, flying squad members, and outside
experts will also be needed to serve in this capacity. 
This assorted group must learn to teach the MFI’s
new concepts, operations, and experiences to the
people selected to train the MFI’s personnel during
the rollout phase. The training of trainers should
take about a month, with the first half conducted at
the head office. The second half of the training is best
carried out in one of the regions where the MFI
operates. The entire group of trainers and trainees
should participate in a training session in the region
selected. This will enable them to gain experience in
training regional and branch staff in that area, and to
resolve training issues and problems while they are
still together. And head-office managers can see for
themselves how each trainer functions.
As part of the savings training program, a case-
book should be prepared for use in different kinds
of training sessions. The casebook contains exam-
ples of how savings were mobilized from different
kinds of savers in the MFI’s pilot branches. It high-
lights the methods for contacting potential savers,
the questions they had, the answers given, the prob-
lems encountered by the branch, the solutions
found, the mistakes made (and how these might be
avoided in the future). These cases demonstrate var-
ious ways that savers use different kinds of savings
accounts and how they customize account use to fit
their particular needs. They also explore the reasons
that households save, and provide lessons in how to
explain the MFI’s savings products in ways that
make them attractive to households. 
In addition, the casebook focuses on how the
pilot project branches mobilized larger savings
accounts from both nonpoor individuals and local
corporations, associations, and institutions.3 Impor-
tant for all levels of training, the casebook (with
continuing additions of examples) is later used also
for in-depth work with the regional and branch staff
during the rollout and market penetration stages of
training (steps 12, 13, and 14).
When the training of the trainers for the rollout
is complete, the MFI is ready to expand gradually to
all its branches. 
Watch out for:
• Inadequate training of the trainers. This is com-
mon and can cause problems as soon as the
expansion gets under way.
• Weak spots and misunderstandings (or even
hostility) on the part of some participants, a not
uncommon occurrence. Not all senior managers
necessarily support fully the MFI’s new products
and activities. This training session is a good time
to spot any holdouts. 
• Unrealistic expectations about the time needed
for the rollout and subsequent follow-up and
troubleshooting.
12. Expand Gradually to All Branches,
Training Managers, and Staff in Each Location.
Do Not Rush This Step!
Expansion should now take place gradually to all
regions covered by the MFI, with several trainers
working in a region for about a month on average.
Then the trainers move on to another region. If
there are enough trainers, expansion can take place
in several regions simultaneously. However, it is
better to use a smaller number of highly qualified
and experienced trainers and have them move from
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region to region, than it is to try to cover many
regions at once with less-qualified trainers. 
During the rollout process, branch managers and
staff must be trained to identify and interview poten-
tial savers. They need to be taught to match the
MFI’s products and services to the clients’ varied
savings purposes. And they will need training in how
to collect different kinds of savings, and how to
develop customer loyalty. The trainers should make
a special effort to elicit and discuss ideas of branch
staff who have the advantage of knowing their areas.
Specialized training on operations is also carried
out for different groups, focused on the specific
responsibilities of internal supervisors, branch man-
agers, credit officers, cashiers, and so forth. In addi-
tion, the trainers can help the branches with specif-
ic preparations and logistics involved in introducing
their new savings products. 
This step must not be rushed. When the trainers
leave, branch managers and staff must be well expe-
rienced in the various aspects of voluntary savings
mobilization and financial intermediation, and must
be able to run their now-expanded branch opera-
tions. Frequent visits by head-office managers (and
regional office managers where relevant) to all
branches are necessary, both during the training
and after the trainers have left—so that problems
and misunderstandings can be caught early. If cer-
tain branches have particular problems after the
trainers have finished, the flying squad can be sent
in to help. 
A large institution with good management and
sufficient resources should be able to roll out grad-
ually and safely to all its branches in about four
months on average. Small institutions may be able
to have their new savings program available in all
branches in about two months of rollout. 
Watch out for: 
• A decision by the board or chief executive officer
to cut the rollout process short
• Middle managers who may resist the changes
being undertaken
Both are common tendencies. A decision to rush
the rollout can have very severe consequences, not
only for savings but also for the quality of the loan
portfolio and for staff morale. Another potentially
serious issue is resistance from some middle man-
agers. The managers of the pilot projects were care-
fully selected to be highly qualified. But now all the
branch managers are involved. They have typically
been promoted over time, based on their abilities in
positions with different requirements from those
now expected. Some managers may be unwilling or
incompetent (or both) to undertake the many new
challenges that the MFI faces in becoming a finan-
cial intermediary. This can undermine the rollout
in unhealthy ways that must be handled effectively
and quickly by the head office. This can happen in
widely scattered branches, taking considerable time
and high-level management resources. Bottom line:
there are no good reasons to cut short the neces-
sarily lengthy process of introducing savings mobi-
lization on a solid foundation. 
13. To Penetrate the Market, Develop a
Detailed, Systematic Approach to Identifying
Potential Savers and Mobilizing Their Savings.
When all the branches of an MFI have begun mobi-
lizing savings from the public, there is a tendency to
think that the hard work is over. Not so! To achieve
market penetration, some crucial steps remain. 
Designing, pricing, and delivering products
effectively and efficiently, training managers and
staff, and solving the logistical and management
problems of expansion are necessary, but insuffi-
cient, conditions for penetrating the market. After
the rollout, typically most of the savings are mobi-
lized from the areas nearest the branch or sub-
branch, with much of the service area left unserved.
Also, the MFI is likely to find after the rollout that
some branches have mobilized funds from microen-
terprises and local factories, but not from govern-
ment offices and schools. Others have accounts
from government offices and cooperatives, but not
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from schools and religious institutions. Some
branches have accounts from cooperatives but not
from local factories, while some have the reverse.
Some have mobilized savings from the agricultural
sector, but not from the service sector. Others have
accounts only from savers who live or work very
near the branch. 
What is now required is a systematic approach to
savings mobilization throughout the service area of
each branch. This phase of expansion uses a coordi-
nated and systematic approach to funds mobiliza-
tion. The approach builds on the methods of locat-
ing and estimating savings potential that were
developed in the pilot projects and recorded in the
casebook. But the focus is now on identifying large
numbers of potential savers who are then systemat-
ically contacted, with the aim of mobilizing their
savings and maintaining them as clients (and having
them build credit ratings). 
At this stage, MFIs that want to mobilize savings
quickly can train branch staff to identify a number
(say, 100) of the largest potential savers in their
service areas—including individuals, organizations,
and institutions. The purpose is not to mobilize
savings only from those with potentially large
accounts, but rather to test the systematic approach
on larger savers first so that more of the MFI’s port-
folio can be financed from savings at this stage.
Once developed and tested, this methodology can
be used to locate potential savers of all kinds, both
large and small. MFIs that do not need to finance
their portfolios with savings so quickly can use a
cross-section of the population for their initial sys-
tematic contacts. In both cases, savers with small
accounts seem often to follow larger savers whom
they trust, placing their savings in the same MFI.
Watch out for: 
• Fatigue
Managers and staff have been through long peri-
ods of intense activity at this point, with savings
adding considerably to their previous workloads.
Starting a major new systematic effort to pene-
trate the market is not likely to generate great
enthusiasm in the regions. Encouragement and
appropriate incentives and training are crucial. This
is particularly important because by this time, the
best employees may be receiving offers from other
MFIs.
14. Select a Pilot Area, Train Managers
and Staff, and Conduct a Pilot in Market
Penetration. Evaluate Results, Revise
Methods, and Gradually Roll Out to All the
MFI’s Branches.
A pilot area is selected, and managers and staff are
trained in systematically identifying potential savers
and collecting their savings. Possible savers are
located through planned visits to subdistricts, vil-
lages, and urban neighborhoods to meet and inter-
view heads of local institutions and government
offices, local organizations, informal leaders, and
other community contacts. From these interviews,
the branch draws up lists of potential savers and
marks their locations on a large-scale map of the
area. In each branch or subbranch, a schedule is
drawn up showing the staff members who are to
visit particular potential savers on particular dates.
And a draft manual of these methods is prepared.4
Managers and staff must be trained in how to
conduct these interviews—both those with local
officials and leaders and those with potential savers.
They should be taught how to explain the uses and
comparative advantages of each type of savings
product. And they should be trained to keep
records of their visits and of any follow-up actions
required. Most of the interviews of potentially large
savers are done by regional, branch, and subbranch
managers, credit officers, and other staff who nor-
mally carry out field-related operations.5
The interviews are also important for gaining
information about other potential savings sources in
the area. Staff need to be trained both to look for
potential sources of savings that are found almost
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everywhere (schools, religious institutions, cooper-
atives, and the like), and to identify sources of
savings that are particular to their areas (such as tea
estates, silver mines, garment factories, tourist
attractions, and so forth). The casebook is useful for
prompting questions in interviews, such as these:
“Are there people in this area who have seasonal
incomes?” “What kinds of work do they do?” “Are
there people here who receive regular remittances?”
“How do they receive their remittances?” “Does it
take a long time?” And so on.
Once the staff is trained, a pilot project should
be carried out (in an area not previously used for a
pilot). If well managed and coordinated, staff who
have already been through the previous training
sessions on savings can learn relatively easily to
locate savers and mobilize savings. But their follow-
through in visiting savers tends to drop off when
the training is finished and the trainers leave the
pilot. The staff have learned that visiting large num-
bers of potential savers, especially in dispersed areas,
is hard work.
At this stage, performance-based incentives for
managers and staff should be reviewed and revised
to take into account the new activities of the branch
(or other lowest-level outlet of the MFI). The
revised incentives should then be tested in the pilot.
If well designed, these can encourage and motivate
staff to follow through in contacting potential
savers throughout the service area of the branch, to
market the MFI’s new products and services, and to
gain new clients for the MFI. As in the earlier pilots,
staff incentives should not be provided for savings
alone but should be included as part of an ongoing
incentive program for high performance in prof-
itability, portfolio quality, number of clients, and
volume of loans and savings. Rewards—in both
cash and institutional recognition—should be pro-
vided to all managers and staff of the lowest level
units that have met their goals.
The pilot should be evaluated after about three
months, and if it is working well, preparations can be
made for a gradual rollout. The methods, training,
and operations of the systematic approach to mobi-
lizing savings can now be revised as necessary and
gradually introduced to all branches. The draft
manual on market penetration should be revised
and, as in the earlier rollout, the expansion should
be carried out with sufficient trainers in each region
working closely with the regional managers and
staff. The presence of the trainers in the branches
also represents an opportunity for troubleshooting
any other problems that may have developed. In
cases of serious problems in particular branches, the
flying squad can be sent there as well. 
This is the stage of the systematic approach to
market penetration at which the MFI begins to
mobilize large amounts of savings. Such matters as
security precautions, internal controls, asset-liability
management, transfer pricing, liquidity manage-
ment, and cash management all need to be carefully
reviewed and improved where necessary. 
The previous steps in the sequence were all nec-
essary. But without a systematic approach, market
penetration tends to move slowly (allowing compe-
tition to move in). However, with these methods,
substantial market penetration can be achieved
within a few years. But performance at the final roll-
out stage is highly sensitive to incentives, the quality
of management and training, and the coordination
by the head office. Yet the goal is within reach. It is
this step that ultimately makes it possible for an
MFI to achieve widespread outreach through large-
scale financial intermediation.
Watch out for:
• Insufficient incentives for management and
staff. Some boards and chief executive officers
may object to staff incentives that are sufficiently
attractive to produce the desired performance
level. But market penetration is both difficult
and crucial—and staff incentives are essential to
achieving it. 
• Management issues. As discussed in chapter 1, at
this stage the branch can no longer control the
number of its clients and may undergo rapid and
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uncontrollable growth. This represents a major
challenge for both branch and head-office man-
agement. If a dynamic and skilled branch
manager understands the importance of the
systematic approach and coordinates the activi-
ties well, the branch can capture savings quickly
and manage its growth (with the help of the
head office). But a branch with an uninterested,
unmotivated manager is unlikely to do well. And
if the head office does not put a high priority on
managing growth effectively, the growth prob-
lem may go away on its own!
• Problems arising from managing larger amounts
of savings. As the value of the MFI’s savings
grows, asset-liability, liquidity, and cash manage-
ment may become more difficult. And security,
internal controls, and MIS may need consider-
able upgrading. 
• Inadequate coordination. This activity requires
high-level management and coordination. If the
methodology, the training, and the incentives are
not carefully coordinated, a successful market
penetration rollout will not result. 
15. Develop Appropriate Strategies
for Investing Excess Liquidity.
As market penetration increases, savings are likely
to overtake lending. Several years after the com-
pletion of step 14, the number of savings accounts
will probably exceed the number of outstanding
loans. Eventually the volume of savings may also
be larger than the amount of the outstanding loan
portfolio. This general trajectory assumes that the
institution continues to serve low-income and
lower-middle-income borrowers (as well as others,
in some cases), and that it collects savings from all
available savers.
Before the amount of savings overtakes that of
outstanding loans, it is crucial that MFIs develop
appropriate strategies for investing excess liquidity.
Reaching the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow
is not the end of the road—these funds have to be
lent out or invested (usually both). Loans to credit-
worthy low- and lower-middle-income borrowers
should increase, and any remaining funds should be
well invested. However, the latter is often easier said
than done. Legal regulations and profitable oppor-
tunities vary considerably by country and by type of
MFI. But as each MFI approaches this stage of the
savings mobilization process, its board should con-
sider its investment options carefully. Some MFIs
invest in treasury bills. Some deposit funds in the
interbank money market. Some keep fixed deposits
in banks. And some have other forms of invest-
ments, including investing in MFIs located outside
their service areas. Some are beginning to invest in
MFIs in other countries. Some combine several of
these strategies.
But in the microfinance industry, little has been
done so far in studying or teaching best practices for
investing MFIs’ excess savings. This gap needs to be
addressed soon. As the commercial microfinance
industry develops, the number of MFIs with more
funds in savings than in outstanding loans is grow-
ing. Increasing attention should be paid to identify-
ing suitable options for investing excess liquidity,
and to disseminating information about the relative
advantages and disadvantages of different options
under varying conditions. 
Watch out for:
• Boards and chief executive officers unqualified to
choose investments. 
• MFIs that begin to lose mission, depositing their
funds in banks rather than lending them out to
new creditworthy borrowers who demand loans.
When governments set treasury bill interest rates,
they should realize that very high rates encour-
age this undesirable result. 
• Governments that use the savings of state-owned
MFIs for their own purposes (for example, sav-
ings in state-owned institutions that are used to
finance the government budget or lent out in
politically related large loans with poor repay-
ment records).
• Insufficient central bank or bank superinten-
dency oversight.
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How long will the whole process take?
The time between step 1 and step 15 will, of
course, vary by country-level factors, and by the
institution—its overall environment, its size, and
its ownership, governance, and management. But
some general parameters can be suggested. Barring
catastrophic events (political upheaval, financial
system collapse, major natural disasters), the
process for most institutions should take about
three years.
Box A.2 provides a breakdown of the time
estimate from steps 1–14 (step 15 is an ongoing
process). It is assumed that the prerequisites
reviewed at the start of this discussion have been
completed before step 1 is begun. These are, of
course, only approximate times. As noted, some
MFIs can finish sooner, especially small MFIs with
good management as well as MFIs that have already
completed some of the steps before becoming
regulated and beginning this process. And some
MFIs may take longer.
Although this is a long process, it should be kept
in mind that by the second and third years, MFIs
using this kind of sequencing process should be
mobilizing significant savings and starting to estab-
lish their reputations as financial intermediaries.
The Crucial Role of Appropriate
Sequencing
Using appropriate sequencing, qualified MFIs can
move in about 15 steps from microcredit organiza-
tions to self-sufficient financial intermediaries. As
noted, not all institutions need all these steps. But
all should understand the underlying principles, the
reasons for the sequence of steps, and all should
heed the warning signals. The aim of sequencing is
Box A.2 Estimated Average Times for Sequencing the Introduction of Savings Facilities 
for the Public in Newly Regulated MFIs
Steps Steps Steps Steps Steps Steps Step
Indicator Step 1 2–3 4–6 7–8 9–10 11–12 13–14 15
Tasks
Estimated 
average 
time 
(months)
TOTAL: 34 months
Assess and
improve
capabili-
ties; recruit
manage-
ment and
staff as
needed
3
Conduct
demand
research;
design
and price
pilot prod-
ucts; plan
pilot 
3
Implement
and evalu-
ate the first
pilot and
begin plans
for second
pilot 
7
Plan, train,
implement,
and evalu-
ate second
pilot; revise
as needed
for rollout 
6
Train train-
ers of the
trainers,
then train
MFI staff;
conduct
rollout
gradually
to all
branches 
6
Develop
systematic
approach
to market
penetration;
conduct
and evalu-
ate market
penetration
pilot; rollout
to all
branches
5
Develop
strategies
for invest-
ing excess
savings
liquidity
Ongoing
Prepare
for the
first pilot,
including
training
4
Source: Author.
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not speed. It is building solid and lasting founda-
tions for commercial MFIs—so they can serve large
numbers of low- and lower-middle-income clients
and others, and can finance their loans wholly or
largely with public savings. Such institutions can
meet large-scale demand from savers, substantially
expand their loan portfolios, maintain financial
self-sufficiency, and accumulate and invest excess
liquidity.
Notes
This appendix is based on a paper, “Mobilizing Savings
from the Public: Basic Principles and Practices” (Robinson
2004). The writing of that paper—aimed at MFIs trans-
forming to regulated deposit-taking institutions—was
supported by the USAID-funded Support for Private
Enterprise Expansion and Development (SPEED) project
in Uganda, and Chemonics, the implementing agency for
the project; and by Women’s World Banking.
1. Somewhat lower interest rates can sometimes be used
in remote areas where there is little competition and
where the MFI may have higher transaction costs.
This holds both for fixed deposit accounts and for
the highest interest rate tier in the passbook savings
account.
2. The transfer price is the interest rate on funds that are
deposited by a lower-level outlet of the MFI (unit,
subbranch, or other) into a higher-level office (branch
or regional office), or that are borrowed by a lower-
level unit from a higher-level one. The rate, periodi-
cally adjusted by the head office according to the
overall liquidity position of the MFI, is used to indi-
cate the relative emphasis that the head office wants
placed on savings and loans.
3. See Robinson (2002b, chapter 13) for a detailed dis-
cussion of the casebook developed by BRI’s Unit Desa
system for training its trainers and managers, as its
savings program expanded from the pilot project stage
to expansion to all units. Examples used in that case-
book included funds mobilized by the pilot branches
from a large variety of organizations and institutions:
32 schools, 6 village associations, 20 government
offices, 11 cooperatives, 6 agricultural estate compa-
nies, and 25 local groups (including the Armed Forces
Pension Association; the Bus Terminal Employees
Association; the Tea Factory Drivers’ Welfare Group;
and various women’s, sports, and religious groups). 
4. See Robinson 2002a, chapter 13, for discussion of the
way the sequencing for market penetration was done
at Indonesia’s BRI.
5. However, bookkeepers, cashiers, guards, cleaning staff
members, and others can also be trained to conduct
interviews on savings demand with local potential
savers, especially with friends, family, and neighbors.
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access to account information, 347, 371
ACCION CAMEL, 186
accountability. See management
accountants, 283, 301
account card issuance, 431
accounting, 311–12, 313t
See also audits
checklist for, 330
controls for, 385–86
MIS upgrade and, 349–51
account opening, 431
accrual-based accounting, 311–12
ACLEDA Staff Association, Inc., 207b
activity-based costing, 316, 317b
advertising, 121
Aga Khan Rural Support Programme transformed
to First MicroFinance Bank (Pakistan), xxxiib
aging of arrears, 343, 370
ARB Apex Bank (Ghana), 44b
arbitration. See dispute resolution
Armenia, transformation in, xxviiib
Asset Liability Committee, 70, 302, 318
asset liability management, 318–23
assets
balance sheet considerations of, 145–46
protection of, 385
quality of, 43
ATMs. See automated teller machines
attorneys
hiring of, 246–47
terms of reference for, 265–66
legal advice unit, 301
attorneys’ fees, 247–48
audits, 375–408
audit committee, 389
sample charter, 399–401
audit department, 302, 387–89
operations of, 389–92
audit trail, 386
external, 71, 392–94, 392t
commissioning of, 392–93
contract or engagement letter, 393
fee for, 393
scope of work, 393b
internal, 71, 302, 387–92
checklist for, 403–7
defined, 375
hiring of auditors for, 281–82, 388–89
manual’s outline of contents, 398
plan for, 390–91
rating system, 391–92
report, 391, 402
training of audit staff, 391
in transformation plan, 86
automated teller machines (ATMs), 114, 353
audits, checklist for, 403
balance sheet considerations, 145–47
complete transfer approach and, 140
risk weights by category of assets, 325t
Banco Los Andes Procredit (Bolivia), xxxvii
expansion of voluntary savings in, 12b
BancoSol (Bolivia)
balanced scorecard, use of, 278b
competition with, 107
creation of, xxv
culture of, 274–75
savings program of, 174b
transfer strategy of, 141b
Banco Solidario (Ecuador)
costs of services, 113–14
banking operations department, role of, 301
Bank of Uganda, questionnaire on premises, 422b
Bank Rakyat (Indonesia), 12b, 27, 28b
Basle Capital Accord of 1988, 41, 184, 324
benchmarks and indicators, 150–51
competitive pricing and, 109–10
for management performance, 234
for risk-based supervision, 52
board
accountability. See governance
board seats and voting rights, 221–22
building effective board, 228–32
conflicts of interest, 230b
founding directors as investors, 204–6
meetings of, 256
purpose of, 229–30
roles and responsibilities, 230–31
References to boxes, figures, and tables are indicated by “b,” “f,” and “t.”
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board (Continued)
sample agenda for transformed MFIs, 241
size and composition, 228–29
structure of, 231–32
Bolivia
See also specific MFIs
interest rates on savings products in, 112b
Law #1488 of banks and financial institutions, 39b
bonds, 182–84, 192–93
borrower protection. See interest rates
BRAC Bank (Bangladesh), xxxvii
branches
checklist for, 435
communications, 423–24
feasibility studies prior to locating, 418–19
improving service at
terms of reference for, 434
infrastructure, 420–23
interbranch transactions
audits, checklist for, 403
MIS upgrade and, 349, 372
location, 418–20
marketing of, 411
peak load management, 426–28
profitability analysis, 314–15
quality premises, challenge of finding, 420b
restructuring of, 283
security, 71, 421–22
structure and service, 301–2, 418–28
supervision department, 301
teller management, 283, 424–26
transfer model, 139, 140
in transformation plan, 86–87
branding, 115–20, 116f, 411
building of a brand, 118–20, 120b
checklist for, 129–30
corporate identity, 116–17
defined, 115
image, 117
promise, 117–18
budgeting, 308, 309
capital budgeting, 309–10
checklist for, 330
for new operating costs, 14
sample transformation budget, 92–93t
business plan. See strategic business planning
bylaws of company, 252
CAELS rating system, 50, 51b
Caja Los Andes (Bolivia)
individual loans by, 107
CAMEL system (Capital, Asset quality, Management,
Earnings, and Liquidity), 50, 186
capital adequacy
business plan and, 146–47, 150
definition of capital, 324t
future capitalization issues, 256–57
management, 323–24
minimum capital requirements, 40
monitoring of, 48
requirements, 41
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 219
capital budgeting, 309–10
CARD Bank’s client ownership, 209b
career path management, 288
cash
audits, checklist for, 403
balance sheet considerations and, 145
control of and security for, 384, 430
idle cash, 321
management of, 428–30
checklist for, 435
cash to accrual accounting, 311–12
certificates of deposit (CDs), 174
change management, 76–77, 76t, 77b, 78b
charter of company, 251
chart of accounts, 311, 350
checklists
for customer service, 435
for financial management, 330–31
for funding considerations, 194
for human resources management, 303
for internal control and audits, 403–7
for legal issues, 261–64
for management information systems, 369–73
for marketing and competitive positioning, 
128–30
for ownership and governance, 242–43
for strategic and business planning, 159–60
chief executive officer, position of, 280
chief financial officer, position of, 280
chief internal auditor, position of, 281–82, 388
client information sources, 348t, 370, 423
Colombia
See also specific MFIs
microcredits defined in, 31b
commercial banks, 179–80
commercial borrowings, 147, 176–84
legal issues and, 181–82
pretransformation debt, 176–77
subordinated and convertible debt, 180–81
term loans and lines of credit, 178–80
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commercial debt
checklist for, 194
legal issues and, 181–82
legal issues for, 181–82
commercial investors, xxv–xxvii, xxviif, 206–7
communications
branch, 423–24
information communications technology, 356, 372
internal controls for, 378–79
with practitioners, 34–35
strategy as part of marketing, 120–23
checklist for, 130
wireless technology, 114
community and clients as investors, 208
Compartamos Bank (Mexico)
access to new funding sources, 25
bond placements of, 182
management and finding the right fit, 73b
Savings Mobilization Project, 68b, 380b
transformation team, 81b
compensation of staff, 290–91, 382
competitive positioning. See marketing
compulsory savings, treatment of, 30–31, 345–47
checklist for, 371
computer systems. See IT department; management
information systems (MIS); technology
conciliation. See dispute resolution
conflicts of interest, 230b
sample policy, 267–69
consensus building for change, 76–77, 76t
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), xxviii,
xxx, 11, 179
consultative strategy, steps for launching, 23, 24b
continuity of services, 428
controller, role of, 313
control of MFIs, 25
corporate culture
branding and corporate identity, 116
checklist for, 303
definition of, 275–76
transformation and, 71–77, 274–78
Corposol (Colombia), xxxv
costs
activity-based costing, 316, 317b
attorney fees, 247–48
budgeting for new operating costs, 14
of capital, 172–73, 172t
of delivery channels, 113–14
as pricing factor, 109
of regulatory compliance, 70–71, 149–50
of staffing, 286
of supervision, 52–53
traditional cost allocation, 316
of transformation, xxxviii, 80–82, 87, 148–49
counterfeit notes, 430
creation of new company after transformation, 138
credit department, 301
credit risk, 37, 48, 378b
current accounts, 173, 348–49
checklist for, 371–72
customer loyalty, elements of, 413f
customer profitability analysis, 316–17
customer service, 113, 409–37
branches, 424
checklist for, 435
elements of customer loyalty, 413f
framework for, 412–18
improving, 411, 415–18, 416f, 417f
psychological factor to, 426b
officers, 283
staffing of, 288
strategy, 413–15
debt. See funding
“deep pockets” needed to inject capital, 53
definition of microfinance, 30
delivery channels, 111–15
business model and, 137
checklist for, 129
costs of, 113–14
coverage, 113
customer service, 113
image and, 114–15
MIS support for, 353–55
reasons for choosing financial institution
and, 111, 112t
retail, 111–13
risk involved, 114
technology for, 114
demand deposits, 173
time deposits vs., 175–76
departments and units, duties and functions 
of, 301–2
deposit insurance schemes, 45
depositor protection. See soundness of financial
institutions
deposits, 147, 173–76, 175t
account management, 430–31
checklist for, 435
audits, checklist for, 405
direct marketing, 121
disaster planning, 406, 428
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discounted cash flow valuation, 237–40
example, 240t
dispute resolution, 223
documentation, 258–59
dividend assumptions, 152
documentation
board meetings, 256
business dealings with shareholders, 259–60
checklist for, 262–63
competition with shareholders, 259
dispute resolution, 258–59
financial policies, 257–58
future capitalization issues, 256–57
management of, 432–33
checklist of, 435
managers’ role with, 256
security of, 433
shareholder meetings, 256
share transfer or exit, 259
donors’ role, 35–37
funding of transformation, 81–82
multilateral and bilateral donors, 206
dormant accounts, 343, 370
due diligence
legal, 84
seeking investors and, 213–15
duration analysis, 323
emergency preparedness. See disaster planning
employees as investors, 207–8
enabling laws, 38–40
countries without, 29b
in Uganda, 453–54
end-of-day processes, 431
Entidades de Desarrollo para la Pequeña y
Microempresa. See Peru
Equity Bank (Kenya)
change management, 77b
expansion of voluntary savings in, 12b
risk management, 319b
sales desk for complex products, 424b
equity capital, 184–86
exit strategy of investors, 151–52, 168, 223–25
expenses. See costs
feasibility studies prior to locating 
branches, 418–19
finance department, organization of, 306–8
financial management, 305–32
accounting, 311–12, 313t
checklist for, 330
checklist for, 330–31
financial control, 310–17
functions, 306–8, 307–8f
investor relations, 326
checklist for, 330–31
key players, 306
organization of finance department, 306–8
planning and budgeting, 308–10
checklist for, 330
profitability analysis, 314–17
reporting, 312–14, 313t
terms of reference for, 327
in transformation plan, 86
treasury management, 317–26
asset liability management, 318–23
capital adequacy management, 323–26
checklist for, 330
investment and funding activities, 326
terms of reference for, 328–29
financial modeling tools and methods, 144–52
assets, 145–46
balance sheet considerations, 145–47
benchmarks and indicators, 150–51
checklist for, 159
expenses, 148–50
income statement considerations, 147–50
investor considerations, 151–52
liabilities and equity, 146–47
projected financial statement, 239t
revenue, 147–48
financial policies
documentation, 257–58
financial statement, projected, 239t
financial systems approach, xxv
FINCA Uganda, 451, 452
First MicroFinance Bank (Pakistan), xxxiib
fixed assets
audits, checklist for, 404
balance sheet considerations of, 146
fixed-deposit receipt books, control of, 433
Fondo Financiero Privado para el Fomento a Inciativas
Económicas (Bolivia), 12, 171
foot traffic, 420
foreign exchange risk, 323
founding directors as investors, 204–6
founding NGOs as investors, 203–4
fraud
choice of delivery channels and, 114
prevention of, 13, 347–48
checklist for, 371
risk of poor controls and, 380
segregation of job duties to prevent, 383
termination for, 383
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funding, 163–97
considerations, 165–71
See also investor considerations
business model, 144, 167
checklist for, 194
institutional ideology, 166–67
investor exit requirements, 168
for investors, 167–68
local vs. international investors, 166
maturity of capital markets, 171
ownership requirements, 167–68
rate of return, 168, 169b
regulatory and fiscal environment, 168–71
regulatory framework, 170–71
tax considerations, 169–70, 170t
cost of capital, 172–73, 172t
optimal leverage, 186–89
debt to equity evolution, 187f
securitization, 193
seeking potential investors, 9–10, 225–26, 226b
sources of, 164–65, 165t
access to, xxx–xxxi, xxxiii–xxxv, 25–26
structure options, xxxivt, 171–86
checklist for, 194
commercial borrowings, 176–84
comparison of, 188t
deposits, xxxiii–xxxiv, 173–76, 175t
equity capital, 184–86
evolution of, 172t
going public, 186
international funds, 178–79
public vs. private finance, xxxiv–xxxv, 177–78, 177t
terms of reference for, 190–91
in transformation plan, 84
of transformation, 80–82
gap analysis of institution, 78, 322t
gap management theory and, 322–23
general manager’s role, 300, 301
Ghana, reserve and liquidity requirements in, 44b
going public, 186
governance, 226–34
absence of effective governance, 279
accountability of management, 7–9, 232–34
benchmarks for management performance, 234
building effective board, 228–32
business plan and, 143
checklist for, 242–43
improved governance through diverse 
owners, 227–28b
reporting system, 232–33
terms of reference for, 235–36
third-party reviews, use of, 233–34
in transformation plan, 85
government investors, 208
government support for microfinance, 32–33
Haiti, xxvii
hardware requirements, 355
checklist for, 372
human resources management, 273–304
balanced scorecard, use of, 278b
business plan and, 143
checklist for, 303
corporate culture, adaptation of, 274–78
checklist for, 303
commitment to change, 276–78
definition of culture, 275–76
departments and units, duties and functions of, 301–2
general manager’s role, 301
HRIS (HR information systems), 359
job description revision, 284–85
job responsibilities for senior staff, 296–97
management board, duties and responsibilities 
of, 300–301
MIS upgrade, implications of, 357–59
model for sustainable change, 277f
preventive controls and, 381–83
recruiting
of right staff, 285–93
use of business plan in, 135
use of core values in, 275–76
staffing, 285–93
See also staffing considerations
training needs. See training
in transformation plan, 85
image, 114–15, 117
incentive schemes for staff, 15, 291–93, 291b, 292b
income statement considerations, 147–50
income taxes, 155
See also taxes
India
equity and leverage in MFIs in, 187b
foreign investment in, 255b
lack of microfinance enabling law in, 29b
Indonesia. See Bank Rakyat
information
See also access to account information; documentation;
reporting requirements
internal controls for, 378–79
in-house vs. external training, 287
insider lending, 43
institutional ideology, 166–67
510 | Index
institutional transformation and NGO’s role, 137–42
accounting impact of complete transfer
approach, 140t
constraints on transfer strategy, 141b
creation of new company, 138
future role of NGO, 141–42
investor role of NGO, 138–41
insurance policies, 406
intelligence and marketing, 97–104, 98f, 136
See also marketing
Inter-American Development Bank, 179
interest rates
borrower protection and, 24–25
prohibiting medium-term or long-term financing, 171
regulation of, 110
risk and, 38, 322–23, 322–23t, 377
internal audits. See audits
internal controls, 375–408
See also audits; fraud
accounting controls, 385–86
activities for, 378, 379t
administrative controls, 383–85
branches, 429
categories of risks, 378b
checklist for, 403–7
components of, 376–79
defined, 375
evaluation of, 394–95
ongoing supervision, 394–95
prelicensing, 394
human resource policies, 381–83
information, communication, 
and monitoring, 378–79
liquidity policy, 321
management oversight, 376–77
preventive controls, 381–86
process mapping, 382b
reconciliations, 386
risk-based supervision and, 52
risk of poor controls, 380
risk recognition and assessment, 377
terms of reference for, 396–97
international financial institutions, 179
international funds, 178–79
inventory management, 433
investments
balance sheet considerations and, 145
losses, 14
investor considerations, 151–52, 167–68
business plan and, 143
checklist for, 242
desired investor characteristics, 200–203
discounted cash flow valuation, 240t
finalizing of investor group, 225
financial distress and, 53
financial policies, 223
funding considerations and, 167–68
future capitalization, 222–23
human resources for investor relations, 282–83
improved governance through diverse 
owners, 227–28b
information provided to, 326
local vs. international investors, 166
mission retention, 222
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